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Copyright, 1889, 

AU rights reserved. 


l%e River gide Press , Cambridge, U.S.A.: 
Xleotro^rped and Printed by H. O. Houghton & Company. 



This work, originally undertaken as a recreation, 
lias been completed in its present form in the hope 
that it may serve the busy public as a helpful epitome 
of the events which have transformed the Europe 
of 1850 into the Europe of to-day, and also afford 
a clue to future events as foreshadowed by present 
complications. While no claim is made to extensive 
research, yet the works consulted are probably too 
numerous and volimiinous to be perused by most peo- 
ple in the active pursuits of life. To attempt any- 
thing more than a sketch of events so recent, while 
political animosities still run high, and while so many 
of the principal actors are living, would be a task that 
few historical students would care to undertake. 
This book purports to be merely a running narrative, 
introducing the great leaders and noting the great 
convulsions of twenty-one years of contemporaneous 
European history. 

The general style of this work partakes somewhat of 
that " drum and trumpet " character which Mr. Green 
deplored, but it ought to be considered that every 
great change during these years has been wrought by 


force of arms, for wliich diplomacy has served merely 
as a convenient stepping-stone. Cavour's greatest 
stroke was the entangling of the French emperor in 
the military alliance of 1859. Bismarck's foreign 
policy has been directed with a view of drawing his 
enemies upon the newly whetted Prussian sword. 
On nearly every battlefield great questions of dynastic 
and national reconstruction have himg in the balance. 
Italy would scarcely have been united to-day if the 
Austrians had been directed at Magenta and Solfe- 
rino by the military genius which moved the Prussians 
in Bohemia and the Germans in France. The Frank- 
fort Diet might have been still dozing on the Main if 
military science had been more carefidly studied in 
the Austrian staff, or if the Prussian crown prince 
had been remiss on the day of Koniggratz. Metz 
might not have fallen if Bazaine had been alive to his 
situation on the 14th and 16th of August, 1870, and 
Alsace and Lorraine might not have become German 
provinces if Metz had not fallen. Is not one justified 
in saying that military operations have been the 
decisive factors in Europe since 1850, that the for- 
tunes of rulers and of peoples have rested upon such 
men as Gyulai, Benedek, Moltke, and Bazaine ? 

Possibly too much space has been devoted to the 
Crimean War, but it was the French emperor's mili- 
tary bow to Europe, and it affords a glimpse of 
Komiloff's "Russian Defense," as well as the spec- 
tacle of England engaged once more in war with a 
first-rate power. Few have time to read Mr. King- 


lake's ponderous volumes, and the first chapters on 
this war as well as the one on the Eastern Question 
are largely based upon his work, modified, it is true, 
by Todleben and Rousset. 

A bibliographical note has been appended, giving a 
list of works for the use of those who desire to go 
deeper into the subject, and to which the author 
acknowledges his obligation. He has endeavored to 
express himself with moderation and allow full scope 
to the judgment of the reader; any more positive 
decisions belong to future times and the verdict of 

BosTOK, September, 1889. 


Intboduction bt John Fiskb 


EUROPE IN 1850. 

EuBOPE IN 1850. — LoTTis Napoleon elected Pbbsidezit oi* 
THE French Republic. — His Previous Career. •— Thb 
Reyolxttion in Gerkant, Austria, and Italy. — State of 
Italy in 1850. — The Attitude of Piedmont. — Tran- 
quillity OF Russia. — Prestiqe of the Czar in Europe. 
— The Great Powers in 1850 1 


THE COUP d'etat. 

The Foreion Policy of France in 1851. — The President's 
Oath. — Enmity between the President and the As- 
sembly. — The Speech at Duon. — St. Arnaud and Mau- 
PAs appoentbd to the Ministry. — The 2d of December. 
— The President's Proclamation and the Are^sts. — 
Dispersion of the Assembly. — How the Coup d'Etat 


December. — State of Affairs on the Boulevard. — 
The Massacre and its Influence. — Conflict of Testi- 

Responsibility. — Disposition op Political Prisoners. — 
The President sustained by the National Vote. — The 
Te Deum in Notre Dame. — The President becomes Em- 
peror 7 



The French Emperor's Standing in Europe. — He has 
Recourse to the Eastern Question. — The Quarrel 


OVEB THE Holt PiiAces. — The Attitude of Russia.— 
The French Ambassador carries his Point. — Wrath of 
THE Czar. — Nesselrode on the Situation. — Menschi- 
Kopp's Mission to Constantinople. — Lord Stratford 
as Peacemaker. — Menschikofp's Demand and its Recep- 
tion BY THE Porte. — Stratford's Position. — European 
Suspicion of Russia. — Attitude of the Powers on the 
Eastern Question. — England the most interested. — 
The Czar's Visit to England in 1844. — " The Sick Man " 
Interviews and their Result. — Strength of the Czar^s 
Claim to a Protectorate. — Progress of Menschikofp's 
Mission. — He is opposed by Stratford. — Menschi- 
koff's Ultimatum. — Stratford's Communication to the 
Sultan. — Position in which England was placed by 
IT. — Failure of Menschikoff's Mission. — The Russian 
Army crosses the Pruth. — The Czar's Proclamation. 

— The Vienna Congress. — The War Fever in Turkey. 

— The Franco-English Fleet enters the Sea of Mar- 
mora — Turkey and Russia at War 16 



The Russian Army enters Moldavia. — The Military 
Blunder of the Czar. — The Turkish Army and its 
Commander. — The Turks cross the Danube. — Fight- 


Offensive. — The Career of Paskevich. — His Advice 
TO THE Czar. — The Russians cross the Danube. — Siege 

FERES. — Retreat of the Russian Army and Battle of 

TRY OF THE Turkish and Austrian Armies. — Isolation 
OF the Czab in Europe 33 


the western alliance. 

France and England in 1853. — Cause of the Emperor^s 
Forwardness. — His Influence over the English Gov- 
ernment. — The Battle of Sinope. — Injustice of Pub- 
lic Sentiment in England and France respecting it. — 


The Empebob advocates a Naval Seizube op the Black 
Sea. — He cabbies his Point. — Rage op the Czab. — 


— Declabation op Wab by England and Fbance and 


LiKE Attitude. — The Allied Commandebs. — Chabacteb 
OP LoBD Raglan. — The Allies at Constantinople and 
at Vabna. — Ravages of the Choleba. — Lobd Raglan's 
Views on the Invasion of the Cbimea. — The At.t.ttm bm- 
babk at Vabna fob the Cbimea 42 



Populabity op the Conquest op Sebastopol in England. 

— Landing op the Allies in the Cbimea. — The Advance 
ON Sebastopol begins. — Pbince Menschikoff seizes the 
Line op the Alma. — Chabacteb op the Position and 
Stbength of the Russian Abmy. — Menschikopp's Fatal 
Blundeb. — The Battle of the Alma. — The Fbench 
tubn the Russian Lefi' Wing. — Pbogbess of the Eng- 
lish. — Theib Advance checked. — The Fbench Flank 
Attack succeeds. — Retbeat op the Russians. — St. Ab- 
naud's Opinion op the Battle — The Allies continue 
theib Advance. — Theib Flank Mabch. — Obtuseness of 
Menschikoff. — His Letteb to Kobniloff. — Occupation 
of Balaclava by the English. — Death op St. Abnaud. 

— Canbobebt opposes the Motion to attack Sebastopol. 

— Pbobable Result of such an Attack ....... 53 

Descbiption op Sebastopol. — Abbival of Colonel de Tod- 

leben thebe. — The Allied Fleet is sighted. — Effect 
OP THE Battle of the Alma upon Sebastopol. — Men- 
scHiKOFP's Obdebs — He betires fbom the Town with 
the Abmy. — Despair op Kobniloff and Todleben. — 
Kobniloff accepts the Command op the Gabbison. — 
His Enthusiasm. — The Defenses of Sebastopol. — Kob- 


induced to send Tboops to Sebastopol. — Stbength of 
THE Gabbison on Octobeb 6. — The Allied Bombabdment 
of Octobeb 17. — Kobniloff' s Demeanob on that Day. — 
His Death. — Result of the Bombardment 60 




The Allied Positioks on the Chersonese. — Failitbe of 
THEiB Bombardment. — The Announcjement op the Fall 
OP Sebastopol in London. — Eppect op this Report upon 
THE Armies. — Chagrin op Lord Raglan. — The Siege op 
Sebastopol begins. — Its Peculiar Character. — The 
Russian Field Army assumes the Ofpensive. — Battle op 
Balaclava and Charge of the Light Brigade. — Results 
op the Battle. — The Battle op Inkermann. — Its Ir- 
regular Character and its Results. — The Great 
Hurricane. — Terrible Suffering and Losses of the 
Allies. — Public Opinion in France and England con- 
oernino the campaign 68 



Death of the Czar Nicholas. — Sardinia joins the West- 
ern Alliance. — Progress op the Allies before Sebas- 
topol. — Pelissier succeeds Canrobert in Command of 
THE French Army. — The June Bombardment and First 
Assault. — Capture op the Mamelon by the French. 
— Failure of the Second Assault. — Death op Lord 
Raglan. — Desperate Condition of Sebastopol. — Tod- 
leben wounded. — The Russians defeated on the 

BER. — The French carry the Malakofp. — Evacuation 
AND Burning of Sebastopol. — Prince Gortschakopf's 
Estimate op the Defense. — The French Emperor and 
the Czar desire Peace. — The Congress of Paris. — 
Signature of Peace. — Results op the War. — Sar- 
dinia the only Gainer 81 



The Map of Italy in 1850. — Political State of Sardinia. 
— The Two Sicilies. — States of the Church. — Tus- 


CANT. — Parma. — Modena. — Lomb abdy and Vknetia. — 
Secret Societies. — Younq Italy and its Mission. — The 
Sardinian Kino and his Policy. — His Parliamentary 
Trials and Loyalty to the Constitution. — Legislation 
IN the Sardinian Parliament against Clerical Abuses. 

— Advent of Cavour. — The Diplomatic Duel between 
Sardinia and Austria and its Influence upon Europe. 

— Cavour takes the Helm. — His Dislike for Secret 
Societies. — His Policy defined. — Throws Sardinia 
into the Alliance against Russia. — Departure of the 
Army for the Crimea. — Effect of the War News in 
Piedmont. — Victor Emmanuel visits London and Paris. 

— Napoleon's Solicitude for Italy. — Is appealed to 

BY Cavour. — Cavour in the Paris Congress .... 96 



Austria's Influence upon the Italian Governments. — 
Metternich on Cavour. — Cavour disappointed in Eng- 
land. — He turns to France as an Ally. — The Orsini 
Incident. — Cavour appeases the Emperor, and strikes 
AT THE Papal Government. — The Conference at Plom- 
BiiiRES. — Cavour jubilant. — Warlike Declarations at 


Napoleon and the Princess Clotilde. — Cavour im- 
pels THE Emperor toward War. — Quizot on Cavour. — 
Signing of the Franco-Sardinian Alliance. — Futile 
Efforts of the Powers to preserve the Peace. — 
Austria declares War. — Enthusiasm in Italy. — Na- 
poleon's Manifesto. — He leaves for the Front. — 
Concentration of the Armies 110 


■ ^ 


Romantic Character of the Theatre of War. — Unpre- 

TLE. — Enthusiastic Reception of the French Troops 
AT Genoa. — Arrival of the Emperor at Genoa. — The 
Austrian Generalissimo and his Career. — His Timid 


Tactics. — Combat at Montebello. — The Emperor 
VISITS THE Field. — The Emperor plans a Flank March. 
— Gyulai deceived. — Battles op Palestro. — Action 
AT TuRBiGO. — Success op the Flank March. — The Em- 
peror's Orders por June 3. — Position op the Two 
Armies at Noon on the 4th. — Battle of Magenta.— 
The French Guard on the Naviglio Grande. — Anxiety 
OP THE Emperor. — Critical Condition op the Guard. — 
Arrival op Canrobert and Niel. — MacMahon carries 
Magenta. — Death op Espinasse. — Ei:snM£ of the Bat- 
tle 122 




Entry Op the French Army into Milan. — The Te Deum. 

— Fighting at Melegnano. — Gyulai retreats upon 
Verona. — The Emperor advances prom Milan. — Igno- 
rance OF EACH Commander as to the Plans of the 
other. — The Austrian Army harassed by Conflicting 
Orders. — It occupies the Heights of Solperino on 
June 23. — Advance op the French Army on the 24th. 

— Commencement op the Battle of Solperino. — Re- 
pulse of the Sardinians. — The Emperor arrives on 
THE Field. — Heavy Fighting at Solperino and on the 
French Right. — The Lethargy op Canrobert. — Sol- 
perino outflanked and abandoned by the Austrians. 

— Failure of Wimppfen to retrieve the Day on the 
Austrian Left. — Canrobert arrives. — General Ad- 
vance of the French. — The Emperor at Cavriana. — 
Firmness op General Benedek. — The French Advance 
RENEWED July 1. — The Armistice and Conference at 


Conduct. — Why the Monarchs made Peace 137 


garibaldi and CAVOUR. 

Disappointment in Italy at the Sudden Termination op 
the War. — Insurrections in Central Italy. — Demands 
of the Central Italians- — Attitude of Victor Emman- 


UBL. — The Peace of Zurich. — Reconciliation of Ca- 
VOUR AND Victor Emmanuel. — Their Battle with the 
Papal Government. — Napoleon agrees to a Plebiscite. 

— Central Italy declares for Annexation to Sardinia. 

— The First Italian Parliament. — Cession of Nice and 
Savoy. — Revolution in the Two Sicilies. — Qaribaldi 
leaves for Sicily to head the Insurgents. — His Rapid 
Advance. — He captures Palermo. — Extraordinary 
Character of his Achievements — Excitement in Turin. 

— The Policy of Cavour. — Garibaldi becomes Head- 
strong. — He crosses to the Mainland and marches 
upon Naples. — Francis II. abandons Naples. — Entry 


Crisis. — Sardinian Troops enter Papal Territory. — 
Battle of Castelfidardo. — The Sardinians pass the 
Neapolitan Frontier. — Meeting of Garibaldi and Vic- 
tor Emmanuel. — The Neapolitans vote for Annexation 
TO THE Italian Kingdom. — Garibaldi's Hatred of Ca- 
vour. — Cavour's Health gives way. — His Death. — 
The World's Estimate of Cavour 150 



The German Confederation and the Frankfort Diet. 
— Old Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings 
between Austria and Prussia. — Austria gains the As- 
cendency in Germany. — The Olmutz Incident. — The 
Crimean War. — Prince William becomes Regent of 
Prussia. — Change in the Prussian Policy. —The Kai- 
ser ANNOYED. — The Regent becomes William I. of 
Prussia. — His Early Career. — His Struggle with the 
House of Deputies on the Army Bill. — He calls 
Bismarck to the Presidency of the Ministry. — Bis- 
marck's Political Creed. — His Views on the Revolu- 

His Early Opposition to German Unity. — His Admi- 
ration OF Austria. — Changes wrought in ehs Views 
AT Frankfort. — His Contempt for the Diet. — He 
distrusts Austria. — Warns his Government against 
Austria. — His Course at St. Petersburg and Paris. — 
Foresees War with Austria, and pushes Army Reform 178 




The Prussian Army Reorqaiozation Ain> rrs Reorganizers. 

— Bismarck forces the Measure over the Lower 
House. — Commencement op the Prusso- Austrian Diplo- 
matic Campaign. — Prussia misunderstood at Vienna. 

— Bismarck explains her Position. — Alarm of the 
Austrian Statesmen — Bismarck's Polish Policy and 
its Result. — The Schleswig-Holstein Question reyiyed. 

— State op the Quarrel. — The Confederation inter- 
feres IN Behalf op the Duchies. — Bismarck inyites 
Austria to Independent Action. — The Two Powers 
LAY THEIR Ultimatum upon Denmark. — Firmness op 
THE Danish Government and the Reasoi^or it. — The 
Allied Armies enter Schleswig. — Evacuation of the 
Dannewerk by the Danes. — Austrian Victory at 
Oeversee. — The Danish Position at Fredericia and 
DtJppEL. — Bombardment op the Duppel Lines. — De- 
struction OP THE Danish Army at Duppel. — Evacua- 
tion OF Fredericia. — The London Conference. — Re- 
newed Fighting. — The Peace of Vienna 193 



Bismarck's Attitude on the Augustbnburg Claim. — His 
Sudden Change of Front. — Mensdorff's Blunder. — 
Bismarck anticipates War. — His Remark at Salzburg. 
— The Conference at Gastrin and the Bargain ar- 
ranged THERE. — Bismarck's Opinion of the Confer- 
ence. — He sounds Italy. — Interviews Napoleon at 
Biarritz. — Napoleon's Views on European Affairs. — 
His Ideas respecting the Military Strength of Prus- 
sia AND Austria. — Condition op Affairs in the Elbe 
Duchies. — Bismarck reopens the Diplomatic Campaign 
AGAINST Austria. — Austria and Italy begin to arm. 
— Attitude of the Diet on the Dispute. — Bismarck's 
Bait to Germany. — The Prusso-Italian Alliance. — 
The Prussian Army mobilized. — The Claims of Prussia 
A2a> Austria presented in the Frankfort Diet. — 


Prussian Troops enter Holstein. — Bismarck's Profo- 
siTioN FOR A New Confederation. — Its Failure. — Aus- 
tria MOVES THE Mobilization of the Federal Army 
against Prussia. — The Miutart Situation. — The Diet 


UPON THE Petty States. — Prussian Occupation of Han- 
over, Hesse-Cassel, and Dresden. — Brilliancy of the 
Prussian Conquest 211 



The Military Situation on June 20. — Benedek's Plan of 
Campaign checkmated. — Advance of the Prussians 
INTO Bohemia. — Combats at Liebenau and Podol, and 
Defeat of the Austrians. — Capture of Munchengratz 
BY THE Prussians. — Retreat of the Austrians upon 
Gitschin. — Battle of Gitschin and Rout of the Aus- 
trians. — Bismarck at Gitschin. — Advance of the Sec- 
ond Prussian Army into Bohemia under the Crown 
Prince. — Victories of the Prussian 5th Corps at Na- 


Trautenau. — Battle at Soor won by the Prussian 
Guards. — Arrival of the Second Army on the Elbe. 
— Communications restored between the Prussian 
Armies. — Dilemma of the Austrian Commander. — 
His Orders to his Army. — His Ignorance of the 
Prussian Designs. — Character of the Austrian Posi- 
tion on the Bistritz 224 



Prince Frederick Charles prepares for Battle. — Night 
March of the First Prussian Army upon the Bistritz. 
— Arrival of the King of Prussia at Dub. — OPEioNa 
of the Battle of EoiaGGRATZ. — The Prussians cross 
THE Bistritz. — State of the Battle at Noon. — Criti- 
cal Position of the Prussian Left. — Anxiety of the 
Prussian Staff. — Approach of the Crown Prince to 
the Field. — He threatens the Austrian Right. — Con- 



FUSED State of that Wing anb Causes thbbefob. — Thb 
Crown Prince moves upon Chlum. — Capture op Chlum 
BY THE Prussian Guards and its Results. — Benedek^s 
Amazement upon learning op the Fall op Chlum. — He 
HEADS HIS Reserves in the Efpobt to retake it. — 
Failure of the Attack. — Total Defeat of the Aus- 
trian Army. — Heroism of the Austrian Artillery. — 
Immediate Results op the Battle. — Archduke Al- 
brecht assumes Command of the Austrian Armies. — 
The Prussian Advance upon Vienna. — Benedek's Re- 
treat. — Battle of Blumenau. — The Armistice . . . 237 



The Campaign in the West. — Critical Situation op thb 
Hanoverian Army. — Indifference of Prince Charles 
OF Bavaria. — Victory op the Hanoverians at Lan- 


Indecision IN THE Federal Councils. — Advance of the 
Pbussian General Falckenstein upon Frankfort. — 
Prussian Occupation op Fulda. — Battle of Kissingen 
AND Defeat of the Bavarians. — Defeat of the 8th 
Federal Corps at Laufach and Aschaffenburg. — 
Prussian Entry into Frankfort. — Junction of Prince 
Alexander with Prince Charles. — General Manteuf- 
FEL succeeds Falckenstein. — Hb marches from Frank- 
fort. — Indecision of the Federal Commander. — Fight- 
ing ON the Taubbr. — Retreat of the Federal Army 


Prussians. — The Armistice 249 



Italian Affairs after the Death of Cavour. — Garibaldi 
AGAIN. — The Battle at Aspromonte. — Fall of the Ra- 
tazzi Ministry. — France and the Roman Question. — 
Drouyn de Lhuys on the Situation. — Transfer of the 
National Government to Florence. — Joy of the Flor- 


BNTiNES. — Declaration op War upon Austria. — Condi- 
tion OP THE Opposing Armies. — The German Plan por 
THE Italian Campaign and its Rejection at Florence. — 
The Italian Army crosses the Mincio. — The Plans of 
the Opposing Comioanders result in a Collision. — The 
Theatre op Action. — Opening op the Battle of Cus- 
tozza on the italian right. — fightino at ouosi and 
Rout of the Italian Left Wing. — Bold and Success- 
ful Move of the Italian General Pianelu to check 
THE Austrian Pursuit. — Progress of the Battle in the 
Centre. — La Marmora's Incapacity. — State of the 
Battle at Two o' Clock. — Concentric Attack of the 
Archduke upon Custozza and Retreat of the Italians. 

— The Italian Army recrosses the Mincio. — Responsi- 
bility OF La Marmora for the Defeat. — The Archduke 
Albrecht summoned to Vienna. — Advance of the Ital- 
ian Army under Cialdini. — Defeat of the Italian 
Fleet at Lissa. — Degradation of Admiral Persano. — 
Good Faith of the ItaliajT Government in 1866 . . . 256 


results of the seven weeks* war. 

The Treaty of Prague. — The Four Great Results of the 
Seven Weeks' War. — The Federal Reichstag. — Bis- 

The New Era in Austria. — The Transfer of Venetia. 

— Victor Emmanuel in Veihce. — Critical Condition op 
Europe in 1867 269 


the decline of the french empire. 

Napoleon's Dream is shattered. — The Crisis of his Reign. 

— Drouyn de Lhu ys' Conception op the Crisis. — In- 
decision of the Emperor. — Condition of the French 
Army in 1866. — The French Government unable to 


Government to indemnify itself through Diplomatic 
Channei^. — Refusal of the French Propositions by 

iyiii CONTENTS^ 


WITH THE South Qebman States. — Second Attack of M. 


HIS Mission. — Benbdetti's Discomfiture and Eetubn to 
Pabis. — Desperation of the Fbench Goyebnment. — 
The Contemplated Purchase of Luxemburg frustrated 
BY Bismarck. — Prussia consents to remoye her Gar- 
PLOMACY FOR 1866-67. — The Declinb of the Empire. — 
Paris in 1867 • . . ^ 276 


last days of the second empire. 

Condition of Eurcxpe in 1867. — The Powers at Peace* 

— Unsettled State of Spain. — Garibaldi in the Field 
AGAIN. — The Battle of Menta^a. — Bitter Feeling en- 
gendered BY rr IN Italy toward France. — Power of 
THE Empress in the French Councim. — Her Ambition. 

— Effobts op the Empeeor to steady his Thbone. — 
The Reorganization of the Army. — Warlike Senti- 
ment IN Paris. — The Hohenzollern Incident. — The 
Rage of France. — Excitement in the Corps L^gislatif. 

— M. Benedetti seeks the Prussian King at Ems. — The 
French (Government becomes unreasonable — Insult- 
ing Demand upon the King op Prussia. — Bismarck's 
Circular in Reference to it. — Ollivier's Bellicose 
Speech in the Corps L^gislatif. — Enthusiasm in Paris. 

— The Emperor's Misgivings. — His Hopes and Fears. — 
The Shattering of his Hopes. — Baron Beust's Letter. 

— The Isolation of the French Government in Europe. 

— The Emperor's Proclamation and Departure for 
Metz. — Wretched Condition of Affairs there. — Im- 
pATiENCB OF Paris. — The ^^ Affaire " OF Saarbruck . 289 



Delivery of the French Declaration of War at Berlin. 
— Perfect Preparation of Prussia for War. — Mobili- 


TENDING FoacES ON August 3. — Fight at WsissENBUBa 
AND Defeat of the French. — MacMahon pbepabes to 


THB 5th of August. — Opening op the Battle of Worth. 
— MacMahon is ouTFiiANKED. — Heroism of thb French 
Cavalry. — Destruction of MacMahon's Army. — Hard 
Fighting on thb Saar. — Critical Situation of thb Ger- 
man Force engaged there. — Final Retreat of thb 
French. — Consternation at Metz over the Result of 
THE Day's Fighting. — Despair of the £mperor. — Hb 


Command under Protest. — He appreciates its Full 
Import. — He is embarrassed by the Emperor. — Thb 
Condition of Affairs at the German Headquarters. — 
Moltkb's Plan. — The March through Lobbainb . . 804 



The French Retreat upon Verdun begins. — Battlb Kxr 
BoRNY. — Bazainb's Night Visit to the Emperor. — 
Flight of the Emperor to Gravelotte. — Bazaene visits 


— Position of the Armies on August 16. — General von 
Alvensleben opens the Battle of Vionville — Char- 
acter OF THE Battle and its Results ~ Bazaine takes 
UP A New Position. — Moltke's Plan for August 18. — 
The Battle of Gravelotte. — Repulse of Steinmetz. 

— Incapacity of Bazaine. — Second Repulse of Stein- 
metz. — Canrobebt ovebpowebed. — Capture of St. Pri- 
VAT AND Turning of the French Right. — Close of the 
Battle. — Influence of the Battle upon the Military 
Situation. — Formation of the Army of the Meusb. — 
The Siege of Metz begins 320 



Confusion at the Fbench Headquabtebs at Chalons. — 
MacMahon^ s Abbival there. — Result of the Militabt 


Councils. — The Paris Cabinet takes a Hand. — Mao- 
Mahon's Irresolution. — Finally concludes to aiakch 
UPON Metz. — Strength and Condition op his Forces. 
— Desperation op the Ministry at Paris. — General 
Blumenthal on MacMahon's Movement. — Moltke 

MOVES to checkmate HIM. — SITUATION ON THE 27tH OP 

August. — On the 29th. — Battle op Beaumont. — Rout 
OF Db Failly's Corps. — Discomfiture of the French 
7th Corps by the Bavarians. — Terrible Demoraliza- 
tion of MacMahon's Army. — The Retreat upon Sedan 
AND MacMahon's Telegram to the Ministry. — The 
Germans close in upon Sedan. — The French Position 
at Sedan. — First Attack of the Germans on Septem- 
ber 1. — MacMahon wounded. — Splendid Work of the 
Saxon Artillery. — The Qu^vrrel at the French Head- 
quarters AND ITS Result. — General de Wimpffen. — 
Heroism of the French Marines. — Terrible Fighting 
at Bazeilles. — Awful Effect op the German Artil- 
lery Fire. — Misery op the Emperor. — The White Flag 
AT Sedan. — The Prussian King on the Heights op 
FrAnois, — Napoleon's Letter. — Evening on the Bat- 
tlefield 329 



The Military Conference at Donchery. — Bismarck's 
Account of rr. — Wimpffen seeks the Emperor. — The 
Meeting between the Emperor and Bismarck as nar- 
rated BY EACH. — Scene at the Weavers' Cottage. — 
Signature of the Capitulation. — The Emperor leaves 
FOR Belgium 342 



The Early War Days in Paris. — False Report op Vic- 
tory. — Popular Rage over the Deception. — The Em- 


TRY. — Paukao. — The Empress at the Tuileries. — De- 
moralization DT the Pau^^ce.— The News of Sedan.-— 
Night Session of the Corps LiiaisiiATiF. — The 4th of 
September. — The Bloodless Revolution and Fall of 
the Empire. — Flight of the Empress from Paris. — 
General Trochu. — The Defenses of Paris. — The De- 
fenders OF Paris. — Regulars, Mobiles, and Nationals. 
— The Marines and the Fortress Artillery. — Arri- 
VAL of Vinoy's Corps at Paris. — Favre and Bismarck 


THE Siege. — Dispositions of the Besieging Army. — 
The Temper op Paris. — More Sorties. — Destruction 
op the Chateau at St. Cloud. — Insubordination in the 
National Guard. — Aspect of Paris during the Last 
Weeks of October. — The Besiegers . ^ 350 


the war in the provinces. 

Strasbubg and its Garrison. — The Bombardment. — 
Burning of Kehl. — Firmness op General Uhrich. — 
General Werder invests Strasburg. — Final Bombard- 
ment AND Surrender of the Place. — Condition of 
Metz. — Repulse op Bazaine's Sortie. — Capitulation 
of Metz. — Bazaine's Culpability. — Complex Nature 
of the Military Problem prom the German Standpoint. 
— Vitality op Republican France. — A French Force 


Formation of the Army of the Loire. — Its Organiza- 
tion BY General d'Aurelle de Paladines. — Wins a 
Victory at Coulmiers. — Retreats upon Orleans. — Con- 
flict between Gambetta and the French Commander. 
— Appearance of the French Army of the NoSth. — 
Prince Frederick Charles marches upon Orleans from 
Metz. — Advance op the Army of the Loire. — Its 
Right Wing is beaten at Beaune. — Gambetta insists 
UPON A Continuation op the Advance. — The Left 
Wing defeated at Loigny and Poupry. — Frederick 
Charles assumes the Offensive — The Two Days' Bat- 
tle IN Front of Orleans and Rout of the Army of thb 

• • 


LomB. — Chanzt rallies the Left Wing and takes 
Position at Josnes. — Is attacked by the Gkand Duke 
OF Mecklenbubg. — Retkeat of Chanzy upon Le Mans. 
— Inaction of the First Army of the Loire under 

ERICK Charles and Mecklenburg concentrate against 
Chanzy. — Severity of the Weather and Suffering by 
the Troops. — The Battle before Le Mans and Defeat 
of Chanzy. — The Second Army of the Loire and its 
Record. — Destruction of the French Army of the 
North by Manteuffel. — March of Manteuffel to Wer- 
der's Succor. — Bourbaki crosses the Swiss Frontier . 368 


the fall of paris. 

The Eastern and Italian Questions reopened. — The 
London Conference. — Occupation of Rome by the 
Italian Army. — The German Foreign Office at Ver- 
sailles. — Its Attitude on European Questions. — Con- 
dition OF Affairs in Paris. — Events of the 31st of 
October. — Temporary Success of the Commune. — Un- 
reliability of the National Guard. — Preparation for 
THE Great Sortie. — The Battle of Champigny. — Its 
Character and Results. — Increasing Gravity of the 
Situation in Paris. — Fighting near Le Bourget. — 
Opening of the German Bombardment. -^ Abandonment 
OF Mont A vron by the French. — New Year's in Paris. 
— The King of Prussia hailed German Emperor at 
Versailles. — Battle of Buzenval and Retrfj^.t of the 
French. — Fwrb at Versailles. — Capitulation of 
Paris and Signature of the Armistice. — The French 
Assembly meets at Bordeaux. — Appoints Thiers Chief 
OF THE Executive Power. — Thiers and Bismarck at 
Versailles. — The Preliminaries of Peace ratified by 
the Assembly. — Entry of the German Troops into 
Paris. — The Peace of Frankfort. — Europe at the 
Present Day. — Prevalence of Militarism and the 
Causes therefor 388 

Bibliographical Note 403 

Index 407 



The Gountby fbom the Alma to Balaclava 54 

The Campaign is Italt, 1859 ; the CouirrBr from Alessak- 


Battlefield of Maqenta 130 

The Campaign in Italy, 1859 ; the Countbt fbom Milan 

TO Yebona 138 

Battlefield of Solfebino 144 

Earlt Opebations of the Pbussian Abmies in Bohemia, 

1866 226 

Battlefield of Koniggbatz 238 

Battlefield of Custozza 260 

Enyibons of Metz 320 

Sedan and Vicinity 336 

Envibons OF Pabis (1870-1871) 850 

Enyibons of Obleanb 374 


He who Is inclined to take optimistic views of hu- 
man history must contemplate the' course of events 
during the past f oriy years with genuine satisfaction, 
for to whatever part of the globe he turns his atten« 
tion he will find much more to confirm than to dis- 
credit his hopeful attitude. Everywhere, doubtless, 
there are difficult and anxious problems to be solved ; 
the spirit of evil, in one shape or another, goes on 
rearing its head defiantly ; and the condition of man- 
kind improves but slowly. Nevertheless, in almost 
every quarter of the world since 1860 we can point 
to solid and unmistakable progress. In the depart- 
ments of scientific discovery and industrial art this 
has been so conspicuous a fact that to mention it is 
like uttering a truism. But in political history the 
illustrations of progress are no less striking. A mar- 
velous revolution in Japan has transformed the feu- 
dal regime of the Shogun and daimios into a consti- 
tutionally governed empire, eager to learn wisdom 
from every available source. The English rule in 
India, since the dreadful days of Cawnpore and 
Lucknow, has been marked by a prosperity unpar- 
alleled in the history of that teeming population. 
Australasia is witnessing the rapid growtii of a new 
English civilization, destined soon to become a valua- 
ble moral power in the world. With the labors of 


Livingstone and Stanley during this same period, a 
new and more hopeful era has begun in the career of 
Africa. In the southern parts of South America, on 
the shores of both oceans, Spanish civilization has 
assimied a thrifty and progressive character, more 
especially since the triumphs of Montt in Chili and 
of Mitre in the Argentine Republic (1852-60). As 
for North America, we need only to remember that 
1860 was the year in which the Fugitive Slave Law 
was enacted, with the consent of the foremost Amer- 
ican statesman then living, who could see no other 
way of saving the United States from disunion and 
anarchy. That negro slavery has been abolished, 
while the spectre of secession has been exorcised, and 
a reconciliation achieved between states so recently 
hostile, marks an amount of political progress which 
may well be set off against the tale of public corrup- 
tion and extortion of which the daily report is slowly 
but surely kindling the righteous indignation of a 
long-suffering people. 

In no part of the world has the improvement in the 
political situation since 1850 been more striking than 
in Europe. The author of the present book has done 
well to entitle it "The Reconstruction of Europe." 
It has been indeed a reconstruction such as one could 
hardly have dared hope for in the days of Haynau 
and Radetzky. Yet no intelligent observer could 
even at that time suppose that the crude adjustments 
made by sheer military force were likely to prove 
enduring. It seemed in 1850 as if despotism were 
triumphant, but appearances were deceitful. Sisera 
could not conquer, for the stars in their courses were 
fighting against him. The movement toward consti- 
tutional freedom and the independence of oppressed 


nationalities, temporarily cheeked by the arms of 
Kadetzky and Paskevitch, was a movement that had 
been gathering strength for more than two genera- 
tions. For its remote sources we must look back to 
the middle of the eighteenth century, when English 
ideas of constitutional liberty, vindicated by Vane 
and Cromwell and expounded by Locke and Milton 
yet a century earlier, were at length taken up and in- 
corporated into the speculations of French philoso- 
phers whose writings were widely read upon the con- 
tinent. In deference to the spirit of the age, as 
represented in various ways by Montesquieu and 
Voltaire, by the Physiocrats and the Encyclopaedists, 
the work of reform was begun by crowned philoso- 
phers and public-spirited despots, such as Frederick 
of Prussia, Catherine of Russia, Joseph of Austria, 
and Charles III. of Spain. 

In the country which had become a more coherent 
nationality than any other upon the continent, which 
had less enlightenment in its dynasty and more in its 
people, and which had been brought most closely into 
contact with English and American ideas, the terri- 
ble revolution beginning in 1789 at once brought 
matters to a crisis and inaugurated for the European 
world the great modem movement of which our 
author describes the most recent phases. With the 
French revolutionary propaganda it became a move- 
ment toward democracy, toward the final abolition of 
feudalism with its arbitrary privileges for the few 
and its excessive burdens for the many, toward the 
fuller participation of the people in the work of gov- 
ernment and their more efficient protection in the en- 
joyment of the fruits of their labor. When the gov- 
ernments of Austria and Prussia in 1792 undertook 


to stem the rising tide by invading France, they 
called into existence a French levee en masse of revo- 
lutionary soldiers destined forthwith to overrun all 
Europe, carrying democratic notions with them every- 
where. When the National Convention published its 
famous proclamation of November 19, 1792, offering 
French assistance to all peoples who wished to get 
rid of their governments, it laid down a revolution- 
ary programme which Napoleon in very considerable 
measure carried out. In many respects the policy of 
the First Empire was a reversal of the policy of the 
Revolution, and keenly disappointed the generous 
aims and hopes that had sustained the nobler spirits 
amid the horrors of that time ; but there were ways 
in which the Napoleonic conquests, albeit marked by 
a most shameless and cynical disregard of morality 
and decency, were beneficial and stimulating to the 
people of Europe. One of these ways was the tem- 
porary extension of the new French laws, and of 
methods of administration connected therewith, over 
certain regions, especially the so-called Confederation 
of the Rhine and some parts of Italy. Another was 
the partial consolidation effected in the same regions, 
along with the overthrow of a swarm of petty tyrants 
who were not reinstated in 1815. A third was the 
spirit of nationality evoked in resistance to Napoleon, 
especially in northern Germany, under the lead of the 
noblest statesman of that age, the gallant and glorious 

The seed sown in these ways had become too deeply 
rooted in 1815 to be destroyed by the ingenious ar- 
rangements made at the Congress of Vienna. The 
next thirty years were, by comparison with what had 
gone before, a time of profound peace ; yet they wit- 


nessed political and military events charaeteristio 
enough as indicating the general drift of affairs. 
Such events were the establishment of independence 
by the Spanish colonies in America, the successful 
revolt of Greece, the unsuccessful revolt of Poland, 
the troubles in Spain after the death of Ferdinand 
VII., the uprising which drove Charles X. from 
France in 1830. The most characteristic feature of 
this period was restlessness. Ideas of reform, aspira- 
tions after a better state of things, were everywhere 
in the air. The moral influence of the gi'cat Parlia- 
mentary Eeform of 1832, and other contemporaneous 
reforms in England, such as Jewish and Catholic 
emancipation and the abolition of the slave-trade, 
counted for much. The success of democracy on 
a vast scale in the United States, however dimly 
apprehended by the people of continental Europe, 
doubtless also counted for much. Increasing com- 
fort, scientific discoveries, railroads and steamboats, 
cheaper and more abundant popular literature, were 
powerful factors in stimulating the revolutionary 
spirit. The revival of historic studies, the keenly 
aroused interest in the past, as shown in Guizot and 
Sir Walter Scott, in the romantic school in poetry, 
painting, and music, did much to strengthen the 
growing sense of the sacredness of nationality. It 
came to be more and more generally felt that it was 
wrong for Greeks and Bulgarians to be trampled 
down by the ruthless Turk,* and for Magyars and 
Italians to be held in subjection by a ruler at Vienna. 
It was especially in the Italian peninsula that the 
aspiration toward political reform was identified with 
the aspiration toward national unity. Since the ar- 
rangements of 1815, Austria had held Lombardy and 


Venice in subjection, but Austrian control. Ovei? the 
peninsula really went much farther than this. In 
1821 an insurrection against Bourbon tyranny in 
Naples was suppressed by Austrian bayonets ; and in 
1831 a revolution in the Papal States was suppressed 
in the same way. Gradually, therefore, it became 
apparent to all thoughtful Italians that the only prac- 
ticable way of putting an end to misgovernment was 
to unite the population of the peninsula in the effort 
to throw off the Austrian yoke. The cause of Lom- 
bardy and Venice must be made the common cause 
of all Italy. In this conclusion Italian statesmen 
came to agree, however they might differ as to thd 
means by which the desired end was to be attained \ 
whether with Mazzini they looked forward to a united 
Italian Republic, or with Gioberti dreamed of a re* 
formed and enlightened Papacy taking the lead in 
driving out those whom bellicose Julius II. used to 
call " the barbarians," or with Cavour saw clearly 
that the hope of Italy lay in Piedmont, the one Italian 
state which combined political freedom with organ- 
ized military strength. 

Where there is so sound a principle at work as 
that represented in the policy of Cavour, it is sure to 
profit by every opportimity that is offered for steady 
and healthful expansion, as was illustrated in the 
masterly skill with which the Italian statesman made 
use of the French emperor from the time of the Cri- 
mean war to the time when the people of one Italian 
state after another elected Victor Emmanuel as their 
king. But perhaps the most curiously significant 
feature in the complex process of European recon- 
struction is the wholesome Nemesis that has over- 
taken Austria, and at the cost of a brief military 


Iiiimiliation placed her in the ranks of progressive 
states. In the days of our fathers the very name of 
Austria had a hateful sound. It stood for mean and 
cruel oppression, A survival of the contemptuous 
anger with which all true lovers of liberty then re- 
garded Austria may still be seen in Mr. Freeman's 
writings, whenever that great historian has occasion 
to allude to her. But the policy to which Metter- 
nich Had devoted his rare abilities provoked reaction ; 
and Cavour, securing by the sacrifice of Nice and 
Savoy at first the active help and then the secret 
connivance of the French emperor, struck the blow 
which called into existence the Kingdom of Italy. 
Then in the final phase of the struggle between Aus- 
trian conservatism and the movement toward German 
unity begun by Stein and carried on by Bismarck, the 
Italian kingdom played its part as an ally of Prus- 
sia, and brought itself nigh to completeness by the 
acquisition of Venetia. Austria, driven from the 
German federation to shift for herself, discovered 
that she could no longer maintain her footing in the 
world without granting to Hungary all that Kossuth 
and his brave companions had vainly contended for 
in 1849. From the moment that she was thus freed 
from the deadly burden of peoples held in unwilling 
subjection, Austria began to show symptoms of 
healthy national life. The surgery of 1859 and 1866 
was sharp but salutary. Then in that year of doom, 
1870, a united Germany, freed from complications 
with Austria, made short work with the French em- 
peror, the greatest sham of the century, and left 
France humbled and exasperated, but probably in 
a less unsound condition than at any previous mo- 
ment since 1789. The Italian kingdom, seizing this 


opportunity, attained completeness by acquiring the 
city of Rome and putting an end to the temporal rule 
of the Papacy. Lastly, the causes of dissension be- 
tween Germany and Austria, as well as between 
Austria and Italy, having been removed, we see these 
great powers leagued together in a triple alliance that 
bids fair, especially if favored by the wealth and 
maritime power of England, to serve as a potent 
guarantee for the maintenance of peace in Etlrope. 
Truly the advance since the days of Paskevitch and 
Radetzky has been wonderful. 

The tares that the enemy has so industriously sown 
have not, however, all been uprooted ; some of them 
are still thrifty and seem likely to prove fruitful in 
disturbance. Our author, no doubt, does well in 
bringing his narrative to a close with the victory of 
Germany over France ; for if he had gone on to treat 
of the Balkan war of 1878, he would have begun 
upon a chapter of history which, in a peculiar degree, 
is not yet ended. It is a pity that the beastly Turk 
could not then have been sent over to Brusa, as a pre- 
liminary step toward improving him off from the face 
of the earth ; for not until that has been done can we 
hope to see civilization restored in those beautiful 
lands which to the historian, the philosopher, and the 
Christian are fraught with such hallowed memories. 
But how the cumberer of the earth can be disposed 
of without kindling a general European conflagra- 
tion is a question that puzzles the wisest statesmen. 

To tliis Eastern difficulty, which is an old one, the 
issue of the war between France and Germany unfor- 
tunately added a new source of probabje contention 
in the future. The Germans deemed it necessary to 
annex Alsace and Lorraine in order to secure a bet- 



ter military frontier in case of any future war with 
France. By so doing they made it ahnost impossible 
for France to abandon her attitude of enmity toward 
Germany, and they annexed a hostile population sure 
to be a source of weakness to Germany, as the pos- 
session of Venetia had been a source of weakness to 
Austria. Moreover in doing this they shocked public 
sentiment, so that if in some future European com- 
plication France goes to war with Germany in order 
to recover her lost provinces and free their people 
from foreign domination, then enlightened public 
sentiment in both hemispheres will probably sympa- 
thize with France in this one particular, even though 
it may sympathize with her in nothing else. And 
this is because the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by 
Germany was reaUy a violation of what is the sound 
basis of the principle of the sacredness of national- 
ities ; in other words, it was a violation of the sacred- 
ness of self-government. It was easy to argue that 
in blood and speech the people of Alsace-Lorraine 
were almost more German than French, and that in 
point of history their connection with France was 
scarcely two centuries old. Such arguments go but 
little way when confronted with the fact that the 
people of Alsace-Lorraine — who are among the most 
intelligent, cultivated, and virtuous people in the 
world — consider themselves Frenchmen. They love 
France and hate Germany, and would hail with de- 
light any such opportunity as was offered to Lom- 
bardy in 1859 and to Venice in 1866. Their present 
position immensely increases the difficulty of dealing 
with the Eastern question. It remains to be seen 
whether the Germans did wisely in 1871 in allow- 
ing military considerations to prevail over such grave 


objections to the forcible severance of these people 
from France. Perhaps it may by and by appear 
that in this one instance they made the same sort of 
mistake that the first Napoleon was so apt to make, 
in setting a higher value upon sheer brute force than 
upon the sagacious statesmanship that takes morality 
and sentiment into the account. Time will show. 





EUKOPE m 1850. 

Europe m 1850. — Louis Napoleon elected President ofthb 
French Bepublic. — His Previous Career. — The Revolu- 
tion IN Germany, Austria, and Italy. — State op Italy in 
1850. — The Attitude op Piedmont. — Tranquillity of Rus- 
sia. — Prestige op the Czar in Europe. — The Great Pow- 
ers IN 1850. 

In the year 1850 Europe was emerging from the 
throes of a revolutionary era, with military autocracy 
generally triumphant, at the expense of liberal and 
free ideas. France, Germany, Austria, Denmark, and 
the Italian states had been shaken by the great popu- 
lar upheaval, but in France alone was the revolution 
sustained. The government of Louis Philippe had 
fallen, never to rise again. A provisional government, 
established to direct affairs pending the election of a 
republican president, was obliged to maintain itself 
with powder and ball against an insurrection of the 
Commune in Paris. The Faubourg St. Antoine was 
mercilessly bombarded, barricaded streets were raked 
with cannon and musketry, before order was restored, 
and the government enabled to turn its hand to the 


last act in a Paris revolution, the execution and trans- 
portation of prisoners. 

Tlie election of 1848 summoned to the presidency 
of the new republic Charles Louis Napoleon Bona- 
parte, the recognized heir of the great Napoleon. He 
had been elected to the Assembly in June and Sep- 
tember, and had taken his seat in the latter month, 
in the face of protests ty the f axjtion most warmly 
attached to the cause of the republic. 

The character and views of Louis Napoleon were 
not imknown to his supporters. He had always 
asserted his belief that he was one day to rule over 
his uncle's empire, and had proved the sincerity of 
his convictions by twice attempting to seize supreme 
power by tampering with the army. For the latter 
of these ill-starred attempts he had suffered imprison- 
ment in the fortress of Ham, but, escaping, had fled 
to England: When he returned to Paris in 1848 it 
was virtually to accept at the hands of the people a 
recall from exile. The prestige of his name won the 
votes of lovers of domestic order, while the absurdity 
of his conduct at Strasburg and Boulogne gained him 
the support of a less patriotic element, who regarded 
him as clay to be moulded at will by unscrupulous 
potters. The state of affairs in France at the opening 
of 1850 was without parallel in Europe. The revolu- 
tion had overthrown Louis Philippe, crushed out a 
revolution that conspired against itself, established 
the republic, and crowned its work by choosing an 
imperial pretender for a republican president. 

Of all the continental governments, those repre« 
sented in the Germanic Diet at Frankfort had suf- 
fered most severely. Mobs raged through the streets 
of Berlin, Dresden, Munich, and Vienna. The Hun- 

EUROPE IN 1850. 3 

garian and Italian subjects of the Kaiser revolted 
and defeated the troops sent to suppress them. The 
Kaiser fled from Vienna, the king of Bavaria abdi- 
cated his throne, while the petty princes of Germany 
were driven to the promulgation of constitutions, and 
the adoption of liberal ministries. In the general 
uprising against absolutism, the Frankfort Diet itself 
was swept away. It had never been popular with 
the masses, as it represented the princes, and not the 
people, of the German states. In its stead there was 
convened a national assembly, elected by popular suf- 
frage, whose leading articles of faith were constitu- 
tional liberty and national unity. Adherence to the 
latter principle induced it to order Prussian troops 
to the assistance of the people of Schleswig-Holstein, 
who were endeavoring to throw off the Danish yoke, 
while devotion to the former led it to offer to Fred- 
erick William of Prussia the crown of united Ger- 
many. Prussia had clearly outstripped Austria in 
the favor of the German people. Her advocacy of 
the Zolleverein which had made Germany a commer- 
cial unit, and the adoption by Frederick William of 
certain liberal reforms advocated by the Berlin rev- 
olutionists, had done much to establish this state of 
things. Frederick William, however, had never 
really sympathized with the new views of his subjects. 
He was a devout believer in his divine right, and in 
the power of the Austrian army, and furthermore felt 
a deep veneration for the House of Hapsburg. He 
mistrusted the wisdom and stability of the Frankfort 
assembly, and refused its offer of imperial honors. 
This proved the deathblow of the liberal assembly on 
the Main. Had Russia remained quiescent, perhaps 
it might have risen superior to this rebuff. In fact, 


however, the Czar placed his troops at the dispo- 
sal of the Kaiser, and confided to his famous lieu- 
tenant, Paskevich, the subjugation of Hungary. 
With his right arm free again, the Kaiser turned to 
the rectification of affairs in Germany, Despotism 
took fresh heart, liberal ministries came tumbling 
down, and Frederick WiUiam, who had been playing 
fast and loose with the Prussian revolutionists, turned 
a cold shoulder to their requests. The Prussian 
troops were recalled from the Elbe Duchies, while 
Austrian troops succeeded them, and reestablished 
the Danish authority. In the mean time, Paskevich 
in Hungary, and Radetsky in Italy, had crushed out 
all opposition. Austria was again dominant, not only 
in Germany, but in Central Europe and Italy as well. 

The condition in which Hungary and Italy were 
left by the Russo- Austrian triumph was a deplorable 
one. While the former was the victim of the stern- 
est military reprisals, the state of affairs in Italy was 
even worse. 

With an intensely national spirit animating all 
classes from the Alps to the Tiber, the Italians for 
generations had been held asunder by foreign bay- 
onets. Austria held Venetia and Lombardy as prov- 
inces of the empire, but her influence extended far 
beyond their frontiers. The Neapolitans crouched 
under the Bourbon lash with the might of Austria 
behind it. Tuscany, Parma, and Modena had their 
old rulers, who had fled upon the outbreak of 1848, 
again forced upon them, while the troops of the 
Kaiser were billeted on their territory. The Pope 
returned from his retirement in the Neapolitan do- 
minions under the protection of Austria, the French 
Republican army having previously occupied Rome. 

EUROPE IN 1860. 5 

Even Piedmont, the little northern kingdom, the 
sole representative of constitutional government in 
Italy, had suffered from a temporary Austrian occupa- 
tion consequent upon Badetsky's victory at Novara. 
But the Piedmontese were not cast down. As Austria 
stood for despotism in the peninsula, so Piedmont had 
come to stand for constitutional government and Ital- , 
ian regeneration. From the dismal night of Novara, 
when the broken-hearted Charles Albert abdicated 
the Sardinian throne to his son, a new era was inau- 
gurated in Italian history. While the battle-smoke 
still brooded over the field of Badetsky's greatest vic- 
tory with evidences of misery and disaster on every 
hand, Victor Emmanuel had voiced the oath "Per 
Dio, Italia sara ! " In the presence of the principal 
dignitaries of the kingdom, he committed himself to 
the fostering of the liberal institutions of the state 
and the furtherance of the Italian cause. Even as 
early as 1850, while still reaping the bitter fruits of 
unsuccessful revolution, the Italian people were com- 
ing to regard Piedmont as the national David, by 
whom the giant strength of foreign oppression should 
one day be broken. 

Throughout this period of turmoU in Europe, the 
vast realms of the Czar had remained undisturbed. 
Not certainly that there were no burdens to be light- 
ened or wrongs to be redressed, but simply from the 
fact that liberty such as was being fought for in Ger- 
many, Austria, and Italy had never entered into the 
conception of the stupid, plodding Russian serf. As 
for the sprinkling of uneasy, restless agitators, from 
which Russia is never free, perhaps the memory of 
Poland and the fear of Paskevich held them back. 
Russia remained tranquil, a fact that won new pres- 


tige for the Czar. The generous, majestic fashion in 
which he came to the assistance of Austria, and hurled 
back the Hungarian patriots before his stubborn bat- 
talions, impressed all Europe with a sense of his great 
might. While every continental government was 
employing the full strength of its military arm to 
preserve or restore order within its territories, the 
Czar was demonstrating the fact that his armed power 
was far beyond his necessities. The withdrawal of 
his troops from Hungary was no less imposing than 
their entry had been. No allusion to compensation 
lessened its moral influence. Austria was grateful 
and profuse, while the rest of Europe was awed by 
the splendid courtesy and boundless power of the 
northern autocrat. 

The general position of the great European states 
at the opening of the year 1850 may be summed up 
briefly as follows : — 

England still remained engrossed in the arts of 
peace and the doings in the Commons. The reforms 
for which the continental peoples contended were 
only those which the English fought for at Naseby 
and Marston Moor, and had enjoyed for centuries. 

France, emerging from a complication of revolu- 
tions, was again sailing smoothly, but with the Bona- 
parte pretender at the helm. 

In the German states, despotism, temporarily in 
danger, had resumed its sway, with the Diet again 
established on the Main. Imperialism, reentrenched 
in Vienna, cast its baleful shadow over Germany, 
Hungary, and Italy. 

Finally, Russia loomed vast and haughty in the far 
East, an object of dread and misgiving, and clothed 
in newly-acquired prestige. 


THE COUP d'etat. 


The Foreign Pouct op France in 1851. — The President's 
Oath. — Enmity between the President and the Assem- 
bly. — The Speech at Duon. — St. Arnaud and Maupas 
appointed to the Ministry. — The 2d of December. — The 
President's PROCLAiaATiON and the Arrests. — Dispersion 
OP THE Assembly. — How the Coup d'Etat was managed. 
— The Events op the 3d. — The 4th op December. — State 
OP Appairs on the Boulevard. — The Massacre and its 
Inpluence. — Conflict op Testimony in regard to the 
Massacre. — The President's Responsibility. — Disposition 
OP Political Prisoners. — The President sustained by the 
National Vote. — The Te Deum in Notre Dame. — The 
President becomes Emperor. 

In the year 1851 France was attracting more atten- 
tion than any other of the great powers on account of 
her conspicuous foreign policy. With an army in 
Kome as a body-guard to the Pope, and an ambas- 
sador in Constantinople vigorously claiming the Holy 
Places at Jerusalem, this policy was strongly sugges- 
tive of the Crusades. But the fact, above all, that 
arrested the attention of the world was the unique 
experiment then in progress of a republican govern- 
ment, with the heir of the First Napoleon as president. 

Prince Louis entered upon his duties as president 
of the French republic December 20, 1848. On that 
day, before the Assembly, he swore " to remain faithful 
to the democratic republic," and declared, " My duly 
is clear. I will fulfill it as a man of honor. I shall 


regard as enemies of the country all those who 
endeavor to change by illegal means that which all 
France has established." 

The president and the Assembly were soon at war. 
The Assembly, or a large proportion of its members, 
suspected the president of treasonable designs against 
the republic, while he believed that the Assembly was 
conspiring for his overthrow. A state of affairs like 
this could not be attended with much good for France. 
In May, 1851, the president declared at a public ban- 
quet in Dijon, " The Assembly has given me its co- 
operation in every means of repression, but has failed 
me in all the measures which I have devised for the 
welfare of the people." 

On October 27 Achille St. Amaud, an officer in 
the French Algerian army, with a bold, venturesome 
spirit and a reputation by no means stainless,^ was 
appointed by the president minister of war. On 
the same day M. de Maupas was appointed prefect 
of police. Maupas unfortunately had won a reputa- 
tion which seemed better calculated to bring him 
under the surveillance of the police, than to place 
him in charge of its intricate machinery.^ It cer- 
tainly could not be regarded otherwise than as a grave 
danger to France that the army should be under the 
orders of an unscrupulous soldier like St. Amaud, 
and the police in charge of a character like Maupas. 
The true significance of these appointments was in- 
dicated by the events which occurred in Paris between 
the 1st and 5th of the following December. 

On the morning of December 2, 1851, Paris awoke to 
find its walls blazing with proclamations by the presi- 

^ Kinglake, chapter xxix.; T^not, pp. 78, 79. 
^ See Kinglake, chapter ziy. 


dent, declaring that he had dissolved the Assembly, 
charging it with being " the hotbed of sedition," that 
it forged the weapons of civil war, that it imperiled 
the tranquillity of France, and that he, the president, 
made the whole people judge between him and it. 
"I make, therefore, my loyal appeal to the whole 
nation, . . . and I say if it be your will that the pres- 
ent state of disturbance continue, choose another to 
fill my place, for I will no longer retain a power which 
is ineffectual for good." Parisians found, further- 
more, that the press had been muzzled, and they 
learned only by word of mouth from the wild stories 
that circulated upon the boulevards, that there had 
been wholesale arrests during the night, and that the 
leading statesmen and soldiers of France were behind 
prison bars. The vast massing of troops at strategi- 
cal points proved that some move of unusual impor- 
tance had been made. A brigade was drawn up on 
the Quai d'Orsay, another was stationed in the Place 
de la Concorde, another in the garden of the Tuile- 
ries, while a fourth under Canrobert, with no less than 
three brigades of cavalry, was located about the palace 
of the Elys^e. 

Later in the morning the Assembly came together, 
but were ejected by a body of troops, and several of 
the members arrested. Another attempt was made 
to hold a session at the mayoralty of the tenth arron- 
dissement. A resolve was passed that the high-handed 
acts of the president were a forfeiture of his office. 
At this juncture General Forey arrived before the 
building at the head of several battalions. A detach- 
ment entered the room where the deputies were sitting, 
and an officer ordered them to disperse. This they 
refused to do, but upon the seizure of the president 


by the soldiers the whole body declared themselves 
prisoners, and were marched through the streets to 
the Quai d'Orsay, hemmed in by a cordon of bay- 
onets. They were confined here through the day, but 
after dark they were sent, in close vans, some to the 
fortresses of Vincennes and Mont Val^rien, and others 
to the prison of Mazas. This concluded the first act 
in the coup d*etat which overthrew the republic 
and left Louis Napoleon the dictator of France. 

The ministers of the president discharged their 
duties with such skill and vigor that people were 
willing to believe they had been chosen with this 
object in view. Maupas, at the head of the police, 
isolated the state printing-office during the striking- 
off of the proclamations dissolving the Assembly, and 
arranged with beautiful precision and a brazen dis- 
regard of law the early morning arrest of the mil- 
itary and civil leaders of France. The total number 
of arrests was seventy-eight, and they included all 
those statesmen who were regarded as most likely 
openly to combat the bold step of the president and 
incite the people to resist him. St. Amaud directed 
the soldiery against the Assembly, and stationed them 
in imposing masses through the city, to intimidate 
those who might feel impelled to protest with the cus- 
tomary barricade arguments. M, de Morny, generally 
known as a daring speculator, assumed charge of the 
home office shortly before light, and the rising sun 
found him at his post, superintending the vast tele- 
graphic system which was conveying to the country 
such accounts of the state of enthusiasm in Paris as 
the president and his ministers deemed best suited to 
their interests. 

The second part of the coup d*Stat^ which drenched 


the boulevards with innocent blood, has cast a shade of 
horror over the whole transaction that time has been 
unable to efface. Paris is never so reduced in a crisis, 
whether the cause be just or unjust, that she is bereft 
of hands to erect and defend barricades in her streets. 
In the Faubourg St. Antoine an incipient rising on 
the 2d was suppressed inunediately by the troops. 
The volcanic district from the Hotel de Ville north- 
ward to the boulevards also showed signs of uneasi- 
ness, and throughout the morning of the 3d the mil- 
itary were busy pulling down partially completed 
barricades and dispersing small bodies of insurgents. 
There seems to be little question that the army was 
embittered against the populace. If this were so, the 
proclamation circulated by the president through the 
ranks on the 2d was not calculated to appease it. 
He styled the soldiers as " the flower of the nation." 
He pointed out to them that his interests and theirs 
were the same, and that they had suffered together in 
the past from the course of the Assembly. He re- 
minded them of the years 1830 and 1848, when the 
army had fought the people in the streets of Paris, 
and concluded by an allusion to the military grandeur 
of the Bonapartes. 

During the afternoon of the 3d and morning of the 
4th the troops remained inactive, pending orders from 
the minister of war, and in this interval several strong 
barricades were erected in the restless quarters. On 
the afternoon of the 4th the boulevards, from the 
Madeleine to the Rue du Sentier, were occupied by a 
great body of troops awaiting orders to move east 
through the Boulevard Bonne Nouvelle upon the bar- 
ricaded district. The soldiers stood at ease, and the 
officers lounged about, smoking their cigars. The 


sidewalks, windows, and balconies were crowded with 
men, women, and children, thoughtless onlookers of 
the great military display. Suddenly a single shot 
was heard. It was fired from a window near the Rue 
du Sentier. The troops at the head of the column 
faced sharply to the south, and commenced a deliber- 
ate fusillade upon the crowded walks and balconies. 
The battalions farther west caught the murderous con- 
tagion, until the line of fire extended into the Boule- 
vard des Italiens. In a few moments the beautiful 
boulevards were converted into a bloody pandemonium. 
The sidewalks were strewn with corpses and stained 
with blood. The air was rent with shrieks and groans 
and the breaking of glass, while the steady, incessant 
rattling of the musketry was intensified by an occa- 
sional cannon-shot, that brought down with a crash 
the masonry from some fine fa9ade. This continued 
for nearly twenty minutes, when a lack of people to 
kill seems to have restrained the mad volleys of the 
troops. If any attempt was made by officers to check 
their men, it was wholly unavailing, and in some cases 
miserable fugitives were followed into buildings and 
massacred. Later in the day the barricades were 
attacked, and their defenders easily overcome. By 
nightfall insurgent Paris was thoroughly cowed. 

These allegations, though conflicting with sworn 
statements of Republicans and Imperialists, can hardly 
be refuted. The efforts of the Napoleonic faction to 
portray the thoughtless crowd of the boulevards as 
desperate and bloody-minded rebels have never been 
successful, while the opposition so brilliantly repre- 
sented by the author of " Histoire d'un Crime " have 
been too fierce and immoderate in their accusations 
to win public credence. The questions as to who fired 


the first shot, and whether it was fired as a signal for, 
or a menace against the miKtary, are points on which 
Frenchmen of different political parties still debate. 
It is charitable to accept M. Hugo's insinuation that 
the soldiery were drunk with the president's wine, 
even though the fact implies a low state of discipline 
in the service. 

To what extent was the president responsible for the 
boulevard horror ? M. Victor Hugo and M. de Maupas 
do not agree upon this point, and it seems useless to 
discuss it. Certain facts are indisputable. We know 
the army bore small love toward the Parisians, and 
we know it was in the streets by order of the presi- 
dent. We know that the latter was in bad company, 
and playing a dangerous game. We may discard M. 
Victor Hugo's statement as to the orders issued by 
the president from the Elys^e on the fatal day, but 
we cannot disguise the fact that the boulevard horror 
subdued Paris, and crowned his cause with success. 
In other words, Louis Napoleon was the gainer by the 
slaughter of imoffending men, women, and children, 
and in after-years, when referring to the 4th of Decem- 
ber, he found it for his interest to distort facts, and 
make figures lie.^ 

There was no deviation from time-honored customs 
in regard to the treatment of prisoners taken in arms 
against "the government." Many were executed, 
while several hundreds were transported to Africa 
and Cayenne, and so ended the heroic measures that 
were deemed necessary to shatter the power of the 
Assembly and place Louis Napoleon and his minis- 
ters in control of France. 

^ For a concise and able review of the evidence bearing^ on the 
events of the 4th of December, see T^not's Paris in DecembeTf 1851« 
ohapter vi. 


But Louis Napoleon had expressly stated in the 
proclamation that astonished Paris on the 2d that he 
made the people judge between him and the Assem- 
bly. The citizens of France were called upon to vote 
on the 20th and 21st of December "Yes" or "No" 
to the question as to whether the president should be 
sustained in the measures he had taken, should be 
empowered to draw up a new constitution, and should 
retain the presidential chair for a period of ten years. 
The army had already voted two weeks previously, 
indorsing the president with a remarkable unanimity. 
Furthermore, the vote "No," if successful, provided 
no substitute for Napoleon, and, leaving the land with- 
out a legal ruler, would of a certainty plunge it into 
anarchy. Moreover, many of the provinces were un- 
der martial law, which, taken in connection with the 
fact that the police and military machinery was in 
the hands of the president and his ministry, left but 
one possible result to the voting. Napoleon was op- 
posed in a total vote of 8,000,000, by only 640,000. 

On January 1, 1852, the morning after the result 
of the vote had been officially announced to him at the 
palace of the Elys^e, he repaired to the cathedral of 
Notre Dame, and there, in the presence of his min- 
isters and the agents of his schemes, he invoked the 
divine protection and blessing upon his future admin- 
istration of the affairs of France. 

On January 14, 1852, the new constitution was 
promulgated, which the plebiscite had empowered the 
president to frame. It eradicated almost the last 
jot of republicanism from France. The presidential 
power was well-nigh absolute, while the popular branch 
of the government was reduced to impotency. There 
was only one more step to be taken, and the republic 


would be extinct. Louis Napoleon still retained the 
title of president. On the 21st of November the 
people of France voted upon this proposition as 
framed by the Senate : " The people desire the re- 
establishment of the imperial dynasty in the person 
of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte," etc., etc. On the 1st 
of December the members of both houses repaired to 
the shades of St. Cloud, and there officially announced 
to the president that he had been elected Emperor of 
France. Since the 14th of the previous January he 
had been imperial in all but name, but now he stood 
before the world the legal inhabitant of the Tuileries, 
" Napoleon the Third, by the Grace of God and by 
the will of the people, Emperor of the French." 



Thb French Emperor's Standing in Europe. — He has Re- 
course TO THE Eastern Question. — The Quarrel over 
THE Holy Places. — The Attitude of Russia. — The French 
Ambassador carries his Point. — Wrath op the Czar. — 
Nesselrode on the Situation. — Menschikoff's Mission 
TO Constantinople. — ' Lord Stratford as Peacemaker. — 
Menschikoff's Demand and its Reception bt the Porte, — 
Stratford's Position. — European Suspicion of Russia. — 
Attitude of the Powers on the Eastern Question. — 
England the most interested. — The Czar's Visit to Eng- 
land IN 1844. — "The Sick Man" Interviews and their 
Result. — Strength of the Czar's Claim to a Protector- 
ate. — Progress of Menschikoff's Mission. — He is op- 
posed BY Stratford. — Menschikoff's Ultimatum. — Strat- 
ford's Communication to the Sultan. — Position in which 
England was placed by it. — Failure of Menschikoff's 
Mission. — The Russian Army crosses the Pruth. — The 
Czar's Proclamation. — The Vienna Congress. — The War 
Fever in Turkey. — The Franco-English Fleet enters 
the Sea of Marmora. — Turkey and Russia at War. 

The influence of the coup d'etat extended far 
beyond the limits of France. The bold overthrow of 
the popular assembly was a bitter blow to the friends 
of constitutional government in all countries, and 
however satisfactory the results may have been to the 
despotic continental sovereigns, the methods adopted 
by the president for their consummation awakened 
toward him, in every court, a feeling of distrust. In 
England the news of the coup Wetat was received 
with mingled feelings of horror and alarm. Lord 


Palmerston, then foreign secretary, alone seems to 
have approved it, and his unwise avowal of his views 
resulted in his withdrawal from the cabinet. 

The French emperor began to appreciate the fact 
that in aU qiuirters he was looked at askance. He 
also realized the absolute necessity of making some 
move that should overshadow the hideous events of 
the coup d'etat. The prestige, and perhaps the ex- 
istence, of his government depended upon his making 
himself a prominent figure in European politics. 

For a number of generations in Europe there has 
been one question that, carelessly or maliciously 
touched upon, has never failed to stimulate strife and 
discord among the nations. This is "the Eastern 
Question," the problem how to settle the disputes, 
political and religious, in the east of Europe. In 
1850 it had temporarily ceased to disturb the con- 
tinental councils, and Europe was rejoicing in a res- 
pite from the diplomatic strife that always attends 
its agitation. But Louis Napoleon deliberately ap- 
plied the torch that kindled Eastern fanaticism, when 
he instructed the French ambassador at Constantino- 
ple to demand from the Porte a strict enforcement of 
the grant in regard to the Holy Places. Lord John 
Russell accused France directly in a letter to Lord 
Cowley, then British ambassador at Paris, of inter- 
rupting the general concord : " Her majesty's govern- 
ment cannot avoid perceiving that the ambassador of 
France at Constantinople was the first to disturb the 
status quo in which the matter rested." 

The Holy Places is the general title applied to 
those sacred precincts about the Church of the Holy 
Sepulchre in Jerusalem where tradition has located 
the scenes of the sufferings, death, and burial of the 


Saviour. The dispute for the protectorate of these 
sacred shrines has been maintained for centuries be- 
tween the Greek and Latin churches. In the year 
1740 France, as the champion of the Latin Church, 
succeeded in obtaining from the Porte a grant of dis- 
tinguished privileges in regard to these sacred shrines. 
Later, however, the Greeks pushed their claims with 
greater zeal than their rivals, and succeeded from 
time to time in obtaining firmans from the Sultan, 
which were in nearly every case opposed to the con- 
cession. France, as the champion of the Latin cause, 
silently acquiesced, until the zealous Greeks and the 
world at large came to regard the grant as null and 

The emperor of Russia is the great protector of 
the Greek Church, and his popularity as a sovereign 
depends largely upon the zeal he displays in the de- 
fence of her sacred interests. The Russian people, 
religious and superstitious, regard the Holy Places of 
Jerusalem with a veneration wholly incomprehensible 
to the practical peoples of Western Europe; and 
when the French ambassador assumed to revive the 
grant of 1740, it sent a shudder of pious horror 
throughout the length and breadth of the Czar's 

The French ambassador at Constantinople, upon 
finding his demands refused by Turkish statesmen 
imbued with fear of Russia, openly threatened the 
use of a French naval force, and even hinted at a 
military occupation of Jerusalem. The Russian 
envoy was less violent, but no less firm, than the rep- 
resentative of France. Some concessions were made 
by both sides, until fiually the questions in dispute 
were narrowed down to such points as these : whether 


the Latins should possess a key to the great door of 
the Church of Bethlehem, and the privilege of placing 
in the grotto of the Nativity a silver star with the 
arms of France. Situated between two fierce fires, 
the Porte was in a sad quandary. Private guarantees 
of an assuring nature were made to both ambassadors, 
but were repelled with demands for public action. 
The Frenchman pressed his case unflinchingly, and 
temporarily the fear of the French fleet outweighed 
the Ottoman dread of Bussia. On December 22, 
1852, the silver star with the arms of France, having 
previously been brought from the sea with great os- 
tentation, was placed in the sanctuary of the Nativity, 
and at the same time the long-coveted key passed into 
the possession of the Latin Church. 

The Czar was in a furious rage, and all Russia was 
deeply stirred. "To the indignation of the whole 
people following the Greek ritual," wrote Count Nes- 
selrode, the Russian chancellor, to Baron Bnmnow, 
" the key of the Church of Bethlehem has been made 
over to the Latins, so as publicly to demonstrate their 
religious supremacy in the East. The mischief, then, 
is done, M. le Baron, and there is no longer any ques- 
tion of preventing it. It is now necessary to remedy 
it. The immunities of the orthodox religion which 
have been injured, the promises which the Sultan had 
solemnly given to the emperor, and which have been 
violated, call for an act of reparation. It is to obtain 
this we must labor. ... It may happen that France, 
perceiving any hesitation on the part of the Porte, 
may again have recourse to menace, and press upon it 
so as to prevent it from listening to our just demands. 
. . . The emperor has therefore considered it neces- 
sary to adopt in the outset some precautionary meas- 


ures, in order to support our negotiations, to neutral- 
ize the effect of M. Lavalette's threats, and to guard 
himself in any contingency which may occur against 
a government accustomed to act by surprises." 

There was an ominous movement in the Kussian 
military establishment, and at the time it became def- 
initely known throughout Europe that three corps 
d^armee were advancing upon the Pruth, Prince 
Menschikoff appeared in Constantinople to extort 
satisfaction from the Sultan for the affront suffered 
by the Greek Church. France was represented at 
Constantinople by M. de la Cour, who had succeeded 
M. Lavalette, and England by Lord Stratford. 
Menschikoff did not ask for an entire repeal of the 
privileges just conferred upon the Latins, but de- 
manded merely counter privileges for the Greeks. 
Chief among these were the following: that the 
Greeks should have the right to repair the cupola of 
the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, that they should 
have the precedence as regards hours of worship at 
the tomb of the Virgin, and that a Greek priest 
should always preside over the great door of the 
Church of Bethlehem. To the mind of western Eu- 
rope the questions in dispute seemed strangely trivial, 
but the Russian ambassador stood as the mouthpiece 
of an angry sovereign and millions of pious people, 
while the Frenchman represented a master bent on 
creating some disturbance which might tend to ob- 
scure the memory of his usurpation. Lord Stratford 
was the peacemaker, and notwithstanding the obstacles 
in the way, the dispute was finally settled before the 
close of April by the general acceptance of Russia's 
demands. The Greek Church had been vindicated, 
but the end was not yet. 


The Czar was not satisfied with this reparation, and 
he also realized that no concessions could render his 
subjects other than joyful for an opportunity to wreak 
vengeance upon the enemies of the church. He had 
determined to cripple Turkey, and so place his holy 
church beyond the possibility of the repetition of 
such an indignity. In fact, Menschikoff had taken 
other instructions from St. Petersburg than those 
regarding the Holy Places. No sooner had this dis- 
pute been cleared away than he demanded an acknowl- 
edgment by the Porte of the protectorate of the Chris- 
tian peoples of Turkey, which had been given to the 
Czars by virtue of the treaty of Kutchuk-K!ainardji 
in 1774. 

The Sultan knew that tha acceptance of this would 
make the Czar the practical ruler over ten millions 
of his subjects. Menschikoff pushed his demands 
haughtily, and eVen fiercely. The ministers of the 
Porte, while appreciating the results of yielding, also 
foresaw the disastrous issue attending a conflict with 
the great northern power. Behind the rough com- 
mands of the ambassador they could hear the low 
nmible of the Russian military advance, and could 
almost catch the glint of the Muscovite bayonets re- 
flected in the waters of the Pruth. 

Unsupported, they must have yielded, but an un- 
looked-for ally came to their aid. Prince Menschikoff 
soon found himself opposed, not only by the Ottoman 
ministers, but by the English ambassador as well. 
Before noticing the progress and result 'of this dip- 
lomatic contest, it will be well to glance at the gen- 
eral attitude of England in regard to the Eastern 
Question, and realize how it came about that at this 
time Lord Stratford, in behalf of his government, 


was found standing squarely in the path of Russian 
ambition as a barrier to the dissolution of the Otto- 
man Empire. 

Throughout Europe in general, but especially in 
England, a deep feeling of suspicion prevailed toward 
the great Muscovite Empire. The suddenness of its 
rise from a condition of indolent barbarism to the 
position of a first-rate power in the list of European 
states had fairly amazed the western nations of slower 
growth. The disposition of Russia to extend her 
frontiers in all directions was a serious bugbear to 
Europe, but the standing menace against Constan- 
tinople which she had maintained since the days of 
Peter the Great had always been a terror to English 
statesmen. The strongest movement on the part of 
the Russian Empire was toward the south. Political 
reasons aside, there was a deep-seated longing in the 
heart of every true Russian to liberate the Christian 
peoples of the Balkan peninsula from the Moham- 
medan yoke, and convert the mosques of the Byzan- 
tine capital into sanctuaries of their sacred church. 

The statesmen of Europe viewed this tendency of 
the Czar and his people from widely different stand- 

Prussia cared but little for the Eastern Question, 
while Austria, on the other hand, was deeply interested. 
The Russian path to the Hellespont lay through the 
Danubian Principalities, and the presence of a Russian 
force hovering upon her flank was something from 
the Austrian view never to be permitted. 

France was indifferent to the matter save in a gen- 
eral way as a Mediterranean power, but England, the 
most distant power from any scene of trouble in east- 
em Europe, was interested far beyond any of the rest. 


Though she was regarded as the leading Christian 
state of Europe, it seemed to her right and satisfac- 
tory that the fairest lands of the old Byzantine Em- 
pire should remain the possession of a foreigner and 
an infidel, whose only achievements had been those of 
treachery and blood, simply because he had no power 
to menace her line of Indian communication^ It 
seemed far better to England that the resources of 
this fair country should remain undeveloped, and that 
its Christian population should be crushed in igno- 
rance and degradation, than that it should ever pass 
into the hands of a more energetic owner, with the 
power to threaten that delicate water-way to India. 
In short, England's practical Christianity was seri- 
ously hampered by her anxiety for her possessions in 
the far East. 

Suspicion of Russia was never wholly at rest in 
England, but perhaps it was less marked than usual 
in the period immediately following the Czar's visit 
in 1844. Every one was charmed with his frank 
ways and pleasant speeches. Only a few were aware 
how far his frankness had carried him in his conver- 
sations with the cabinet ministers in regard to the 
future of Turkey. He spoke almost tenderly of her, 
but assured the ministers that however matters might 
appear upon the surface, the Ottoman power was 
surely falling to pieces. He regarded it as better 
for Europe that England and Russia should arrive 
at some imderstanding in regard to the disposition of 
the Porte's dominions before the downfall really came. 
After his return to Russia he forwarded to the Eng- 
lish government, through his chancellor, a memoran- 
dum or statement of the imderstanding existing 
between Russia and England. It was merely a repe- 


titioii of what lie had previously stated in his conver- 
sations with the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aber- 
deen. The memorandum, it seems, was never replied 
to by the English government, but was filed away 
among the state papers. Nicholas, on the supposi- 
tion that " silence gives consent," regarded the Eng- 
lish government as in sympathy with his ideas on the 
Eastern (^estion. 

The dispute in regard to the Holy Places, first en- 
gendered, as we have seen, by the French ambassador, 
had awakened the Czar from his temporary lethargy 
in regard to the fate of the Ottoman Empire. All 
Kussia was burning with religious and patriotic fervor. 
It was an imperative necessity for the Czar to retrieve 
the prestige of the church ; was it not also the fitting 
time to break the Ottoman power in pieces with the 
weapon which the outraged feelings of his subjects 
had placed at his command ? 

His influence at Berlin was all powerful, and Prus- 
sia was his friend. The memory of the Hungarian 
revolt was not forgotten in Vienna, and he felt secure 
in the friendship of the young Kaiser. England was 
engrossed in commercial pursuits and opposed to war, 
and furthermore her statesmen had been in accord 
with his views in regard to Turkey for years. France 
was the only power he had to reckon with, and 
France unsupported would hardly deem it wise to 
combat his schemes. This was unquestionably the 
general line of argument that Nicholas was following 
at the opening of the year 1853. 

On January 9 a ball was given at the palace of 
the Archduchess Helen in St. Petersburg. Few who 
mingled in the brilliant throng on that winter's even- 
ing dreamed that the occasion was destined to become 


more famous in the diplomatic than in the social 
annals of Europe. In the course of the festivities 
the Czar drew aside with the British ambassador, Sir 
G. Hamilton Seymour, and in his frank, engaging 
way divulged his views, as to a sympathetic hearer. 
The conversation was upon the prospects of Turkey 
and its speedy downfall, and was renewed again and 
again during the few days succeeding. "We have 
on our hands a sick man, a very sick man," said the 
emperor ; " it will be a great misfortune if, one of these 
days, he should slip away from us before the neces- 
sary arrangements have been made." He declared 
that he did not desire a permanent Kussian occupation 
of Constantinople and would allow no other power 
that privilege. He preferred that the Christian prov- 
inces north of the Balkan Mountains should become 
independent states imder his protection. If England 
wanted Egypt " he had no objection to offer ; " if Can- 
dia, he would not oppose her. He dwelt especially 
upon the sad condition of the Christian peoples under 
Turkish rule, and the duty that devolved upon him 
to exercise a protecting care over them. This duty 
was made incumbent upon him, he explained, by the 
treaty of 1774. The Czar sought these conferences 
for the purpose of acquainting the English government 
with his intentions and eliciting a ratification of the 
views expressed in the memorandum of 1844. The 
response to his overtures was far different from what 
he had expected, and chilling in the extreme. It was 
hardly customary. Lord Aberdeen replied, to distrib- 
ute the possessions of a friendly state still in exist- 
ence. England had not lost confidence in the stabil- 
ity of the Turkish government. 

The Czar was enraged at the useless exposure of 


his schemes. At least, he argued, if England is not 
in sympathy, she will not fight ; the English people are 
opposed to fighting. Then he dispatched Menschi- 
koff to Constantinople, literally to force a quarrel, — 
a quarrel in which the wrongs of the church would 
be thoroughly revenged, and the hateful dominion of 
the Sultan overthrown. Thus it was that in the 
spring of 1853, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire 
being threatened. Lord Stratford was at Constanti- 
nople stimulating the Turkish ministers to resist the 
demands of Prince Menschikoff and his imperial mas- 

Russia's claim to a protectorate over the Greek 
Christians was based solely upon the treaty of Ku- 
tchuk-Kainardji. This treaty was forced upon the 
Sultan by Catherine II. after her victorious war in 
1774. The Ottoman power had been thoroughly 
humbled, and by the terms of the treaty Russia 
gained vast territorial acquisitions and the free navi- 
gation of Turkish waters. Furthermore this treaty 
allowed Russia to erect a Christian church in Con- 
stantinople, to be always imder her protection. 

It was in reference to this church that Russia and 
Europe were openly at variance in 1853. Russia 
claimed that when the Sultan allowed the right of 
Russian interference in the case of the Constantinople 
church, he admitted her claim to do likewise in behalf 
of all Christians within his dominions. Turkey denied 
that any such protectorate was implied. A superficial 
glance at the disputed clauses seems adverse to the 
Russian view of the case, but it is interesting to note 
that even among her enemies Russia has found prom- 
inent defenders of her position.^ Lord John Russell^ 

^ Mr. Gladstone has defended Kussia's position in this matter. 


perhaps unintentionally, justified tlie Kussian claim at 
a critical time. In writing to Sir G. Hamilton Sey- 
mour at St. Petersburg under date of February 9, 
1853, lie said : " The more the Turkish government 
adopts the rules of impartial law and equal adminis- 
tration, the less will the emperor of Russia find it 
necessary to apply that exceptional protection which 
his imperial majesty has found so burdensome and 
inconvenient, though no doubt prescribed by duty and 
sanctioned by treaty." This was pleasant reading to 
Nicholas. He had stated to the English ambassador 
in his famous "sick man" interviews that he was 
bound by treaty to protect the Christians of the Bal- 
kan peniasula, and Ls letter was a virtual a^knowl- 
edgment of his claim. He felt that he could press 
the Porte without fear of England. Perhaps it was 
due in some part to this admission of Lord John Rus- 
sell's that the Czar failed to comprehend for so long 
a time that Lord Stratford really represented the 
spirit of the English government. 

Prince Menschikoff had arrived at Constantinople 
early in March. liord Stratford arrived upon the 
6th of April. Count Nesselrode had given the Eng- 
lish government to understand that MenschikofiPs mis- 
sion concerned solely the question of the Holy Places. 
The English government thought otherwise, and Lord 
Stratford soon found that their suspicions were well 
grounded. In four days he had won the confidence of 
the Turkish ministry so far as to learn that Menschi- 
koff had been pressing upon them the Czar's claim for 
a protectorate, and urging, fu^hermore, the necessity 
of strict secrecy in the matter. By the time the dis- 
pute over the Holy Places had been settled, it had 
become useless for the Russian ambassador to attempt 


longer to preserve secrecy in regard to the more im- 
portant matter. It was plain to him that Lord Strat- 
ford was aware of the nature of his demands, and that 
he was responsible for the increasing firmness of the 
Turkish ministry. He saw, to his chagrin, the terror 
inspired by his harsh commands and the presence of 
the army on the Pruth failing to impress the mind of 
the Sultan under the counsel and support of the Eng- 
Ksh ambassador. 

On May 5 Menschikoff, in a haughty note, openly 
demanded of the Porte an immediate compliance with 
the requests of the emperor of Russia in regard to 
the protectorate of the Greek Christians in Turkey, 
declaring in conclusion that he could not " consider 
longer delay in any other light than as a want of re- 
spect towards his government, which would impose 
upon him the most painful duty." This was just one 
month after Stratford's arrival. The matter had 
been under active discussion for three weeks, and it 
was evident that the Kussian ambassador was deter- 
mined to push things to a conclusion. 

The Turkish ministry were seriously alarmed at this 
peremptory summons. They conferred anxiously with 
Lord Stratford, and sought to obtain from him some 
pledge of material aid in case they pushed the Czar 
too far by their opposition. In this they were un- 
successful ; Stratford counseled them to firmness and 
patience, and wrote to Menschikoff, pointing out to 
him the danger of the path in which his imperial 
master was treading, and the deep stain that he was 
bringing upon his hitherto just and temperate reign. 
Menschikoff was immovable, and the Porte was 
brought to another pitiful strait. As a last resort 
Stratford requested a private audience with the Sul- 


tan, and then informed him that in ease the Turkish 
integrity was seriously threatened, he should order 
the admiral of the English Mediterranean fleet to 
hold himself in readiness for service. The effect of 
this communication was electrifying. The quick- 
witted pashas comprehended its full import. It was 
something tangible, it smacked of men and guns, and 
was far more satisfactory than any amount of disin- 
terested counsel. 

England was rapidly drifting into a critical posi- 
tion. Lord Stratford had not openly opposed the 
Kussian claims, but the Czar realized that the English 
ambassador alone stood between him and the accom 
plishment of his desires. Stratford rebuked every 
sign of wavering in the Ottoman councils, and always 
advocated refusal to the Russian demands. He be- 
came absolutely responsible for the strength of the 
Turkish opposition. 

On the 10th Menschikoff received from the Porte 
a courteous but firm refusal of all his demands regard- 
ing the protectorate, and after a few days more of 
fruitiess threatening he declared his mission at an end. 
Before this Lord Stratford had assembled the am- 
bassadors of the three powers for consultation, and 
secured their approval of the course so far pursued 
by the Ottoman government. On the 21st, taking 
with him the entire legation, Menschikoff departed for 
Kussia to face the wrath of an angry and disappointed 

Upon the receipt of the intelligence of Menschi- 
koff's failure. Count Nesselrode immediately informed 
Keschid Pasha that " in a few weeks the Russian troops 
will receive the order to cross the boundaries of the em- 
pire, not for the purpose of making war, but in order 


to obtain material guarantees," etc. Almost at the 
same time with the receipt of Nesselrode's threat, 
Lord Stratford received from Lord Clarendon a state- 
ment to the effect that England was *' bound to main- 
tain the independence of Turkey," and that " the use 
of force was to be resorted to as a last and unavoid- 
able resource." From this time England was hope- 
lessly bound to the Porte. The policy of Lord Strat- 
ford had of necessity brought her to a pass where she 
was in honor compelled to sustain the Sultan in any 
crisis that might arise from the stand he had taken 
against the Czar. 

On the 3d of July the vanguard of the Kussian 
army crossed the Pruth and entered Moldavia. 
"Having exhausted all persuasion," declared the 
emperor to his faithful subjects, " we have found it 
needful to advance our armies into the Danubian 
Principalities, in order to show the Ottoman Porte to 
what its obstinacy may lead. But even now we have 
not the intention to commence war. By the occupa- 
tion of the principalities we desire to have such a 
security as will insure us the restoration of our 

However the presence of Kussian troops in tbe 
principalities might be interpreted by the Czar, it 
was practically an invasion of the territory of the 
Porte, and as such formed a good and sufficient casus 
belli. Lord Stratford, however, held the belligerent 
party at Constantinople in check, and the ministry 
were not slow in realizing that their safety depended 
on the closeness and fidelity with which they followed 
his instructions. 

Diplomatists did not despair, even after this hostile 
move of the Czar. The representatives of the four 


powers assembled in Vienna during July for another 
effort to settle the questions in dispute without war. 
The fruit of this meeting was the drafting of an 
agreement purporting to come from the Sultan. This 
paper, which became famous under the title of " The 
Vienna Note," practically insured to the Czar the 
right of a protectorate, thus yielding the chief point 
of dispute. If there could have been any doubt of 
this fact, it was dispelled by the extreme eagerness 
with which the proposals were received by the St. 
Petersburg cabinet. The note reached Constantinople 
early in August. Lord Stratford declared it to be 
a complete acceptance of all Russia's objectionable 
demands, and under his direction the clauses in regard 
to the protectorate were amended in such a way as to 
make it plain that the Sultan, and he alone, should 
exercise a tender watchfulness over the Greek Chris- 
tians in his dominions. The note in its altered form 
was promptly rejected at St. Petersburg. The Vienna 
Congress came to an end, leaving matters exactly as 
they stood before its labors began. 

This was the last serious effort made toward the 
preservation of peace. The war feeling throughout 
the Moslem population of the Sultan's dominions 
grew in intensity day by day. The ministry did not 
fail to take advantage of this, and to warn the ambas- 
sadors of foreign courts in Constantinople that the 
peace of the city and the lives of Christians were 
seriously jeopardized in consequence. The impres- 
sion upon the French ambassador was so strong that 
he openly advocated to his government the expediency 
of moving the French fleet from Besika Bay to Con- 
stantinople. This was exactly what the Ottoman 
ministry wished. The Emperor Napoleon, perhaps 


nothing loath to force hostilities, called the attention 
of the British cabinet to the subject, and strenuously 
urged the policy of sending the allied fleets into the 
Sea of Marmora. The English government had a 
reapect for treaties, and demurred. Under the treaty 
of 1841 no war vessel was allowed to enter the Dar* 
danelles in time of peace. The English cabinet were 
not certain as to whether the state of affairs between 
Kussia and Turkey could be regarded as one of war. 
Omar Pasha, the Turkish commander, had on Octo- 
ber 8 summoned the Russian forces to evacuate the 
principalities within fifteen days, and upon the ac^ 
ceptance or refusal of this demand the question of 
war was hanging. The influence of the French em- 
peror, however, prevailed, and on the 22d the com- 
bined fleets steamed through the Dardanelles into the 
Sea of Marmora, and came to anchor off Constanti- 
nople. On the next day, Omar Pasha's summons 
hi^ving been disregarded, Turkey was openly at W4r 
with Kussia* 


The Russiak Army sntebs ^oja>ayvl. — The Mhjtabt Blitvdeb 


The Turks cross the Daitubb. — FioHTiNa about Kaxafat. — 
The Czar determines upon the Offensive. — The Career of 
Paskeyich. — His Advice to the Ckab. — The Russians cross 
the Danube. — Siege of Sujstria and Fall of Paskevigh. — 
Austria interferes. — Retreat of the Russian Army and 


— Entry of the Turkish and Austrian Armtks. — Isolation 
of the Czar in Europe. 

The Kussian army entered Moldavia under cotn- 
mand of Prince Gortscliakoff , and the advance was 
made without haste.^ Gortschakoff established his 
headquarters at Bucharest, where he was received in 
great pomp by the nobility and functionaries of the 
church. In a few weeks the advanced posts were on 
the Danube and the uniform of the Czar was a com- 
mon sight in the streets of the larger towns. The 
strength of the army during the first weeks of the 
occupation was close upon 75,000 men, with 74 guns. 

Upon the declaration of war by Turkey, the power 
of this army was compromised by the foolish decision 

^ Prince Mikhail Qortsohakoff. He entered ihe Russian anny in 
1807, took part in the Persian campaign in 1810 and those of 1812-15 
against Franoe. He also served in the Turkish campaigpi of 1828, 
the Polish campaign of 1831, and commanded the Russian artillery 
against the Hungarians in 1849. He must not be confounded with hia 
brother Prince Peter, who figured as a corps commander at the Alma 
and Inkermann. 


of the Czar which Nesselrode dispatched to all the 
European courts on October 31. He declared that 
notwithstanding the declaration of war the Kussian 
troops would still refrain from the offensive and 
merely stand in defense of the principalities. This 
rendered it incumbent upon Gortschakoff to cover 
nearly the whole length of the Danube from Widdin 
to Gralatz, making it possible for the Turks to fall 
upon his extended line at any point in overwhelming 

Throughout the negotiations at Constantinople the 
Porte had been steadily preparing for war, and the 
fanatical hatred of the Moslem for the Giaour had 
been thoroughly whetted. When imbued with this 
religious zeal and ably led, the fierce soldiery of the 
Sultan have always proved themselves the equals of 
any in Europe. They are at their best when com- 
manded by officers of foreign birth and education, 
and in the campaigns of the Danube in 1853-54 they 
were officered by representatives of the two peoples 
principally interested in checking Russian aggression. 
Omar Pasha, the Ottoman generalissimo, was an 
Austrian, while in nearly every critical engagement 
the Turkish soldiers were encouraged to success by 
volunteers from the service of the English queen. 

Toward the close of October, Omar Pasha had un- 
der his command in Bulgaria a Turkish army of at 
least 120,000 men. He was quick to see and improve 
the advantage offered by the mistake of his enemy, and 
commenced massing troops at Widdin, situated on the 
Danube just above the point where its course changes 
to the east. Opposite Widdin, in Wallachia, is the 
smaller town of Kalafat, and on October 28 the 
Turkish force crossed the river and occupied it after 


a short skirmisli. The result of the move was to 
establish a strong Turkish defense squarely upon the 
Russian flank. Another crossing was made by the 
Turks from Turtukai to Oltenitza, while they also 
met with temporary success in an attempt from Silis^ 
tria upon Kalarash. 

These were practically the only movements of the 
year, the approach of winter and the enforced in. 
activity of the Russians conducing to a temporary 
lulL About the middle of November, Omar Pasha 
withdrew his troops from Oltenitza, leaving the force 
at Kalaf at his only large detachment on WaUachian 
soil. The position of this force was too serious a 
menace to be left unheeded by the Russian com- 
mander, who proceeded to mass his available troops 
in Lesser Wallachia* Achmet Pasha, commanding 
the garrison at Kalaf at, determined to anticipate the 
Russian attack, and on the 6th of January moved 
with 15,000 men against CState. A Russian brigade 
held the village, and had thrown up earthworks in 
its rear. The Turks attacked the village furiously 
with the bayonet, and in the streets and lanes a terri- 
ble conflict took place. The Russians, heavily clothed 
and accoutred, were soon worsted by their agile ad- 
versaries, but driven from the streets they threw 
themselves into the houses and maintained a desper- 
ate resistance. It was fochr hours before the last 
Russian detachment was dislodged, and by that time 
their supports were at hand. Achmet Pasha brought 
up his Teserves to confront these troops, whose move- 
ment placed him between two fires and threatened his 
communications with Kalafat. The Russians ad- 
vanced in close column under cover of their artillery, 
and despite their numerical inferiority they finally 


recaptured Citate and compelled the retirement of the 
Turks upon Kalafat.^ During the week succeeding 
there was severe and indecisive fighting, after which 
the Kussians commenced a leisurely retreat toward 
the east, abandoning finally the object of their ad- 

The Russian situation was by no means promising. 
The Czar, mortified at the Ottoman successes, deter- 
mined to relinquish his defensive plan, and inaugurate 
without delay an invasion of Turkey. To insure suc- 
cess he called Prince Paskevich, and sought his coun- 
sel as to the best way to push his battalions to the 
Bosphorous. Paskevich, then an old man, was an 
honored soldier and the most successful general that 
Kussia possessed. He first saw service in 1805, and 
fought in the campaign that ended with the disastrous 
sunset of Austerlitz. In 1812-14 he was again in 
the field, participating in the battle of Leipsic and 
the victorious march to Paris. In 1825 he led the 
armies of the Czar in a victorious campaign against 
the Persians, and in the Turkish campaign of 1828-29 
he conquered Armenia, subjugating even the great 
fortresses of Kars and Erzerovun. In 1831, when 
Poland was in revolt, it was his firm if cruel hand 
that crushed out the insurrection. In 1848 he en- 
tered Hungary at the head of the imperial troops, 
and in 1850 the fiftieth anniversary of his entry into 
the military service was celebrated at Warsaw amid 
general rejoicing, and the sovereigns of Austria and 
Prussia created him field marshal in their respective 


1 This action was reported in Vienna, London, and Paris as a great 
Turkish victory. Achmet Pasha's course certainly protected Kalaf at 
from an attack, if he cannot be credited with winning a victory in 
the field. 


armies. With this event the old soldier would will- 
ingly have closed his active career, but the summons 
of the Czar in 1854 found him ready for service as 
heretofore. Paskevich insisted that it was useless to 
attempt to cover the length of the Danube, and that 
Lesser Wallachia should be abandoned. An invasion 
of Turkey, he contended, was only feasible via Silis- 
tria and Shumla, and the success of this plan de- 
pended upon the ability of the imperial troops to re- 
duce Silistria by the 1st of May. 

The pride of the Czar was touched at having to 
relinquish any portion of his "material guarantee," 
but he yielded nevertheless to the hard counsel of his 
general. The Bussian military establishment entered 
into vigorous action once again. Heavy masses of 
troops began to converge upon the Danube toward 
Silistria, while all through April the Moldavian vil- 
lagers witnessed the march of fresh battalions pass- 
ing southward from Bussia to the front. 

But the Czar had waited too long, and no amount 
of ene;rgy could now retrieve his failing fortunes. 
Russia was openly at war with both France and Eng- 
land, and their fleets had been blockading the Black 
Sea since the opening of the year. Furthermore, 
Austria was increasing her army on her eastern fron- 
tier and the Vienna cabinet left no room for doubt as 
to its purpose. Paskevich knew well that even if 
Silistria fell by May 1, if his hardy soldiers succeeded 
in forcing the intrenched camp at Shumla, and indeed 
if they should pass the Balkan range in the face of 
the Ottoman resistance, all this would be but the pref- 
ace to a sterner conflict beyond. On the plains of 
Eoumelia, if not before, he would have to face the 
combined strength of England and France. Nor 


was this the worst feature of his dilemma. The Aus- 
trian army was a yet more fatal menace, possessing as 
it did the power to break in upon his flank. By 
April 1 the Czar had lost his last chance of pushing 
his forces within sight of the minarets of St. Sophia. 
Paskevich entered upon his difficult task in the hope, 
perhaps, of gaining for Bussia a position of some mili- 
tary advantage, when she might be better prepared to 
throw her case upon arbitration. 

Silistria, with about 20,000 inhabitants, was a for- 
tified Bulgarian town on the Danube, forming at this 
time with Bustchuk and Shimda a formidable military 
triangle. Its naturally strong defenses had been ren- 
dered almost impregnable during the year 1853 by 
the erection of a series of detached forts on the south 
and southeast. The Turkish attempts to cross the 
Danube here had been unsuccessful, and when the 
Czar removed the restrictions from his troops they 
forced a passage and laid siege to the town on the Bul- 
garian side. About the same time the Bussians 
crossed the river lower down near Matchin, and after 
a little fighting obtained control of that large but 
unhealthy tract of country known as the Dobrudscha. 
Omar Pasha, leaving Moussa Pasha with 15,000 men 
to defend Silistria as best he could, began to concen- 
trate all his available troops about Shumla. 

Paskevich arrived to superintend in person the 
siege of Silistria, but May was far advanced before 
serious operations commenced. The 1st of June 
found its defenses terribly battered by the Bussian 
artillery, but still stubbornly defended by the soldiers 
of the Sultan. Paskevich was badly wounded and 
obliged to relinquish his command, while the gar- 
rison of Silistria was reduced to extremities. Moussa 


Paslia was killed on June 2, and the command de- 
volved upon Hussein Pasha. After this the affairs 
of the garrison became daily more desperate until the 
efforts of the besiegers suddenly relaxed.^ An influ* 
ence more potent than Ottoman military succor had 
come to the deliverance of beleaguered Silistria. 

On the 3d of Jime Austria had formally sum* 
moned the Czar to withdraw his troops from the 
Danubian Principalities. This fell like a death-knell 
upon the heavy-hearted Autocrat of all the Bussias. 
He had seen his hopes for a conquest of Turkey fad- 
ing away, and had beheld with pain the woimding of 
his greatest general and the aimless slaughter of his 
choicest troops. These were as nothing, however, 
compared with the ingratitude of Francis Joseph. 
He had "i-eckoned" upon Austria because he felt 
secure of the Kaiser's love.^ 

On the 14th of Jime the fate of the Czar's cam- 
paign was finally sealed by the agreement signed 
between Austria and Turkey, wherein it was declared 
that ^^his majesty the emperor of Austria engages 
to exhaust all the means of negotiation, and all other 
means, to obtain the evacuation of the Danubian Prin- 
cipalities by the foreign army which occupies them, 
and even to employ, in case they are required, the 

^ Lientenant Nasmyth, an English officer of the garrison, npon 
-whose statements English aecoonts of the sieg^ haye been generally 
founded, estimates the Russian losses at twelve thousand men. Qten." 
eral Todleben, on the other hand, ridicules the much vaunted defense 
of Silistria, and declares the Russian casualties during the inyestment 
amounted to only twenty-five hundred, or an average of fifty a day. 

^ In one of the rick man interviews with Sir Hamilton Seymour 
the Czar spoke of his relations with Austria as follows : '* Ton must 
understand that when I speak of Russia, I speak of Austria as well. 
What suits one suits the other. Our interests as reg^ards Turkey axe 
perfectly identieal." 


number of troops necessary to attain this end." " The 
number of troops necessary " were already in position 
awaiting orders to sweep down upon the Kussian flank 
and rear. Furthermore, the green uplands about 
Varna were already whitened by the camps of the 
French and English soldiery. It was clear that the 
Austrian summons was not to be disregarded. 

On the morning of June 23 the weary defenders 
of Silistria awoke to find the Bussian works deserted 
and their recent occupants across the Danube retreat- 
ing northward. The troops in the Dobrudscha like- 
wise began to retire, and soon all the roads leading to 
the north were crowded by the broken and retreating 
battalions of the Czar. Omar Pasha, stealing out of 
his camp at Shumla, cautiously advanced as his foes 
retired, and on July 7 the final engagements of 
the campaign were fought in the neighborhood of 
Giurgevo. The Turkish soldiery crossed the river 
in small detachments from Rustchuk, and furiously 
assailed the retiring Muscovites. On an island close 
to the Giurgevo shore the fighting was especially 
fierce, and cost the lives of several English officers 
who were leading the Ottoman troops. The day's 
fighting may have served to increase the rapidity of 
the Russian retreat, but the results were hardly com- 
mensurate with the loss of life. After these engage- 
ments Omar Pasha crossed the Danube in force from 
Rustchuk and moved leisurely upon Bucharest. 

On July 28 Prince Gortschakoff, having already 
informed the Wallachians that his troops were to be 
temporarily withdrawn, broke up his headquarters at 
Bucharest, and ten days later a Turkish army entered. 
On the 6th of September the principalities were des- 
tined to undergo one more humiliation, when the 


Austrian troops under Count Coronini marched into 
Bucharest. Coronini prochiimed to the Wallachians 
that his troops came among them as friends, and 
would remain only as long as danger existed of a 
second Russian occupation of the territory of the 

The Bussian Czar, as the smnmer of 1854 was 
waning, found himself hopelessly isolated from the 
consummation of his dearest schemes. He was openly 
at war with England, France, and Turkey, while any 
move toward Constantinople was sure to be opposed 
by Austrian as well as Ottoman bayonets. The fleets 
of England and France controlled the Black Sea, and 
compelled the retirement of his inferior squadrons 
under the guns of Sebastopol. It was literally the 
Czar against all Europe. With anger and sorrow 
Nicholas realized the bitter truth that with all his 
vast army, and the years of careful preparation he 
had lavished upon it, he stood powerless against these 
overwhelming odds. 



Francs and England in 1853. — Causb of tbs Emfkbob'b Fob« 
wABDNEss. — His Invluence over the English Goyebnment. 

— The Battle of Sinope. — Injustice of Public Sentiment 
IN England and France respecting rr. — The EitPEROR ad- 
vocates A Natal Seizure of the Black Sea. — He cARRisg 
HIS Point. — Rage of the Czar. — Correspondence between 
THE Emperor and the Czar. — Declaration of War by Eng- 
land AND France and Signature of the Treatt of Alliance. 

— Austria's Warlike Attitude. — The Allied Commanders. 

— Character of Lord Raglan. — The Allies at Constanti- 
nople AND AT Varna. — Ravages of the Cholera. — Lord 
Raglan's Views on the Invasion of the Crimea. — ^The Allies 


The great western powers were at war with Bussia. 
A narrative of the events that preceded the declara- 
tion of hostilities will help to demonstrate upon whose 
shoulders should rest the responsibility for this disturb- 
ance of the continental peace. 

If Stratford's course at Constantinople had bound 
England to support the Sultan, then France was 
bound to the support of England. As early as Jan- 
uary, 1853, the Emperor Napoleon had expressed the 
opinion to the English cabinet that France and Eng- 
land together should preserve " the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire." On July 8, 1853, Lord Palmer- 
ston declared in the House of Commons " that Eng- 
land and France were agreed, that they continued to 
follow the same policy, and that they had the most 


perfect confidence in each other." The speech from 
the throne was to the same effect. 

In fact, so vigorously had the Paris government 
adopted the hereditary English views on the Eastern 
Question that it actually pushed Lord Aberdeen and 
his ministers into decisive measures which otherwise 
they might have been slow to adopt. 

The question naturally arises, Why should France 
have thrust herself so prominently forward in a mat- 
ter so foreign to her interest as the Eastern Question ? 
It was not France which was responsible, but the 
French emperor. It was the same influence that led 
M. Lavalette to threaten the Porte with fleets and 
armies during the first debates on the Holy Places. 
Napoleon was bent on a showy policy, and was willing 
to enter upon any course that promised prestige for 
his government. The English people, from the queen 
downward, had been shocked at his coup d'etat^ and he 
well knew the moral effect which an English alliance 
would have upon his standing in Europe. England's 
" hobby," so to speak, being the Eastern Question, 
he adopted unreservedly her policy. His gratifica- 
tion must have been keen when, as the months went 
by, he found his influence over Lord Aberdeen's 
cabinet steadily growing, until at last it became all 

Through the spring of 1853, while Lord Stratford 
was duelling with Menschikoff at Stamboul, the hand 
of the French emperor did not prominently appear, 
and his representative at Vienna agreed to the Note 
which it was hoped would preserve the peace of Eu- 
rope. Upon the rejection of this, however, and the 
entry of the Russian troops into the principalities, 
while still retaining his representative at the Vienna 


Congress, he commenced to urge warlike measures 
upon the London cabinet. It was his influence that 
sent the allied fleets to Constantinople on the 22d of 
October, one day before Russia and Turkey were 
actually at war. 

The presence of a foreign war-flag in the Sea of 
Marmora was perhaps the most galling affront that 
Nicholas could suffer. Whether or not there was any 
immediate connection between this event and the one 
which followed, the movement of the allied fleets was 
terribly revenged on the 30th of November. It had 
been known for several days to the Turkish ministers, 
and the allied admirals as well, that the Bussian fleet 
was cruising in the Black Sea, and that, if so disposed, 
it could easily annihilate the inferior Turkish squad- 
ron at Sinope. The Turkish commander at Sinope 
realized the danger, and repeatedly warned his govern- 
ment of the great peril in which he stood. Perhaps 
Turkey, like England and the rest of Europe, was 
lulled into a sense of security by Nesselrode's declara- 
tion of October 31, that Kussia would '' remain with 
folded arms, resolved only to resist all aggression." ^ 
At all events, the appeal of the Turkish admiral re- 
mained unheeded, while Omar Pasha attracted all 
attention by his brilliant operations on the Danube. 
Early in December the tidings reached Constanti- 
nople that the Sultan's fleet at Sinope had been de- 
stroyed ; that four thousand men had been killed, and 
the town of Sinope itself badly battered by Bussian 
broadsides. The news was received with dismay by 
the Ottoman government, while in England and 

^ This expression was used by Nesselrode in conyersation with Sir 
Hamilton Seymonr, but the same idea was embodied in the October 


France it aroused a storm of rage. All England 
was stirred to its depths, and so unreasonable had 
popular opinion become that the Czar was univer- 
sally condemned as having broken his plighted word. 
He stood before the English people as a man devoid 
of honor, with innocent blood upon his hands. The 
Sinope affair was never dignified by the title of " bat- 
tle," but was alluded to as a treacherous massacre. 
English writers of the present day, in cooler blood, 
candidly admit the distortion of public opinion on 
this point. In the activity of Omar Pasha, whose 
achievements on the Danube they applauded to the 
echo, the public failed to detect any provocation for 
aggressive measures on the part of tiie Czar. The 
presence of the allied fleet at Constantinople was en- 
tirely overlooked, as was also the fact that the first 
shot at Sinope had been fired by a Turkish vessel. 

The voice of the nation was for war, and the cabinet 
with its peaceable hopes and projects came to repre- 
sent but tamely the spirit of the masses. 

The French government declared the " massacre " 
of Sinope to be an insult to France, perpetrated as it 
was ahnost under the guns of the allied fleet. The 
English cabinet, while deploring the event, was little 
inclined to take a decisive step. Lord Palmerston 
resigned in consequence ; but as December advanced. 
Napoleon again tried his hand with the London states- 
men. He urged that a summons should be immedi- 
ately forwarded to St. Petersburg to this effect, " that 
France and England were resolved to prevent the rep- 
etition of the affair of Sinope, and that every Rus- 
sian ship thenceforward met in the Euxine would be 
requested and, if necessary, constrained to return to 
Sebastopol; and that any act of aggression after- 


wards attempted against the Ottoman territory or 
flag would be repelled by force." The English cab- 
inet yielded, and Palmerston returned. Napoleon's 
responsibility in this move is clearly shown by Lord 
Clarendon's statement that the government " believed 
the whole matter might be left to the discretion of 
the admirals, but they attach so much importance, not 
alone to the united action of the two governments, but 
to the instructions addressed to their respective agents 
being precisely the same, that they are prepared to 
adopt the specific mode of action now proposed by 
the government of the emperor." 

In compliance with instructions forwarded from 
Paris and London, the allied fleets entered the Black 
Sea on the 4th of January, 1854. A few days later 
the Emperor Nicholas at St. Petersburg was officially 
informed of the determination to drive his flag from 
the Euxine. He responded by recalling his legations 
from Paris and London. If the presence of hostile 
war-flags in the Dardanelles had been a thorn to the 
Czar, their appearance in the Black Sea could have 
been little less than maddening. The Black Sea he 
regarded as his own peculiar property, and in fact, 
the treaties of 1774 and 1828 had rendered it in aU 
save name a Russian lake. To see its supremacy 
snatched from him by the tremendous naval prepon- 
derance of the western powers was a staggering blow, 
and from the day that the allied fleets passed into the 
Bosphorus there never existed a chance of peace. 

The Emperor of the French now came before Eu- 
rope in the role of a pacific letter-writer, and posed 
as a ruler who was being forced into hostilities for the 
sake of principle alone. His correspondent was the 
Czar of all the Russias. If you do thus and so, 


the letter implied, peace is assured ; " if you do other- 
wise, then France as well as England would be obliged 
to leave to the arbitrament of arms and the chances 
of war that which might be decided at once by rea- 
son and justice." This letter was written with the 
knowledge and consent of the English government. 
Useless in any circumstances as a medium of peace, 
the closing threat only added fuel to the anger of the 
Czar. " Whatever your majesty may decide," replied 
Nicholas, after reviewing the letter, "threats will not 
induce me to recede. My trust is in God and in my 
right, and Russia, as I can pledge, will prove herself 
in 1854 what she was in 1812." This last reference 
to the year of the discomfiture of the grand army on 
the bleak plains of Russia could not be lost upon the 
heir of the First Napoleon. Personal animosity now 
served to quicken the movements of the Emperor of 
the French in warlike channels. 

Russia's isolation was complete. The four powers 
were in full accord as to the evacuation of the princi- 
palities and the preservation of the " integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire." Austria was bellicose in the ex- 
treme, and Prussia, while less aggressive, had entered 
into an agreement with Austria that bound them both 
alike for the protection of their respective territories. 
On the whole, the attitude of Austria, even after the 
fleets had entered the Euxine, was the most warlike 
of any of the powers. Her troops were swarming in 
the Banat and on the Transylvanian frontier, while on 
February 22 Count Buol, the Austrian chancellor, 
informed the representative of France at Vienna that 
" if England and France will fix a day for the evacua- 
tion of the principalities, the expiration of which shall 
be the signal for hostilities, the cabinet of Vienna will 
support the summons." 


On February 27 Lord Clarendon dispatched a 
special messenger to St. Petersburg ma Vienna, where, 
however, no effort was made to obtain a further pledge 
of Austria's " support." The summons declared that 
if the Czar did not pledge himself to evacuate the 
principalities by the 30th of April, " the British gov- 
ernment must consider the refusal or the silence of 
the cabinet of St. Petersburg as equivalent to a deo- 
laration of war, and will take its measures accord- 
ingly." A similar message was forwarded from Paris 
at the same time. The messengers reached the. Bus« 
sian capital on the 13th of March, and on the fifth 
day after their arrival Count Nesselrode stated that 
the emperor ^^ thought it unbecoming to make any 

On the 27th of March the Emperor of the French 
informed the Senate and Assembly that the refusal of 
his demands by the Czar had placed France in a state 
of war with Bussia. On the same day the queen 
communicated the situation to Parliament, and on the 
next issued her declaration of war. On the 10th of 
April was signe^ the treaty of alliance between Eng- 
land and France that bound them to act harmoniously 
together for the protection of the Sultan's dominions 
and the restoration of peace in Europe. They pro- 
fessed a willingness to receive any other power into 
their agreement, but were not solicitous in this re- 

The last demand of the western cabinets had been 
that the Czar should evacuate Moldavia and Wal- 
lachia, and upon his refusal they had taken up arms. 
Austria had far more interest in securing this evacua- 
tion than either of the powers which had made it their 
ultimatum. Austria's hand was upon her sword hilt. 


and apparently she was determined at all hazards to 
break the Museoyite grip on the Danubian Princi- 
palities. Perhaps she was nothing loath to find what 
seemed her own especial task undertaken by the two 
powers, which, in their hot zeal, never waited to secure 
even her cooperation. Austria was not destined to 
fire a shot, but when, after three months of hostilities, 
she found the principalities still held by the Bussian 
troops, she sternly conmianded the Czar to retire. 
What the summons of the allies, supplemented by 
three months of military and naval demonstration, 
had failed to bring about, the command of Austria 

The war fever in England increased steadily after 
the Sinope affair. For weeks before the declaration 
of war, preparations for the struggle had been vigor- 
ously pushed in all the military and naval centres. 
From time to time troops were forwarded to Malta, 
while Liverpool, Southampton, and Cork were gay 
and sad together, as to the strains of martial music 
the men marched aboard the transports. The first 
detachment of the enormous fleet destined for service 
in the Baltic under the command of Sir Charles 
Napier sailed from Spithead. The Guards departed 
for Gibraltar late in March, and upon receiving the 
news of the declaration of war were forwarded to the 

In France, too, the war was popular. No French- 
man is indifferent when an opportunity to achieve 
martial glory is in prospect. The officer appointed 
by the French emperor to command his armies in 
the field was Marshal St. Amaud, of Algerian and 
coy.p d*Stat fame. The direction of the forces of the 
queen was given to Lord Kaglan, an honorable gen* 


tleman, a brave soldier, and a friend and pupil of the 
creat duke. Lord Radian's only military experience 
L been in Welling^n's campaigns. He was his 
aide and military secretary, and lost his arm during 
the thickest of the fighting about La Haye Sainte on 
the day of Waterloo. He served as military secre- 
tary at the Horse Guards from 1827 to 1852, when 
he was made master general of the ordnance and 
raised to the peerage. In February, 1854, he was 
made a general, and in April, at sixty-six years of 
age, found himself at the head of the army destined 
for service in the East. Lord Kaglan left England 
on the 10th of April. He called at Paris, and with 
the Duke of Cambridge was received at the Tuileries 
by the emperor, presented to Marshal St. Amaud, 
and treated to a military pageant on the Champ de 

French as well as English troops began to congre- 
gate at Malta, and in the quaint streets of Yaletta 
the Zouave and Highlander met as friends and gazed 
in gaping wonder upon each other. Gallipoli was 
soon fortified by an allied force, and Constantinople 
itself was thronged with tangible evidence of the great 
alliance. Guardsmen, cuirassiers, and soldiers of the 
line jostled each other in the narrow streets, and 
swarmed in the caf 6s, while the placid sea was alive 
with the boats of pleasure-loving officers passing to 
and fro between the camps. 

As summer approached, however, and the situation 
at Silistria became more and more precarious, the 
rendezvous at Constantinople was broken up and the 
troops pushed on to Varna, to be ready if need be, to 
repel the Russians on the north of the Balkan range. 
The plans of the western powers do not seem at this 


time to have been clearly defined. If Silistria fell, 
there would be work enough in Bulgaria, beating 
back the tide of Russian invasion that would be sure 
to follow, but while the Russians were held on the 
Danube, the military councils were at sea. The 
armies concentrated slowly at Varna, but by the 1st 
of August at least 60,000 troops were in camp about 
the town. The green rolling country beyond, with 
its broad views and glimpses of the blue swelling 
Balkans, is a feast to the eye, but proved the last 
glimpse of life to many a stout soldier. Cholera ap- 
peared in the allied camps during the last of July, 
and spread rapidly through the ranks. The news 
had arrived that the siege of Silistria was raised, 
and the Russians in retreat. There was nothing left 
to stimulate the heavy-hearted troops, and the gen- 
erals saw that some change of plan must be imme- 
diately fixed upon. " We must escape from this 
sepulchre of Varna," wrote Marshal St. Amaud. 

The Russians retreating, and the Austrians in the 
principalities, the nominal end for which the expedi- 
tion had been sent out was accomplished. The west- 
em governments, however, had determined upon a 
more thorough humiliation of Russia. It was now 
that the plan for the invasion of the Crimea was pro- 
mulgated. It originated among the statesmen in 
Paris and London, and not among the soldiers in the 
field. On the 29th of June the Duke of Newcastle 
wrote to Lord Raglan advocating the reduction of 
Sebastopol with a vigor which rendered it tantamount 
to an order from the government. Lord Raglan, 
realizing the almost total ignorance that prevailed in 
regard to the Czar's strength and resources in the 
Crimea, was opposed to the plan. So were Omar 


Pasha and St. Arnaud. Lord Raglan's reply to the 
Duke of Newcastle was that of an honest soldier who 
disbelieved in the move he felt obliged to make. " It 
becomes my duty," he said, ^*to acquaint you that 
it was more in deference to the views of the British 
government as conveyed to me in your grace's dis* 
patch, and to the known acquiescence of the Emperor 
Louis Napoleon in those views, than to any informa- 
tion in the possession of the naval and military au* 
thorities, either as to the extent of the enemy's forces, 
or their state of preparation, that the decision to make 
a descent upon the Crimea was adopted." 
- The last of August the camp about Varna was 
broken up and the troops began to embark for the 
new field of action. The generals were entering upon 
the new project with doubt and misgiving, but as for 
the men, the whole mighty Muscovite army possessed 
no such dread for them as the smiling but pestilential 
couAtry they were leaving. 




Landing of the AuirKs in the Crimea. — The Advance on 
Sebastopol begins. — Prince Msnsghikoff seizes the Line 
OF THE Alma. — Character of the Position and Strength 
OF THE Russian Army. — Mbnschikoff's Fatal Blunder. — 
The Battle of the Alma. — The French turn the Russian 
Left Wing. — Progress of the English. — Their Adyangb 
CHECKED. — The French Flank Attack succeeds. — Retreat 
of the Russians. — St. Arnaud^s Opinion of the Battle — 
The Allies continue their Adtancb. — Their Flank March. 

— Obtusbness of Menschikoff. — His Letter to Eornilofp. 

— Occupation of Balaclava by the English. — Death of 
St. Arnaud. — Canrobkrt opposes the Motion to attack Se- 
bastopol. — Probable Result of such an Attack. 

Description of Sebastopol — Arrival of Colonel de Todlebek 
THERE. — The Allied Fleet is sighted. — Effect of the 
Battle of the Alma upon Sebastopol. — Menschikoff^s 
Orders — He retires from TgE Town with the Army. — 
Despair of Korniloff and Todleben. — Eorniloff accepts 
the Command of the Garrison. — His Enthusiasm. — The Db- 
fenses of Sebastopol. — Korniloff's Controversy with Men- 
schikoff. — The Latter induced to send Troops to Sebas- 
topol. — Strength of the Garrison on October 6. — The 
Allied Bombardment of October 17. — Korniloff^s Demeanor 
ON that Day. — His Death. — Result of the Bombardment. 


The conquest of Sebastopol was thoroughly popular 
in England and France outside of military circles. 
The rage engendered by the Sinope affair was still 
high, and to the public mind there was a poetic jus- 
tice in the destruction of the naval port that equipped 


and sheltered the obnoxious Black Sea fleet. " The 
Times " voiced the popular opinion, when it declared 
that " the gi-and political and military objects of the 
war could not be attained, so long as Sebastopol and 
the Kussian fleet were in existence ; but, if that cen- 
tral position of the Kussian power in the south of the 
empire were annihilated, the whole fabric, which it 
had cost the Czars of Kussia centuries to raise, must 
fall to the ground." 

Toward the middle of September the great allied 
armada in the Black Sea began to converge upon the 
northwestern coast of the Crimea. Eupatoria was 
occupied without resistance, and on the morning of 
the 14th the general debarkation of the troops began 
at a point fourteen miles south of that town. By 
the 18th the whole army, comprising 30,000 French, 
27,000 English, and 7,000 Turks were on Russian 
soil.^ The commanders found themselves in a hostile 
country, only a score of miles from the famous for- 
tress of Sebastopol, entirely ignorant as to the strength 
or whereabouts of their enemy. It was determined 
to follow the coast in the advance, keeping in conmiu- 
nication with the fleet, upon which the armies were 
dependent for supplies. 

On the 19th the advance commenced, with the 
Turks on the right close to the sea, the French in the 

^ The English possessed the only cavalry in the one thonsand sabres 
of the weak diyision under Lord Lucan. They had five infantry 
divisions with artillery attached, as follows: First Division com- 
manded by Duke of Cambridge ; Second Division, by Sir De Lacy 
Evans ; Third Division, by Sir Richard England ; Fourth Division, 
by Sir George Cathcart; Light Division, by Sir George Browne. The 
French had four infantry divisions, commanded as follows : First 
Division, by General Canrobert ; Second Division, by General Bos- 
quet ; Third Division, by Prince Napoleon ; Fourth Division, by G^n. 
eral Forey. 



centre, and the EngKsh on the left, with the hostile 
country on their flank. It was an inspiring pageant, 
and the men moved over the grassy, roUing coimtry 
in excellent spirits. That night the army bivouacked 
a few miles north of the Alma River, and it was 
rumored through the ranks that the enemy were close 
at hand. 

Prince Menschikoff,^ commander of the Czar's mili- 
tary and naval forces in the Crimea, had seized with 
all his available troops an exceedingly strong position 
on the heights south of the river Alma. These heights 
rise abruptly from the river, and, while higher far- 
ther east, are steepest from a point nearly opposite 
the village of Almatamack and from there to the 
sea. Prince Menschikoff regarded this portion of the 
heights as insurmountable, and consequently neglected 
to occupy it. A space of two miles thus intervened 
between the sea and the left of his forces, his entire 
front extending about three miles. Rather on the 
left of his position, opposite the village of Bour- 
liouk, is a deep ravine through which the road from 
Eupatoria to Sebastopol passes. This road crosses 
the Alma at Bourliouk, but Menschikoff destroyed 
the bridge, and placed his heaviest batteries to cover 
the ravine, which he regarded as the weak spot in his 
position. To defend these lines he had a force aggre- 
gating nearly 34,000 men.^ It comprised some of 
the choicest battalions in the Russian establishment, 
and he was confident in his ability to hold his ground 
against any force at the disposal of the allies^ A 
good general would certainly have been justified in 

^ The same who conducted the negotiations at Constantinople. 
^ According to Todleben. Mr. Einglake figures the Russian 
strength at 40,000 men. 


this feeling of assurance, but Menschikoff, when he 
determined to leave his left protected only by cliffs 
presumably insurmountable, committed a blunder, to 
which the result of the battle that followed can be 
justly attributed. 

The allied armies came within sight of their ene- 
mies shortly before noon on the 20th. From a height 
of land that sloped gently into the Alma valley, they 
could see the cliffs beyond capped with artillery and 
bristling with infantry. The English were on the 
left, the French and Turks on the right as usual. 
The French commenced the action, and their skir- 
mishers soon discovered that the heights in their front 
were not inaccessible. The conflict that ensued for 
the next three hours has become famous under the 
title of the battle of the Alma. It has been desig- 
nated by an eminent EngKsh historian as « a big 
scramble," and this conveys the true idea of the ac- 
tion. General Canrobert's French division clambered 
up the heights between Bourliouk and Almatamack 
almost unopposed. General Bosquet^ reached the 
summit of the cliffs farther west from Almatamack. 
Menschikoff's plan of battle was thrown hopelessly 
out of joint by these movements, and he dispatched 
all his available forces to protect his left. Meanwhile 
the English were dashing blindly and bravely against 
the face of the main Russian position. Avoiding the 
blazing village of Bourliouk, fired by the Russian out- 
posts, they pushed through the vineyards, forded the 
river, and clambered up the heights to get at bayonet's 
point with their foes. Codrington's brigade was 

^ Mr. Kinglake cites Bosquet as being the only divisional or bri- 
gade commander in the French army of the East who was not promi- 
nent in the Paris massacre of the 4th of December. 


driven back with awful slaughter, but was supported 
by the GKiards in the nick of time. Prince Gortscha- 
koff ^ came up with the Vladimir regiment, and the 
struggle became desperate and stationary in the heart 
of the Russian position. At this crisis the French 
made their presence severely felt on the Russian flank. 
Menschikoff had lost all idea of his battle, and his 
troops began sullenly to retire. The retreat was a 
strange mixture of order and confusion. The " big 
scramble " was at an end, and the French and English 
rested on the summits they had so gallantly carried. 

It is rarely that a battle reveals such a total lack 
of generalship as did this. The English claim that 
St. Arnaud's movements were bungling and left them 
pi*actically to fight the battle single-handed. The 
French assert, however, that they saved the English 
from defeat. ^ St. Amaud expressed himself tersely 
as to both English and Russian generalship : " As 
Lord Raglan was the pupil of the Duke of Welling- 
ton, so Prince Menschikoff followed the rules be- 
queathed by Suvarof to Kutusof ." ^ Fortunately for 
the allies, generalship was not a necessity for them. 
The great strength of the Russian position and the 
acknowledged bravery of the Russian soldiers were 
whoUy neuti*alized by the gross carelessness and mis- 
calculation of Menschikoff. * 

^ Prince Peter Gortschakoff, brother of Mikhail. 

^ Todleben agrees with St. Amaud, and regards the French move- 
ments as the decisive ones of the day. He ascribes the Russian de- 
feat to bad manoBuvring and the inferiority of their muskets, which 
had only one third the carrying power of the allied weapons. He 
deplores the machine tactics practiced by the Russians as tending to 
destroy the self-reliance of the soldier and to render him dependent 
upon massra. 

' Rousset, vol. i. p. 830. 

* The English loss at the Alma was 2,002 killed and wounded. The 


No pursuit was attempted, the English having but 
one thousand cavalry, and the French being wholly- 
destitute of this branch of the service. On the 23d 
the advance recommenced, and the armies encamped 
that night in the vicinity of the Katscha River. On 
the next day the march was continued to the Belbek, 
and from the high ground south of the river the city 
of Sebastopol, the coveted prize of the expedition, 
was plainly visible. So near, indeed, had the army ap- 
proached to the great stronghold of the Czar that the 
military councils were rendered spicy by the questions 
as to how and from what point the city should be ap- 
proached. The opinion prevailed that the north side 
had been rendered impregnable by the garrison, and 
it was determined to make a flank march, and, leav- 
ing the town on the right, approach it from the south. 
The route of this march was over a rough, broken 
coimtry, covered with low, thick woods. The English 
led the advance, and tJie army wound about among 
the hills like an attenuated serpent. On the after- 
noon of the 25th a detachment of cavalry and horse 
artillery debouched upon a broad plateau known to 
the allies as Mackenzie's farm, and came squarely 
upon a Russian colunm moving northeast at right an- 
gles to their line of march. The surprise was mutual, 
but the Russians were seized with something like a 
panic. The English artillery fired a few shots after 
the fugitives, and the excitement was over. Lord 
Raglan surmised correctly that the Russian troops 
were the rear-guard of an army that had just left 
SebastopoL It was, in fact, the army of Prince Men- 

Rnssians estimated their losses at 5,709 and the French theirs at 1,343. 
Mr. Kinglake asserts that Lord Raglan considered the French loss to 
he groaalj exaggerated. He placed it at less than 600. 


schikoff that for thirty-six hours, during the 25th and 
26th, had the allies completely in its power. Had 
Menschikoff taken any measures to learn the where- 
abouts of his enemy and his line of advance, he could 
have hopelessly crushed him, as he struggled through 
the difficult, wooded country. At the very hour, how- 
ever, when the allied army was painfully defiling 
within a few miles of his headquarters, he was writ- 
ing these words to Admiral Korniloff in Sebastopol : 
" Our further movements will depend upon the posi- 
tion of the enemy, and it would be therefore desirable 
to get, from time to time, some information from 
Sebastopol as to the position of our adversaries. We 
neither see nor hear anything of the enemy here." 

Delivered again from peril by the carelessness of 
their opponent, the allied generals pushed on their 
columns toward Sebastopol. The English occupied 
Balaclava after a bloodless skirmish with its handful 
of defenders. This was a gratifying success, as this 
place had already been settled upon as the base of 
supplies for the army before Sebastopol. Its harbor 
is narrow, surrounded by high hills, and so deep as to 
afford access to the largest ships. The highlands of 
the Chersonese, sloping off on the north into the har- 
bor of Sebastopol, are traversed from Balaclava by a 
good road. Upon these heights, carpeted with green 
grass and swept by the pure sea breezes, the English 
and French began to establish themselves. The clear 
air cheered and invigorated the men, wasted by fa- 
tigue and the disease that had followed them from the 
deadly Bulgarian coast. Marshal St. Arnaud, how- 
ever, was beyond the reviving powers of the sea winds, 
and yielding, like many a lesser soldier, to the grim 
scourge of cholera, was soon overcome by the uni- 


versal conqueror. He was in ill health on leaving 
France, and on the day of the Alma was barely able 
to keep his saddle. On the 29th he was taken aboard 
a French man-of-war, where he expired in a few 
hours. General Canrobert succeeded to the command 
of the French armies, and entered upon his duties, at 
a most critical time. The question of assaulting the 
city was then under discussion. Lord Raglan was in 
favor of an immediate attack, and entertained but 
little doubt of its success. Canrobert, however, wa« 
opposed, and advocated awaiting the arrival of the 
siege trains, when the place could be reduced with 
less waste of life. 

Canrobert's opinion was based upon sound military 
grounds and prevailed, but we know at this day that 
had the allies attacked, either from the north or the 
south, any time previous to September 29 they could 
hardly have failed of success. The interval between 
the battle of the Alma and this date was not lost by 
the defenders of the town. Thanks to the devotion 
of soldiers, seamen, and citizens, inspired by the pa- 
triotic enthusiasm of an admiral, and directed by the 
splendid genius of a colonel of engineers, its defenses 
were made well-nigh impregnable. The operations 
of the allies during the last ten days of September 
were tame indeed compared with the stirring events 
that occurred within Sebastopol. The skill, energy, 
and unselfish patriotism displayed by all classes of its 
defenders certainly deserve some notice. 


Sebastopol in 1854 had a population of 46,000, of 
which 38,000 were connected with the army and navy. 
It stood on the southern shore of the roadstead or 


great harbor, a deep cut between the hills extending 
eastward a distance of three and a half miles from the 
sea to the mouth of the Tchemaya River. The city 
was separated from the Karabel suburb on the east 
by a branch of the larger harbor known as the " Port " 
of Sebastopol. The main city was traversed by broad 
thoroughfares running north and south, while the 
streets crossing these at right angles were narrower 
and less pretentious. On the most commanding point 
of the city stood the building known as the Naval 
Library, a sort of exchange or kursaal, where the 
officers of the garrison met for business or social in- 
tercourse. The Karabel suburb contained the gov- 
ernment storehouses, barracks, and dock-yards. On 
the northern side of the roadstead opposite the city 
there were other military buildings covered by strong 
sea forts, but almost unprotected from land attacks. 

Under the Emperor Nicholas Sebastopol had be- 
come strictly a naval port. The Black Sea fleet had 
its headquarters here, where all the machinery and 
supplies that would insure its efficiency were to be 
found. The docks were among the finest in the world, 
being in many cases hewn out of the solid cliffs. To- 
ward the sea the place had been rendered impregnable 
by a chain of magnificent forts and batteries. Against 
land attacks, however, Sebastopol was almost defense- 
less. A series of fortifications had been projected to 
protect the place on the south, but little work had 
been accomplished at the breaking out of the war. 

Prince Menschikoff steadily refused to credit the 
idea that the allies would attempt an invasion of the 
Crimea. He was not, however, left without warnings. 
As the Danubian campaign approached its disastrous 
end, Prince Gortschakoff sent a messenger to him 


with a letter calling his attention to the immediate 
necessity of fortifying Sebastopol on the landward 
side. The letter also informed MenschikoiBf that in 
this work of fortification the messenger would be 
found a valuable counselor. This messenger was 
Lieutenant-Colonel de Todleben of the engineers. 

It was the 22d of August when Todleben reached 
Sebastopol with the letter of his conunander. He 
was well received by Menschikoff until he began to 
urge too strenuously the fortification of the place. 
Menschikoff was still unconvinced even by Gortscha- 
koff's warning, and it is certain that Todleben would 
have been dismissed from* Sebastopol, had not the 
allied fleet suddenly appeared off the coast. 

The hostile squadrons were first sighted on Septem- 
ber 12. In the harbor lay the Russian Black Sea 
fleet, comprising about forty ships of aU classes, 
carrying 1,908 guns, and manned by 18,500 well- 
disciplined seamen. Leaving this fleet in command 
of Admiral Komiloff, his chief of staff, Menschikoff 
proceeded to mass his land forces on the Alma. All 
the afternoon of the 20th the firing was plainly audi- 
ble in Sebastopol, and toward night Komiloff and 
Todleben rode out toward the battlefield. They met 
the prince returning from the scene of disaster, heavy- 
hearted and almost prostrated with fatigue. His only 
orders that night were to sink some of the ships across 
the entrance of the roadstead to prevent the entry of 
the enemy's fleet. To Korniloff, an enthusiastic naval 
officer, these were cruel orders. By dawn of the 23d, 
however, eight fine ships had been scuttled, the har- 
bor had been closed, and the hearts of thousands of 
brave seamen had been wrung with sorrow. It was 
on this day that Menschikoff came to his extraordi- 


nary decision to withdraw the army and leave Sebas- 
topol to its f ate. He determined to move northeast 
and gain possession of the great road to Simpheropol, 
in order to secure his communication with Russia. 
Against this Komiloff protested, but the prince 
assured him of his cooperation against the flank of 
any enemy that threatened SebastopoL On the night 
of the 24th the army withdrew from the town, Men- 
schikoff leaving General Moller in command of the 
handful of militia and gunners, Admiral Nachimoff ^ 
in command of all the seamen that had been trans- 
ferred to the south side of the roadstead, while to 
Komiloff he left the charge of the forces on the 
north side, against which it was believed the allies 
would move. 

The position in which Sebastopol was left by the 
withdrawal of the army was a desperate one. The 
whole garrison, including the seamen landed from 
the fleet, comprised but 16,000 men, a force wholly 
inadequate to cope with the allied armies behind half- 
finished works. Komiloff, a true-hearted, religious 
patriot, made the best use of his scanty means of de- 
fense on the north side. He encouraged his men, 
but to the officers on his staff he openly expressed his 
hopelessness. "From the north side," he declared, 
" there is no retreat. All of us who are there will 
also find our graves.*' He carefully assigned his staff 
officers to positions elsewhere. " I should not like," 
he said, " to have all fall with me." Colonel Todle- 
ben was scarcely more hopefuL Speaking of the 
efforts made by the garrison, he declared that "there 
remained to them no alternative, but that of seeking 
to die gloriously at the post committed to their 

' This officer commanded the Russian fleet at Sinope. 


It was about noon on the 25th that the officers con- 
gregated at the Naval Library saw the allied armies 
marching southward over the heights at the head of 
the harbor. It was plain at a glance that the north 
side was not to be molested. Komiloff immediately 
threw up the command imposed upon him by Men- 
schikoff , and passing over to the south side, offered his 
services to Nachimoff . Later a conference was held 
between Nachimoff, Moller, Komiloff, and Todleben. 
Precedence of rank was disregarded, and influenced 
only by motives of the purest patriotism, Moller and 
Nachimoff offered the supreme command of the Se- 
bastopol garrison to Komiloff. Korniloff accepted, 
and from that moment, shoulder to shoulder with 
Todleben, for whom he had conceived a great respect 
and admiration, he pushed with all his energy the 
work of defense. Korniloff inspired the men by his 
piety and enthusiasm, while Todleben turned the 
energy thus awakened into the most useful channels. 
The work on the fortifications was pushed with the 
most unremitting zeal. Soldiers, sailors, citizens, and 
even women toiled night and day imceasingly. While 
the engineer grew more and more absorbed in the 
vast system of defenses he had planned, Komiloff 
still continued anxious. Where was Menschikoff 
with the army? On the 26th, heavy-hearted and 
harassed by many cares, he made the entry in his 
diary, " Of the prince nothing is heard." The next 
day he had divine service performed in the presence 
of the soldiers, and then addressed them himself. 
" Let the troops," he said, " first be reminded of the 
Word of God, and then I will impart to them the 
word of the Czar." That evening he seems again to 
have been overcome by despondency. " Of the prince 


nothing still is to be heard. The evening passed in 
gloomy thoughts about the future of Kussia." 

On the 28th tidings were received from Menschi- 
koff, but he evinced little inclination to come to the 
aid of the city. He merely wished to know the 
whereabouts of the enemy. On the 29th the de- 
fenses were practically completed, forming a half 
circle on the south of the city, four miles in length. 
On the western side, from north to south, the three 
salient points in the lines became known as the Land 
Quarantine Bastion, the Central Bastion, and the 
Flagstaff Bastion. On the east side were three other 
strong works, from south to north, as follows : the 
Redan, the Malakoff Tower, and the Little Bedan.^ 
To arm these fortifications the ships were dismantled, 
and their great guns brought ashore. The seamen 
Kkewise were transferred to the land service, but even 
with this addition Komiloff knew that the presence 
of -trained troops was a necessity of the situation. 

On the 30th Prince Menschikoff himself appeared 
on the north side of the harbor, and had an interview 
with Korniloff, whom he found in command of the 
place. He reiterated his intention to keep his army 
aloof, upon which Komiloff, hot with patriotic rage, 
retorted, " If that takes place, then farewell to Sebas- 
topol ! " The entry that night in Komiloff's diary 
shows that he was brooding over the strange policy 
of the prince. " To hold Sebastopol with troops is 
very possible ; nay, it is possible even to hold out long, 
but without troops — that alters the case ! " 

Komiloff's retort had induced Menschikoff to call 
a coimcil of war, and upon hearing this Komiloff 

^ These are the names by which they were known to the allies and 
to the world. 


determined upon presenting there a written protest. 
Upon being informed of this Menschikoff weakened. 
Whatever the motives that were inducing him to 
pursue his extraordinary tactics, he was not prepared 
to let this emphatic paper pass under the eye of the 
Czar. He yielded before the council met, and de- 
tached twelve battalions from his field army to the 
assistance of the garrison. Komiloff and Todleben 
could now breathe freely for a time, for on October 6 
25,000 soldiers and 13,000 seamen were ready for the 
defense of the town. The energy of the defenders 
never flagged ; and when on the 17th of October the 
allies opened their bombardment, they were enabled 
to return a fire of equal power. At early dawn the 
French batteries opened against the western defenses, 
the English against the lines on the east, while from 
the sea the men-of-war trained their broadsides upon 
the coast forts. Shortly after ten o'clock the French 
batteries were silenced by the explosion of a powder 
magazine, nor was their fire resumed during the day. 
Komiloff was early on horseback, riding from 
work to work, watching the progress of the contest, 
and encouraging the gunners at their toil. His course 
could be traced from a distance by the " hurrahs " 
that greeted him as he passed along. He had. an eye 
for everything. At one moment he was directing the 
care of the wounded, at another superintending the 
transfer of some regiment to a place of greater secu- 
rity, at another arranging for the transportation of 
water to the men at the front. He exposed his life 
almost recklessly, and was often on the parapets 
among the screaming shot, peering through the smoke 
to detect, if possible, the effect of the Russian fire. 
It was in vain that his officers entreated hun to caur 


tion. To one he replied, " What will the soldiers say • 
of me if they do not see me to-day ? " to another, with 
a smile, " You can never run away from a shot." Just 
before noon, as he was leaving the Malakoff Tower, 
he was struck down by a cannon ball. " Now, gen- 
tlemen," he said to the officers who thronged about 
him, " I leave you to defend Sebastopol. Do not sur- 
render it." He was carried to the hospital, where he 
lived for a short time in great pain. " TeU all," he 
said, ^^ it is sweet to die when the conscience is at 
rest;" then, as the roar of the bombardment fell upon 
his ears, he prayed again and again, ^^ O God ! bless 
Kussia and the emperor. Save Sebastopol and the 
fleet." An orderly came into the apartment with 
the tidings that the English guns were being silenced. 
Komiloff, simunoning all his strength, cried out, 
" Hurrah ! hurrah ! " and a few moments later ex- 

All unconscious of Komiloff's death, the Russian 
gunners still toiled at their heated pieces ; and when 
darkness began to faU it was plain that the allied 
attack had been a failure. The ships were withdraw- 
ing, and the English guns alone were left to maintain 
the unequal contest. No assault had been attempted, 
and Todleben still hved to direct the defense. The 
Russian people regard their prolonged and resolute 
defense of Sebastopol with pride, but they look upon 
it as something more than a common honor to have 
been numbered in the garrison during this brief, 
heroic period of Komiloff's command. 


The Alldsd Positions on the Chersonese. — Failure of thxib 


TOPOL IN London. — Effect of this Report upon the Armies. 
— Chagrin of Lord Raqlan. — The Siege of Sebastopol 
BEGINS. — Its Peculiar Character. — The Russian Field Army 
assumes the Offensive. — Battle of Balaclaya and Charqb 
of the Light Brigade. — Results of the Battle. — This 
Battle of Inkermann. — Its Irregular Character and its 
Results. — The Great Hurricane. — Terrible SuFFSRiNa 
AND Losses of the Allies. — Public Opinion in Francs and 
England concerning the Campaign. 

The allied positions south of Sebastopol formed a 
half circle. The French held the lines on the west, 
from a point nearly south of the formidable Kussian 
work known as the Redan. The English positions 
extended from the Redan to Mt. Inkermann, over- 
looking the Tchernaya a short distance above its 
confluence with the harbor of Sebastopol. General 
Canrobert's judgment having prevailed, intrenching 
was pushed during the first weeks of October, while 
heavy guns were brought up from the coast. The 
confidence of the allied commanders in the success of 
their bombardment increased with every day, and 
when on the 17th the batteries opened fire, the least 
sanguine were inclined to limit the Muscovite defense 
to three days. By the night of the 17th not only had 
this confidence disappeared, but all hope of reducing 


the place with artillery had gone down with the sun. 
The naval and military commanders were compelled 
to admit that they had made no serious impression 
upon the Kussian works, while they had received a 
return fire at once vigorous and destructive. The 
next day the bombardment was renewed, and indeed 
it was not finally relinquished until the 25th ; but 
after the first day of fruitless powder burning, no 
decisive results were looked for. 

On the 18th a mail arrived from England with 
London papers enthusiastically announcing ^^the 
fall of SebastopoL" To the men on the shot-swept 
ridges of the Chersonese these glowing and ill-founded 
accounts were the most cruel mockeries. Said " The 
Times : " " The latest dispatches received from our 
correspondents at Vienna and Paris remove all doubt 
as to the triumph of the allied armies, and the reality 
of the most splendid achievement of modem wai-f are, 
an exploit alike unequaled in magnitude, in rapidity, 
and in its results. It may now be confidently stated 
that the forts of Sebastopol fell successively before 
the combined forces of the assailants ; that at least 
half of the Kussian fleet perished ; that the fiiags of 
the allies were waving on the Church of St. Vladimir, 
and that, on the 26th at latest. Prince Menschikoff 
surrendered the place. The battles are over, and the 
victory is won. . . . Never since the days of Napoleon, 
we may almost say since the days of Caesar, has an 
exploit of arms been attended with such entire, or 
such instantaneous, success. The arrival, the sight, 
and the conquest form parts of one and the same 
event. The final triumph followed close on the first 
disembarkation ; and all the anticipated incidents of 
an arduous campaign — marches, battles, sieges, and 


stormings — have been crowded into a single impulse 
of onslaught and victory.^ 

So spake " The Times," and from the perusal of 
such pompous exultations the British soldier turned 
again to the reality about him, the air screaming with 
Bussian missiles and the wounded passing to the rear. 
Lord Baglan was deeply chagrined and mortified 
that such a rumor should have been circulated ' as 
truth in England. On the day of the receipt of the 
mail he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle as follows : 
" I cannot but deplore the ready credence which has 
been given by the public in England to the annoimce- 
ment in the newspapers of the capture of Sebastopol ; 
and indeed it is an injustice to our troops to view the 
accomplishment of the enterprise as an easy opera- 
tion, and with the f uU determination to do everything 
to insure success, I must stiU regard it as one of 
extreme difficulty, and of no great certainty." 

With the abandonment of the idea of the speedy 
reduction of Sebastopol the allies entered upon ^^ the 
siege," — a siege, however, in which at times, they 
themselves were the besieged. By the middle of Octo- 
ber, as we have noticed, Sebastopol was garrisoned by 
a force sufficiently large to insure a stout defense of 
all its works. The allied forces at the same time, in« 
eluding seamen and marines from the fleet, comprised 
40,000 French, 25,000 English, and 11,000 Turks. 
The Sebastopol garrison was left free to communicate 

^ Mention of this false ntmor is found in Prosper M^rim^'s Let" 
ters to an Incognita, Writing from Vienna, he says : '* We are 
agitated by news from the Crimea. Is Sebastopol taken ? It is be- 
lieved so here ; and the Anstrians, with the exception of a few ancient 
families who are Russian at heart, congratulate us God grant that 
the news may not be an inyention such as the telegraph delights in 
when at leisure." 


with Bussia, and open at all times to the receipt of 
supplies and reinforcements. In other words, unless 
the allies could render Sebastopol untenable by direct 
assault or the power of their bombardment, its gar- 
rison had nothing to fear. The 4th Kussian army 
corps, which had been detained on the Bessarabian 
frontier through fear of the Austrians in the princi- 
palities, was moved to the south when it became evi- 
dent that the Kaiser's government was not for war. 
As a result, the Sebastopol garrison was again rein- 
forced, while it was assisted furthermore by the 
appearance of the field army which Menschikoff so 
long and fatally mismanaged. With the Sebastopol 
garrison nearly equal in numbers to the hostile force 
on the Chersonese, and in perfect communication with 
a field army of considerable strength, the difficulty of 
settling at all times the question as to who was be- 
sieged will be readily ajjpreciated. 

On the 25th of October the Russian field army 
under General Liprandi, comprising about 25,000 
men of all arms, advanced from the northeast and 
east for a demonstration against Balaclava. It was 
early morning when their movements were first de- 
scried, and much later when Lord Baglan learned the 
fact and ordered two infantry divisions down to the 
plain for the protection of the threatened point. The 
town itself was covered by the guns of an English 
frigate, and garrisoned by a force of marines and 
artillery. On the north, a short distance from the 
village of Kadikoi, was the camp of the 93d High- 
landers, while the advanced line of defenses on the 
Causeway heights, which cross the plain from east to 
west, was held by the Turks. Against these latter 
works, preceding their action by a heavy artillery fire. 


the Bussians moved in overwhelming numbers. The 
Turks, finding themselves unsupported and their line 
of retreat threatened, were seized with a panic and 
abandoned their guns. With the capture of these 
redoubts the affair might have ended but for a chain 
of accidents that precipitated more useless carnage. 

Upon the flight of the Turks, a portion of the Eng- 
lish heavy cavalry brigade, under General Scarlett, 
moved from its position near the western base of 
the Causeway heights in a southeasterly direction to 
cover Balaclava. At the same time a heavy column 
of Russian cavalry, advancing from the northeast, 
passed over the Causeway heights and down the 
southern slope, toward the plain where the English 
cavalry were marching. Notwithstanding his great 
inferiority in numbers (he had but 300 men) Scar- 
lett charged the Russians furiously, overthrowing 
them by the mere impetus of Jiis onset. The discom- 
fited troops fell back over the ridge, and again the 
fighting seemed over. 

At this time the Russians still held in force the 
Causeway heights and the Fedioukine Hills across 
the valley on the north. At the eastern end of this 
valley their discomfited cavalry halted and reformed 
under the protection of some batteries of horse artil- 
lery. At the western end of the valley, under the 
heights of the Chersonese, stood the English light bri- 
gade, nearly 700 strong, under Lord Cardigan, which 
up to this time had not been engaged. Lord Raglan, 
from his commanding position on the Chersonese, 
thought he detected signs of withdrawal among the 
Russians on the Causeway ridge. Anxious, if possi- 
ble, to recover the guns lost by the Turks in the morn- 
ing, he forwarded by Captain Nolan an order to the 



Earl of Lucan commanding the cavalry division as 
follows : " Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance 
rapidly to the front and try to prevent the enemy 
carrying away the guns. Troop of horse artillery 
may accompany. French cavalry is on your left." 
Lord Lucan, it seems, protested against the move- 
ment in Nolan's hearing. He asked him where and 
what he should attack. Nolan's reply was not a 
model of military respect; he assei'ted that Lord 
Raglan's orders were positive, and as he rode away, 
it is said, pointed up the vaUey, at the farther end of 
which the Russian guns were located.^ " The guns " 
that Lord Raglan meant were the captured ones on 
the Causeway heights, and this had been clearly des- 
ignated to Lucan in a former order. Li some way, 
however, the orders became hopelessly jumbled in the 
process of conveyance from Lord Raglan to Lord 
Cardigan, the general commanding the light brigade. 
Cardigan certainly failed to comprehend that any 
other guns were meant than those of the batteries in 
the valley. Exposed the whole distance to a murder- 
ous flanking fire, few of his gallant corps reached the 
hostile guns. Some indeed penetrated beyond and 
crossed swords with the supporting cavalry, but in 
fifteen minutes from the moment that the brigade 
had left its position the scattered survivors were 
streaming back toward their rendezvous. The corps 
might have been utterly destroyed but for the timely 
and brilliant charge of the French 4th Chasseurs 
d'Afrique against the Fedioukine Hills. This tem- 
porarily demoralized the Russian artillery stationed 

^ This is Lord Lucan^s description of what passed between Nolan 
and himself. Nolan accompanied the brigade, and was the first man 


there, and left the valley comparativelj clear for the 
retreat of the light brigade.^ 

The Chersonese heights were thronged with mili- 
tary spectators gazing down upon the battlefield. In 
fact, the cavalry manoeuvred all day under the eyes 
of some of the keenest military critics in Europe. 
Perhaps the day's work showed that English cavalry 
generals did not know how to handle their men, but 
the bold ride of the light brigade through that tem- 
pest of plunging cannon-shot proved that the men 
knew how to handle themselves. The French gen- 
eral Bosquet appreciated the affair in all its phases 
when he exclaimed, ^^ C'est magnifique ; mais ce n'est 
pas la guerre." 

Who was to blame for the charge of the light 
brigade ? To this day opinions differ as to where the 
weight of responsibility should lie. This much is cer- 
tain, that Lord Lucan, Lord Cardigan, Lord Raglan, 
and the memory of Captain Nolan, who fell in the 
charge, have aU suffered in consequence. Further- 
more, it cost Lord Lucan his command. 

The results of the battle of Balaclava, aside from 
the disputes it engendered in English military circles, 
were the loss of the Woronzoff road to the allies, the 
practical blockade of the English in Balaclava, and 
the earning of a great prestige for the English cav- 
alry soldier. 

This October skirmkh proved but the prelude to the 
grand effort of the Russians to break the allied hold 
upon the Chersonese. On the evening of November 

^ The light brigade out of 673 men lost 247 killed and wonnded. 
Only 195 horses escaped. The English losses in the day^s fighting 
-were about 600 men, the French and Turks losing 200 more. The 
Bussian casualties amounted to 600 men killed and wounded. 


4th the English pickets on Mt. InkermannweFe warned 
that some unusual event was taking place among the 
Russians from the clanging of the Sebastopol bells 
that was borne along to them on the wind. The even- 
ing being rainy, nothing could be seen ; and as dawn 
approached, the fog rising from the dripping valleys 
settled down upon the Chersonese like a pall. It 
was scarcely light when the rattle of musketry and 
the scream of shells announced to the astonished pick- 
ets that the Russians were upon them. Bewildered 
by the suddenness of the attack, the English camps 
sprang quickly into lif e.^ There was no time to form, 
and in broken detachments the half-awakened soldiers 
moved f orwaixl through the mist to where the uproar 
told them that the enemy was attacking. Colonels 
lost their regiments, captains their companies, while 
officers were found in the ranks that day, armed with 
rifles. In fact, during the battle of Inkermann, from 
the moment when the Russian shells began to cleave 
the fog until the hour when the last dropping fire 
was dying away, there was absolutely no system in 
the English defense. 

On the Russian side the scheme of attack was 
boldly conceived and bravely, if clumsily, executed. 
The movement against Mt. Inkermann was confided 
to General Dannenburg. One column, under General 
Soimonoff moved up from the Karabel suburb through 
the Careenage ravine, while another, under General 
Pauloff, attacked from the Tchemaya valley on the 
north. Prince Gortschakoff^ with 22,000 men oc- 
cupied the Tchemaya vaUey toward Kadikoi, with 
orders to move upon the Chersonese when the English 
grip upon Mt. Inkermann had been broken. An- 

^ Prince Peter Qortsohakoff. 


other force under General Timof ^ieff was detailed to 
create a diversion from Sebastopol against the French 
left. Owing to Dannenburg's failure to make any 
serious impression upon the Inkermann position, 
GortschakofiE's troops remained inactive through the 
day.^ The Russians engaged against Mt. Inker- 
mann comprised nearly 40,000 men,^ and to them 
were opposed 8,000 English and 6,000 Frenchmen. 
Owing to the dense mist, it is doubtful if at the time 
the allies had any idea of the vast odds against which 
they were contending, while, on the other hand, it is 
clear that the Russians whoUy failed to comprehend 
the weakness of the forces opposing them. The 
great numerical superiority of the Russians was 
largely neutralized by the unfavorable character of 
the ground, which prevented the cooperation of their 
columns ^ and allowed the allies to fight on a narrow 
front. General SoimonofPs death early in the action 
paralyzed the Russian right column, nor was it rallied 
again during the day. The battle swayed to and fro 
upon the heights during the early hours of the morn- 
ing, and the French regiments arrived not a moment 
too soon. At noon the Russians practically relin- 
quished the struggle, retiring all along the line by 
order of General Dannenburg. 

The battle of Inkermann cost the British in kiUed 
and wounded nearly 2,600 men, while the French 
losses aggregated nearly 1,800. On the other hand, 
the Russian losses have been computed as between 
eleven and twelve thousand. This unequal showing 

^ This inaction is aUaded to by Todleben in an uncomplimentary 

2 34,835 according to Todleben. 

^ It is questionable if the Russians had 20,000 men engaged at 
any one time. 


at least reflects credit upon the stolid bravery of the 
poorly armed Russian soldier. 

In England Inkermann became renowned as " the 
soldiers' battle." The private soldiers took the affair 
in charge and fought it through, unhampered by 
"generalship." They demonstrated the fact that 
forty years of enervating peace had failed to eradicate 
from the national character those indomitable qualities 
that rendered Wellington's squares impregnable on 
the slopes of Mt. St. Jean.^ 

Prince Menschikoff was bitterly disappointed over 
the failure of his crowning effort to crush his foes. 
Had his troops succeeded in getting a permanent foot- 
hold on the Inkermann heights, the aUied situation 
could have been nothing less than * desperate. The 
defeat at Inkermann dissipated his last hope of gain- 
ing a position on the Chersonese before winter. 

Relieved in a measure by their victory from the 
danger of Eussian aggression, the aUies found them- 
selves called upon to confront other trials and hard- 
ships. Winter was approaching, and the management 
of the Russian campaign was slowly drifting into the 
hands of those two merciless chieftains, "Janvier 
and Fevrier." ^ The blue sky had become murky, the 
bright expanse of the Euxine a leaden gray. The 
grassy slopes of the Chersonese were transformed 
into slippery mire, while the white city of Sebastopol 
appeared black and forbidding through drifting 
clouds of fog. Everything was cheerless and gloomy. 
Rain feU incessantly, and the road from Balaclava to 

^ The battle of Inkermann demonstrated the force of the remark 
attributed to Marshal Soult, *^ The British infantry is the finest in 
the world, but I thank God there is n't much of it." 

^ The Emperor Nicholas used to say that Russia had two generals 
upon whom she could always rely, '* Janvier and Fevrier." 


the camps became a slough, in which men waded and 
supply wagons floundered and 'collapsed. Notwith- 
standing these surroundings, up to November 14 the 
tents were fairly dry and habitable. On this day, 
however, during the early morning hours a great hur- 
ricane arose. It was accompanied at first with tor- 
rents of rain, which diminished toward dawn, as the 
wind increased in violence. The furious blast roared 
through the camps, literally sweeping away the tents. 
The men came staggering in from their fatiguing 
duties in the trenches to fi^ad their habitations gone, 
and their belongings scattered for miles over the miry 
plains. The hospital tents went with the rest, and 
the sick as weU as the strong were left unprotected 
in the gale. 

To the men on the ships at Balaclava and all along 
the coast it was a trying time. The seas, beating in 
at Balaclava harbor, brought huge masses of floating 
debris that told of destruction among the shipping 
outside. When the gale subsided it was found that 
between forty and fifty vessels had been wrecked or 
disabled and 1,000 lives lost. Eleven transpoi*ts were 
lost and with them vast amounts of supplies, including 
ammunition, medical stores, and warm clothing for 
the troops. The Henri Quatre, the fi^aest ship in 
the French navy, was driven ashore near Eupatoria. 
The losses suffered by the allies through this disas- 
trous freak of nature could not be reckoned in gold. 
The men on the heights found themselves almost shel- 
terless, with nothing but their ragged simuner uni- 
forms to protect them from the wintry blasts. To 
add to their misery cholera broke out again with re- 
newed severity, and the dismal scenes of Bulgaria 
were repeated. The rain was superseded by sleet and 


snow, and portions of the trenches were knee-deep 
with icy water. Fuel was scarce, and provender for 
the animals as well. The horses died in great num- 
bers, and their carcasses festered on the plains until 
they sank out of sight in the mire or were devoured 
by the hungry dogs which infested the camps. 

Meanwhile in England the people were wrought 
up to a high pitch of rage* and disgust, and it was 
asserted on all hands that the war had been an un- 
mitigated failure. The contradiction of the fictitious 
statement of the fall of Sebastopol was the first blow 
to the calm assurance that had existed before. To 
make matters worse, the Baltic fleet, of which so much 
had been expected, returned after an experience re- 
sembling that of the king of France who marched 
up the hill and down again. The details of the suf- 
ferings of the soldiers, resulting from the total inca- 
pacity of the medical and commissary departments, 
stirred the popular feeling almost to frenzy. Miss 
Florence Nightingale, a lady of vast experience in 
hospital affairs, was induced by the government to go 
to the East and supervise personally a reform in the 
wretched state of affairs existing in the Crimea and 
at Scutari. This move allayed but little . the public 
discontent. Parliament met just before Christmas, 
and a motion to investigate the management of the 
war was carried by a large majority. As a result 
Lord Aberdeen's government went out of of&ce, and 
it devolved upon Lord Palmerston to form a new one. 

It was the habit of the English people during these 
times to exalt the French military establishment as a 
model for their government to follow. The French 
people naturally became magnificently conceited over 
their admitted superiority. Perhaps the different 


estimate in England and France in regard to the state 
of their military affairs was owing somewhat to the 
measure in which free speech was allowed in the two 
countries. In England every weakness in the army 
was ruthlessly exposed by an unhampered press. In 
France disagreeable facts were smothered, or so peiw 
verted by a cringing press as to suit the ends of a 
government whose existence depended upon success. 



Death of the Czar NichoiiAs. — Sardinia, joikb thb Webtebn 
At.t.tawce. — Pbogress of thb Ajajva before Sebastopoii. -* 


Abmy. — The June Bombardment and First Assault. — Cap- 

OND Assault. — Death of Lord Raglan. — Desperate Condi- 

IN September. — The French carry the Malakoff. — Evacu- 
ation AND burning of Sebastopol. — Phince Gortschakoff^s 
Estimate of the Defense. — The French Emperor and the 
Czar desire Peace. — The Congress of Paris. — Signature 
OF Peace. — Results of the War. — Sardinia the only 

Two events of deep import to Europe opened the 
year 1855. The first was the death of the emperor 
of Russia, the other the entrance of Sardinia into the 
Western Alliance. 

The death of the Czar occurred on the 2d of March. 
The battle of the Alma was his deathblow, and after 
that all hope forsook him. The window of his sick- 
room commanded the stately splendor of his capital, 
but his mind still retained the vision of the hostile 
fleet before Cronstadt, his ear seemed to catch the 
low moan of his suffering people, and the ominous 
roar of the Sebastopol cannon. Upon realizing that 
his end was near, he dictated the telegram for trans- 
mission to the country, " The emperor is dying." On 


the 2d of March he delivered these parting words to 
his son and successor : " All my care, all my endeavors, 
have been directed for Russia's welfare. I was anx- 
ious to continue to labor so that I might leave you 
the empire steadfast and orderly, safe against dan- 
gers from without, thoroughly prosperous, and at 
peace. But you see at what a time and under what 
circumstances I am dying. God has willed it so. 
You will find . the burden hard to bear." A few 
hours later, with a simple prayer upon his lips, tiie 
broken-hearted emperor passed away. 

It was not apparent to the superficial observer what 
interest Sardinia, one of the smallest of European 
states, could have in the Eastern Question, but com- 
ing forward at a critical time, her aid was not to be 
despised. On the 26th of January King Victor Em- 
manuel signed at Turin the treaty that bound him to 
furnish 15,000 men for service against Russia. Early 
in the spring the first detachments sailed for the 
Crimea, and a few weeks later, under the command of 
General La Marmora, were in camp side by side with 
the soldiers of two of the great European powers. 

The first military movements of the year 1865 oc- 
curred at Eupatoria, where Omar Pasha, in an in- 
trenched position, worsted a Russian force sent from 
Sebastopol to dislodge him. This affair concluded 
Menschikoff's long season of mismanagement in the 
Crimea and threw the burden of the Russian leader- 
ship upon Prince Gortschakoff, who had directed the 
Danubian campaign. 

Meanwhile the siege of Sebastopol was being ac- 
tively pushed by the allies. By the first of March 
the hospitals were thoroughly renovated, the English 
commissariat overhauled, and the thinned ranks rein- 


forced. The severity of the winter had been favora- 
ble to the aUies, inasmuch as by rendering the roads 
impassable it checked the flow of Russian reinforce- 
ments and supplies. During January, February, and 
March skirmishing frequently occurred, but as the 
allies pushed their siege lines nearer to the Russian 
defenses, the genius and ceaseless activily of Todleben 
foiled them at every turn. New redoubts sprang up 
in their front as if by magic, to sweep their path with 
"mitrail."^ On the 9th of April the second bom- 
bardment of Sebastopol was undertaken. It was a 
repetition of the events of the preceding fall, and on 
the night of the 20th, when the firing ceased, nothing 
had been accomplished. 

On May 16 General Canrobert resigned his com- 
mand in consequence of ill health.^ The French 
army at this time numbered 120,000 men. The Eng- 
lish strength, which during the winter months had 
fallen as low as 12,000, had been restored to nearly 
30,000. Beside these there were 50,000 Turks under 
Omar Pasha and the 15,000 Sardinians under La 
Marmora. In consequence of their superior strength, 

^ This is the word used by Todleben to indicate the cross fire of the 
defenders of Sebastopol. 

^ Mr. Eanglake asserts in his closing Yolomes that Canrobert's can- 
tious tactics and final resignation were induced by the extraordinary 
orders of the French emperor, who contemplated going to the Crimea 
to assume command himself. *^ No one seems to have divined that 
the emperor, though a man strangely fond of effecting theatric sur- 
prises and belieyed to be intent on the notion of assuming high com- 
mand at the seat of war, might desire to keep Canrobert's army 
in a state of restraint, with its fires, as the phrase is, ' banked up,' 
until the time of his own arriyal, when troubles unnumbered and suc- 
cessive disappointments and the weariness of hope long deferred 
would be all at once followed by what the play-books call * flour- 
ishes,' by victory, conquest, and triumph." — Kinglake, " From the 
Morrow of Inkerman to the Fall of Canrobert/' chap. v. 


the French had gradually assumed the defense of the 
ground occupied by the English during the early days 
of the campaign. Indeed, by the middle of May the 
English were only holding a small portion of the al- 
lied line, with the Sedan in their front. General 
P^lissier,^ who succeeded Canrobert, was anxious to 
justify his reputation as a brilliant soldier, and the 
belief became prevalent throughout Europe that some 
extraordinary efforts would now be made toward 
breaking down the Russian defense. 

A council of war held early in June decided to 
reopen the bombardment on the 6th, to be followed 
by a general infantry assault. Accordingly on the 
afternoon of the appointed day the cannonade recom- 
menced, and was maintained through the night to pre- 
vent the Russians repairing damages. The bombard- 
ment on the part of the allies was of greater power and 
better sustained than either of the previous ones, while 
the Russians maintained a comparatively sluggish fire 
in response. On the 7th the allied commanders deliv- 
ered their assault. P^lissier was to direct his main 
attack against the Mamelon redoubt, a dangerous out- 
post of the Malakoff , and upon its capture the English 
were to make a rush for the Quarries under the Redan. 
All through the afternoon the cannonade languished, 
and the troops destined for the attack were drawn up 
in readiness. At half past six the signal rockets were 
discharged, and the French columns broke forward 
with wild cheers. The Russians, lulled into a sense 
of security by the waning of the bombardment, were 

^ P^liasier, ''the short, thickset, resolute Norman," as Mr. E[iii^- 
lake describes him, entirely disregarded the commands of the Tuile- 
ries. He persisted in handling his army with reference to the enemy 
in his front. 


taken unawares, and the French bayonets were swarm- 
ing over the parapets on the Mamelon before they 
realized that an attack was in progress. Had the 
French troops been under good control at this time, 
their victory might have been cheaply bought. The 
heat of the charge was upon them, however, and as 
they clambered over the crest. of the hill they saw 
before them, separated only by a gentle hoUow, the 
shot-scarred Malakoff looming defiantly against the 
evening sky. They charged down the slope, while its 
great guns played upon them and the dusk was illu- 
minated by the flashing of the Russian musketry. 
When the rush is on them French troops care little 
for death-dealing missiles, and it was not till they 
came close under the deadly work, and, baffled by the 
abattis and abrupt parapets, found themselves help- 
less under a galling fire, that the reaction came. A 
Russian column emerged from the redoubts adjacent 
to the Malakoff and fell furiously upon them. The 
retreat became a rout and swept over the crest of the 
Mamelon, leaving it again in the hands of the Rus- 
sians. The whole object of the attack seemed lost, 
and it was with extreme difficulty that the discomfited 
troops were rallied in the trenches at the foot of the 
Mamelon. The reserves under General Brunet com- 
ing up, however, at eight o'clock, just after sunset 
another attack was made, and when darkness had 
fallen on the Chersonese, at a terrible cost of life the 
French had again made themselves masters of the 
coveted hill. 

Meanwhile Lord Raglan, upon the first capture of 
the Mamelon, had sent a column of 1,000 men against 
the Quarries. The conquest was achieved with slight 
loss, but in defending the position against the Rus- 


sian attacks that followed, the English sufiFered great 
slaughter. At intervals throughout the night, the 
heavy rolling of musketry and the lurid flickerings in 
front of the English lines told the weary soldiery on 
the heights that the Russians were still disputing the 
possession of the Quarries with their comrades. 

The next morning, the allied commanders could 
congratulate themselves upon having made progress, 
almost the first since the siege began. The English 
in the Quarries and the French on the Mamelon 
were within striking distance of the Bedan and Mala- 

Felissier was impatient of delay. On the 15th a 
council of war was held, and it was determined to 
strike another blow for Sebastopol. It was to be no 
afPair of outworks this time, but a general assault 
along the whole line. The French were to exercise 
their main strength against the Malakoff, and the 
English, as usual, against the Redan. The details 
were arranged with great precision. Upon the cap- 
ture of the Malakoff a flag was to be displayed on 
the work as the signal of success, when Lord Raglan 
would make his assault upon the Redan. 

At two o'clock on the morning of the 18th the ex- 
pectant French infantry was under arms, massed in 
three strong divisions. The mistaking of a bomb for 
the signal rocket threw Pelissier's plans into hope- 
less confusion. The three divisions were beaten in 
detail, and the whole assault repulsed before it had 
been ordered. The English, too, failed utterly at the 
Redan. Their columns became confused in the ad- 
vance and were beaten back with terrible slaughter. 

To the English commander this was a heavy blow. 
Worn with care and emaciated by cholera, he was 


unable to rise above the mortification of his defeat, 
and his sorrow at the useless sacrifice of so many 
lives. On the 28th, just ten days after the disaster, 
he passed away. He was succeeded by Sir James 
Simpson, who had been sent out by Lord Palmer- 
ston to investigate the management of the campaign. 
Once again the siege settled down into trench work 
and desultory skirmishing. 

Meanwhile within Sebastopol the Bussian leaders 
realized that events were approaching a crisis. The 
parallels of the enemy had approached close under 
their main defenses, and the new artillery placed in 
position against them had proved of far greater power 
than any in their possession. Furthermore the de- 
struction of the great granaries on the Sea of Azov 
made it necessary to bring their supplies from Russia, 
and the roads were often rendered impassable by the 
weather. From this and other causes reinforcements 
were slow in arriving. The army in Sebastopol and 
its vicinily numbered less than half as many bayonets 
as the allies. Of the 18,000 seamen who had fought 
under Korniloff in the previous October only 4,000 
were left, and on July 11 Admiral Nachimoff their 
commander was killed in the Malakoff Tower. Tod- 
leben himself was suffering from a severe wound, 
though he still continued to superintend the defense 
from a villa in the suburbs.^ 

By August 1 the Russian commanders were at log- 
gerheads as to whether it were wise to prolong the 
defense of the city, already badly injured by repeated 
bombardments. On the 9th a council of war was 

^ The personal presence of Todleben had become an inspiration to 
the garrison. From the day he was wounded the vigor of the defense 
began to wane. 


held, upon the arrival of General Vrevski from St. 
Petersburg. The sentiment of the assembly was for 
a vigorous sortie, and Gortsehakoff, while personally 
opposed to the measure, issued his orders for an 
attack upon the Franco-Sardinian positions on the 
Fedioukine heights in the Tchemaya valley. The 
object of this attack was to secure control again of 
the whole valley as far as Kadikoi, and to threaten 
the allied positions on the Chersonese from the east. 
That he was almost hopeless of success Gortscha- 
koff's dispatch to the minister of war proves. "There 
is no doubt about it. I am attacking the enemy un- 
der wretched circumstances. ... If things go wrong, 
it will not be my fault. I have done my best, but 
the task has been too difficult ever since I came to 
the Crimea." On August 16 the attack was made at 
dawn under cover of a dense fog. The rank and file 
of the Russian army had imbibed something of the 
hopelessness of their general, and failed to fight as 
stoutly as usual. Several assaults were made, and at 
first with some success. Later, Generals Head and 
Vrevski were killed, and before noon Gortschakoff 
abandoned the struggle and a general retreat com- 
menced. This contest, generally known to the allies 
as the battle of the Tchemaya, was the last aggressive 
movement of the Russians in the Sebastopol cam- 
paign. Their next step was of a different nature, the 
construction of a floating bridge from Sebastopol to 
the north side of the great harbor. Even the com- 
mon soldiers could not mistake the meaning of this. 
Sebastopol was to be given up. Their generals were 
securing their retreat. 

The long campaign was surely drawing to a dose. 


With their vastly superior resources the allied gen- 
erals were determined at whatever cost to break the 
Russian defense. On September 6 the allied bat- 
teries began to rain a destructive tempest of missiles 
upon forts, town, and suburbs. All through the 6th 
and 7th the cannonade was steadily maintained, the 
Russian works were terribly battered, while at night 
dull, lurid clouds of smoke told of devastation worked 
in the town itself. At noon on the 8th the bombard- 
ment, which had been waning for a few hours, broke 
out with redoubled violence. This was maintained 
for about twenty minutes, when suddenly it entirely 
ceased. Scarcely had the reverberation died away 
than the pealing of the French bugles rang out upon 
the air, and the chasseurs and zouaves of MacMahon's 
division swept up the slope of the Malakoff Hill. It 
was a rush of only seventy-five feet to the ditch of 
the tower, which had been almost filled by the debris 
of the bombardment. The Russians were surprised 
again, and, opposed only by a feeble musketry fire, 
the French in a twinkling were clambering over the 
parapets and through the embrasures of the work. 
General Pelissier, from his position on the Mamelon, 
scanned with intense anxiety the progress of the 
struggle. Regiment after regiment swept across the 
hollow to the support of the troops already engaged, 
hand to hand, with the defenders of the Malakoff 
which had cost France so many lives. At last with 
exultant eyes the French commander descried the tri- 
color waving from the parapet. " Tenez ! voila mon 
baton de marechal ! " he exclaimed as he lowered his 

^ Prissier was right. He became a Marshal of France with the 
title of Due de MalakofiE. 


The attacks at all other points had utterly failed. 
The French were repulsed at the Little Kedan, while 
at the Redan itself the English soldiers, after strug- 
gling valiantly to a position close under the work in 
the face of a decimating fire, were compelled to re- 
treat for lack of supports. 

But the possession of the Malakoff was the posses- 
sion of SebastopoL It completely dominated the 
harbor, the town, and all its important defenses. The 
Russians, realizing this, made almost superhiunan 
efforts to recapture it. A terrible contest was waged 
in its passages and inclosures throughout the after- 
noon, the Russians pushing up heavy columns from 
the north, while the French supports poured in from 
the other side. At dusk, however, the Russians were 
sullenly retiring. The last fight for Sebastopol had 
been fought and won. 

With the cessation of the struggle at the Malakoff 
an almost complete silence reigned. The sky was 
murky and overcast, and an impenetrable darkness 
settled upon the country. As the night deepened the 
muffled tread of marching columns arose from the 
gloomy town. Then puffs of flame became visible 
far below, and spreading rapidly they began to dis- 
pel the darkness and reveal buildings on fire. The 
crackle and roar of the flames soon became audible 
on the heights, while the explosion of vast magazines 
shook the very hills of the peninsula. At midnight 
Sebastopol was literally in flames. The harbor, the 
ships, the heights, and ruined forts were all revealed 
as by day, while the French tricolor, on the Mala- 
koff, as once at Moscow, tossed in the fierce glare of 
a Russian conflagration. The English outposts foimd 
the Redan unoccupied, and soon it became evident 


that the Russians had abandoned their defenses all 
along the line. Their retreating masses of bayonets, 
that flashed back the glare of the fire, could be traced 
passing over the bridge to the north, while the con- 
stantly recurring explosions in the ill-fated town ef- 
fectually prevented any interruption with their move- 

When morning dawned the Russians were gone, 
the ships burned or sunk, and the bridge destroyed. 
Sebastopol itself was a smoking waste, scarce a dozen 
bundings remaining. WeU might Prince Gortscha. 
koff declare, " It is not Sebastopol which we have left 
to them, but the burning ruins of the town, which we 
ourselves set fire to, having maintained the honor of 
the defense in such a manner that our great-grand- 
children may recall with pride the remembrance of it, 
and send it down to all posterity." 

With the fall of Sebastopol the campaign in the 
Crimea came practically to a close, though the Rus- 
sians still clung to the north side of the harbor and 
confronted their foes in the Tchemaya Valley. 

With Sebastopol in their possession, and the prose- 
cution of hostilities still upon their hands, the allied 
generals were at a loss what course to pursue. An 
advance into the interior of the bleak and thinly 
settled Crimea was not an attractive or promising 
undertaking. The cabinets of London and Paris took 
the question in hand, while the military men occupied 
themselves in the destruction of those magnificent 
docks and fortifications that had rendered Sebastopol 

The Emperor of the French, having awakened in 
Europe a satisfactory opinion of his military strength, 


was anxious to be rid of the war and gather new 
laurels as a peacemaker. The English government, 
on the other hand, was more strongly inclined toward 
aggressive movements. English pride had been 
touched. The second Baltic expedition under Ad- 
miral Dundas had returned after bombarding Svea- 
borg and executing a few harmless manoeuvres off 
the Bussian coast. The operations in the Black Sea 
and Sea of Azov had been mostly confined to the 
destruction of the batteries at Odessa and the reduc- 
tion of Kertch, Yenikale, and Kinbum, and there 
was little in these affairs to gratify the British ambi- 
tion for naval glory. 

The sentiment of the continent was for peace. 
Austria at this crisis redoubled her efforts for the 
achievement of a settlement of the dispute. She 
found the French emperor in accord with her designs, 
and the new Czar to be far more pliable than his im- 
perious father. Alexander II. was not of a warlike 
temperament, and he regarded peace at this time as an 
absolute necessity to the empire. The finances were 
in a terribly reduced and disordered state, the expen- 
diture of life had been enormous, and he was willing 
to avail himself of any plan that seemed to afford an 
honorable retreat. The tidings of the fall of Kars, 
the celebrated Turkish fortress in Armenia, came as 
a soothing balm to the mortified military pride of 
Russia. In fact, the campaigns in Armenia had been 
throughout generally favorable to the Russian arms. 
The capture of Kars was a brilliant consiunmation of 
the fighting in Asia, and with this fortress in his pos- 
session the Czar might reasonably hope for easier 
terms from the western powers. 

During the last of December Austria submitted 


to the St. Petersburg cabinet proposals for peace. 
After some bickering over the clauses relative to the 
supremacy of the Black Sea, on January 16 the 
Czar accepted the propositions entire. On February 
25 the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, 
France, Bussia, Sardinia, and Turkey convened at 
the palace of the ministry for foreign afFairs in Paris.^ 
An armistice was concluded between the belligerents, 
and on March 30, the day before its expiration, the 
plenipotentiaries waited upon the emperor at the 
Tuileries, and informed him of the conclusion of a 
treaty of peace. 

This famous congress discussed and acted upon 
other matters than those immediately pertaining to 
the belligerents in the eastern war. Privateering was 
declared abolished, and the state of affairs in Bel- 
gium, Greece, and Italy was brought to notice. It 
was owing to the exertions of Count Cavour that the 
Italian question was introduced, and forced into a 
prominence that committed every power to an expres- 
sion of opinion. This discussion, which practically 
closed the work of the congress, developed at least 
three facts : First, that the French emperor was will- 
ing to withdraw his troops from Bome ; second, that 
the Austrian occupation of the Papal States was in no 
sense beneficial ; and third, that there was no prob- 
ability that Austria would of her own free will dis- 
continue that occupation. 

Peace having resumed her sway, the belligerents in 
the eastern war could count the cost. Bussia, it is 

^ Prussia was not represented at the congress until some days later, 
when Baron Manteuffel was admitted at the instigation of the French 
emperor. This incident gives a striking idea of the relative standing 
of France and Pmsma in Europe in 1856. 


said, lost 250,000 men by wounds, exposure, and dis- 
ease, France lost nearly 100,000, England 26,000, 
Turkey 35,000, and Sardinia 3,000. Kussia entered 
the war to maintain her right of protectorate over 
the Greek Christians in Turkey, to humiliate the 
Porte, and perhaps destroy it. By the terms of the 
treaty of Paris she not only failed in this, but lost 
her nominal protectorate over the Danubian Princi- 
palities. She also lost her supremacy on the Black 
Sea, being forbidden to maintain a naval fleet on its 
waters. She yielded Kars for Sebastopol and other 
points held by the allies, and was obliged to suffer a 
loss of territory on her southeastern frontier. Aside 
from the expenditure in blood and treasure, Bussia 
stood as the principal loser by the war. 

The Emperor of the French had entered the contest 
for military " glory," and to strengthen the insecure 
foundations of his throne. He gained the plaudits 
of an admiring world, which hastened to crown him 
as the sovereign of the first military power of Eu- 

England had taken up arms to maintain the integ- 
rity of the Ottoman empire, to curb the ambition of 
Russia, and to settle the Eastern Question : England 
was regarded in the light of a power that had gained 
ber ends. 

Turkey fought for self-preservation, and, propped 
by the strong arms of the western powers, she still 
lived. Furthermore, she gained admittance into the 
great family of European states, with all that the 
dignity implied. The Sultan renewed his old pledge 
to close the Sea of Marmora to ships of war during 
times of peace. 

Sardinia fought to gain the attention and ear of 


Europe. The 8th of April at the Paris congress 
demonstrated her success. 

This is the way in which the nations were affected 
by the terms of the treaty of Paris, in the days when 
the treaty was young. After a lapse of twenty-five 
years, what are the permanent results achieved by 
two years of bloodshed in the East ? 

Bussia has scoffed at the treaty, and resumed her 
sway on the Euxine and in the principalities. 

The French emperor sleeps in exile, and the 
" glory " the world awarded him has passed away in 
the wreck of his tinsel empire. 

England still frets over the unsettled Eastern 

The " sick man " lives on, but his palsied hand has 
lost its grip on the north of the Balkan range. 

Sardinia, and Sardinia alone, has proved to be the 
real gainer by the Crimean war ; for from the day 
when the gallantry of the Bersaglieri on the heights 
of the Tchemaya gained Cavour an influential voice 
in the congress of Paris dates the birth of the king- 
dom of Italy. 



The Map op Italy in 1850. — Politigal State op Sabduoa. -^ 
The Two Sicilies. — States op the Chubch. — Tuscaky. — 
Parma. — Modena. — Lombabd y akd Venetia. — Secret Socie- 
ties. — Young Italy and its Mission. — The Sardinian King 
AND his Policy. — His Parliakentary Trials and Loyalty 
TO THE Constitution. — Legislation in the Sardinian Par- 
liament AGAINST Clerical Abuses. — Advent op Cavoub. — 
The Diplomatic Duel between Sardinia and Austria and 
ITS Influence upon Europe. — Cavour takes the Helm. — 
His Dislike for Secret Societies. — His Policy defined. — 
Throws Sardinia into the Alliance against Russia. — De- 
parture OF the Army for the Crimea. — Effect of the Wab 
News in Piedmont. — Victor Emmanuel visits London and 
Paris. — Napoleon's Solicitude for Italy. — Is appealed to 
BY Cavour. — Cavour in the Paris Congress. 

In the year 1850 Italy had almost realized the pre- 
diction of Prince Mettemich as a " mere geographical 
expression." The divisions of the peninsula remained 
practically as they had been settled by the treaty of 
1815. The kingdom of the Two Sicilies comprised 
all southern Italy, including the island of Sicily. The 
States of the Church, with the grand duchies of Tus- 
cany, Parma, and Modena, occupied all central Italy 
northward to the Po. The territory of the Sardinian 
kingdom on the west and the Lombardo-Venetian 
provinces of Austria on the east carried the Italian 
frontiers high up among the Alps. 

Of all these states Sardinia was the only one gov- 
erned constitutionally by an Italian prince. The 


Bourbon dynasty continued to disgrace the throne of 
the Two Sicilies. The Pope directed the temporal as 
well as the spiritual affairs of his realm, while the 
grand dukes followed the standard set by the Vienna 
government in its administration of its Italian prov- 

The condition of the majority of these states was 
most deplorable. As for the Two Sicilies, the govern- 
ment of " King Bomba " had become a scandal to civ- 
ilization. The history of the state since 1815 had 
been one dark page of royal perjury and popular in- 
surrections cruelly suppressed. Twice, in 1820 and 
in 1848, the imhappy people had seen their hopes 
strangled by sovereigns whose lack of honor was as 
notorious as their ingenuity in all manner of oppres- 
8ion and misrule. In only one respect did this for- 
eign dynasty seem to become nationalized. The in- 
habitants of the volcanic districts of southern Italy 
are notoriously careless of the future, and refuse to 
be taught by hard experience. The dwellers on the 
slopes and along the base of Vesuvius, after losing 
their all in some sudden outburst, will rebuild on the 
same precarious spots. With the smoking moimtain 
in view from his palace windows, perhaps the Bourbon 
caught this much of the national character. At all 
events he failed to profit by previous experience, and 
in the lurid flickerings of discontent that blazed out 
here and there within his realm, he failed to compre- 
hend the great popular upheaval that it presaged. 
So the Neapolitan dungeons swarmed with miserable 
prisoners arrested on suspicion and committed without 
trial. So the people sank lower in ignorance and deg- 
radation, while poverty, villainy, and brigandage 
grew apace. 


In the States of the Church matters were scarcely 
better. Pius IX. forfeited the love and confidence 
of his subjects when, in 1848, he refused to use his 
troops against Austria and fled into the arms of the 
Neapolitan king. When under the protection of 
French bayonets he resumed his rule in Some, no 
Italian patriot looked to him for the lightening of the 
national burdens. With his return the Jesuits again 
resimied their sway, and the whole state became mis- 
erably priest-ridden. Liberalism in religion became 
the worst crime of which a subject of the Pope could 
be guilty, offenses against the civil law receiving com- 
paratively slight attention. As a result crime flour- 
ished, and brigands f oimd another successful field for 
operation. The papal government was cruel yet 
weak, oppressive yet inefficient. The subjects of the 
Holy See were held in check only by the French in 
Some and the Austrians in the Legations. 

In Tuscany greater liberty and comfort were en- 
joyed, thanks to the disposition of the Grand Duke 
Leopold. But the Tuscans had never forgiven the 
duke for his course in 1848, when, disregarding their 
invitation to return to them in peace, he chose to 
come back with Austrian bayonets and over the wreck 
of a short-lived constitution. 

In the grand duchies of Parma and Modena the 
win of Vienna was maintained in a rigorous rule, 
while the Austrian eagle with whetted beak hovered 
ever ready within the famous " Quadrilateral." The 
turbulence of the people of the Lombardo-Venetian 
provinces necessitated the employment of a vast secret 
police. The work of this organization in a province 
charged with conspiracy can be better imagined than 
described. The Austrian dominion in Lombardy and 


Venetia deserves little else than condemnation, and 
none the less that Austria was one of the leading 
powers of the civilization of the nineteenth century. 

Such, briefly, was the condition of the Italian states 
in 1850. It was the old sad story. Wars had swept 
over the peninsula again and again, only to leave it 
more hopelessly enslaved. In that year there seemed 
no ray of light on the horizon to the millions of Ital- 
ians gazing longingly for the rising of the sun of lib- 
erty and national regeneration.^ 

One result of the stolid indifference of the rulers 
to the interests of their peoples was the formation of 
secret societies. The most celebrated of these was the 
Carbonari, which, originating in the south of Italy, 
spread rapidly into the Papal States and northern 
provinces. It included within its ranks the noble 
and gifted as well as the ignorant and villainous. 
The ends to be attained were vague, beyond the over- 
turning of the existing order of things. No oppor- 
tunity was to be lost to incite and promote revolution. 
The torch and stiletto were its legitimate weapons. 

The papal power^ finding itself helpless against this 
hidden danger, had sanctioned the organization of a 
coimter society opposed to its aims. The notorious 
sect of the Sanfedisti was the result. The character 
of the work to be accomplished by this organization 
can be comprehended by a few clauses from their 
oath. The neophyte swore " to have no pity either 
on children or old men, and to shed the last drop of 
the Liberals' blood without regard to sex or rank." ^ 

^ For a condensed narrative of the terrible state of Italian affairs in 
1852 see the letter of Lnigfi Carlo Farini written in December of that 
year to Mr. Gladstone. It is appended to yol. iv. of Mr. Gladstone's 
translation of Farini's Roman State. 

^ See introduction to Gbdkin's Victor Emmanuel IL p. xviL 


Furthermore this society, working presumably in the 
interest of Christ on earth, swore to " implacable ha- 
tred of the enemies of our Holy Roman Catholic and 
only true religion." So the subterranean struggle 
grew fiercer and fiercer, until the whole structure 
upon which the Soman and Neapolitan governments 
rested was honeycombed to the core. 

But the most active society in 1850, for the achieve- 
ment of Italian independence, was known as " Young 
Italy." It was foimded by Joseph Mazzini, and first 
came into notice about 1831. " Yoimg Italy " had 
one advantage over the Carbonari inasmuch as it 
aimed at a definite result, the foundation of an Italian 
republic with Rome as its capital. " Young Italy " 
was bitterly opposed to aU things monarchical. The 
numbers of the society increased rapidly, but its move- 
ments were governed by zeal rather than judgment. 
The misdirected efforts of its devotees threw serious 
obstacles in the path of the calmer and more constitu- 
tional methods of achieving national unity. 

There is but one state that we have failed to notice, 
the kingdom of Sardinia, including Piedmont, Savoy, 
Nice, and the island of Sardinia. From the year 1850 
the history of this little state is the history of Italy. 
In 1848 Charles Albert, king of Sardinia, at the head 
of his brave and enlightened people, took the field 
against Austria in the cause of Italian independence. 
Deserted in the hour of need by Rome and Naples, 
he sacrificed the blood and treasure of his little state 
on the altar of Italian freedom. Since the mournful 
evening when his abdication left the destinies of the 
kingdom in the hands of his son, Sardinia had taken 
no step backward. When Victor Emmanuel assumed 
the duties his father had laid aside, he found his peo- 



pie wearied with the war and heart-broken at Its 
results. At the outset the fidelity of the king to con- 
stitutional principles was severely tested, the parlia- 
ment refusing to ratify the treaty of peace he had 
concluded with Austria at Milan. The terms were 
by no means light, but he had refused to adopt the 
one course that would have won Austrian leniency, 
the abolition of constitutional government in his 
realms. It was a hard position for a young king. 
On the one hand an easy peace and Austrian protec- 
tion over his despotism, on the other, harsher terms 
and a conflict with an injudicious and ungrateful par- 
liament. His high sense of honor asserted itself in 
this the first crisis of his reign. He rejected the 
40,000 bayonets which Marshal Badetzky declared to 
be at his service, and returned to his capital and hos- 
tile parliament. 

It became clear immediately that nothing reason- 
able could be hoped from the Chambers. They were 
composed largely of " Young Italy," while the judg- 
ment of many of the wiser heads had become dis- 
torted by the national misfortunes. The king seized 
boldly the only course open to him and dissolved the 
Chambers. Then, calling a new election, he entreated 
the people to return wise and patriotic representatives 
for his support. The result was a more reasonable 
parliament, which recognized above all that the neces- 
sities of the state compelled an immediate settlement 
of peace. The first danger of Victor Emmanuel's 
reign was over, and constitutional government became 
more strongly rooted by the ordeal through which it 
had passed. 

The king and his ministry then turned to the de- 
velopment of the country, healing the ravages of the 


war, and righting long condoned clerical abuses. 
The prime minister was the Marquis Massimo d' Aze- 
glio, a man of intelligence and refinement, who had 
made himself famous by his exposure of misrule in 
central Italy, and by his general prominence in mat- 
ters relating to national unification. For these ten- 
dencies he was expelled from Tuscany in 1846, 
returning to Piedmont, his native state. The reor- 
ganization of the army was confided to General Al- 
f onzo La Marmora, while Count Siccardi was sent to 
Rome to discuss reforms of the church in Piedmont. 
Siccardi found the Pope obdurate and unwilling to 
yield a jot. Upon his return in February, 1850, and 
his admission to the cabinet as minister of grace and 
justice, he brought a biU before parliament abohsh- 
ing the *' Foro Ecclesiastico," the courts held by the 
bishops of the church, and the only ones to which 
ecclesiastical offenders against the civil law were 
amenable.* In spite of the opposition of Rome the 
bill was finally carried, and its practical enforcement 
was soon demonstrated by the arraignment of clerical 
criminals in the civil courts. 

It was in the fall of 1850 that Count CamiUo Benso 
di Cavour first appeared in the cabinet as minister of 
agriculture and commerce. He was a true represen- 
tative of the old Piedmontese aristocracy, had been 
trained for the army, and later made himself a reputa- 
tion for great political ability. He had strong liberal 
tendencies, and was an ardent advocate of English 
governmental methods. He was a prominent sup- 
porter of Siccardi's bill for the abolition of the eccle- 
siastical courts. His talents were of such an order 
as to immediately impress the king. Upon the de- 
cision to tender him a poiii olio, the king is reported 


to have said laughingly to D' Azeglio, " Look out 
what you are doing ; Cavour will soon be master of 
you all." 

The royal speech at the opening of parliament in 
November, 1850, evinced no intention of retracing a 
step taken in the teeth of papal protestation. It was 
plain that the papal thunders were powerless against 
the resolution of the king. Already he had earned 
the title of " H Re Galantuomo," in which he gloried 
through his life. 

The efforts of the Sardinian government toward 
the development of free institutions received a tem- 
porary check when the influences awakened by the 
French coup (Tetat swept over Europe. The only 
popular government of the continent had been over- 
thrown, and the supreme power seized by a man who 
appealed to the military traditions of the Bonapartes 
to stir enthusiasm. The downfall of the French Re- 
public left Piedmont like a green spot of liberty in 
the far-spreading desert of European autocracy. 

Austria, already dreading the influence of Turin 
upon the people of Italy, seized this moment of ap- 
parent despotic ascendency to terrorize the Sardinian 
king by protestations and warnings which the Berlin 
cabinet supported. On December 10, 1851, the Mar- 
quis d' Azeglio replied, defending the policy of Pied- 
mont, and concluded in this fashion : '' His majesty 
was unable to forbear observing that the political 
condition of the two countries governed by the two 
sovereigns who addressed to him this species of ulti- 
matum, appeared to him to stand much more in need 
of advice than to give them any right to offer their 
advice to others. The king added that he was master 
in his own house, that he in no way interfered with 


what other sovereigns thought fit to do, and that he 
desired, on his part, perfect Kberty of action; he 
again expressed his perfect confidence in the efforts 
by which he continued to support the wise and mod- 
erate course of his government." 

This was hot shot for the governments of central 
Europe. It was plain to Austria, as it was to the 
Pope, that the Sardinian king was incorrigible. She 
saw trouble in the future, and went on building up 
her military strength within the Quadrilateral. 

In the fall of 1852 D' Azeglio, wearied with his long 
contest with the papal authority, resigned his premier- 
ship, and it devolved upon Cavour to form a new min- 
istry. Scarcely had he assumed his duties when in 
February, 1853, he was diverted from his contem- 
plated task of internal development by an incipient 
uprising against the Austrian authority in Milan. It 
was probably the work of " Young Italy," and per- 
haps the product of Mazzini's plotting brain. The 
Austrian government, however, laid the charge of 
being accessory to it at the door of Sardinia. This 
was indignantly denied by Cavour, who proved the 
innocence of his government to the satisfaction of the 
continental courts. 

Cavour had always deprecated the violent methods 
of the great Italian societies in the cause of freedom. 
As for " Young Italy," it had been from the first a 
s erious em barrassment to the benevolent designs of 
>ardinia."^J^ former days Charles Albert, upon his 
refusal to tak§>^ arms against Austria at Mazzini's 
appeal, had found himself compelled to defend his 
borders against Mazzini's revengeful attack from 
Switzerland. Cavour deplored lawlessness and assas- 
sination as political methods, and was especially tena^ 


clous of maintaining constitutional obligations. The 
Carbonari and " Young Italy " might be striving for 
the same end as the Sardinian government, but they 
struggled on in secret and divergent channels, inspir- 
ing crime and impeding healthful progress. In the 
mind of Cayour no less than in Mazzini's, was the 
picture of a united Italy, but Cavour's sight was 
clearer and more definite, revealing the House of 
Savoy dominant on the banks of the Tiber. He be- 
lieved Piedmont must of necessity be the principal 
agent in effecting this transformation. " Events have 
led Piedmont to take a clear and decided position in 
Italy," he wrote at this time. " That position is not, 
I am well aware, without danger, and I feel all the 
weight of the responsibility that in consequence presses 
on me, but duty and honor alike impose it upon us. 
As providence has willed that in Italy Piedmont 
alone should be free and independent, Piedmont ought 
to use her liberty and her independence to plead be- 
fore Europe the cause of the unhappy peninsula. We 
shall not recoil from this perilous task : the king and 
the country are decided to go through with it to the 

In furtherance of this policy, and while using 
every endeavor to force the Italian question upon 
tl^e attention of Europe, Cavour went on strengthen- 
ing his own state for the great duties to which with 
the approval of the king he had dedicated it. The 
taxation was overhauled, free trade introduced, rail- 
ways opened, and bridges built under the encourage- 
ment of the government. In 1S54 the final and 
decisive blows were struck at clerical abuses. A law 
of civil marriage was passed, while certain religious 
corporations were abolished and church property gen- 


erally brought under control of the state. Against 
these measures, as was anticipated, the Pope pro- 
tested in unison with the local clergy. Cavour was 
immovable, however, in his consistent adherence to 
his policy of a " free church in a free state." 

Moreover, during these debates in the Chambers, 
Cavour's mind was running in other channels. The 
Crimean war was in progress, winter was approach- 
ing, and the condition of the allied armies was known 
to be anything but satisfactory. Piedmont with its 
well-trained army would be no contemptible succor in 
a time like this. Cavour was little inclined to run 
a great risk, but he recognized in the condition of 
affairs a glorious opportunity. In fact, he favored 
the sending of a military force to the Crimea to assist 
the allies. England was known to be desirous of 
this, and here was an opportunity to win her gratitude 
and perhaps assistance, later, in his settlement of the 
Italian question. Furthermore the alliance of Sar- 
dinia with England and France would accomplish the 
great purpose of bringing her into friendly sympathy 
with the two great courts. A successful campaign in 
the Crimea would also raise the " morale " of the 
Piedmontese army and give it confidence for future 
service. This consideration had great weight with 
the king. " Our defeat," he exclaimed, referring to 
Novara, "was too ignominious, we have need of a 
little glory to raise us up." There was one other 
reason, perhaps, that may have influenced Cavour's 
mind; a blow at Russia was a blow at European 
despotism. ■ 

The ministry was opposed to Cavour's bold plan. 
In the Chambers, too, it provoked bitter criticism. It 
was represented as ruinous, as suicidal, for a little 


state scarcely able to preserve her free institutions 
against vast hostile influences, to waste her strength 
in a quarrel in which she had not even a remote in- . 
terest. But Cavour remained steadfast to his purpose, 
confident in the royal approbation. His firmness and 
patience were rewarded ; the Chambers supported his 
project, the treaty of alliance was signed, and the 
battie-fiags of Sardinia again committed to the charge 
of her devoted soldiery. 

These were trying days for the king. At the open- 
ing of the year 1855, with the church still heaping its 
anathemas upon him, and the strong minority in the 
Chambers bitterly condemning his folly, the hand of 
domestic affliction was laid heavily upon him. The 
treaty of alliance between Piedmont and the western 
powers was signed on January 10, and within a 
month of that event the king lost his wife, mother, 
and his only brother, the Duke of Genoa. These 
trials aroused the deep sympathy of his people, but 
they were cited by the church as the pimishment of 
God upon an impious monarch. The king, fatigued 
and sorrowing, leaned more than ever upon the wis- 
dom of Cavour. He would have been glad to leave 
the atmosphere of civil and clerical strife that sur- 
roimded him, for the head of his army in the East. 
On April 14, at a review of the troops destined for 
the Crimea, he bade farewell to General La Marmora 
with these words : " Ah, general, happy you. You 
go to fight soldiers. I remain to fight monks and 

Meanwhile the struggle in the Chambers went on 
over the Rattazzi bill for the abolition of religious 
corporations. The clamors of the angry clergy that 
followed its passage were soon drowned in the en« 


thusiastic acdamations that greeted the tidings of the 
Franco-Sardinian victory of the Tchemaya. The last 
note of the opposition was silenced, and no one could 
question longer that the prime minister's foreign 
policy had been right. The narrow streets of Genoa 
and the broad avenues of the royal capital only re- 
flected the pride and joy that were animating every 
village and mountain chalet over the news that the 
gallant soldiers of Sardinia had again proved their 
valor against one of the first military powers of 

Cavour determined to strike while the iron was 
hot, and force Sardinia still more upon the notice of 
the courts and people of western Europe. It was in 
furtherance of this policy that in November the king 
paid a visit to Paris and London. He was received 
with courtesy and an interest bordering perhaps upon 
curiosity. It was during his stay in Paris that the 
king received his first intimation from the lips of the 
emperor that he was deeply interested in the solution 
of the Italian question. What did the emperor mean 
by that inquiry, " Que pent on faire pour I'ltalie?" 
After all, the destroyer of the French republic might 
become the destroyer of Austrian despotism in Italy. 
Soon after the return of the king, Cavour, presimiing 
upon the solicitude the emperor had expressed, wrote 
as follows to him : " The emperor can render immense 
service to Italy: first, by inducing Austria to do 
justice to Piedmont and maintain her engagements ; 
secondly, by obtaining from her a mitigation of the 
regime that weighs upon Lombardy and Venetia ; in 
the third place by forcing the king of Naples not to 
scandalize civilized Europe by a deportment contrary 
to all the principles of justice and equity ; in the fourth 


place, by reestabKshing an equilibrum in Italy such 
as was settled by the treaty of Vienna, that is to say, 
rendering possible the removal of the Austrians from 
the Legations and the Romagna; by placing these 
provinces under a secular prince, or procuring them 
the benefit of a laic and independent administration." 
Then followed the congress of Paris, and it was 
the French plenipotentiary who opened the way for 
Cavour's exposure of the evils resulting from the 
Austrian domination in Italy. Cavour much desired 
the support of England as a constitutional power of 
far greater moral weight than the French empire. 
He was not, however, to be lulled into a sense of false 
security. While still hoping for signs of tangible 
encouragement from the reticent statesmen of Great 
Britain, he never for a moment relaxed that vigilance 
and marvelous skill which in their subtle development 
were drawmg the French emperor into the position of 
the champion of Italian unity. 


Austria's Inplubncb upon the Italian Govebkments. — Mkt- 


He turns to France as an Ally. — The Qrsini Incident. 
— Cavour appeases the Emperor, and strikes at the Papal 
Government. — The Conference at PLOMsikRES. — Cavoub 
JUBILANT. — Warlike Declarations at the Tuileries and 
AT Turin. — Marriage op Prince Napoleon and the Prin- 
cess Clotilde. — Cayour impels the Emperor toward War. 
— GuizoT ON Cavour. — Signing op the Franco-Sardinian 
Alliance. — Futile Efforts of the Powers to preserve 
the Peace. — Austria declares War. — Enthusiasm in 
Italy. — Napoleon's Manifesto. — He leaves for the 
Front. — Concentration of the Armies. 

Though only a small portion of Italian territory 
was occupied by her troops, Austria was largely re- 
sponsible for the oppression exercised by the despotic 
rulers throughout the peninsula. The tyranny in the 
Two Sicilies and the bigoted inefficiency of the papal 
government could not have stood a month without the 
support of Vienna. The Pope and " King Bomba " 
relied implicitly upon the material as well as the moral 
aid of Austria against their rebellious subjects. 

The more rational of the Italian patriots had 
already begim to pin their hopes to the king of Sar- 
dinia as a champion. His liberal course, pursued in 
the face of Austrian opposition, had compelled even 
the most ardent republicans to acknowledge that there 
was one monarch in Italy true to his pledge and the 


interests of his people. Secret societies had only 
harassed the despotic governments, and shown them- 
selves not only incapable of improving opportunities, 
but propagators of anarchy as well. It began to be 
realized that to wage a successful battle with the Ital- 
ian governments supported by the might of Austria, 
it would be necessary to adopt methods sufficiently 
honorable to arouse and retain the sympathy of Eu- 

Of course the great societies died slowly, and 
Cavour, who was constantly replying to Austrian ac- 
cusations, was sometimes handicapped by the mis- 
guided zeal of "Young Italy." Nevertheless he 
always defended his state successfully, turning with 
telling force the responsibility of political outrages 
upon the governments whose intolerance rendered 
such deeds possible. "We have always followed a 
frank, loyal policy," he declared in the Chambers, 
"without duplicity, and as long as we shall be at 
peace with other potentates we will not employ rev- 
olutionary means, nor ever seek to excite tumults or 
rebellions in their states." The energy, skill, and 
straightforwardness displayed by Cavour in these dis- 
putes with Austria was not lost upon Europe. Old 
Prince Mettemich could already see the drift of pub- 
lic opinion setting in against the empire he had so 
long and faithfully served. An Austrian and an im- 
perialist to the core, he could not conceal his admira- 
tion for the Sardinian minister. " Diplomacy is pass- 
ing away," he is reported to have said ; " there is only 
now one diplomatist in Europe, and unfortunately he 
is against us ; I mean M. de Cavour." 

Before the close of 1856 Cavour realized that Eng- 
land's interests Wiere drawing her closer to Austria, and 


of necessity farther away from the championship of 
Italian freedom. Cavour's creed being undying hostil- 
ity to Austria, it was plain to him that England could 
never be his ally in the sense he wished. The loss of 
England was a heavy disappointment to him, for no 
support could ever be as satisfactory as that of the 
great people whose institutions he always held up to 
his countrymen as worthy of emulation. "Public 
affairs hold me in very great suspense," he wrote at 
this time. " Abandoned by England, having in front 
of us Austria, malevolent and hostile, obliged to strug- 
gle against Rome and the other Italian princes — you 
can imagine how difficult our position is. In spite 
of all, I am not quite discouraged, because I believe 
that the country is with us." 

The English influence upon Austria tended to bring 
about certain reforms in Lombardy and Venetia, am- 
nesty being granted for political offenders and Prince 
Maximilian appointed viceroy of the provinces. Ca- 
vour, however, saw in this, as well as in the Kaiser's 
visit to Venice and Milan that followed, only a tardy 
effort on the part of the Vienna government to win 
the loyalty of its Italian subjects. Cavour had no 
faith in Austrian reforms ; Austria was a usurper on 
Italian soil, and her rule could never be endured by 
the true sons of the fair peninsula. 

Cavour's only hope now was in the Emperor of the 
French. It is true that the turn of the diplomatic 
wheel that had estranged constitutional England 
brought about more friendly relations with despotic 
Russia, still it was to France that he must look for 
material support. The emperor's course, since his 
first profession of interest in the Italian question, had 
been so consistently friendly as to awaken within 


Cavour the brightest hopes. AU the ingenuity and 
seductive wiles of his diplomacy were now directed 
toward drawing the Emperor of the French into an 
alliance with the Sardinian state. 

The unhappy attempt upon the emperor's life in 
January, 1858, threw a temporary cloud upon the 
growing cordiality that existed between the courts of 
Paris and Turin. The crime was traced to Felice 
Orsini, an Italian agitator, who expiated his guilt 
upon the scaffold. If the whole matter could have 
been forgotten with Orsini's death, it would have been 
to Cavour's liking. There followed, however, a long 
series of charges, counter-charges, and denials be- 
tween the French, English, and Sardinian govern- 
ments. Orsini had been striving, by means legitimate 
and criminal, to incite in all quarters hostility to Aus- 
trian rule in Italy. In England he addressed public 
meetings, but soon awoke to the knowledge that 
English enthusiasm would never blossom into action. 
While engaged there, the French emperor visited the 
queen at the Isle of Wight, and it seems probable 
that the deluded enthusiast gained the idea that in 
some way Napoleon was responsible for English in- 
difference. The attempted assassination on the Rue 
de r Opera may have been actuated by motives of 
revenge or for the purpose of frightening the em- 
peror into hostility to Austria. The correspondence 
that passed between England and France was ex- 
tremely bitter. England was denominated by the 
French press as a den of assassins, while the retorts 
from England galled the emperor by their uncom- 
plimentary allusions to his coup d^etat. In contrast 
with England, the conciliatory tone of Sardinia was 
extremely marked and agreeable. The king wrote a 


note to the emperor, expressing his sorrow and horror 
at the attempt upon his life, and begging him not to 
allow the impious deed of an unhappy zealot to influ- 
ence him to abandon the Italian cause. Nor was this 
all, for in the Chambers stringent laws were passed 
in regard to regicide and conspiracy. The charges 
against Piedmont as a nurser of conspiracies being 
renewed at this time by the Austrian and Italian 
courts, Cavour again turned skillfully at bay. He 
struck a vigorous blow at the papal power, laying 
the prevalence of political lawlessness in Italy at the 
door of the Vatican. The system of expulsion prac- 
ticed by the pontifical government in regard to its 
subjects could not, he claimed, fail to be attended by 
" dreadful consequences " in filling other states with 
homeless, discontented, and desperate Italians. " To 
the measures adopted by the Holy See is to be attrib- 
uted the extraordinary vitality of the Mazzinian 

What seemed at first to be the .deathblow to 
French intervention in Italian affairs was turned by 
Cavour into an impelling force in the right direction. 
However much the French emperor was thrown out 
of conceit with the Italian cause by the explosion of 
Orsini's bombs, he was completely moUified by the 
course of the Sardinian government. In fact, so sud- 
denly did the fierce zeal of the emperor for the op- 
pressed Italians blaze forth, that for some years it 
was a prevalent belief in Europe that he was driven 
forward through fear of other Orsinis that might in- 
fest his gay capital.^ 

1 * * The truth is that he is determined to go to war with Austria to 

« propitiate the Italians, and to save his own life from assassination since 

the cUtentai of January, 1858. Cavour worked upon this at their inter^ 


An open alliance with Sardinia meant war, and per- 
haps the emperor thought that it was time to break 
another lance for his popularity at home. Possibly, 
too, a war with Austria, as has often been intimated, 
was one of the great strokes of the policy he had 
determined upon when he seized his imcle's throne. 
It is certain that his spleen and jealousy had been 
whetted by the preponderance of Austrian influence 
in Italy. His bayonets preserved the peace in Borne, 
but in the papal coimcils the will of the Kaiser was 
more potent than his own. He might style himseK 
" the eldest son of the church," but it had become a 
hollow title. Whatever his motives, when he turned 
the face of encouragement to the appeal of Sardinia 
in behalf of a down-trodden people, he entered upon 
a course that has entitled him to the gratitude of the 
civilized world. 

On the 20th of July, 1868, Cavour met the em- 
peror at Plombieres. The conference was private ; and 
when they parted, the outside world could only surmise 
as to the topics discussed and the conclusions reached. 
But though the world was in darkness, a great light 
shone upon Cavour's path. He had long looked for- 
ward to a death grapple with Austrian despotism as 
a necessity, and he no longer confronted the crisis 
with only the help of the slender ranks of Piedmont, 
but he felt behind him the mighty support of the 
French military empire. In case of an Austrian 
attack upon Piedmont, the French army would take 
the field in her defense. As for aggressive move- 
ments, they were to be left to the judgment of the 

view at Plombieres last antunm, and persuaded him that taking up 
the cause of Italy will save his life, forfeited according to the laws of 
the Carbonari.'' — Malmesbury's Memoirs of an ex-Minister^ p. 460. 


emperor. Already while Europe plodded on, never 
suspecting war, while the Bourbon persecuted and 
misruled calm in the sense of Austrian protection, 
while the clergy fumed and conspirators plotted, Ca- 
vour saw, fair and beautiful, a united Italy, and all its 
roads converged toward Rome. 

On the 1st of January, 1859, an event occurred 
that rudely shattered the quiet of Europe. At a re- 
ception at the Tuileries the French emperor expressed 
himself as follows to the Austrian ambassador: "I 
regret that our relations with your government are 
not as good as in the past, but I pray you to inform 
the emperor that my sentiments toward him are not 
changed." Words like these from the Emperor of 
the French could not fail to be regarded in aU quar- 
ters as a menace to the peace of Europe. Following 
close upon this came the royal speech at the opening 
of the Sardinian parliament on January 10. " Our 
coimtry," declared the king, " though small in terri- 
tory, has acquired credit in the councils of Europe, 
because it is great by the ideas it represents, and by 
the sympathies it inspires. This state of things is 
not devoid of perils, for while we respect treaties, we 
are not insensible to the cry of grief which comes 
up to us from so many parts of Italy." The Cham- 
ber was crowded; and as these words were uttered 
the enthusiasm could no longer be restrained. The 
room rang with cheers for the king and the House of 

The declaration at the Tuileries, followed so closely 
by the exciting scene in Turin, left no room for doubt 
that France was pledged to support Sardinia in push- 
ing the Italian question to a solution. The emperor 
had always been made to feel a sense of isolation in 


his intercourse with European monarchs, and had 
long been anxious to ally himself with some ancient 
royal line. A match with the House of Savoy was 
certainly a step in the right direction, and on Janu- 
ary 29 his cousin Prince Napoleon was married to 
the Princess Clotilde, daughter of Victor Emmanuel. 
The union was by no means agreeable to the king, 
but it was urged by Cavour as a portion of the price 
to be paid for French bayonets in the coming strug- 
gle. In short, it was a bargain : a few army corps for 
a princess. The necessities of the state blinded Ca- 
vour to every other consideration. 

The emperor needed at the last some stimulating 
influence to drive him forward. When he saw war 
staring him in the face, he seems to have half re- 
pented his course. Cavour had been leading him on 
step by step from encouraging remarks to positive 
pledges, now craftily picturing Austrian dominance at 
Rome, and then offering inducements like a tract of 
country or the hand of a princess. After committing 
himself at the Tuileries, the Emperor of the French 
was hopelessly bound to Sardinia, to rise or fall with 
her fortunes. Cavour was determined to draw the 
sword, and there was nothing for Napoleon but to 
support him. " There are," exclaimed M. de Guizot 
at this time, " but two men upon whom the eyes of 
Europe are fixed, the Emperor Napoleon and M. de 
Cavour. The game is being played. I back M. de 

The treaty of alliance between France and Sardinia 
was signed on the 18th of January, but already the 
startled powers had commenced to exert themselves in 
the interests of peace. Their efforts were hopeless 
from the first. Both Austria and Sardinia had been 


pushing their war preparations for weeks, and the 
first question for the peacemakers was how to effect 
at least a partial disarmament. Neither Austria nor 
Sardinia wished to take the first step. As for Cavour, 
there was nothing he dreaded so much as peace, for 
he had much to lose and nothing to gain by it. So 
he claimed he was acting strictly on the defensive, 
and continued to augment the military strength of his 
state. A congress was next suggested, but now, to 
the joy of Cavour, the Austrian government began to 
raise serious objections. The Vienna statesmen de- 
cided that in case a congress were held, Sardinia, not 
being a power of the first class, could not claim admit- 
tance. Cavour protested, and through the efforts of 
England, Austria agreed to the admission of Sardinia, 
but to discuss the question of disarmament alone. 
Cavour refused this compromise. At last England 
urged the French emperor to induce Sardinia to dis- 
arm on condition of her entering the congress on 
equal terms with the great powers. This proposition 
was so fair that Cavour was forced to accept it. The 
Sardinian acquiescence was dispatched from Turin on 
April 18, and it only remained to secure the approval 
of Austria. But Austria, hopeless of peace and 
goaded to rage by the insolence of her petty foe, 
solved all Cavour's difficulties by dispatching an ulti- 
matum to Turin. On April 23 the Austrian am- 
bassador delivered to Cavour the message of Count 
Buol, that unless Sardinia should disarm within three 
days, the Austrian government would enforce its de- 
mands by force of arms. There could be only one 
response to this. Everything was as Cavour wished 
it. He still appeared to Europe to be standing 
purely on the defensive. 


The enthusiasm with which the declaration of war 
was haUed was not confined to Sardinia alone. While 
the weU-disciplined strength of that state was being 
rapidly massed, thousands of volunteers from all parts 
of Italy poured into Piedmont to offer their aid to 
" II Re Galantuomo." In fact, the force that Victor 
Emmanuel led to the field might properly be desig- 
nated as an -Italian army. His proclamation was ad- 
dressed to the liation. "People of Italy," he ex- 
claimed, "Austria assails Piedmont because I have 
maintained the cause of our common coimtry in the 
coimcils of Europe, because I was not insensible to 
your cries of anguish. Thus she violently breaks now 
the treaties which she never has respected. ... I 
fight for the right of the whole nation. We confide 
in God and in our concord ; we confide in the valor of 
the Italian soldiers, in the alliance of the noble French 
nation ; we confide in the justice of public opinion. I 
have no other ambition than to be the first soldier of 
Italian independence. Viva V Italia ! " 

The excitement in Paris was hardly less intense, 
though scarcely of so sacred a character as that which 
animated the Sardinian capital. Immediately upon* 
the declaration of war by Austria, the emperor issued 
his manifesto to his people. " Austria, by ordering 
the entry of her armies into the territory of the king 
of Sardinia our ally, declares war against us ; setting 
at nought treaties and justice, and menacing our fron- 
tiers. All the great powers have protested against 
this aggression. Since Piedmont has accepted every 
condition proposed for the preservation of peace, we 
may naturally ask. What inducement can have led to 
this sudden invasion ? It is simply this : Austria has 
pushed matters to such an extremity that either her 


dominion must extend to the Alps, or Italy must be 
free to the Adriatic. . . . Courage, then, and concord. 
The world shall see yet again that our coimtry has 
not degenerated. Providence will bless our efforts, 
for the cause must be holy in the sight of Heaven 
which rests on justice, humanity, love of coimtry, and 
of independence." 

It was not the moral side of the question that in- 
spired the throngs on the boulevards and made the 
streets ring with their plaudits as the emperor passed 
along. It was rather the romantic glory attaching to 
another contest with Austria on the classic fields of 
Bonaparte's great victories. Paris was gay in the 
pomp and music of departing battalions. It pleased 
the martial spirit of France to hear that the imperial 
eagles were again climbing the Alps and glittering 
on the sunny Italian plains. It was not for the ex- 
cited populace crying " Vive I'empereur '* and " Vive 
la guerre" to know at that time how slowly and 
lamely mobilization progressed, and how unprepared 
after all the emperor was for a trying war. On May 
10, the day the emperor left Paris for the army, he 
was to aU appearances at the zenith of popularity and 

The war manifesto of the emperor of Austria had 
been issued on April 28, defending the course of 
his government and regretting the necessity that com- 
pelled him to order his armies over the Sardinian fron- 
tier. The war was not popular in Austria, as it was 
in France and Piedmont. Austria was too complex 
internally, with too much discontent at the core, to dis- 
play great enthusiasm at this time. The hatred of 
France was the one influence that lent popularity to 
the Kaiser's project, and in Munich, on their way to 


the front, the Austrian troops were hailed as the exe- 
cutioners of the hated Napoleon. 

The three armies converged steadily toward the 
theatre of carnage, accompanied by their respective 
sovereigns, each relying on the justice of his cause 
and the blessing of Heaven upon his arms. 




BoMAirric Chabacter op the Theatbe of War. — Unprepared- 
NEss OP THE French Army. — Its Order op Battle. — Ek- 
THusiASTio Reception op the French Troops at Genoa. — 
Arriyal op the Emperor at Genoa. — The Austrian Gener- 


OP Palestro. — Action at Turbigo. — Success op the Flank 
March. — The Emperor's Orders for June 3d. — Position of 
the Two Armies at Noon on the 4th. — Battle op Magenta. 
— The French Guard on the Nayiglio Grande. — Anxiety 
of the Emperor. — Critical Condition op the Guard. — 
Arriyal op Canrobert and Niel. — MacMahon carries Ma- 
genta. — Death op Espinasse. — II]&sum6 of the Battle. 

The campaign of 1859 in Italy, as the meeting of 
the first military powers of Europe, was regarded with 
supreme interest. The peculiar nature of the French 
emperor's casus JcZZi, and the historic country in 
which the scenes were to be enacted, added a tinge of 
romance to the picture. It was as if the days of Ma- 
rengo and Rivoli had returned, to read of " Napoleon 
in Italy " battling with the hosts of Austria. More- 
over, despite the two sanguinary battles that charac- 
terized it, the Italian campaign had more of pageantry 
than is conmion in modern days of scientific warfare. 

The story must be told to-day in a manner less 
eulogistic to French generalship, than characterized 
the works based on official data which appeared be- 


fore the disasters of Sedan and Metz laid bare the de- 
fects of the imperial military establishment. Indeed, 
the Emperor of the French, although he had officially 
announced to the Vienna cabinet that he should re- 
gard the passage of the Ticino by an Austrian army 
as an act of hostility, found himself at a disadvantage 
upon the acceptance of his gauge. Great confusion 
attended the mobilization of the army, and matters 
were especially deplorable in everything pertaining to 
its equipment. The supply of horses, tents, ammuni- 
tion, and shoes was found to be insufficient, while the 
majority of the battalions went to the front with thin 

Upon issuing his manifesto of war, the emperor 
declared his intention of taking the field at the head 
of the Imperial Guard and directing in person the 
operations of his army. The five corps of the army 
were commanded as follows : 1st corps, Marshal Bara- 
guey d'HiUiers ; 2d corps. General MacMahon ; 3d 
corps. Marshal Canrobert ; 4th corps. General Niel ; 
5th corps, Prince Napoleon. All these officers had 
earned more or less distinction in the Crimean cam- 
paign. Baraguey d'Hilliers had won his baton in 
the Baltic expedition. Canrobert had commanded 
the army for several months, and Niel had officiated 
at his headquarters as the emperor's mouthpiece. 
Prince Napoleon commanded a division at the Alma, 
while it was MacMahon's division that bore the brunt 
of the fighting at the taking of the Malakoff. Many 
of the divisional commanders, too, had won laurels on 
the same field of action. While the 1st, 2d, and 5th 
corps embarked at Toulon, Marseilles, and Algeria 
for Genoa, the 3d and 4th passed the Alps by Mont 
Cenis into Piedmont. There was a grand scramble to 


attain the battle-ground, as the Sardinian army was 
supposed to stand in jeopardy from the overwhelming 
strength of its foe. 

On April 26 the eager watchers on the ramparts of 
Genoa descried on the horizon the first French trans- 
port. A few hours later General Bazaine landed on 
the quay, and the troops began to disembark. The 
excitement of the Genoese knew no bounds, and they 
swarmed about the soldiers with the most extravagant 
expressions of joy and welcome. Day after day, as 
the booming cannon announced the arrival of rein- 
forcements and the chasseurs and zouaves went swing- 
ing through the streets to their camps, the enthusiasm 
grew in intensity. Citizens walked the streets arm 
in arm with the red-trousered soldiery, while in the 
Acqua Sola and public promenades, the Genoese 
ladies in spotless white did not shrink from the soci- 
ety of the jaunty officers of the empire. The enthu- 
siasm culminated on May 12, when the emperor him- 
self arrived in the imperial yacht. As he looked 
about upon the sea of glad faces that surrounded 
him, and heard the shouts of " Viva Napoleone," he 
must have felt that here at least was true sincerity : 
not the fawning of the fickle Paris mob, but the 
demonstration of a grateful people. Upon landing, 
the emperor foiuid fresh proofs of the popular joy. 
The streets were strewn with flowers, and the house 
fronts were ablaze with the interwined colors of 
France and Sardinia. As night deepened, the city 
became transformed. Every window seemed illumi- 
nated, from the poorest hovels to the stately palaces 
that in other days rendered Genoa truly " the superb." 
From the sea the appearance of the terraced city was 
brilliant in the extreme, while the colored illumina- 


tions on the shipping were reflected in the placid mir- 
ror of the harbor. The emperor left Genoa on the 
14th, proceeding to Alessandria, in the vicinity of 
which his army was massing. 

Meanwhile the Austrian commander had utterly 
neglected to make use of his splendid opportunities. 
For weeks previous to the final rupture he had been 
steadily massing his troops in Lombardy, until in the 
last week of April he was able to cross the Ticino at 
the head of five corps d^armee. What Count Gyulai 
had achieved to merit his distinction as general of 
the Kaiser's forces, it is difficult to determine. He 
won some credit as governor of Trieste in 1848 and 
as minister of war for a few months previous to 1850. 
After that he reappeared in Italy as a corps com- 
mander under Eadetsky, and upon the death of that 
distinguished general he was appointed to command the 
army in Lombardy. With little reputation as a sol- 
dier, at sixty years of age he found himself in com- 
mand of the army advancing on Turin. Had he been to 
any degree energetic, he might easily have overthrown 
or masked the Piedmontese army, and by the close of 
the month been thundering at the gates of Turin. 
He advanced timidly, however. The absence of foes 
seemed to alarm him as much as their presence could 
have done. He became possessed with the idea that 
his wily antagonists were preparing some trap for the 
engulfing of his devoted battalions. After occupy- 
ing Novara and Vercelli he came to a halt; and 
while he deliberated upon the situation, the head of 
Canrobert's corps entered Turin. The first point in 
the game was lost to the Kaiser. 

On the 19th of May Gyulai withdrew his head- 
quarters to Garlasco. The king of Sardinia was at 


Occimiano, the French emperor at Alessandria. The 
five Austrian corps held a line from Mortara to Strsu- 
della, the Sardinians being massed about Casale and 
the French between Voghera and Alessandria. Gryu- 
lai interpreted the presence of the French in such 
force about Voghera as an evidence of their inten- 
tion to attempt the passage of the Po somewhere 
south of Pavia. In order to better assure himself on 
this point, he determined to push a reconnoissauce 
against Voghera to test the French strength. On 
May 20 he dispatched five Austrian brigades under 
Coimt Stadion upon this service. Stadion moved in 
three columns converging toward Voghera. 

General Forey's division of the 1st corps was hold- 
ing Voghera, supported by three regiments of Pied- 
montese cavalry, and his outposts were in Castegg^o 
and the adjacent villages. The advancing Austrians 
drove the French from Casteggio through Montebello 
and Genestrello with slight loss. Forey, with only 
two brigades at his disposal, would have been justified 
in declining battle and in standing on the defensive 
at Voghera. He was little inclined, however, to miss 
the possibility of winning the first success of the war, 
and in consequence, what had been intended by the 
Austrian commander as a mere reconnoissauce soon 
developed into a warm engagement. While General 
Blanchard's brigade operated against the Austrians 
on the north of the Montebello road, Forey threw 
Beuret's brigade against Genestrello. The village 
was carried at the point of the bayonet, the Austrians 
falling back in some confusion upon Montebello. The 
contest for the possession of this village was stubborn 
and protracted. Driven from the streets after hot 
bayonet-work, the Austrians made a last stand in the 


cemetery on some rising groimd just outside the vil- 
lage. General Beuret was killed at this point, and 
his troops were roughly handled. The position was 
finally carried, however, and the Austrians retired in 
good order upon Casteggio. 

The whole contest, known to the French as the bat- 
tle of Montebello, was a furious, disorderly scrimmage 
from the moment that Beuret first pointed his men to 
Genestrello. There was no system or cohesion either 
in the attack or defense. Stadion was completely 
demoralized and glad to retire immolested. He had 
mismanaged throughout. He failed to utilize his 
strong right against Blanchard's brigade, and left 
Urban's division to bear the brimt of the fighting at 
Genestrello and Montebello, while a brigade at Cas- 
teggio and one at Casatisma remained inactive 
throughout the day. 

The following day the emperor visited the battle- 
field. He gazed upon the stricken country, upon 
wheatfields torn and trodden by horses and cannon- 
wheels, upon dismantled Montebello with its shot- 
scarred church and wreath of fire-withered vines, and 
upon dead men lying as they fell, the blue and crim- 
son of his chasseurs thickly interspersed with the 
white livery of the Hapsburgs. Finally he congrat- 
ulated Forey, embraced him, and returned to Ales- 

Gyulai was confirmed in his belief that the French 
were heading for Piacenza, and would cross the Po 
south of Pavia. Napoleon, knowing this, determined 
to profit by it. He decided to execute a long march 
to the north, carrying his army via Casale and Ver- 
celli to No vara, and, crossing the Ticino near the lat- 
ter place, turn the Austrian right and place them at 


a disadvantage for the defense of Milan. On May 
27 his orders to this effect were issued, and on the 
following day the various corps were on the move. 
The possession of the railway between Alessandria 
and Novara proved a great advantage in this enter- 
prise. The unsuspecting Gyulai still maintained his 
strength between Mortara and Stradella, with his 
headquarters at Garlasco. On the 30th occurred the 
battle of Palestro, brought on by an advance of the 
Piedmontese army eastward from Vercelli. With 
the approval of the emperor the move was made 
against the Austrian posts at Casalino, Yinzaglio, and 
Palestro. Lilia's division of the Austrian 7th corps 
was opposed by the three Piedmontese divisions of 
Cialdini, Durando, and Fanti. The former dislodged 
the Austrians from Palestro after a sharp conflict, 
while his colleagues gained equal success with less 
difficulty. On the day following, General Zobel, 
commander of the Austrian 7th corps, came up 
with Jellacich's division of the 2d corps to assist in 
recovering the lost ground. The result was some 
heavy fighting about Palestro, though the Austrians 
scarcely had a chance of success against the over- 
whelming numbers that opposed them. Szabo's bri- 
gade of Jellacich's division made a desperate effort 
to seize the river bridges and cut off the Sardinians 
from their supports. They advanced as far as the 
bridge of La Bridda, and here the contest became so 
dubious that the sword of the Sardinian king himself 
flashed in the smoke of the melSe, At the critical 
moment for the Sardinians the 3d French zouave 
regiment was brought up to their support. Their 
impetuous charge carried everything before it, and 
Szabo was driven from all his positions. At the 


same time the Austrian centre and right withdrew 
from before Palestro and Confienza, General Zobel 
having learned of the vast strength of the Sardinian 
supports west of the Ticino. 

The battles of Palestro were the result of question- 
able strategy on the part of the emperor and the king 
of Sardinia. It was all-important to them that the Aus- 
trian commander be kept in ignorance of their north- 
ward movement, and a demonstration of force in the 
vicinity of Vercelli was certainly calculated to draw 
Austrian attention in the very direction in which it 
was least desired. That the two days' battle was not 
attended with evil results to the allies was due largely 
to Austrian obtuseness. It was not until the 2d of 
Jime that Gyulai learned of the presence of the 
French on his right, and began to hurry his troops 
northward. On the 3d the action took place in which 
MacMahon's corps crossed the Ticino at Turbigo, and 
wrested the village of Robecchetto from the Austrians. 
This aroused Gyulai to a full sense of his error, and 
threw the Austrian camps into a paroxysm of ener- 
getic preparation. 

On the evening of the 3d the headquarters of the 
French emperor were at Novara. He was all in the 
dark regarding the numbers and whereabouts of the 
enemy. He was aiming for Milan, but was undecided 
as to the best means of reaching it. The guard was 
at Trecate and Turbigo, the 2d corps at Robecchetto, 
and the rest of the army close at hand. The Sar- 
dinian headquarters were at GaUiate. The emperor 
finally decided upon a plan, and issued his orders 
accordingly on the evening of the 3d. General Mac- 
Mahon with the 2d corps was to move in the morn- 
ing upon Buffalora and Magenta, supported by the 


light division of the Guard and the Sardinian army, 
which was to cross the Ticino at Tui'bigo. The 3d 
corps was to remain at Novara with the exception of 
Picard's brigade, which was ordered to Turbigo. The 
grenadier division of the Guard was to cross the 
Ticino at San Mai^tino, while the 4th corps was to 
move from Trecate to the same place. On the morn- 
ing of the 4th, however, the emperor changed his 
mind, and dispatched messengers to Canrobert and 
Picard to support the Guard at San Martino. 

It was noon when the emperor reached San Mar- 
tino. The engineers were repairing the stone foot 
and railway bridge that spanned the river at this 
point, two arches of which had been blown up by the 
Austrians. After passing the river, the next obstruc- 
tion was the Naviglio Grande, the great canal that 
connects Milan with the Ticino and Lake Maggiore. 
The canal was crossed in this vicinity by four bridges 
— at Buffalora, at Ponte Nuovo di Magenta, Ponte 
Vecchio di Magenta, and at Eobecco. 

It was plain to the emperor that the Austrians held 
these villages, though he did not anticipate that they 
were in force. He determined to await some signal 
from MacMahon before advancing. It was a fair sight 
that his eye dwelt upon, meanwhile, from his position 
above the Ticino. The sun blazed forth from a cloud- 
less sky. Before him he could trace the line of the 
canal by the red-roofed villages peering through their 
wealth of dark foliage. Beyond these, rising above 
the verdure that clothed the hills, was the bell tower 
of Magenta. On the northern and southern horizons 
the Alps and Apennines shone dimly through the 
haze, seeming to melt into the blue of the heavens. 

Meanwhile the Austrian commander was entirely 


Innocent of any definite knowledge concerning Ms 
foe. Count Clam Gallas was in command about 
Magenta, and had at Ms disposal six brigades of the 
1st and 2d corps. Three of these brigades were in- 
trenched at Ponte Nuovo and in the outskirts of 
Buffalora ; another occupied the heights on the east 
bank between Ponte Nuovo and Robecco. The other 
two held Magenta itself. In addition to these, there 
were two brigades of the 7th corps at Casa Cerella, 
while the two other brigades of the same corps 
and the whole of the 3d corps were at Abbiate 
Grasso. At ten o'clock, the hour when Ms sentries 
in the bell tower of Kobecco reported the enemy in 
sight, Gyulai had the bulk of his army well in hand. 
Napoleon, on the other hand, was at San Martino 
with a single division, never imagining the magnitude 
of the forces in his front. He supposed that the ap- 
proach of MacMahon to Buffalora would compel the 
retirement of the Austrians from all their positions 
on the canal north of the railway. About two o'clock 
the grumbling of artillery toward the north told him 
that MacMahon was at hand. He determined to accel- 
erate the movements of the Austrians before Mm, 
and ordered an advance upon their positions at Buf- 
falora, Ponte Vecchio, and Ponte Nuovo. 

The Austrians blew up the bridge at the former 
place upon the approach of the French, but at Ponte 
Nuovo they were driven across the canal and from 
all their defenses on the other bank. They were 
utterly demoralized by the fury of the French assault. 
One of the brigades that came up from Magenta to 
their support was carried away in the general rout. 
Kinzel's brigade abandoned its positions about Ponte 
Vecchio, and fell back toward Robecco. The brigade 


at Buffalora was completely isolated. The panic ex- 
tended to Magenta itself, where the streets became 
blocked by supply - wagons, artillery, and fugitive 

This was the first stage of the battle, but the ad- 
vantage gained by the French was too great to be 
maintained by so small a force. The Austrian Gen- 
eral Keischach came up at the head of two brigades 
from Casa Cerella, and rallying a few of the broken 
battalions on the way, fell fiercely upon the French 
at the bildges. The tide of battle was turned in a 
twinkling, and it was plain that if left unsupported 
the Guard must be wholly overthrown at this point. 
The emperor from his post in front of the Ticino 
contemplated the struggle with a stolid countenancie. 
To requests for supports he could only reply that he 
had none to send. He betrayed his anxiety to his 
staJBf by his frequent interrogations as to the where- 
abouts of Canrobert and MacMahon. Canrobert had 
not been signaled, and MacMahon's artillery had be- 
come silent. All eyes were turned toward Buffalora, 
but in vain. If MacMahon was beaten, what was to 
become of the Guard? Perhaps the doubt flitted 
through the mind of the emperor as to MacMahon's 
loyalty. It was the price of his throne that he must 
always suspect his servants. He looked to the south 
and there, as if he had not foes enough in front, the 
head of the Austrian 3d corps could be descried ad- 
vancing from Eobecco between the canal and the 
Ticino. The emperor seemed dazed and bewildered. 
It was at this crisis, at about 3.30, that Picard's bri- 
gade arrived, having come in hot haste through the 
fields and over crowded roads from Turbigo, inspired 
by the urgent messages of the emperor and the dis- 


tant roar of the battle. Picard threw his brigade 
into action between Ponte Vecchio and Ponte Nuovo, 
and for a time the Austrian advance was checked. 
It was not long, however, before the Austrian 3d 
corps began to develop its strength against Ponte 
Vecchio. The French were beaten back, though 
fiercely contesting every inch of ground. Another 
crisis arrived. 

It was five o'clock. Marshal Canrobert appeared 
at San Martino and reported the head of Niel's col- 
umn close at hand. Half an hour later and the 
bridge of the Ticino was resounding to the hurried 
tramp of tjie long expected battalions. It was Vinoy's 
division. General Niel rode up to the emperor, who 
had no order to give, and Vinoy pushed on to the 
bridges without a halt. The troops continued to 
defile past the emperor, and his aides reported the 
long delayed flood of reinforcements as flowing in a 
steady stream over the Novara road. Better than 
all, the air began to throb again to the music of 
artillery on the north, telling the staff that MacMahon 
was not beaten, and the emperor that after all he was 

At six o'clock Canrobert's corps was also arriving, 
and it was plain to every one save the emperor that 
the Austrian resistance was weakening. Threatened 
by MacMahon on the north, they slowly retired from 
their positions on the canal. The Austrian 5th corps 
had arrived at Robecco, all ignorant of the state of 
the contest. They advanced slowly up the west bank 
of the canal until, finding their path illuminated only 
by the flashing of the French artillery, they halted 
for orders. Darkness put an end to the battle, and as 
it settled down upon the country the French emperor 


was still in his old place, his anxiety unallayed, peer- 
ing through the darkening air toward Magenta, and 
glancing ever and anon at the fresh regiments as they 
poured on to the already crowded banks of the canal. 
When the firing finally died away he was fearful as 
to how matters had terminated. Where was Mac- 
Mahon ? More important still, where were the Aus- 
trians ? The uncertainty on these points oppressed 
his mind, and he could glean no intelligence from his 
staff. He returned to San Martino, and in a room 
dimly lighted by a smoky candle paced restlessly up 
and down. He dispatched an orderly toward Ma- 
genta to leara if possible MacMahon's whereabouts. 
After a weary period of anxiety the messenger re- 
turned. He reported that MacMahon had won a great 
victory, and that Magenta was in his possession. The 
emperor breathed freely again and lay down to rest. 

The movements of MacMahon decided the fate of 
the day. To incumber the roads as little as possible, 
he had divided his columns in the morning, sending 
the division of General Espinasse by a circuitous 
route on the left. MacMahon, with the division of 
General Motterouge, advanced rapidly, and about two 
o'clock engaged the Austrians before Buffalora. This 
was the cannonading that first attracted the notice of 
the emperor at San Martino. In his haste, however, 
MacMahon had advanced regardless of his other divi- 
sions. A brief survey convinced him that the Aus- 
trians were in great force before him. Fearing to 
involve his single division too deeply, he fell back 
and effected a junction with Camou's division of the 
Guard. He realized how the cessation of his cannon- 
ade might be misconstrued by the emperor, and 
waited impatiently for the approach of Espinasse. 


Finally in a paroxysm of anxiety, escorted only by a 
platoon of horse, he galloped across country to Mar- 
caUo, where he found Espinasse and urged upon him 
the necessity of haste. At five o'clock, with his line 
of battle extending from Bemate to MarcaUo and 
guiding on the bell tower of Magenta still visible 
through a screen of smoke, MacMahon began his ad- 
vance. The Austrians had evacuated Buffalora, and 
the advance of Motterouge's division found the French 
Guards already in possession. Prince Liechtenstein, 
who commanded the Austrians on the north of Ma- 
genta, had only a few battalions, already disheartened 
by hard knocks received at other points. A brigade 
from Buffalora, in attempting to execute its orders to 
occupy MarcaUo, was taken on the flank by Espinasse 
and routed. Two fresh brigades at Corbetta re- 
mained inactive on account of conflicting orders. As 
a result the French advanced rapidly. While their 
artillery swept the plain before Magenta, the infantry 
closed in upon the village, carried the line of the rail- 
way, and turned the station into a slaughter-pen. The 
brave survivors of the broken Austrian brigades bar- 
ricaded the streets of the village, converting every 
house into a fortress from which the Tyrolese rifle- 
men fired with unerring aim. Enraged at the mur- 
derous opposition encountered by his troops. General 
Espinasse threw himself at the head of the 2d zouave 
regiment and led them to the charge. He fell mor- 
tally wounded, but his example electrified the men. 
In the dubious light they cut their way through the 
streets and cooperated with the column of General 
Motterouge in the storming of the cemetery. With 
Magenta thorouglily in his possession, MacMahon 
arrested the battle at dark. 


The battle of Magenta consisted of two distinct 
battles, for the emperor at San Martino and Mac- 
Mahon on the north did not communicate from morn- 
ing until after the fighting was over. The Emperor 
of the French did nothing to merit approbation. He 
did not plunge into the smoke, sword in hand, as at 
one time the world was led to believe, but with mud- 
dled brain and brooding dread w atched from a dis- 
tance the varying fortune of the day. 

Gyulai comprehended little more of the contest than 
the emperor. In fact, on the evening of the battle, 
from his headquarters at Robecco he issued orders 
for a renewal of the combat to brigades that did not 
exist, or were scattered over the fields and roads 
toward Milan. He failed to appreciate the fact that 
a large portion of the army had been routed, until 
informed by Clam Gallas that the execution of his 
orders was an impossibility. 

The French soldiers carried away the honors of 
Magenta. The conduct of the Guard and the few 
regiments that bore with them the burden of the day 
shed new lustre upon the military glory of France. 
That the Austrians, though numerically superior, 
showed to such poor advantage at many points was 
due largely to the fact that their battalions were 
weighted by Italian blood. One brigade composed 
exclusively of Italian subjects of the Kaiser broke at 
the first fire. In this war the Italians fought well 
only under the standard of Italy. 




Entry of the French Army into Milan. — The Te Deum. — 
Fighting at Melegnano. — Gyulai retreats upon Verona. — 
The Emperor advances from Milan. — Ignorance of each 
Commander as to the Plans of the other. — The Aus- 
trian Army harassed by Conflicting Orders. — It occupies 
THE Heights of Solferino on June 23 — Advance of the 
French Army on the 24th. — Commencement of the Battle 
OF Solferino. — Repulse of the Sardinians. — The Emperor 


ON THE French Right. — The Lethargy of Canrobert. — 
Solferino outflanked and abandoned by the Austrians. 

— Failure of Wimpffen to retrieve the Day on the Aus- 
trian Left. — Canrobert arrives. — General Advance of 
THE French. — The Emperor at Cavriana. — Firmness of 
General Benedek. — The French Advance renewed July 1. 

— The Armistice and Conference at Villafranca. — Rage 
OF Cavour. — His Undignified Conduct. — Why the Mon- 
archs made Peace. 

The battle of Magenta compelled the abandonment 
of Milan by the Austrians. The emperor did not 
appreciate the fuU extent of the victory until the 6th, 
when he met at Magenta the deputation representing 
the municipality of Milan, who came to offer the 
crown of Lombardy to the Sardinian king. They 
reported the city evacuated by the Austrians and 
awaiting with open arms the arrival of its liberators. 
The emperor became jubilant. He congratulated the 
army, and acknowledged the heroism of the Guard 


by conferring the rank of marshal upon its com- 
mander. As for MacMahon, he not only received the 
marshal's b§.ton, but was hailed as the conqueror of 
the day and created Duke of Magenta. 

That night MacMahon's corps bivouacked on the 
Milan road, with orders to enter the city next day. 
Consequently at nine o'clock on the morning of the 
7th, wiijh bands playing and flags flying, the first 
French troops passed into the ancient capital of Lom- 
bardy. The reception tendered them by the Milanese 
surpassed the April scenes at Genoa. A little girl 
offered the marshal a bouquet of flowers, and was 
lifted to his saddle, where she rode at the head of the 
column.^ The long pent-up feelings of the populace 
broke forth into cheers and the wildest demonstra- 
tions of joy. Men and women saw through their 
tears the foreign soldiers bronzed by Italian suns 
and begrimed with the smoke of Austrian cannon. 
The men who had carried Magenta under a tempest 
of bullets traversed the streets of Milan under a rain 
of flowers. All through the day the excitement in 
the city increased. In the public squares the mili- 
tary bands played patriotic airs long prohibited by 
the Austrian government. 

Next morning before light MacMahon was again 
on the march southward, while the head of the 1st 
corps entered the city, bound in the same direction in 
execution of the imperial orders to " intercept the 
Austrian army retiring by Binasco and Landriano 
on Lodi." The emperor and king of Sardinia arrived 
in the city at early dawn with a small escort. They 
were soon recognized, and once again the emperor saw 

^ This incident is alluded to by Mrs. Browning in her poem, 
Napoleon III. in Italy, 


in the happy faces that pressed about his cavalcade, 
and heard in the shouts that burst from thousands of 
throats, an evidence of popular enthusiasm and grati- 
tude. The day following both sovereigns attended 
service in the cathedral. The tinted rays that fell 
across the misty nave glanced upon a profusion of 
military and priestly splendor, as the two monarchs 
bowed before the altar with its candles gleaming 
dimly through the smoke of burning incense. In the 
afternoon appeared the proclamation of the king, 
accepting the union of Lombardy with his kingdom, 
and that of the emperor addressed to Italians, urging 
them to " be nothing to-day but soldiers, to-morrow 
you wiU be free citizens of a great coimtry." 

The final feature of these four days of jubilation, the 
happiest perhaps that Milan had known for centuries, 
was the performance at the theatre of La Scala. The 
auditorium was ablaze with the colors of France and 
Sardinia, gay with rich toilets and brilliant uniforms, 
while the two monarchs were cheered to the echo. 
All the officers of the liberating army were not so 
agreeably entertained during these days as the pa- 
trons of La Scala, and at the hour when the brilliant 
audience was assembling, the ambulances from Mele- 
gnano were rumbling through the streets. 

Marshal Baraguey d'HiUiers, after leaving Milan 
on the morning of the 8th, had received information 
from the emperor that the Austrians were at Mele- 
gnano. The same messenger brought the order for 
him to assume command of the 2d and 4th corps 
and dislodge them from that place. The 2d corps 
was directed to pass east of Melegnano and cut off 
the Austrian retreat on Lodi. The 4th corps was 
moving southeast from Corsico. The marshal, with 


Bazaine's division of his corps, followed the highway 
from Milan to Melegnano, with Ladmirault's divi- 
sion traversing the villages on his left, and Forey 
those on his right. These dispositions, employing so 
large a force, seemed to portend a heavy battle. They 
were, however, merely the result of the ignorance of 
the French headquarters concerning the position of 
the Austrians. Three corps d'armee were moving 
upon Melegnano defended by a single brigade ! 

The marshal pushed rapidly over the highroad, 
and at half past five, when he approached Melegnano, 
both Ladmirault and Forey were still distant. Ac- 
tuated, perhaps, by the same spirit that induced Forey 
to risk the action of Montebello, at six o'clock he gave 
Bazaine orders to carry the village. The Austrians 
made but slight resistance in the outskirts, but de- 
fended the streets and houses with their usual tena- 
city. The French were unable to make the least prog- 
ress in the face of the murderous fusilades they 
encoimtered. But the appearance of Ladmirault's 
division soon convinced the Austrian General Ber- 
ger of the uselessness of a longer defense, and he 
gave orders for the retreat. Great confusion attended 
this movement, as his men were distributed in small 
detachments in the houses throughout the village. 
The French entered the streets and attacked with the 
bayonet. General Berger, however, transferred his 
brigade safely to the other side of the Lambro. Here 
he was joined by Boer's brigade, but upon the appear- 
ance of MacMahon's corps on the north, the whole 
column began its retreat upon Lodi. 

This action, so far as the French were concerned, 
was a blunder. The Austrian commander had deter- 
mined to evacuate Melegnano, and the French attack 


only hastened his movements by a few useless hours. 
The capture of Berger's brigade was all that could 
have justified the action, and this was prevented by 
the impatience of the French commander, who allowed 
MacMahon no time to come up and intercept the Aus- 
trian retreat. 

It was on the day of the fight at Melegnano that 
Gyulai had finally determined to fall back upon the 
army which was being concentrated at Verona under 
the eye of the Kaiser. Reduced in numbers, with the 
morale of his troops seriously affected by successive 
defeats, Gyulai was not inclined to risk another battle. 
He argued that every step in retreat would raise the 
spirit of his soldiers, as it brought them nearer to the 
impregnable Quadrilateral and the imperial army at 

Meanwhile the French emperor had determined in 
the future to avoid such dangers as he had encoun- 
tered at Magenta, by keeping his army well together. 
How to move an army of 160,000 men in one mass 
was a serious problem to the commissary department. 
It would be necessary to keep open rapid communica- 
tion with a distant base of supplies. The Po was 
dominated by the Austrians, and there was no alter- 
native for the French but to hug the railway from 
Milan to Venice in their advance. The engineers 
were soon at work repairing the numerous breaks in 
the line, the troops were all recalled to the vicinity of 
Milan, and on the 11th the advance was recommenced. 
The Sardinian army moved on the left of the French 
and advanced with imprudent zeal. On the 14th 
Victor Emmanuel had carried his headquarters to 
Brescia, while the French were just approaching the 
Oglio, two days' march in the rear. This state of af- 


fairs was by no means agreeable to the emperor. The 
isolation of the Sardinians was a grave danger to the 
whole army. No one knew where the Austrians 
were, though it was not doubted that they were re- 
treating upon the Quadrilateral. 

On the 16th news arrived from Brescia that Gen- 
eral Garibaldi had encountered an Austrian detach- 
ment at a little village a few miles east of that place. 
This intelligence still further disconcerted the emperor 
and induced him to adopt the precaution of always 
advancing in line of battle. On the 18th he effected 
a junction with the Sardinians, establishing his head- 
quarters at Brescia, while his forces were distributed 
between Brescia and Bagnolo. 

On the day of the emperor's arrival at Brescia, 
the Austrian headquarters were at Pozzolengo. The 
Feldzeugmeister had brought his army in good condi- 
tion to the Chiese, hoping to induce the Kaiser to 
take up a strong defensive position in the hills about 
SoLf erino and Cavriana south of the Lago di Garda. 
His scheme, however, was overruled at headquarters, 
where the opinion prevailed that the French would 
foUow the Po to turn the Quadrilateral. On the 15th 
of June the command had passed to the Kaiser, and 
on the day following the army was in full retreat 
toward the Mincio. 

The skirmish near Brescia had shaken the theory 
in every mind that the allies were following the Po. 
Could it be possible they were advancing from Milan 
upon the front of the Quadrilateral ? If this were so, 
certainly there was no spot so favorable to oppose 
them as that which Gyulai had suggested. Orders 
were issued to regain the Chiese, but when they were 
received the troops were already approaching the 


Minclo. Again the councils wavered. The old or- 
ders were renewed, and on the next day the army was 
crossing the Mincio. On the 19th, owing to the con- 
fusion of orders, the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 8th corps were 
still midway between the rivers. Count Schlik went 
out to assume command of these troops and conduct 
their retreat on the Mincio. These four corps be- 
came known as the second army, the remainder formed 
thie first. On the 21st the whole army was in the 
rear of the Mincio. The headquarters of the first 
army were at Tormene, of the second at Valeggio. 
The Kaiser was at Villafranca. The idea steadily 
gained credence that the French were approaching 
the front of the Quadrilateral. Their patrols had 
been seen several times during the retreat, and they 
were reported in force at Montechiaro. On the 22d 
a reconnoissance was made toward Rivoltella, Cas- 
tiglione, and Carpenedolo. There could be no longer 
any question that the whole French army was on the 
banks of the Chiese. It was imperative to seize at 
once the heights about Cavriana to withstand them. 
The instructions to this effect were hurriedly given, 
and at nine o'clock on the morning of the 23d the ad- 
vance began. AU that day the troops poured across 
the Mincio at Valeggio, Ferri, and Goito. At evening 
the 5th corps bivouacked on the heights about Sol- 
f erino ; the 1st corps at Cavriana, with one of its bri- 
gades at San Cassiano ; the 8th corps at Foresto and 
Volta ; the 3d and 9th corps at Gxiidizzolo, with their 
outposts in Medole and at Casa Morino, a farmhouse 
on the road to Castiglione. The 7th corps was ap- 
proacliing Volta, and the 11th corps was distributed 
along the road from Cerlungo to Goito. 

From the heights of Solferino the French bivouacks 


could be seen. It was determined to continue the ad- 
vance the next day and take up a position in front of 
the hills. The 8th corps was to move upon Lonato, 
the 6th toward Castiglione, the 1st to Essenta with 
the 7th in reserve. The 9th corps on the left was to 
advance by Medole, and the 3d on its right toward 
Carpenedolo. These last two were to cross the Chiese 
at Bosco, their left covered by cavalry with the 2d 
corps in reserve. 

In the mean time the French emperor had become 
convinced that the Austrians had passed beyond the 
Mincio. Even the alarming reports of his patrols 
on the evening of the 23d failed to convince him that 
anything more formidable than reconnoitring parties 
were in his front. In the evening the orders for the 
next day's march were given as usual. The Sardinian 
army had Pozzolengo for its destination ; the French 
Guard, Castiglione ; the 1st corps, Solf erino ; the 2d, 
Cavriana ; the 3d, Medole ; and the 4th Guidizzolo. 
A glance at the map will indicate how the plans of 
the rival monarchs were unconsciously bringing their 
hosts into collision. 

The Austrians had the advantage of position in 
possessing that group of abrupt heights that extends 
southward from the Lago di Garda to the vicinity of 
Volta. The " rock " of Solferino, the loftiest and 
most precipitous of these, was clearly the key to the ad- 
jacent country. The conspicuous tower that crowned 
its summit, and appropriately styled " Spia d' Italia," 
commanded a view for miles in all directions, while 
on the west it swept to the blue horizon, the green 
plain diversified by canals, villages, orchards, and 
mulberry groves. The French emperor committed a 
grave error in leaving this point unoccupied. 





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In order to avoid the extreme heat of the day the 
French took up their march soon after midnight. 
Ganrobert crossed the Chiese at Visano and advanced 
upon Castel-Goffredo via Acqua-Fredda. Niel fol- 
lowed the highway to Medole. MacMahon moved 
from Castiglione over the Mantua road. Baraguey 
d'Hilliers marched straight upon Solferino through 
the great ravines that admit the roads clambering up 
the heights to the town. 

Ganrobert approached Gastel-Goffredo about seven 
o'clock, and after a brush with the Austrian cavalry 
took possession of that place. Here he was discon- 
certed by the receipt of a message from the emperor 
to the effect that an Austrian corps was reported to 
have left Mantua for the north on the day previous. 
From this he inferred that his right flank was en- 
dangered, and called a halt to await developments. 
Niel found Medole stubbornly defended.^ He bat- 
tered it with his artillery, and at seven o'clock carried 
it at the point of the bayonet. Advancing cautiously 
toward Ghiidizzolo the Austrian bivouacks were re- 
vealed.2 Niel halted and deployed his divisions be- 
tween Eobecco and Gasa Nuova on the Mantua road. 

About three o'clock MacMahon from Monte Medo- 
lano had assured himself that the Austrians were in 
great force before him, and dispatched a messenger 
to the emperor with that information. He then dis- 
lodged the Austrians from the farmhouse of Gasa 
Morino, and, deploying his divisions on the right 
and left of the road, awaited word from Niel before 

Baraguey d'HiUiers, advancing from the northeast, 

^ Held by two battalions with two cannon. 
^ Bivouacks of the 3d and 9th Austrian corps. 


was driving in the enemy's outposts upon Solf erino. 
At eight o'clock he carried Le Grole. 

With a view to effect an early junction with the 
French at Solferino, General Durando's division of 
the Sardinian army moved from Malocco across the 
hills to the chapel of Madonna delle Scoperte. Gen- 
erals Mollard and Cucchiari moved southward from 
Eivoltella by the Strada Lugana upon Pozzolengo. 
Durando's vanguard, after reaching Madonna delle 
Scoperte, was surprised by the enemy and compelled 
to retreat. Their colleagues, after gaining the vicinity 
of Pozzolengo, were attacked by heavy Austrian col- 
umns advancing from the south and driven through 
San Martino to Kivoltella. 

Such was the state of the battle at eight o'clock. 
Along a front of twelve miles the French command- 
ers found themselves confronted by a powerful foe. 
The corps were acting almost independently of each 
other. As for the Sardinians, their repulse at Ma- 
donna delle Scoperte and the presence of the Aus- 
trians at Solferino left them completely isolated from 
their allies. 

The messengers of MacMahon and Baraguey d'Hil- 
liers arrived at the headquarters in Montechiaro 
about seven o'clock. The emperor was asleep at the 
time, but before an hour had elapsed his equipage 
was whirling into Castiglione. There he climbed the 
staircase of the bell tower and peered westward to 
the " Spia d' Italia," a silhouette against the morning 
sky, and southward to where the early mists had 
given place to white billows of battle-smoke. As to 
the state of the contest, however, he could gain no idea, . 
and galloped away to MacMahon for information. 
He found the marshal in the alignments he had taken 


up after carrying Casa Morino. He also found him 
reticent. " When I am assured of the cooperation 
of General Niel, I shall advance on Cavriana," he 
said. The emperor knew Niel was waiting for Can- 
robert. He struck the matter at the root by dispatch- 
ing an order to the latter to hasten his movements on 
Medole, and then rode away to the 1st corps, whose 
progress had been checked in the ravines before Sol- 

The Austrian General Wimpffen furiously assailed 
Niel's corps at Guidizzolo. Beaten back from this 
attack, he formed another line of battle from Guidiz- 
zolo to the Val de Termine. At nine o'clock the 
Kaiser reached Volta, and sent orders to Wimpffen 
to advance toward Medole without delay, in order to 
relieve the tremendous pressure upon Stadion's corps 
at Solf erino. In fact, that corps was nearly exhausted. 
The French batteries on the heights west of the vil- 
lage swept the advance positions with a murderous 
fire. Stadion had but two brigades of his corps to 
hold the French in check. One had already been 
demoralized by the cannonade, and the other two were 
in pursuit of the Sardinians, who had suffered another 
repulse. Just before noon the Kaiser directed the 
1st corps to the aid of the 5th at Solferino, and the 
7th upon San Cassiano, while he sent another mes- 
sage to Wimpffen, urging him again to advance, not 
toward Medole, but in the direction of Castiglione. 
Wimpffen had his hands full, however. All through 
the morning his two corps vainly assailed the three 
divisions of General Niel in line between Robecco 
and Casa Nuova. In the village, in the orchards, in 
the inclosures of farm-buildings, and in the fields, 
the combat was savagely maintained without advan- 


tage to the Austrians. Niel watched anxiously the 
fortune of the day, and scanned the country on the 
southeast for some sign of Canrobert, who was still 
busily engaged at Castel-Goffredo worrying about his 
flank.^ How long Niel could hold his ground unsup- 
ported was uncertain. His retreat meant the cutting 
in two of the French army, and in consequence its 
utter defeat. 

In the mean time the Emperor of the French had 
become convinced by the reports he had received, and 
by the clouds of dust among the hills, that the Aus- 
trians were reinforcing their position at Solferino. 
He arrived at the conclusion that the battle was to be 
settled in that vicinity, and that delay was fatal to 
his cause. He sent a message to the king of Sar- 
dinia to advance immediately on Pozzolengo, while he 
held the light division of the Guard to assist the 1st 
corps. Baraguey d'Hilliers was making superhuman 
efforts to carry the heights of Solferino. While Gen- 
eral Bazaine with his division attacked the village it- 
self, Ladmirault stormed the heights on his left, and 
Forey the positions on Monte Alto and summits south 
of Solferino. Before the development of this attack 
the Austrians on Monte Alto had been heavily rein- 
forced,^ while a few battalions arrived in Solferino 
itself. Bazaine's columns advanced doggedly up the 
ravine, but at the entrance of the village were stag- 

^ Canrobert's action in withholding his aid during the crisis of the 
battle deepened the bitterness between Niel and himself that had ez> 
isted since the Crimean campaign. Matters had reached such a pass 
in the French army even in 1859 that the generals suspected each 
other of being capable of actual treason in order to bring disgrace 
upon a rival. Canrobert^s delay seems to have been induced only by 
that extreme caution that governed all his movements, and prevented 
bis taking a high place among military conmianders. 

^ By the 1st corps. 


gered by the close fusillades and brought to a halt. 
Bazaine hurried a battery up the steep incline and 
opened on the village at short range, but the massive 
stone houses resisting well the cannonading, the battle 
became stationary at this point. General Ladmi- 
rault was also checked, while at Monte Alto Forey's 
division was beaten back in confusion. The emperor 
at this crisis sent forward the Guards. They rallied 
Forey's division, and advanced straight against the 
heights south of Solferino. They carried the posi- 
tions. This settled the fate of Solferino, for the Aus- 
trians there, finding themselves flanked, abandoned 
the contest and retired from the village. The French 
following close, the Austrian retreat became a disor- 
derly flight. In fact, the capture of Solferino and 
adjacent heights resulted in the almost complete dis- 
persion of the 1st and 5th corps. Moreover, the 8th 
corps, still engaged with the Sardinians before Pozzo- 
lengo, was completely isolated from the main Austrian 

But the Austrian generals did not despair. Their 
line of battle was still intact from Cavriana to Gui- 
dizzolo, while the 7th and 11th corps had not yet 
been engaged. A strong advance upon Castiglione 
would compel the abandonment by the French of 
their conquests about Solferino. At three o'clock, 
however, the hopes of the Kaiser received a death- 
blow in this dispatch from Count Wimpffen : " I have 
twice taken the offensive, and have engaged my last 
reserves. I cannot hold out much longer, and find 
myself under the necessity of beating a retreat under 
the protection of the 11th corps. I direct the 9th to- 
ward Goito ; the 3d by Cerlungo on Ferri ; the 11th 
by Goito on Eoverbella I regret that I can report 


nothing more satisfactory to your majesty." There 
was nothing more to be done, and the Kaiser issued 
orders for the general retreat. 

Before this time MacMahon had thrown off his 
lethargy, and was advancing upon Cavriana. He ex- 
pected the cooperation of Niel, but upon reaching 
San Cassiano found no sign of him. In conjunction 
with the Guard on his left he pressed rapidly on to- 
ward the heights of Cavriana. A change in the Aus- 
trian tactics prevented Niel's cooperation. Wimpffen, 
detecting MacMahon's advance, and seeing the road 
to Castiglione open, determined, despite his message 
to the Kaiser, to make one final effort to save the day. 
Niel's men were nearly exhausted by their long con- 
test with overwhelming numbers, and the Austrians 
gained groimd. He was even reduced to the use of 
cavalry to gain a brief respite for his infantry. Be- 
tween four and five o'clock the vanguard of Canro- 
bert's column passed through Medole to his aid. 
About the same time a furious tempest burst upon 
the country. The wind that prefaced it swept the 
dust in blinding clouds across the plains, completely 
obscuring the operations. The violence of the storm 
was enhanced by thunder and lightning, as though 
the elements were in sympathy with the fierce pas- 
sions of wayward humanity. When the clouds broke 
away the air was cleared of polluting smoke, and the 
long slanting rays of the sun glittered on the spark- 
ling foliage of the valley. The battle was then over, 
Canrobert and Niel were joined, Wimpffen was in 
retreat, and MacMahon was at Cavriana. Only on 
the extreme right were the Austrians still in line. 
There General Benedek with the 8th corps still con- 
fronted the baffled Sardinians, adding to a fame that 


a few years later was to place him in command of the 
armies of his sovereign. Perhaps he hardly deserved 
all the credit he gained at San Martino. His defense 
was stubborn and skillful, and to the close of the day 
he worsted his antagonists. He committed the error, 
however, of overrating the numbers opposed to him, 
and refused to dispatch a portion of his forces to the 
defense of Solf erino. Upon finding how the day had 
gone he began his retreat, regaining the Mincio in 
perfect order during the night. 

The French made no pursuit. The emperor rode 
on to Cavriana, and established himself in the house 
occupied by the Kaiser in the morning. Darkness 
fell. The army of the second empire slept for the 
last time on a victorious field.^ 

On the 1st of July the advance was continued. 
The French army passed the Mincio, and the Sar- 
dinians invested Peschiera. On the 2d the emperor's 
headquarters were at Valeggio, while the 1st, 2d, 
and 4th corps held a line from Castelnuovo through 
Sommacampagna to ViUafranca. The Guard and 3d 
corps were at Valeggio, the 5th corps had joined the 
army at Goito. It seemed plain that another battle 
was to be fought before Verona. On the 6th of Jidy 
the emperor issued his orders for the following day 
with unusual minuteness. The whole army was to 
be under arms by daybreak. Long before light the 
eager battalions were awaiting the order to advance, 
but none came. The morning passed without event, 
and then early in the afternoon the tidings ran 
through the astonished ranks that an armistice was 
to be signed. 

^ This is a fact, if we disregard the petty successes of the Mexican 


In fact, the French emperor had decided to make 
peace. He had turned to Lord Palmerston the day 
following the battle of Solferino, inviting his media- 
tion on the basis of a cession of Lombardy and Parma 
to Sardinia. Palmerston was in favor of driving Aus- 
tria from Italy, and would not lend the good offices 
of his government to effect any other arrangement. 
Determined to bring hostilities to a close, Napoleon 
communicated directly with the Kaiser at Verona. 
His note suggesting an armistice was on its way 
while he was busy issuing his elaborate instructions 
to the army on the 6th. The next day he received a 
favorable reply, and on the 8th an armistice was 

On the 11th the two monarchs met at a small house 
in Villafranca to discuss the preliminaries of peace. 
The Kaiser was inclined to peace for other reasons 
than that his army had been beaten in the field. He 
had entered the contest calm in the assurance that the 
Frankfort Diet would never allow him to be stripped 
of a foot of his Italian territory. With the mobil- 
ization of the German federal army his confidence 
had increased ; but when the command of that army 
passed to the prince regent of Prussia, his feelings 
underwent a change. He longed to be free from his 
Italian difficulties, that he might devote his energies 
to the recovery of Austrian prestige in Germany. 
Of course the mediation of Prussia was not to be 
thought of ; that might prove too costly. England was 
against him, and Kussia had not forgiven his aban- 
donment of her in 1854. Napoleon's note of July 6 
opened to him a means of escape from his dilemma 
without mortifying his pride. With both monarchs 
of one mind, there could be no serious difficulty in 


coming to an understanding. Napoleon even modi- 
fied his demands from the shape in which Lord Pahner- 
ston had disapproved them. He had made no allu- 
sion to Parma, but only insisted upon the cession of 
Lombardy. He even compromised on this so as to 
leave the Austrian Quadrilateral intact. The prelim- 
inaries were signed in the afternoon. Napoleon was 
glad to have an end of the fighting, and Francis 
Joseph had come off much better than he expected. 

There was nothing for the king of Sardinia but to 
acquiesce in these arrangements. His task was ren- 
dered doubly hard by the action of Cavour, whose 
judgment failed him for the first and only time in his 
diplomatic career. Cavour left Turin immediately 
upon the receipt of the news of the armistice. He 
hastened to the Sardinian headquarters, and in the 
royal presence bitterly denounced the measure, while 
he raved against the emperor, and urged the non- 
acceptance of Lombardy. The king was deeply 
offended, and naturally was not dissuaded from his 
course. He signed the preliminaries of peace, but 
attached the words " pour ce qui me concerne," merely 
signifying that he accepted Lombardy, but held him- 
self unembarrassed for future events. Then he re- 
turned to his capital disgusted with the result of the 
campaign, and indignant with his minister. Cavour 
went also to Turin, his rage unabated, to resign his 
post. Napoleon, in better spirits than either, jour- 
neyed to Paris, and on the 15th was recreating within 
sound of the plashing fountain at St. Cloud. 

What influenced the French emperor to abandon 
the Italian cause on the Mincio ? Was he swerved 
from his purpose by the carnage of Solf erino, by his 
dread of offending the Pope beyond reconciliation, or 


by his awakening to the knowledge that he was not a 
general ? Was he alarmed by the attitude of central 
Italy, that presaged a Sardinia too powerful for the 
safety of his southern frontier ; did he mistrust the 
hostility of the German federal army ? These ques- 
tions were asked by an astonished world. The em- 
peror's explanation, delivered to the Chambers, July 
19, was as follows: "Arrived beneath the walls of 
Verona, the struggle was inevitably about to change 
its nature as well in a military as in a political aspect. 
Obliged to attack the enemy in front, who was in- 
trenched behind great fortresses and protected on his 
flank by the neutrality of the surrounding territory, 
and about to begin a long and barren war, I found 
myself in the face of Europe in arms, ready to dis- 
pute our successes or aggravate our reverses. Never- 
theless the difficulty of the enterprise would not have 
shaken my resolution, if the means had not been out 
of proportion to the results to be expected. It was 
necessary to crush boldly the obstacles opposed, and 
then to accept a conflict on the Rhine as well as on 
the Adige. It was necessary to fortify ourselves 
openly with the concurrence of revolution. It was 
necessary to go on shedding precious blood, and at 
last risk that which a sovereign should only stake for 
the independence of his country. If I have stopped, 
it was neither through weariness nor exhaustion, nor 
through abandoning the noble cause which I desired 
to serve, but for the interests of France. I felt great 
reluctance to put reins upon the ardor of our soldiers, 
to retrench from my programme the territory from the 
Mincio to the Adriatic, and to see vanish from honest 
hearts noble delusions and patriotic hopes." 

If the world had not learned to doubt the sincerity 


of Louis Napoleon's sayings, it would have rested 
content with this statement, and accepted earlier the 
fact that he was induced to sheathe his victorious 
sword by the strength of the Austrian Quadrilateral 
and the threatening attitude of the Grerman federal 
army on the Rhine. 




Wab. — Insurrections in Central Italy. — Demands of the 
Central Italians. — Attitude op Victor Emmanuel. — The 
Peace op Zurich. — Reconciliation op Cavour and Victor 
Emmanuel. — Their Battle with the Papal Government. — 
Napoleon agrees to a Plebiscite. — Central Italy de- 
clares POR Annexation to Sardinia. — The First Italian 
Parliament. — Cession op Nice and Savoy. — Revolution in 
THE Two Sicilies. — Garibaldi leaves por Sicily to head 
THE Insurgents. — His Rapid Advance. — He captures Pa- 
lermo. — Extraordinary Character op his Achievements — 
Excitement in Turin. — The Policy op Cavour. — Garibaldi 
BECOMES Headstrong. — He crosses to the Mainland and 


Entry op the Garibaldians. — Cavour' s Conception op the 
Crisis. — Sardinian Troops enter Papal Territory. — Bat- 
tle OP Castelpidardo. — The Sardinians pass the Neapol- 
itan Frontier. — Meeting op Garibaldi and Victor Emman- 
uel. — The Neapolitans vote for Annexation to the Italian 
Kingdom. — Garibaldi's Hatred op Cavour. — Cavour's 
Health gives way. — His Death. — The World's Estimate 
op Cavour. 

The statement of the French emperor that Italy 
must be free to the Adriatic had received a literal 
acceptance by the Italians, and confidence had grown 
to certainty as victory after victory crowned the 
allied arms. The news of the armistice came as a 
bewildering, crushing blow. It was received first 
with incredulity, and then with demonstrations that 
expressed vividly the wrath and disappointment which 
everywhere abounded. 


Venice was in tears. For days the eyes of her 
citizens liad been lifted to the belfry of San Marco, 
for from there they knew that the allied fleets were 
yisible in the Adriatic beyond Lido. When the glad 
faces of the Austrian garrison betrayed the news from 
Villafranca, the high confidence of the Venetians gave 
way to a despair rendered almost paralyzing from the 
suddenness of the reaction. 

In Piedmont and Lombardy the sympathy for 
Venice tempered the popular joy. Milan refused to 
rejoice while Venice, the companion of her long thraU- 
dom, still remained in chains. The French emperor, 
upon returning from the front, could not fail to notice 
the changed temper of Milan and Turin. The French 
colors were sparingly displayed and where all had 
been noisy enthusiasm a few weeks before, there was 
only resentful silence. 

While the war was in progress great events had 
been taking place elsewhere in the peninsula. Fer- 
dinand II. of Naples died, and his last moments were 
embittered by tidings of the battle of Montebello. 
His youthful successor recklessly followed in his steps, 
turning a deaf ear to the entreaties of his people, and 
spiuTiing the invitation of Victor Emmanuel to enter 
the anti- Austrian alliance. 

In Tuscany the people arose, demanding a constitu- 
tion and an active participation by the Tuscan forces 
in the war. The grand duke, finding that the spirit 
of sedition had extended to his own guards, left 
Florence and fled into the arms of Austria. 

In the Emilian provinces of Parma and Modena 
the temper of the people necessitated the flight of 
their rulers. 

Bologna, too, broke into revolt, — Bologna the 


capital of the Papal Legations, that had been held in 
subjection for ten years by Austrian bayonets. The 
imperial commander, nevertheless, held his own until 
the battle of Magenta necessitated his retirement upon 
the Quadrilateral. The Cardinal Legate, finding his 
holy office no longer supported by the foreign troops, 
also withdrew. Military and priestly oppression left 
Bologna together on the 12th of June. 

Ever3rwhere it was 1848 repeated. In the States of 
the Church general uneasiness prevailed, and would 
have developed into insurrection at Rome but for the 
restraining influences of the French garrison. The 
state of affairs on the Tiber was curious enough. 
The Pope was praying for Austrian victories, the 
Romans were longing for French success, and the 
French soldiery protected the Pope from the Ro- 

In the central Italian states the popular position 
was strengthened by the presence of a portion of 
Prince Napoleon's corps, which disembarked at Leg- 
horn and passed through Tuscany on its northward 
march. Provisional governments were formed in all 
the states, and deputations sent to Victor Emmanuel 
offering him their allegiance. To the representatives 
of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena he extended en- 
couragement, but expressed his inability to accept 
their offer until after the conclusion of peace. He, 
however, sent conmaissioners in his name to admin- 
ister their governments and organize their military 
forces for participation in the war. When the depu- 
tations from Bologna presented their petition he was 
forced into a delicate position. It was one thing to 
undertake the cause of the Tuscans and Emilians, but 
quite another to interfere in behalf of the subjects of 


the charcli. Any move in favor of the people of the 
liegations was sure to bring down upon him the 
denunciations of the Vatican. Furthermore, he mis- 
trusted that his ally, " the eldest son of the church," 
would not regard such a course with favor. The king, 
received the deputation cordially, explained his posi- 
tion frankly, and referred them to the emperor, who 
was then at Monteehiaro planning the march that 
was to bring on the battle of Solferino. From this 
visit the deputation returned to Bologna with but 
little encouragement and somewhat crestfallen. But 
Cavour had the interest of the Legations deeply at 
heart. He understood the emperor better than his 
royal master, and judged him to be lukewarm in the 
position he had taken. He induced the king to send 
Massimo d' Azeglio as commissioner to conduct the 
temporary government at Bologna. The result, so 
far as the Vatican was concerned, confirmed the ex- 
pectations of the king. Victor Emmanuel, his army 
and his people, were condemned by a papal allocution 
and warned to mend their impious ways, while the 
papal troops suppressed a rising at Perugia with un- 
necessary severity and shocking cruelty. 

The treaty concluded at Zurich in November be- 
tween the ambassadors of France, Austria, and Sar- 
dinia substantially ratified the preliminaries arranged 
at Villafranca. Lombardy passed to the king of 
Sardinia; Venetia was retained by Austria. The 
rulers of Modena and Parma were to be restored, 
the papal power again established in the Legations, 
while the various states of the peninsula, excepting 
Sardinia and the Two Sicilies, were to form a con- 
federation under the leadership of the Pope. Accord- 
ing to the terms of the treaty Lombardy was the only 


the church. Any move ia favor of the people of the 
Legations was sure to bring down upon him the 
denunciations of the Vatican. Furthermore, he mis- 
trnsted that his ally, " the eldest eon of the church," 
would not regard such a course with favor. The king, 
received the deputation cordially, explained his posi- 
tion frankly, and referred them to the emperor, who 
waa then at Monteehiaro planning the march that 
was to bring on the battle of Solferino. From this 
visit the deputation returned to Bologna with but 
little encouragement and somewhat crestfallen. But 
Cavour had the interest of the Liegations deeply at 
heart. He understood the emperor better than his 
royal master, and judged him to be lukewarm in the 
position he had taken. He induced the king to send 
Massimo d' Azegho as commissioner to conduct the 
temporary government at Bologna. The result, so 
far as the Vatican was concerned, confirmed the ex- 
pectations of the king. Victor Emmanuel, his army 
and his people, were condemned by a papal allocution 
and warned to mend their impious ways, while the 
papal troops suppressetl a rising at Perugia with un- 
necessary severity and shocking cruelty. 

The treaty concluded at Zurich in November be- 
tween the ambassadors of France, Austria, and Sar- 
dinia substantially ratified the preliminaries arranged 
at Villafranca. Lombardy passed to the king of 
Sardinia ; Venetia was retained by Austria. The 
rulers of Modena and Parma were to be restored, 
the papal power again established in the Legations, 
while the various states of the peninsula, excepting 
Sardinia and the Two Sicilies, were to form a con- 
^feile ration under tlie leadei-shiii i.f tlie Pope. Accord- 
" 5 to the terms of the treaty Lombardy was the only 


state directly benefited by the war. The emperor, 
however, had promised Victor Emmanuel that he 
would not use force to restore the old rulers in cen- 
tral Italy, and that he would not allow another power 
to do so. Moreover, in addressing his troops at 
the close of the war he uttered these words : " Italy, 
henceforth mistress of her destinies, will only have 
herself to blame if she does not make regular prog- 
ress in order and liberty." ^ This public statement 
meant something, and perhaps Napoleon was not in- 
clined to add to the iU repute he had gained in Italy 
by the abandonment of his project to carry his con- 
quering arms to the Adriatic. At all events the 
position of the emperor simplified matters from the 
Sardinian point of view, as the people of central 
Italy showed no inclination to resume the old regime. 
They maintained their position firmly and consist- 
ently, despite the decisions of the Zurich Congress, 
the advice of the French emperor, and the threatening 
attitude of Naples and Rome. Their representatives 
were at work in London and Paris endeavoring to 
arouse popular sympathy in their behalf, but the year 
closed without definite action, leaving the provisional 
governments in control. In fact, matters were simply 
drifting, and it seemed imperative to take some vig- 
orous measures to terminate so abnormal a condition 
of affairs. Finally the project of a European con- 
gress was suggested. There was but one opinion as 
to who should represent Italy in such an event. The 
king, piqued at Cavour's course at Villafranca, was 
little inclined to call upon him, though he had already 

^ In conversation with Victor Emmanuel, Napoleon also let drop 
this portentous statement: '*Now we shall see what the Italians 
c£Ui do unaided/' 


felt painfully the loss of his guiding mind. The 
necessity brought about a reconciliation. Cavour 
made the amende honorable and the coldness be- 
tween the king and the minister was at an end. He 
returned to the head of affairs in January. This 
event was simultaneous with the removal of M. Walew- 
ski at Paris and a change in the policy of the French 
government. The emperor no longer advised the 
central Italians to accept the return of their rulers. 
His influence at Rome was exercised to induce the 
Pope to allow his subjects in the Legations to have 
their will. 

The months of February and March were prolific 
in correspondence between Victor Emmanuel and the 
Pope. The object of the king was to persuade the 
Holy Father to consent to some arrangement that 
would satisfy the desires of his people. The tone of 
his letters was dignified and yet reverential. He ad- 
dressed the " Most Blessed Father " as a " devoted 
son of the church," and invariably concluded by re- 
questing the benediction. As for the Pope, though 
courteous and kindly of heart, he stood like a rock 
consistent with his unfailing policy of " non possu- 
mus^ The king's note of February 6 struck the nail 
squarely on the head by the following proposal, " that 
taking into consideration the necessity of the times ; 
the increasing force of the principle of nationality ; 
the irresistible impulse which impels the peoples of 
Italy to unite and order themselves in conformity 
with the model adopted by all civilized nations, an 
impulse which I believe demands my frank and loyal 
concurrence, such a state of things might be estab- 
lished not only in the Romagna, but also in the 
Marches and Umbria, as would reserve to the church 


its high dominion, and assure to the Supreme PontifE 
a glorious post at the head of the Italian nation: 
while giving the people of these provinces a share in 
the benefits that a kingdom strong and highly national 
secures to the greater part of central Italy." In 
short, the Pope was invited to relinquish his temporal 
authority. The response was what might have been 
anticipated. The war between church and state was 
waxing bitter, and in the end one must suffer. 

The scheme of a European congress was abandoned. 
With France at his back to neutralize Austria, Ca- 
vour had nothing to fear. England, too, was unmis- 
takably friendly ; but despite the disappointment of 
Yillaf ranca he was still firm in his old theory that 
Napoleon was the monarch whose whims must be 
humored. It was in pursuance of this policy that he 
suggested to the emperor that the central Italians 
be allowed to settle their fate by plebiscite. This 
method was to a certain extent a craze with the em- 
peror. It was the glorious ordinance behind which 
he had attempted to conceal the blood that stained 
the boulevards during the days of his coup d^etat He 
was the last man who would lift his protest against 
the plebiscite, and Cavour was not surprised at the 
affirmative reply he received to his proposal.' The 
elections took place in March, and by an overwhelm- 
ing majority the people of Parma, Modena, Tuscany, 
and the Legations declared for annexation to Sardinia. 
Austria protested, but could do no more in the face of 

^ '^ Let the populations vote, and when it is demonstrated that liie 
terms of ViUafranca can only be executed in contempt of those prin- 
ciples of popular rights from which I draw my power, I may change 
my mind. " — Napoleon to Sig^or Peruzzi, the Tuscan Enyoy, Mazckde^ 
p. 231. 


England and France.^ Naples followed the Austrian 
example, while almost simultaneously with the news 
of the elections there arrived at Turin the papal ex- 
communication for Victor Emmanuel and his sub- 

On the 2d of April the king opened the new par- 
liament and addressed himself to the representatives 
of 12,000,000 Italians. The natural enthusiasm at- 
tending the session was seriously dampened by the 
royal annoiincement that, subject to the approval of 
their citizens and the ratification of parliament, Nice 
and Savoy were to be returned to France. It was, in 
fact, the concluding installment of the price arranged 
at PlombiSres to be paid for the French troops in the 
campaign of the previous year. The king waa loath 
to make the sacrifice, and Cavour had acquiesced only 
after exhausting every expedient. The emperor, mean- 
while, had insisted, and with reason, upon his inability 
to spend the blood and treasure of his state without 
some tangible recompense to satisfy his people for the 
outlay. Furthermore, as far as Nice and Savoy were 
concerned, it must be admitted that in race and lan- 
guage they were more French than Italian. 

General Graribaldi, who sat in the parliament for 
Nice, was especially prominent in the angry debates 
that followed the king's announcement. Toward Ca- 
vour, whom he held solely responsible for the trans- 
action, he conceived a distrust and dislike that he 
never wholly conquered. When the transfer had 
been ratified he withdrew to a humble retreat in the 
island of Caprera, with his heart bitter against the 

^ " He [Napoleon] informed PriDce Mettemich at Compi^g^e, that 
if Austria crossed the Po, it would be instant war with France.*' 
— McLgade, p. 231. 


man who had made him a stranger in his own house. 
But the excitement over the loss of Nice and Savoy 
was soon diminished by the startling intelligence which 
arrived of rebellion in the Neapolitan dominions. 
Naples was mutinous, while in Sicily, Palermo and 
Messina were in open revolt. Garibaldi's time had 
come. Leaving Caprera, he made for Piedmont, and 
hastily organized a band of volunteers to assist in the 
popular movement. On the night of May 6, with about 
a thousand enthusiastic spirits, he embarked from 
the coast near Genoa in two steamers and sailed for 
Sicily. Cavour in the mean time winked at this 
extraordinary performance. He dispatched Admiral 
Persano with a squadron ostensibly to intercept the 
expedition, but in reality " to navigate between it and 
the hostile Neapolitan fleet." On the 11th Garibaldi 
landed safely at Marsala under the sleepy guns of 
a Neapolitan man-of-war. On the 14th he was at 
Salemi, where he issued the following proclamation : 
" Garibaldi, commander-in-chief of the national forces 
in Sicily, on the invitation of the principal citizens, 
and on the deliberation of the free communes of the 
island, considering that in times of war it is necessary 
that the civil and military powers should be united in 
one person, assumes in the name of Victor Emmanuel, 
King of Italy, the Dictatorship in Sicily." With 
his volunteers increased by several hundred " pic- 
ciotti," as the native mountaineers were called. Gari- 
baldi routed several Neapolitan battalions in position 
at Calatafimi, and a few days later had the camp-fires 
of his rapidly swelling host blazing on the heights 
above Palermo. Having by skiUful manoeuvring 
among the mountains concealed his mmibers and 
plans from the enemy, on the night of the 26th he 


led his forces to the plain, and at dawn attacked the 
city. After a few hours of street fighting, the Nea- 
politans were driven back upon the citadel and royal 
palace. In revenge for the defeat, the g^uns of the 
fleet and the citadel opened a destructive and indis- 
criminate fire upon the city. The slaughter and 
misery worked by this terrific bombardment were ter- 
rible beyond description. Having glutted his thirst 
for vengeance, the Neapolitan commander concluded 
an armistice with Garibaldi, and on the 6th of June 
evacuated aU his positions and sailed from the port. 
In the mean time Garibaldi had been further rein- 
forced by another detachment of recruits from the 
north under General Medici. On July 20 the Near 
politan General Bosco was beaten at MUazzo, and so 
vast had Garibaldi's prestige become that five days 
later, when Medici summoned Messina, it came to 
terms without a blow. 

In the eyes of Europe a miracle had been accom- 
plished. Was it a man or devil who in three months 
time, with a handful of desperadoes at his back, could 
overthrow trained armies, and conquer the fairest 
province of a great kingdom ? But after all we must 
now admit that Garibaldi's military achievements in 
Sicily, however great in the results they accomplished, 
have been exaggerated. From the moment he landed 
at Marsala until he had planted the tricolored flag 
on the walls of Messina, he was regarded by the sim- 
ple, superstitious- Sicilians as a demi-god, mysterious 
and all-powerful. He had among his followers men 
whose pens were mightier than their swords, to whose 
romantic narrations is due the fact that the world 
became almost Sicilian in its judgment of him. 
Whether marching silently over the moonlit moim- 


tains, or apart from his followers gazing down from 
the heights upon the twinkling lights of Palermo which 
gleamed in the valley, or in the glare of the day con- 
spicuous in his scarlet shirt amid the battle-smoke of 
Milazzo, it was all the same. He was invested with 
a halo that bordered upon the supernatural. 

In reality, Graribaldi had but a contemptible foe 
to deal with. The Neapolitan army with its impos- 
ing array on paper of 30,000 bayonets was a mis- 
erable corps of discontented mercenaries, badly dis- 
tributed and poorly commanded, whose superstitious 
natures were overwhelmed by the prestige Garibaldi 
brought with him from the Alps. After the first ac- 
tion at Calatafimi they regarded him as the Scottish 
Covenanters did Claverhouse, as one who had sold him- 
self to the devil, and against whom no bullet could pre- 
vail. Demoralized by these beliefs, and realizing that 
every Sicilian was their enemy, it is not surprising 
that Garibaldi's enthusiasts made head against them. 
Every retreat contributed to this demoralization, 
as they were harassed by the people in the villages 
through which they passed. After Milazzo the Near 
politan army of the south had ceased to exist. It 
succiunbed to hard blows less than to its own inherent 
worthlessness. It was not destroyed, but rather fell 
to pieces. 

Perhaps the excitement at Turin during these days 
was second only to that which animated the great 
Sicilian cities. The guns of Bomba's fleet at Palermo 
were no more active than the diplomatic artillery 
which the courts of Central Europe trained upon the 
government at Turin. Indeed, as has been tersely 
expressed, it literally " rained diplomatic notes " in 
the Sardinian capital. Garibaldi was a subject of 


Sardinia, and the men who were overturning Bourbon 
rule in Sicily were volunteers from the realms of 
Victor Emmanuel. Cavour's position at this time 
was a trying, deKcate, and from some points of view 
a questionable one. He had publicly expressed regret 
for Garibaldi'8 expedition, while privately he encour- 
aged it. It cannot be denied that the position into 
which he forced Sardinia^ at this time was very far 
from one of strict neutrality or even of candor. He 
did not conceal, however, the fact that he would be 
wholly out of sympathy with any movement on the 
part of his government to protect the worst govern- 
ment in the peninsula from its just deserts. Cavour's 
position is revealed clearly in his note to La Farina, 
the Sardinian envoy at Palermo, under date of Jime 
19, " Persano will give you all the aid he can without 
compromising our banner. It would be a great mat- 
ter if Garibaldi could pass into Calabria. Here 
things do not go badly. The diplomatists do not 
molest us too much. Russia made a fearful hubbub ; 
Prussia less. The parliament has much sense. I 
await your letters with impatience." 

Cavour's desire to see Garibaldi in Calabria was 
changed, a little later. La Farina was at Palermo in 
behalf of the Sardinian government, to induce Gari- 
baldi to consent to the immediate annexation of Sicily 
to the new Italian kingdom. This Garibaldi declined 
to do, preferring to wait until he could lay the entire 
Neapolitan realm and Rome as weU at the feet of 
Victor Emmanuel. This altered the aspect of affairs. 
It was evident that Garibaldi was getting headstrong. 
It was Cavour's constant solicitude to keep the Italian 
question in such a shape as to allow no foreign 
power a pretext for interference. Garibaldi's design 


against Rome garrisoned by French troops would be 
almost certain to bring on foreign complications and 
ruin the cause of Italian unity. It was in conse- 
quence of this dread that Victor Emmanuel wrote to 
Garibaldi a congratulatory letter, urging him to de- 
sist from further operations and not carry the conflict 
into Calabria. The response, while it breathed per- 
sonal devotion to the king, could not be regarded 
with much pleasure in official circles at Turin. It 
was written from Milazzo, July 27, and concluded as 
f oUows : " May your majesty therefore permit me this 
time to disobey. As soon as I shall have finished the 
task imposed upon me by the wishes of the people 
who groan under the tyranny of the Neapolitan Bour- 
bon, I shall lay down my sword at your majesty's 
feet, and shall obey your majesty for the remainder 
of my lifetime." Garibaldi's followers numbered 
nearly 20,000 men. The Neapolitan king had been 
so thoroughly cowed as to proclaim his intention of 
establishing constitutional liberty within his realms. 
There was no mistaking that symptom. When a 
Neapolitan Bourbon proclaimed liberty, he also pro- 
claimed the fact that his throne was in danger. It 
was too late, and this despairing effort of Francis II. 
was scarcely heeded in the whirl of events. 

On August 1 the Garibaldians were massing about 
Faro, preparatory to crossing to the mainland. The 
coast opposite was guarded by Neapolitan forts, while 
hostile men-of-war ceaselessly patrolled the straits 
from Reggio to Scilla. Garibaldi was reinforced by 
6,000 men, adventurers of all nationalities, who had 
been raised by Bertani, his agent at Genoa. Seeing 
that the Neapolitan vigilance was concentrated upon 
the troops at Faro, Garibaldi moved the fresh forces 


rapidly to the south toward Taonnina. On the 19th 
he embarked from that place, and so completely were 
the enemy deceived that his whole detachment landed 
unopposed at Melito. Pushing rapidly up the moun- 
tains, he gained the heights above Reggio, where the 
Neapolitan garrison were panic-stricken at finding 
their position turned. After some fighting the Nea- 
politan commander surrendered. Some of his troops 
joined the Garibaldians, while the rest were allowed 
to embark on their ships. Master now of both banks 
of the straits, with his numbers still further aug- 
mented by many thousand enthusiastic Calabrese, it 
only remained for Garibaldi to advance directly upon 
Naples. The excitement along his line of march 
was most intense. In every village where his troops 
appeared the same spirit was shown. The Bourbon 
arms upon the public buildings were torn down, and 
those of Savoy substituted. 

At Naples itself the rioting, which had been par- 
tially suppressed, broke out afresh upon the news of 
Garibaldi's appearance at Reggio. When it became 
known that he was advancing upon the city, the 
populace passed fairly beyond the control of the 
authorities. In these early September days the king 
sat brooding in his palace, and the cheers for Gari- 
baldi and Victor Emmanuel were borne to his ears 
on every breeze that stirred the seditious air of his 
capital. From all quarters the tidings became more 
alarming. His soldiers were cowed, and in many 
places were attacked and routed by the national 
guard. From all the provinces came tidings of suc- 
cessful revolts. His proclamation of liberty had won 
him no friends. His ministry had turned against 
him and characterized as folly the attempt to check 


Graribaldi's advance. There was no help for it. His 
dynasty was crumbling to pieces, and no hand was 
raised to save it. The recently liberated political 
prisoners, the beneficiaries of his eleventh hour clem- 
ency, roamed the streets, their dazed and haggard 
faces presenting a terrible protest against the long 
era of misrule. On the evening of September 6 the 
king embarked on a Spanish ship, and leaving his 
mutinous navy at anchor in the bay, quit forever those 
beautiful shores which his race had too long defiled. 
On the morning of September 7 Garibaldi was at 
Salerno ; before night he had reached Naples, and its 
teeming thousands had run mad. The Neapolitan 
garrison of Castel Nuovo broke out, and rushing 
down into the streets with shouts of "Viva Gari- 
baldi " fraternized with the people. Castel Sant' Elmo 
wrapped itself in the smoke of its saluting artillery 
and hoisted the Sardinian flag, a compliment that the 
Sardinian squadron in the bay acknowledged with 
thimdering broadsides. The Neapolitan fleet went 
over en masse to Garibaldi, and by him was placed 
under the orders of the Sardinian admiral. The 
Garibaldian troops came swarming into the city, 
some by land and others by sea. For days the roll 
of drums and blare of bugles told of new arrivals. 
With little of military precision about them, in mot- • 
ley imiforms, these heroes of Milazzo and Reggio 
streamed along Santa Lucia and up the Toledo. 
Italians and foreigners, strong men and boys, they 
betrayed by eager faces and elastic step the enthu- 
siasm that animated them. All Naples was out to 
welcome its liberators. The city, at all times a pan- 
demonium of uproar and confusion, fairly surpassed 
herself during the first days of Garibaldi's occupation. 


Francis 11. had shut himself up in the fortress of 
Graeta with the remnants of his army, holding the 
line of the Voltumo. Garibaldi's vanguard was at 
Caserta, and he was pushing his forces forward with 
all rapidity to strike the Bourbon a final blow. 

At Turin the state of unrest continued. Gari- 
baldi's presence at Naples was attended with grave 
perils. Of course his designs upon Rome formed the 
principal danger, but his conspicuous inability as 
an organizer was one of scarcely less gravity. The 
ignorant subjects of Francis II. were not to be 
trusted to maintain order among themselves, and 
Garibaldi was not the man to enforce it. So far the 
conduct of Naples had been exemplary, but Mazzini 
was known to be at work forwarding his schemes for 
a great Neapolitan republic. If left to drift, this 
state of things might easily develop into anarchy, and 
anarchy meant foreign interference and the undoing 
of all the great results of Garibaldi's campaign. 
Sardinian troops had become a necessity of the situa- 
tion. " If we do not arrive on the Voltumo before 
Garibaldi arrives at Cattolica, the monarchy is lost, 
— Italy remains a prey to revolution." T^hat was 
Cavour's conception of the crisis. There was no time 
to lose. There could be no difficulty in finding an 
excuse to enter papal territory. The inhabitants of 
Umbria and the Marches, who had never ceased to 
appeal for annexation to the new kingdom, were sup- 
pressed by an army of foreign mercenaries that the 
Pope had mustered beneath his banner. That native- 
bom Italians should be held in subjection by hirelings 
from abroad was certainly a scandalous matter. It 
was in reality a worse state of things than Cavour 
had exposed at the Paris Congress a few years before. 


Cavour had interceded in vain . with the Vatican to 
alter its course toward its disaffected subjects. At 
last on September 7, the day Garibaldi entered Naples, 
he sent the royal ultimatum to Cardinal Antonelli at 
Rome. "After having applied to his majesty the 
king, my august sovereign, for his orders, I have the 
honor of signifying to your eminence that the king's 
troops are charged to prevent, in the name of the 
rights of humanity, the pontifical mercenary corps 
from repressing by violence the expression of the 
sentiments of the people of the Marches and Umbria. 
I have, moreover, the honor to invite your excel- 
lency, for the reasons above explained, to give imme- 
diate orders for the disbanding and dissolving of those 
corps, the existence of which is a menace to the peace 
of Italy." On the 11th the unfavorable reply of 
Antonelli was received, and the same day the Sar- 
dinian troops crossed the papal frontier. " Soldiers," 
exclaimed the king, "you enter the Marches and 
Umbria to restore civil order in their desolated cities, 
and to afford the people the opportunity of expressing 
their wishes. You have not to combat powerful armies, 
but to free unhappy Italian provinces from foreign 
bands of mercenaries. You go not to avenge the in- 
juries done to me and to Italy, but to prevent the 
bursting forth of popular hatred and vengeance 
against misrule." 

Every European power except England, which ex- 
pressed open satisfaction, protested against this action. 
There was an imposing flight of ambassadors from 
Turin, and an ominous commotion all along the dip- 
lomatic horizon. Cavour had not moved, however, 
without a secret understanding with Napoleon. Fran- 
cis II. issued his feeble protest from Gaeta, the Pope 


hurled his excommunication at his despoilers, but 
with England friendly and France passive Cavour 
had nothing to fear. Austria was too much broken 
by her recent misfortunes to resist, while Russia and 
Prussia had no interest in the matter that would jus- 
tify their passing beyond protestations. The Sar- 
dinian army advanced rapidly in two columns. Gen- 
eral Fanti seized Perugia and Spoleto, whUe Cialdini 
on the east of the Apennines utterly destroyed the 
main papal army under the French general Lamori- 
ciere at Castelfidardo. Lamoriciere with a few fol- 
lowers gained Ancona, but finding that town covered 
by the guns of the Sardinian fleet, he was compelled 
to surrender. " The pontifical mercenary corps " be- 
ing a thing of the past, Cavour could turn his whole 
attention to Naples. He had obtained from parlia- 
ment an enthusiastic permission to receive, if tendered, 
the allegiance of the Two Sicilies. The army was 
ordered across the Neapolitan frontier, and the king 
left for Ancona to take command. 

In the mean time on October 1 Garibaldi had in- 
flicted another severe defeat to the royal Neapolitan 
army on the Volturno. The Sardinian advance was 
wholly unimpeded. On the 26th, as the king and his 
staff were approaching the little village of Teano, 
they descried a group of horsemen moving toward 
them. It was Garibaldi and a squadron of his red 
shirts. The simple soldier rode forward, uncovered, 
and checking his horse beside the king exclaimed in 
a voice choking with emotion, " King of Italy." " I 
thank you," was the reply, and clasping each other's 
hand, the two remained silent for a minute, gazing 
into each other's eyes, while their followers stood 
apart. Then the air was rent by enthusiastic cheer- 


ing \diich was caught up by the splendid Sardinian 
regiments as they went swinging by. 

On November 7 the king entered Naples, and on 
the following day was waited upon by a deputation to 
announce the result of the election that Garibaldi 
had previously decreed. " Sire," said their spokes- 
man, " The Neapolitan people, assembled in Comitia, 
by an immense majority have proclaimed you their 
king. Nine millions of Italians unite themselves to 
the other provinces governed by your majesty with 
so much wisdom, and verify your solemn promise that 
Italy must belong to Italians." 

Then followed an event so sublime as to be without 
parallel in these times of selfish ambition. Grari- 
baldi bade farewell to his faithful followers, and, 
refusing all rewards, passed again to his quiet home 
in Caprera. The man who for months had been at- 
tracting the attention of the world by his victories, 
and who without an army had won a kingdom by the 
sword, laid his conquest at the feet of the monarch 
whom he was proud to serve. 

The people of Umbria and the Marches followed 
the lead of Naples in declaring themselves subjects 
of Victor Emmanuel. Except for the patrimony of 
St. Peter surrounding the city of Rome and the Aus- 
trian province of Venetia, Italy was united under the 
tricolor. While Garibaldi returned to his humble 
Kfe, Cavour went to Turin to resume his labors. For 
years he had been staggering under the vast weight 
of public affairs ; and now, while the darling object 
of his life seemed almost accomplished, he felt the 
burden crushing him down. All these petty states 
must be amalgamated into one strong nation. There 
were several budgets to be condensed into one, a com- 


plete reorganization of the army to be effected, brig- 
andage to be broken up, railways to be opened, ruined 
cities to be restored, education to be provided. Of all 
the states the Two Sicilies was in the most deplorable 
condition with the ignorant superstitions of its long- 
persecuted people. "Northern Italy is made," ex- 
claimed Cavour ; " there are no longer Lombards, 
Piedmontese, Tuscans, or Eomagnols ; we are all Ital- 
ians, but there are still Neapolitans." On the 18th of 
February, 1861, the fii'st national parliament repre- 
senting the north and south met at Turin. Five days 
before, the last stronghold of Francis II. had capit- 
ulated, and the enthusiasm ran high. The kingdom 
of Italy was proclaimed, and the king confirmed as 
" Victor Emmanuel II., by the grace of God and the 
will of the nation King of Italy." 

There was no mistaking the temper of the parlia- 
ment in regard to Rome and Venice. Garibaldi was 
there with his longing for Rome and his distrust of 
Cavour unabated. Indeed, his fierce attacks upon 
the man who had bartered away Nice embittered the 
early days of the session. Cavour bore patiently the 
criticism of the fiery patriot. "I know," he said 
sadly, " that between me and the honorable General 
Garibaldi there exists a fact which divides us two like 
an abyss. I believed that I fulfilled a painful duty 
— the most painful that I ever accomplished in my 
life — in counseling the king, and proposing to par- 
liament, to approve the cession of Nice and Savoy to 
France. By the grief that I then experienced I can 
understand that which the honorable General Gari- 
baldi must have felt ; and if he cannot forgive me 
this act, I will not bear him any grudge for it." 

That a misunderstanding should exist between Ca- 


vour and Graribaldi, both working for a common end, 
is by no means remarkable. One swept all Europe 
with his searching eye, and guided his policy with ref- 
erence to his surroundings ; the other defied Europe, 
and never looked beyond the point of his sword blade. 
For all this the enthusiastic recluse of Caprera was 
no more determined that Srome should be the Italian 
capital than was the prime minister at Turin. While 
he was being assailed for lukewarmness, Cavour was 
exhausting every resource to induce Napoleon to with- 
draw his troops and allow a voluntary Italian solu- 
tion of the Sroman question. The work was almost 
done. The scheme that a few years before would 
have provoked a smile in any diplomatic circle in Eu- 
rope had been perfected almost to the capstone. But 
the man who had conceived the plan and carried it 
through its darkest days was not destined to witness 
its final consummation. Cavour was giving way. On 
May 29 he was stricken down with a violent illness. 
On the evening of June 5, when all hope was aban- 
doned, the king visited his bedside. Upon hearing 
of the royal presence, Cavour rallied from the stupor 
in which he lay. " Ah, Maesti," he said with a smile, 
and whispered a few words of farewell. The next 
day the confessor was by his side. The face of the 
dying statesman lightened as he seized his hand, ex- 
claiming, " Frate I Frate ! A free church in a free 
state ! " So with the battle-cry of his great adminis- 
tration upon his lips, Cavour passed away. 

To Mazzini belongs the credit of keeping alive the 
spirit of patriotism ; Graribaldi is entitled to the ad- 
miration of the world as the pure patriot who fired 
men's souls ; but Cavour was greater than either, and 
Mazzini and Garibaldi were but humble instruments 


in his magnificent plan of Italian regeneration. Mor- 
alists may quibble over his course in drenching Lom- 
bardy with French blood ; churchmen will denoimce 
his treatment of the pontifical government at Rome ; 
but the verdict of posterity will be one of admira- 
tion for the man who, true to his great doctrines of 
national unity and the freedom of church and state, 
worked ceaselessly, unselfishly, regardless of enmity 
abroad and criticism at home ; who healed schisms 
among his people, and converted foreigners into 
allies; who made anarchy and insubordination to 
serve his ends, until at last, when he laid the burden 
down, he bequeathed as a legacy to his countrymen 
a nation fair and strong. 

The universal sorrow in Italy that succeeded the 
death of Cavour was mingled with misgiving and 
fear, but for all that the new nation agreed with Mas- 
simo d' Azeglio, as he wrote through his tears, " If 
God will, He can save Italy even without Cavour." 




Old Undebstakdings and Modern Misunderstandings be- 
tween Austria and Prussia. — Austria gains the Ascend- 
ency IN Germany. — The OiiMttTZ Incident. — The Crimean 
War. — Prince Wilmam becomes Regent of Pbussia. — 
Change in the Prussian Policy. — The Kaiser annoyed. — 
The Regent becomes William I. op Pbussia. — His Early 
Career. — His Struggle with the House of Deputies on 
the Army Bill. — He calls Bismarck to the Presidency 
OF THE Ministry. — Bismarck's Political Creed. — His Views 
on the Revolution of 1848 and the Schleswig-Holstein 
Question. — His Early Opposition to German Unity. — 
His Admiration of Austria. — Changes wrought in his 
Views at Frankfort. — His Contempt for the Diet. — 
He distrusts Austria. — Warns his Government against 
Austria. — His Course at St. Petersburg and Paris. — 
Foresees War with Austria, and pushes Army Reform. 

The Kaiser, Francis Joseph, returned to Schbn- 
brunn from the seat of war to nurse his wrath against 
Prussia and the German states. In order to com- 
prehend the relations existing between Prussia and 
Austria at this time, it is necessary to glance at the 
condition of Germany in 1850 and review the events 
that characterized the ten years succeeding. 

The German confederation was the creation of the 
Vienna Congress of 1815. It comprised thirty-five 
sovereign states besides the four free cities of Frank- 
fort, Hamburg, Lubeck, and Bremen. The pleni- 
potentiaries of these various governments met at 

GERMANY IN 1850. 179 

Frankfort and formed the national Diet or Bund, of 
which Austria held the permanent presidency. The 
principal prerogatives of this famous body, renowned 
abroad for its solemnity and extreme deliberation, 
were those of declaring war and settling disputes 
between the states. One of its peculiar features was 
the system of voting. On ordinary questions seven- 
teen votes were cast, one each for the eleven larger 
states, while the others, holding each a fractional vote, 
made up the remaining six. More weighty questions 
of constitutional importance were settled by the 
" Plenum " or " full Diet." In this case each state 
cast at least one vote, while the six large states had 
six votes, the next five, four votes, and the next three, 
two votes each. Under this system it will be seen 
that Austria and Prussia with three quarters of the 
population represented always less than one sixth of 
the voting strength in the Diet. This in itself was 
an anomaly that might have proved serious, had 
Austria and Prussia united ever been opposed by the 
voting majority. The minor states, however, never 
sacrificed their prudence sufficiently to tempt the 
wrath of their mighty patrons. 

From the first there had been an understanding 
between the courts of Vienna and Berlin that Prus- 
sia should supervise the domestic affairs of the con- 
federation on the condition of her supporting Austria 
on European questions. The temporary overthrow 
of the Diet in 1849 was the means of shattering this 
understanding and establishing a spirit of distrust 
between the great German powers. The friendly 
course pursued by Frederick William toward the 
national assembly, and the evident preference of the 
German liberals for Prussia, as opposed to Austria, 


stirred the anger of the Kaiser and his ministry. To 
be sure the Prussian king refused the national crown, 
but in a manner so half-hearted as to indicate that 
were the experiment repeated under more auspicious 
circumstances, he would not be found so coy. In- 
deed, hardly was his refusal pronounced before he 
commenced to ply the courts of Saxony and Hanover 
for their support in measures that had imperial ends 
in view. Early in 1850 a parliament convened at 
Erfurt at his instigation to discuss national reorgan- 
ization. By that time Austria had arranged her tur- 
bulent realms, and was prepared to deal with German 
affairs. Prince Metternich was in retirement, but 
the Kaiser had a bold adviser in Schwarzenberg, and 
one who was little inclined to follow his predecessor 
in his policy of non-interference in confederate affairs. 
In fact, the extraordinary position occupied by Prus- 
sia at this time afforded an excuse for his breaking 
loose from old traditions. He had no sympathy with 
the national assembly at Frankfort, and he was de- 
termined to frustrate Frederick William's scheme at 
Erfurt. "Prussia must first be abased so that she 
may afterwards be crushed," were his words at this 
time. He turned to the southern German states with 
proposals to restore the old federal diet, and not only 
succeeded there, but also enticed Saxony and Han- 
over to his cause. As a result, the Erfurt parliament 
f eU to pieces. Then followed an event which effectu- 
ally estranged the two great powers of Germany, and 
threw the controlling influence into the hands of Aus- 
tria. In the electorate of Hesse the people had 
revolted against the oppressions of minister Hassen- 
pflug, whose cause was immediately espoused by 
Schwarzenberg. The Hessians appealed to Prussia 

GERMANY IN 1850, 181 

for protection, and Frederick William asked the Cham' 
bers for an extraordinary credit to put the army on a 
war footing. Austria massed troops in Bohemia, and 
in company with Bavaria invaded Hesse. The Prus- 
sians upon this entered Cassel, and shots were even 
exchanged between the outposts. The great struggle 
for German supremacy seemed at hand. But the 
war cloud dissolved as suddenly as it had arisen. 
While Europe awaited with breathless intensity the 
clash of arms, the Berlin cabinet was frantically seek- 
ing some means of escape from the warlike attitude it 
had so hastily adopted. Enervated by a long peace, 
and poorly organized, the Prussian army was in no 
condition to take the field. " We cannot fight at all, 
it is impossible for us to prevent the Austrians from 
occupying Berlin ; " such was the confession of the 
minister of war. Count Manteuffel hastened to meet 
Schwarzenberg at Olmiitz, and there acceded to all 
Austria's demands. Hassenpflug was restored, and 
so was the federal Diet. War was averted, but Prus- 
sian prestige had ebbed low. By her interference in 
Schleswig-Holstein and the espousal of the ministerial 
cause in Hesse, Austria indicated unmistakably the 
line of conduct she intended to pursue henceforth in 
German affairs. The Olmiitz incident was accepted 
as a proof of her ability to execute her will. Schwar- 
zenberg openly pronounced against any scheme of ' 
national unity that shoidd render the House of Haps- 
burg subordinate in Germany. In 1851 Austria re- 
turned to the presidency of the restored Diet amid 
the servile bowing and scraping of the petty princes. 
To all intents and purposes at this time Austria con- 
trolled Germany. She assumed there as in Italy the 
championship of despotism, the rulers in Modena and 


Naples being no more secure of her support than the 
German princes. In the Diet she used her influence 
over the smaller states systematically to oppose and 
outvote Prussia. Upon nearly every question intro- 
duced the Prussian envoy found himself opposed by 
an overwhelming and compact opposition. The death 
of Schwarzenberg in 1852 produced no change in 
this policy, Count Buol his successor maintaining his 
methods with relentless energy. In Austria itself the 
constitution was abolished in January, 1852, the au- 
thority of the Catholic priesthood reestablished, and 
Hungary throttled by an irritated military. In 1854 
the attention of the Vienna cabinet was at length 
diverted from the prosecution of federal business by 
the threatening condition of affairs in the east. Prus- 
sia was thoroughly under the influence of St. Peters- 
burg, while Austria from her geographical position 
was led into violent hostility to the schemes of the 
Czar. The majority of the small states were strongly 
Kussian in their sympathies ; and had Prussia been 
equal to the occasion, she might at this time have 
found a way out of the galling humiliation to which 
she had been subjected for three years back. But 
the memory of Olmiitz was still fresh in Germany, 
and Austria's prestige so firm that she not only held 
the petty courts in check, but induced the government 
of Berlin to sign the treaty in which Austria and 
Prussia guaranteed each other their respective terri- 
tories against invasion. 

This event, however, marks perhaps the flood tide 
of Austria's influence in Germany. Under a milder 
regime than was enjoyed in the empire, Prussia had 
made rapid strides in wealth and national develop- 
ment. Austria, threatened from within by revolu- 

GERMANY IN 1850. 188 

tion and menaced from without by great military 
states, regarded with alarm the growing tendency in 
Prussia toward independence and disregard of the 
will of the majority in the Diet. After Frederick 
William fell ill in 1857, and the regency was under- 
taken by his brother William, the Austrian cabinet 
was brought to a knowledge that Prussia was no 
longer the creature of Vienna. 

Prince Schwarzenberg had violated the old under- 
standing between the governments by his policy of 
German interference, so auspiciously inaugurated at 
Olmiitz. Prussia returned the compliment by prov- 
ing to Schwarzenberg's successor that he could no 
longer reckon confidently upon the support of Berlin. 
The war in Italy offered Prussia a rare opportunity 
to emphasize her position. At first the cause of 
Piedmont was intensely popular among the German 
masses, but the interference of France turned the tide 
of sympathy to Austria. The old hatred of the Napo- 
leonic dynasty was revived, and the Kaiser became 
the champion of Germany against French imperial- 
ism. The federal army was in a state of readiness 
under the command of the prince regent of Prussia, 
and after the first Austrian defeats there was a strong 
party at Berlin which advocated armed intervention 
in her behalf. The prince regent, however, remained 
inactive, and refused to move unless his claim to the 
command of the entire German army should be 
acknowledged by Austria. The Kaiser had no idea 
of thus tacitly admitting the supremacy of his rival 
in Germany. Prussia's assistance was anything but 
desirable except in the capacity of a vassal state. 
He patched up his peace with Napoleon, and hastened 
to cool his wrath in the shades of Schonbnmn. From 


there he addressed his faithful subjects, telling them 
how he had been " bitterly deceived " in his reliance 
upon the confederation, and how his natural and 
"most ancient allies" had "obstinately refused to 
recognize the great importance of the grand question 
of the day." The defeats of Magenta and Solferino 
and the independent attitude of Prussia went far to 
eradicate the influence of Olmiitz and restore the 
two great German powers to something like an equal 
footing in the Diet. 

On the 2d of January, 1861, Frederick WiUiam of 
Prussia died, and the regent succeeded to the throne 
with the title of WiUiam I. Unlike his brother, the 
new king had devoted himself with enthusiasm to the 
career of arms. His memory went back to Bliicher's 
campaigns, and he had entered Paris with the aveng- 
ing army of that bluff old warrior. He held the 
command-in-chief of the Prussian army at the time of 
his assimiption of the regency, and realized with pain 
and mortification its degeneration since he as a boy 
had won the Iron Cross in its ranks. As regent he 
had been engaged in one perpetual quarrel with the 
Prussian Diet for its reorganization. If this body 
represented truly the spirit of the masses, the love of 
peace had developed marvelously since the days of the 
great Frederick. The deputies declaimed against the 
expense of a military reorganization and ridiculed 
the idea of its necessity. The ministry of Prince Ho- 
henzollem fell on this issue, and Hohenlohe formed 
another which continued the contest. The king 
dissolved one house, but the people returned another 
even more strongly opposed to his military reforms. 
Enraged by the persistent opposition he encountered, 
he rashly appealed to his "divine right," thereby 

GERMANY IN 1850. 185 

engendering even more bitter hostility from the lib- 
eral factions. lie was determined to force the meas- 
ures which he regarded as indispensable to Prussia's 
welfare " through or over " the Diet. The ministry, 
it was clear, was not strong enough for the emer- 
gency. The royal eye swept the country for "an 
iron man " who valued the " divine right " above the 
constitution. When it was known in September, 
1862, that Herr von Bismarck had been recalled from 
Paris to the presidency of the ministry, the Diet pre- 
pared itself for a stern struggle. 

Bismarck first came publicly to notice as deputy in 
the Prussian Diet at Berlin in 1847. Throughout 
that stormy period when liberalism was rampant, he 
mingled fearlessly in the parliamentary melee as a 
champion of the crown. He listened complacently 
to the startling announcement of Frederick William, 
" No power on earth shall ever succeed in moving me 
to transform the natural relation between sovereign 
and people into a conventional constitutional one ; 
and never will I consent that a written document 
should be allowed to intrude between our Lord God 
in Heaven and this country, and to take the place of 
the ancient faith." Such words as these, according 
to Bismarck's ideas, were fitting for a king to utter. 
" The Prussian crown," he stated in reply to the ex- 
treme progressive party in the Diet, " must not allow 
itself to be thrust into the powerless position of the 
English crown, which seems more like a graceful and 
ornamental cupola of the state edifice, than its central 
pillar of support, as I look upon ours to be." 

As for the revolutionists of 1848, Bismarck held 
them in the most supreme contempt. In September, 
1849, he expressed liimseK as follows : " I am of opin- 


ion that the motive principles of the year 1848 were 
far more of a social than a national kind ; the national 
movement would have been confined to a small circle 
of more prominent men, if the ground under our feet 
had not been shaken by the introduction of a social 
element into the movement, in consequence of which 
the lust of the indigent for others' goods, the envy of 
the less wealthy for the rich, was stirred up by false 
show. These passions gained ground all the more 
easily, the more the moral force of resistance in men's 
hearts was annihilated by a latitudinarianism which 
had long been nourished from above." 

In regard to the Schleswig-Holstein question, Bis- 
marck also expressed very decided ideas entirely at 
variance with those entertained by the liberal party. 
He expressed his regret in the Chambers " that the 
royal Prussian troops have been employed to uphold 
the revolution in Schleswig against its legitimate 
sovereign the king of Denmark," and later charac- 
terized this military interference as " an eminently 
iniquitous, frivolous, disastrous, and revolutionary en- 

Throughout its short career Bismarck was the un- 
compromising foe of the national assembly at Frank- 
fort. Referring to the imperial honor which it ten- 
dered to Frederick William, he sarcastically observed 
at Erfurt in 1849, "The Frankfort crown may be 
very brilliant, but the gold which would give truth to 
its brilliancy could only be gained by melting down 
the Prussian crown, and I have no confidence that it 
could be successfully recast in the mould of that con- 
stitution." At this time he was a firm unbeliever in 
any scheme of German unity. He openly accused 
those of his colleagues who advocated it of a lack of 

GERMANY IN 1850. 187 

patriotism. " The scheme for a union annihilates the 
integrity of the Prussian kingdom," were his words 
in 1849. He denied the existence of any such desire 
in the Prussian people, and appealed to the army in 
proof of his words. " The army," he said, " cherishes 
no tricolored enthusiasm. It does not feel the want 
of a national regeneration any more than the rest of 
the Prussian people. It is content to be called Prus- 
sian. Its hosts follow the black and white banner, 
not the tricolor ; imder the black and white banner 
they gladly die for their country. ... I never yet 
heard a Prussian soldier sing ' Was ist des Deutschen 
Vaterland ? ' The people from whom this army is 
drawn, and who are most truly represented by the 
army, feel no desire to see their Prussian kingdom 
dissolved in the rotten fermentation of South German 
insubordination. Prussians we are, and Prussians we 
will remain." 

Throughout his three years of service as deputy at 
Berlin and at Erfurt Bismarck played consistently 
the role of an uncompromising royalist. The position 
he adopted during these years in regard to German 
unity and the question of Schleswig-Holstein is ren- 
dered conspicuous in the light of his later policy. 

But the most remarkable feature of Bismarck's 
belief at this time, the one that separated him sharply 
from the mass of his countrymen, was his admiration 
for Austria. He protested against the scheme sug- 
gested at Frankfort for her exclusion from the con- 
federation on the ground of her not being a German 
power. " People avoid calling Austria a German 
power," he said sarcastically, " because she has the 
good f oi*tune to extend her dominion over other na- 
tionalities. As far as I am concerned, I would rather 


not admit that because the Slaves and Buthenians 
happen to be subject to Austria, they therefore more 
especially represent that state, leaving the German 
element to play the second part. On the contrary, 
I look up to Austria as the representative of an 
ancient Grerman power.** 

His admiration of the southern empire survived 
nnabated even the ignominy of Olmiitz, and in the 
Prussian chamber in December, 1860, we actually 
find him justifying the course of the Manteuffel min- 
istry on that occasion, and making the extraordinary 
assertion that " Prussia ought to submit itself to Aus- 
tria in order to combat in union with her a men- 
acing democracy." 

In 1851 the old Diet reassembled at Frankfort. 
Frederick William had been reduced to a conciliatory 
mood, and was willing to placate Austria and con- 
vince her that his theory of a federal German state 
under Prussian leadership had been finally aban- 
doned. In this case, who so fit to represent Prussia 
at Frankfort as the deputy who defended Austria at 
Berlin and condoned her eourse at Olmiitz ? 

Bismarck arrived at Frankfort in April, 1851, the 
regularly accredited envoy of the Prussian govern- 
ment to the Diet. He entered upon his duties with 
the same brusque energy that had characterized him 
at Berlin, and was not long in making his reputation 
a national one. Few were better known by sight to 
the dwellers in the federal capital than the Prussian 
«nvoy, his erect figure arrayed in a tight-fitting uni- 
form of lieutenant of Landwehr. The life at Prank- 
fort he found arduous and often irksome. The 
monotony of parliamentary strife was varied only by 
diplomatic journeys to Berlin or Vienna. For the 

GERMANY IN 1850. 189 

Diet he conceived the most supreme contempt. " I 
already know perfectly well what we shall have ac- 
complished in one, two, or five years," he wrote during 
his early days in Frankfort, " and am ready to accom- 
plish it in twenty-four hours if the others would only 
be sensible and straightforward for a whole day. . . . 
I am making tearing progress in the art of saying 
nothing in a great many words ; I fill several pages 
with reports as neat and well roimded as leading 
articles, but if after reading them ManteufPel imder- 
stands one word, his intelligence is greater than mine. 
Each one behaves as if he believed that the other 
were crammed full of ideas and plans, if he would 
only tell them ; and meanwhile not one of us is an 
atom the wiser as to what will become of Germany." 

As for his Austrian sympathies, a few months of 
the Diet thoroughly eradicated them. A short time 
after his arrival we find him on the parade at Frank- 
fort with a host of official personages, admiring the 
evolutions of a body of the Kaiser's chosen troops. 
An Austrian officer approaches him and glancing at 
his broad chest, almost unadorned by medals, deri- 
sively inquires as to where he won his orders. The 
retort was ready. " All of them before the enemy 
here in Frankfort." And yet this was the man who 
had made enemies among his own countrymen by his 
veneration for the House of Hapsburg. 

At the opening of 1853 Bismarck was defiantly 
opposed to the Austro-German alliance in Frankfort. 
Even before the expiration of the year 1851 he wrote 
his misgivings as follows to Berlin: "The attitude 
of the Vienna cabinet since Austria, having for the 
moment arranged her domestic affairs, has been once 
more enabled to meddle with German politics, shows 


that on the whole Prince Schwarzenberg is not satis- 
fied to reoccupy the position accorded to the empire 
by the federal constitution up to 1848, but desires 
to utilize the revolution (that all but ruined Austria) 
as a basis for the realization of far-seeing plans. . . . 
In any case of divergence between Austria and Prus- 
sia, as matters now stand, the majority of the federal 
assembly is insured to Austria." 

In 1866 Bismarck saw clearer, and on April 26 
wrote as follows to Manteuffel at Berlin, svunming 
up the state of affairs in Germany. " I only desire 
to express my conviction that ere long we shall have 
to fight Austria for our very existence ; it is not in 
our power to avert that eventuality, for the course of 
events in Germany can lead to no other result." 

In 1859 he was recalled from Frankfort for the 
St. Petersburg mission. He took the opportunity to 
forward to Baron von Schleinitz, the foreign min- 
ister, a resume of his experiences at the Diet and 
the conclusions he drew from them. In this docu- 
ment he confirms his views of 1856 by declaring: 
"I see in our federal alliance that Prussia has an 
infirmity which sooner or later we shall have to heal 
ferro et igne^ unless we begin in good time to apply a 
remedy to it." He also mentioned in this connection 
certain contingencies in which he might be glad to 
see " the word German " exchanged " for Prussian " 
on the royal standard, proving that his life at Frank- 
fort had also wrought a change in his hostility to the 
unification of Germany. 

Bismarck went to St. Petersburg, but his mind was 
far from relinquishing the thoughts that had absorbed 
it at the Diet. He became fretful and alarmed after 
the opening of the Italian campaign lest Prussia 

GERMANY IN 1850. 191 

should use the federal army to support Austria. 
" Our policy is slipping more and more into the wake 
of Austria," he wrote in a private letter at this time, 
"and once we have fired a shot across the Rhine 
there will be an end of the Italo-Austrian war, and 
in its place a Franco-Prussian war will step on to the 
stage. After we have taken the burden off Austria's 
shoulders she will stand by us or not, as it suits her 
own interests." But his fears proved groundless, and 
doubtless he entered warmly into the general satisfac- 
tion that pervaded official circles in St. Petersburg 
over Austria's reverses. Furthermore, he was a warm 
personal friend of Prince Gortschakoff, the Russian 
chancellor, and perhaps in his presence he touched 
upon many of the points of his future policy then 
dimly defined. At all events, from that time until 
he had reached his final goal, Bismarck had a faith- 
ful friend and invaluable ally in the Russian chan- 

Bismarck returned to Prussia in 1861, and had an 
interview with the king. In the spring of 1862 he 
was definitely transferred from St. Petersburg and 
sent as ambassador to Paris. His stay there was 
abruptly terminated after a few months by his call to 
the head of the ministry at Berlin. His brief sojourn 
on the Seine, however, he used to good advantage. 
The French emperor at this time was a firm believer 
in the " Piedmontese mission " of Prussia in Ger- 
many, and there can be no question that Bismarck 
gained some encouragement from his conferences at 
the Tuileries. 

Upon his return to Berlin in the autumn, he was 
somewhat changed from the bluff, outspoken deputy 
of 1849. While still " the king's man," he was will- 


ing to concede something to gain the good will of the 
liberals. He had a policy, however, and he woidd 
allow nothing to thwart it. It included among its 
main features the humiliation of Austria and the 
reconstruction of Germany under the leadership of 
Prussia. So far as external influences were con- 
cerned, he already felt secure in the neutrality of his 
friends on the Neva, while as for Napoleon he cordd 
always be tempted by Luxemburg or Belgium. " The 
policy of France is one of tips," was Bismarck's say- 

The one indispensable adjimct to the successful 
prosecution of his plans was a Prussian army of per- 
fect discipline and invincible strength. This mighty 
weapon once forged and thoroughly whetted, — then 
''ferro et igner and an end of Hapsburg domination 
in Germany. 

^ " La France fait une politiqne de ponrboiie.*' 



Thb Prussian Abmy Reorganization and its Reorganizers. 

— Bismarck forges the Measure over the Lower Houss. 

— Commencement of the Prusso-Austrian Diplomatic Cam- 
paign. — Prussia misunderstood at Vienna. — Bismarck 

MEN. — Bismarck's Polish Policy and its Result. — The 


Quarrel. — The Confederation interferes in Behalf of 
THE Duchies. — Bismarck invites Austria to Independent 
Action. — The Two Powers lay their Ultimatum upon 
Denmark. — Firmness of the Danish Government and the 
Reason for it. — The Allied Armies enter Schleswig. — 
Evacuation of the Dannewerk by the Danes. — Austrian 
Victory at Oeversee. — The Danish Position at Fredericia 
AND DtJppEL. — Bombardment of the Duppel Lines. — De- 
struction OF THE Danish Army at DitppEL. — Evacuation of 
Fredericia. — The London Conference. — Renewed Fight- 
ing. — The Peace of Vienna. 

Bismarck returned to Berlin to face a house of 
deputies whose majority judged him in the light of 
his performances in 1848-49. The task of army- 
reform had already been confided to two generals, 
Moltke and Soon, neither of whom at that time pos- 
sessed scarcely more than a local reputation. The 
former had witnessed but one campaign, that between 
the Turks and Egyptians in Syria, while as for Eoon 
he had been even less favored, and was known prin- 
cipally through his writings on military geography. 
Nevertheless they possessed the confidence of the gov- 


emment, and according to their own devices and ideas 
undertook the labor of constructing that mighty en- 
gine which William I. had declared to be indispensable 
to the welfare of his people. 

It is needless to say that Bismarck's appearance in 
the Diet was the signal for a resumption of bitter 
parliamentary strife, or to trace minutely the contest 
that was waged through four long years. It was the 
same state of things that had existed since the old 
king's death, save that Bismarck was a far different 
foe for the deputies to deal with than HohenzoUern 
or his successor had ever been. Indeed, the conflict 
resolved itself, as Bismarck himself expressed it, 
into " a struggle between the House of HohenzoUern 
and the House of Deputies for the dominion of Prus- 

Both parties accused each other of unconstitution- 
ality. The deputies combated the crown, taking their 
stand on the letter of the constitution. Bismarck, on 
the other hand, based his action on what the constitu- 
tion admitted or implied. He was continually upon 
his feet, asserting, as of old, the prerogatives of the 
crown, and fiercely declaiming to the opposition that 
it could not be shaken by their liberum veto. Fi- 
nally, when the house refused to vote the necessary 
supplies, Bismarck unhesitatingly adopted the extreme 
remedy and dissolved it. New elections brought no 
better results. Month after month the noisy strife 
went on with threats of impeachment and dissolving 
diets, but at no time was there any sign of flagging 
in the activity at the war office. The barrack yards 
resounded with busy life, as the raw peasantry passed 
through the grinding-mill that was to discharge them 
soldiers with a perfect knowledge of the deadly 


needle-gun. The army question was the one on which 
the crown and the deputies split, and throughout the 
contest it must be admitted that the crown had its 

After all, the strife in the deputies was only inter- 
esting to Bismarck as it affected through the army 
his foreign policy. Within a few weeks after his as- 
sumption of office he opened his campaign against 
Austria. He squarely inaugurated his policy, when 
in January, 1863, he informed Count Karolyi, the 
Austrian ambassador at Berlin, that he was convinced 
that Prussia's " relations with Austria must unavoid- 
ably become better or worse." Karolyi refused to 
take so solemn a view of the state of affairs, and even 
ventured the belief " that both great powers would 
revert to their old alliance, whatever might occur, 
should Austria find herseM engaged in a perilous 
war." This was placing Prussia in exactly the posi- 
tion that Bismarck had determined she should no 
longer occupy. He lost no time in assuring the Aus- 
trian ambassador that his view of the case was "a 
dangerous error, which, it might be, would only be 
cleared up at a critical moment and in a manner 
fraught with calamity to both cabinets." He pointed 
out that Austria had two courses open to her, either 
of persisting in her anti-Prussian policy with the sup- 
port of the smaller states, or of seeking an alliance 
with Prussia. 

The Vienna statesmen, however, could not as yet 
believe that Prussia had really passed beyond the 
possibility of another Olmiitz. They failed to make 
due allowance for the difference in character between 
the late king of Prussia and William I., and more- 
over they were guilty with the world at large of un- 


derrating and misunderstanding the first minister at 
Berlin. The Austrian cabinet, too, had carried its 
policy too far to admit of any compromise with 
its principal victim. At all events, Karolyi declared 
that " the imperial house could not possibly renounce 
its traditional influence upon the German govern- 
ments." The position of affairs when Bismarck 
turned to reply was more threatening than at any 
time since the days preceding Olmiitz. It was noth- 
ing different, to be sure, from what he had anticipated 
in the pursuance of his policy, and Moltke and Boon 
reported their portion of the contract as progressing 
favorably. With every word suggesting conscious 
power, Bismarck sarcastically observed "that the 
alleged traditions of the Austrian imperial house 
date only as far back as the Schwarzenberg epoch," 
and concluded by emphasizing the fact that Austria, 
in her treatment of Prussia, " seemed to be prompted 
by the assumption that Prussia was more exposed to 
foreign attacks than any other state, and must conse- 
quently put up with inconsiderate behavior from those 
states to which she had to look for support. It would 
therefore be the aim of the Prussian government, 
which had at heart the interest of its royal house 
and its country, to take steps to point out the error 
in this assiunption, if its words and wishes are not 

As the year 1863 drew to a close, the relations ex- 
isting between the two great German powers had be- 
come very far removed from those of cordiality. 
Austria was irritated and alarmed at the altered pol- 
icy of her northern neighbor, and longed for the old 
days of Schwarzenberg and Manteuffel. Bismarck 
felt that he had carried things so far that it was time 


to test the edge of the weapon that Moltke and Boon 
had been preparing. As for his great European 
neighbors, his relations with them had been steadily 
improving. The revolution in Poland during the 
early weeks of the year had proved a lucky dispensa- 
tion in his favor. His first act was to conclude a 
military convention with Russia in the face of the 
openly avowed Polish sympathies of the deputies. 
The plan seemed attended with scarcely any danger. 
If the insurgents were crushed, Prussia merely held 
her frontiers against the refugees; if the Russian 
troops were worsted, then Prussia entered Poland, 
subdued the insurrection, and later exacted her price. 
The result demonstrated the ability of Russia to deal 
with her own rebellions, but the gratitude of Prince 
Gortschakoff toward the cabinet of Berlin was fervid 
in its warmth. This was not all that Bismarck gained. 
Austria earned the redoubled hatred of Russia by her 
action in throwing open Galicia as a Polish recruiting 
groimd and depot of supplies, while the Emperor of 
the French committed the fatal error of protesting 
against the Russian course in Poland. Doubtless, 
too, he would have gone farther, could he have per- 
suaded England to accompany him. The results of 
the Polish outbreak, then, were to knit Prussia and 
Russia closely together, to deepen Russia's hatred for 
Austria, and to overturn the friendly feelings that had 
existed between Paris and St. Petersburg and Paris 
and London. 

Meanwhile, in the north Frederick VII. of Den- 
mark was busily smoothing Bismarck's path. The 
Danish tendency for years had been toward the amal- 
gamation of Schleswig with its own governmental 
system, and Frederick YII. was led to promulgate a 


new constitution incorporating Schleswig in the mon- 
arcliy. The Schleswig-Holstein question was thus 
again forced into prominence. By far the greater 
part of the population of these duchies and of Lauen- 
burg as well, were German by race and sympathy, 
and had never yielded themselves cheerfully to the 
authority of Denmark. Schleswig formeji practi- 
cally an integral part of the Danish kingdom, while 
the others were merely governed by the king as duke 
of Holstein and Lauenburg, in which capacity he was 
a member of the German confederation. It had 
been plain for years that nothing would satisfy the 
people of the duchies but complete independence of 
Denmark and a closer alliance with the German 
states. The hope had been entertained that upon the 
extinction of the old royal line of Denmark, an event 
apparently of the near future, a loophole would be 
opened for the accomplishment of this end. An open 
letter of Christian VIII. in 1846, combating this idea, 
engendered serious discontent, which was increased 
upon his death a few months later, when a new consti- 
tution was promrdgated by his successor. The revolt 
of 1848 followed. Upon the disarming of the insur- 
gents by Austria, the Schleswig-Holstein question was 
left to a conference of the powers that convened in 
Liondon in 1852. The Danish claims were sustained, 
and it was provided in case of the failure of the an- 
cient line of Denmark, that the duchies should fall to 
Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg- 
Glucksburg. The other aspirant for the honor was 
Duke Christian of the Augustenburg line, but he was 
finally induced to forego his claim for -a pecuniary 
consideration which was paid by Denmark, nor did this 
act call forth any public protest from his sons. The 


congress came to an end, and the Schleswig-Holstein 
question seemed settled. The duchies relapsed into 
sullen silence, but bided their time. 

The proclamation of Frederick VII. again aroused 
them from their lethargy. Their outcry found ready 
acknowledgment from the Frankfort Diet, but inas- 
much as Schleswig was not included in the German 
confederation, no decisive steps could be taken in 
behalf of that duchy. Federal execution, however, 
was immediately decreed in behalf of Holstein, Han- 
overian and Saxon troops entering the territory and 
pushing their outposts to within rifle-shot of the Danes 
on the Eider. To complicate matters still more, 
Prince Frederick of Augustenburg denoimced his 
father's concession, and came forward to assert his 
claim to the dukedom of both Schleswig and Holstein. 
Then on November 15 Frederick VII. died, and ac- 
cording to the stipulations of the London treaty the 
prince of Glucksburg succeeded as Christian IX., 
king of Denmark and duke of Schleswig and Hol- 
stein. He was immediately forced by the popular 
will to ratify the new constitution for Denmark and 

The long-mooted question of the duchies had thus 
assumed a tangled complexity without parallel in its 
history. Danish and German sentries glowered at 
each other across the ice-bound channel of the Eider. 
The prince of Augustenburg was at Kiel receiving 
the homage of his would-be subjects, and bending his 
gaze toward Frankfort for an acknowledgment of his 
right. At Copenhagen the determination was fixed 
to recover Holstein from the German grip ; at Kiel 
the hope was to wrest Schleswig from Denmark. In 
both Copenhagen and Kiel the Frankfort government 


was looked to with confidence, and the two great Ger- 
man powers regarded with distrust. At Kiel they 
argued that no good could come from an unprincipled 
absolutist like Bismarck Schonhausen ; at Copenhagen 
they believed that he might engender any amount of 

In the mean time Bismarck was busily at work at 
Berlin. Prussian aggrandizement being his aim, he 
thought he detected among the sleet clouds of the 
northern peninsula a chance for his first decisive 
move. At this time he had determined that the 
duchies so long in dispute must become the property 
of his royal master. Had Christian IX. withstood 
the pressure at Copenhagen, Bismarck might have 
found difficulty in so early carrying out his designs. 
Inasmuch as Prussia was a party to the London con- 
ference, he could hardly have raised a doubt as to the 
claim of Christian IX. to the dukedom over Schles- 
wig and Holstein. But the treaty concluded at that 
conference also stipulated that the duchies should 
always remain distinct from the Danish monarchy, 
and the act of Christian IX. in ratifying the incor- 
poration of Schleswig formed Bismarck's opportunity. 
A quarrel with the little northern power, with terri- 
torial compensation at its close, was by no means dis- 
tasteful to him. It would besides form a rare chance 
to test the new army. Russia and France being 
" fixed," he cared nothing for England. Austria was 
his only fear, and to guarantee Prussia against her 
enmity he conceived the extraordinary idea of drag- 
ging her into the contest with him. He argued that 
Austria's presence in Denmark was preferable to 
leaving her to mass her strength in the Prussian rear. 
She would also be in a position to share the oppro* 


brium which a Prussian invasion of Denmark would 
be sure to arouse in Europe. Inasmuch, too, as the 
Diet was opposed to any military interference in be- 
half of Schleswig, if Austria could be lured into 
independent action with Prussia it would abnost of 
necessity bring about a rupture between her and the 
smaller states. 

The Vienna cabinet feU into the Prussian trap. 
They dreaded a Prussian annexation of the duchies, 
and had a dim notion that by following Prussia into 
Denmark they would be able to prevent this eviL 
Moreover, a chance might be afforded to restore some- 
thing of the lustre which the imperial eagles had lost 
at Magenta and Solferino. 

The state of affairs in South Jutland thus brought 
Austria and Prussia together. The two powers which 
seemed on the point of engaging in a death grapple 
clasped hands, and turned their swords against Den- 
mark early in 1864. 

Of course Bismarck met nothing but hostility in 
the deputies, regarding his alliance with Austria. 
This fact failed to alter his course a jot, and by 
December his accord with the Vienna cabinet had be- 
come so well established, that both powers made a 
formal demand upon the Diet to insist upon the with- 
drawal of the new Danish constitution. The Diet 
refusing to comply, the powers on January 16 laid 
the demand upon Denmark as their ultimatum. The 
Copenhagen government declined to accede, and the 
allied troops immediately entered Holstein, the Prus- 
sians under Marshal Wrangel and Prince Frederick 
Charles, the Austrians under General Gablenz. 

The poKcy adopted at Copenhagen in withstanding 
the demands of the German powers was dictated by 


other considerations than the undoubted valor of the 
little Danish army. It was upon outside help that Den- 
mark depended, upon armed assistance from Kussia or 
England. To the former, from her friendly course in 
1848-49, the Danes felt they could appeal with confi- 
dence. But Alexander II. improved this opportunity 
to display his gratitude to Prussia for her course in the 
Polish troubles, and Prince Gortschakoflf was enthu- 
siastically Prussian in his conferences with the Eng- 
lish ambassador at St. Petersburg. The Danes natu- 
rally felt that the great northern power was crtfelly 
unsympathetic, but they could not claim that she 
had betrayed them. The same cannot be said of 
England. To her Denmark looked confidently for 
aid, and with ample reason. On July 23, 1863, in 
reply to certain questions touching the probable 
course of the government in case of a Danish war, 
Lord Palmerston declared in the English House of 
Commons, "We are convinced — I am convinced at 
least — that if any violent attempt were made to 
overthrow the rights, and interfere with the independ- 
ence of Denmark, those who made the attempt would 
find in the result that it would not be Denmark alone 
with which they would have to contend." This was 
accepted in Denmark as well as in England as a dec- 
laration of the position of the English government 
in case of war, nor is there any reason to suppose that 
at the time they were uttered these words did not 
voice accurately the sentiments of the cabinet. Lord 
John Russell, since 1862, had been busy building up 
Danish hopes. He advised and instructed the Danish 
government as to the course it should pursue; and 
when the Copenhagen statesmen evinced an inclina- 
tion to chafe under his guidance, he brought them 


back by the solemn warning that unless they complied 
strictly with instructions from London, they need 
not look to England for support. Declarations like 
these scarcely admitted of misinterpretation, and 
Denmark followed blindly the English lead.^ When 
the war came Palmerston looked about for allies with 
whom to defend Danish rights. The English ambas- 
sador sounded the Russian chancellor sufficiently to 
ascertain that it was useless to proceed farther, while a 
proposal at the Tuileries was met by a rebuff adminis- 
tered in payment for the non-compliance of England 
in the emperor's Polish project. The English gov- 
ernment had no idea of going to war without an ally. 
After publicly deploring the hostile and lukewarm 
attitudes of the various signers of the London treaty, 
the English statesmen turned their attention to domes- 
tic affairs, and left Denmark to its fate. 

With Marshal Wrangel's announcement to the 
Danish commander that he was under orders to occupy 
the duchy of Schleswig, and the response of the lat- 
ter that he was charged to defend the same, the war 
in Denmark began. The allies crossed the Eider 
with nearly 60,000 men, of whom 37,000 were Prus- 
sians and 23,000 Austrians. Prussia sent a division 
of the infantry of the Guard under General Miilbe, 
the 6th infantry division of the line under Manstein, 
and the 13th division under Wintsingerode, two cav- 
alry brigades, and eighteen batteries of artillery. 
Austria sent the 6th army corps, with a brigade of 
cavalry and seven batteries. 

1 Evidently Bismarck did what lie could to stimulate the Danish 
confidence in England. Count Beust states in his memoirs (vol. i. 
p. 242) that Bismarck admitted as nauch to him: "I made the cahi- 
net of Copenhagen helieve that England had threatened us with 
active intervention, if hostilities should he opened, although, as a 
matter of fact, England did nothing of the kind.'' 


At the Danish war office there was no disposition 
to belittle the danger which threatened the kingdom. 
All hopes were pinned to the Dannewerk, where it was 
hoped the army would hold its ground until England, 
Russia, or perhaps Sweden could be induced to come 
to the rescue. 

The Dannewerk was a chain of redoubts and forts 
extending across Schleswig from the head of the 
Schlei Fiord on the east to the village of Holingsted 
on the Treen. The length of this line was nearly 
fourteen miles, but in order to secure it against a 
turning movement, it was necessary to guard the 
shores of the Schlei, and patrol the marshy country 
from Holingsted to Frederickstadt. Thus the de- 
fenders of the Dannewerk were obliged to extend 
their vigilance along a front of nearly sixty miles. 
Manned by a force of 150,000 men the position might 
reasonably be regarded as impregnable ; to attempt 
the defense with less would be a perilous undertaking. 
Neither of the three divisions of the Danish army 
exceeded 10,000 men on a war footing, and yet it was 
with this handful that the authorities at Copenhagen 
expected General de Meza to hold the Dannewerk 
against the armies of two first-rate powers. 

The Danish soldiery, however, had confidence both 
in the Dannewerk and in themselves, and there was 
no lack of assurance among the strapping officers 
who thronged the streets and hotel cafes of Schleswig 
town. The king came down from Copenhagen to 
inspect the position, and fly the Dannebrog for a few 
days in the wintry blasts that howled around the tur- 
rets of Castle Gottorp. He was not long in appre- 
ciating the difficulty of the task De Meza had to per- 
form. The frozen surface of the Schlei formed the 


principal danger of the position, and a mere glance 
through the glasses across the bleak sea-indented 
country at the activity in the Prussian lines was suf- 
ficient to prove that they saw their advantage. On 
February 2 Canstein's Prussian brigade carried the 
Danish advance posts before Missunde at the narrow- 
est point of the Schlei. On the following day Nos- 
titz's Austrian brigade made a dash more to the west 
against the redoubts at Bustrup. Perhaps this latter 
was intended for nothing but a demonstration, but it 
sent the Danish bugles ringing through the frosty air 
all the way to Schleswig, and alaimed the king in the 
castle on the hill. These two days were sufficient to 
convince De Meza of the hopelessness of a longer 
stand at the Dannewerk. The cold weather had trans- 
formed the marshy country into a fair field for the 
operation of the allied armies. It seemed imperative 
that the Danish troops should be withdrawn, and 
placed on a narrower front. 

It was toward evening on February 5 when orders 
were circulated for the immediate evacuation of the 
Dannewerk. It was a terrible humiliation to the 
Danish officers to abandon thus their celebrated for- 
tress without a blow, and there were long faces and 
bitter words among the military devotees of Schles- 
wig. The king had already left for the north, and to 
complete the misery the elements conspired against 
the unhappy Danes. In the midst of a driving snow- 
storm the retreat began. Rarely have the patience 
and endurance of an army been more severely tested. 
Horses and men tugged together at the cannon over 
ice-coated roads, where to stand against the gale was 
an arduous task. After forty-eight hours of these 
hardships, the Danish army began to concentrate at 


Soaderburg in the Isle of Alsen, in the rear of the 
intrenchments of Diippel. The aUies pushed the 
pursuit vigorously, and on the 6th the brigade Nostitz, 
stumbling over the slippery roads, came up with two 
Danish regiments near Oeversee. The contest that 
ensued was stubborn and sanguinary, and the Aus- 
trians could attribute their victory to their superior 
Man as well as to their overwhelming nimibers. 

From this time the interest in the war centred 
about Diippel and Fredericia. The latter town, sit- 
uated at the entrance of the Little Belt, being hemmed 
in on three sides by the sea, presented a narrow front 
for land defense. It played a prominent part in the 
campaign of 1849, and the growth of its defensive 
works since that time had earned it the title of a for- 
tress. A portion of the Danish army from the Danne- 
werk had continued the retreat to Fredericia, and 
was followed by the Prussian Gruard division and the 
Austrian brigades Tomas and Nostitz. 

The Diippel position was strong and compact. The 
main works, consisting of ten detached redoubts, ex- 
tended across the little Sondeved peninsula along the 
Duppel heights, a distance of a mile and a quarter. 
These protected the bridge that crossed the narrow 
Alsen Sound to Sonderburg one mile to the east. The 
Danish outposts were strongly posted in Duppel vil- 
lage, on the hiU known as the Avnbjerg, and in the 
forests to the west. There were other defenses nearer 
the bridge-head and on the Sonderburg side to cover 
a retreat in case the works on the heights became 
untenable, while the ironclad Rolf Krake patrolled 
the 'waters south of the Sondeved peninsula. 

General de Meza was sacrificed to satisfy the 
anger that pervaded Copenhagen on account of the 


abandonment of the Dannewerk, and General Ger- 
laeh succeeded to the command of 18,000 men behind 
the Diippel defenses. The headquai'ters were at Son- 
derburg and the troops billeted in all the neighboring 
villages, whence they could quickly make their way 
across the bridges and up the heights to where the 
vast wings of Duppel windmill marked the centre of 
the Danish position. 

The Prussians settled down to a regular siege with 
their two infantry divisions suppoi*ted by a powerful 
artillery, but for six weeks nothing occurred save 
occasional skirmishes. The Danes adhered to their 
defensive tactics, partly on account of their inferior 
numbers, and still more because they dreaded to 
risk their clumsy though courageous infantry against 
their more agile adversaries in the open field. If this 
latter cause prevailed less at Diippel than at Fred- 
ericia it was due to the poor esteem in which the 
Prussian soldiers were held. The Danes hated the 
Prussians and were little inclined to do them justice. 
Every day of inaction only increased the contempt of 
the Danish army for its foes. The Austrians they 
admitted to be worthy of their steel, but it was with 
confidence and gladness that the fair-haired soldiers, 
huddling about their fires on the windy heights, roared 
like true descendants of the Vikings the martial 
chorus, — 

" Now shall we fight the Prassiaiis again." 

In the mean time the Prussians went about their 
work leisurely under the eye of Prince Frederick 
Charles, who established his headquarters in the pic- 
turesque schloss among the beeches of Gravenstein. 
There was no haste, nor any anxiety displayed to raise 
the reputation of Prussia as a military power in Dan- 


ish estimation, but as soon as the alternation of cold 
and thaw was superseded by milder weather and high 
winds that dried the soil, then activity began, and 
one by one the ponderous batteries were unmasked to 
try the range of the Danish positions. A general as- 
sault was ordered on the Danish advance posts on the 
Avnbjerg and in Diippel village. The Danes made a 
courageous stand, but numbers and modern weapons 
overcame them. The Avnbjerg was carried with a 
rush, and after a fierce battle about the church, Diip- 
pel village fell. The Danes returned pluckily to the 
onset, only .to swell their losses. The needle-guns 
swept the approaches with a ceaseless leaden rain. 
Night fell and progress was reported at the Prussian 

Diippel taught the Danes a lesson in modem small 
arms. Even before that, they had learned something 
in regard to modern artillery. The peninsula of 
Broager, three miles southwest of their main posi- 
tion, which their engineers had deemed too distant to 
be of any service to an enemy, had been lined with 
Prussian batteries whose great guns covered Sonder- 
burg itself. From the middle of March the Danes 
had no reason to complain of Prussian inactivity. 
Day after day the bombardment was continued. The 
Prussians seemed bent on destroying not only the 
redoubts, but every shelter beneath which the Danes 
could find refuge. In every direction villages and 
farm buildings were in flames. When the new Prus- 
sian batteries on the Avnbjerg and at Duppel church- 
yard opened their fire, the effect was terrific. Even 
at night the fire was maintained, allowing the weary 
Danes no opportunity to repair damages. Day after 
day they worked patiently at their smooth-bore guns 


behind breastworks little better than rubbish, with a 
burning town behind them and an irresistible enemy 
in their front. It is no discredit to the Danish sol- 
diers if during the last days of their defense their 
spirits failed them. 

At last the windmill on the heights, whose wings 
had fanned so long the sulphiu^us air was shot away, 
an event regarded as an evil omen. The Prussians 
pushed their parallels close under the Danish works, 
and frequently the roll of the needle-guns was added 
to the timiult. The Danish officers, driven from the 
burning streets of Sonderburg, conferred at Ulkebol 
upon the advisability of abandoning their almost dis- 
mantled works. The conference was speedily decided 
by the production of orders from Copenhagen to hold 
the position to the last extremity. This order was 
fatal to the Danish army. The moral effect of the 
terrible cannonade had been most pronounced, and it 
was everywhere realized that the end was near. 

On the morning of the 18th of April the Prussian 
infantry suddenly burst from their lines against the 
Danish left. It was a matter of only a few moments 
before the Danes were struggling down the hiU under 
the deadly fire of the needle-guns. On the crest of 
the captured heights the Prussian artillery went 
promptly into action. Sublime confusion reigned 
among the Danes. The attack was unexpected, Ger- 
lach was ill, there was no one to give orders. The 
whole Diippel line was abandoned, th6 batteries in the 
rear were wholly untenable, while the Rolf Krake was 
disabled by a shell before she had fired a gun. When 
night fell, the remnants of the brave Danish army 
were scattered through the villages and along the 
roads of western Alsen. 



The garrison of Fredericia, discouraged by the news 
from Alsen, evacuated the town and withdrew into 
Fiinen, leaving all Jutland at the mercy of the in- 

England in the mean time had been ceaselessly 
bestirring herself in behalf of peace, and had invited 
the five powers to a conference at London. The am- 
bassadors gathered on the Thames, and an armistice 
was concluded between the belligerents. Austria and 
Prussia demanded the establishment of the duchies 
under the sway of the prince of Augustenburg. 
Their claims were supported by the congress, and 
Denmark was advised to relinquish her rights over 
Holstein-Lauenburg and the German districts of 
Schleswig. To these terms the Danes refused to 
accede, and resorted once more to arms. What they 
hoped to gain by this rash step it is difficult to see, 
unless some dim hope yet lingered in Copenhagen of 
European interference. The fighting that followed 
was insipid in the extreme. The Austrians overran Jut- 
land ; the Prussians swarmed through Alsen. Den- 
mark was beaten to her knees. Finally Prince John 
was sent to Berlin to sue for peace. Preliminaries 
were arranged on August 1, and finally ratified by 
the treaty of Vienna, October 31, according to which 
the king of Denmark ceded all his rights over the 
duchies, including the island of Alsen, to the king of 
Prussia and the emperor of Austria. 



Bismabck's Attitude on the AuGusTEifBURG Claim. — His Sui>- 
DEN Change op Front. — Mensdorff's Blunder. — Bismarck 


Bismarck's Opinion op the Conference. — He sounds Italy. 
— Interviews Napoleon at Biarritz. — Napoleon's Views on 
European Affairs. — His Ideas respecting the Military 
Strength of Prussia and Austria. — Condition of Affairs 
in THE Elbe Duchies. — Bismarck reopens the Diplomatio 
Campaign against Austria. — Austria and Italy begin to 
ARM. — Attitude of the Diet on the Dispute. — Bismarck's 
Bait to Germany. — The Prusso-Itauan Alliance, — The 
Prussian Army mobilized. — The Claims of Prussia and Aus- 


enter Holstein. — Bismarck's Proposition for a New Con- 
federation. — Its Failure. — Austria moves the Mobiliza- 
tion OF THE Federal Army against Prussia. — The Military 
Situation. — The Diet votes to support Austria. — Prussia 

TION OF Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Dresden. — Brilliancy 
OF THE Prussian Conquest. 

In the London Congress Bismarck had advocated 
the claims of the prince of Augustenburg, and stated 
that Prussia and Austria were merely holding the 
duchies in trust for their lawful ruler. Six months 
later, however, we find him in the Prussian Diet op- 
posing the claims of the Augustenburg pretender, 
and declaring that "his majesty the king and his 
majesty the emperor of Austria are the duke of 
Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg." This incon- 
sistency admits of easy explanation. 


Austria and Prussia at London were agreed upon 
the legality of the Augustenburg claims. Austria 
backed the prince because she aimed at the establish- 
ment of another anti-Prussian state in the confedera- 
tion, with its prince under her influence. Bismarck, 
on the other hand, never seriously advocated the Au- 
gustenburg cause, and merely chimed in with the 
Austrian views so long as it suited his policy. He 
understood the Vienna government well enough to 
appreciate its designs in regard to the duchies, and 
on his part was determined to frustrate them. 

Shortly after his return from London, when Aus- 
tria and the smaller states began to clamor for the 
recognition of the prince of Augustenburg by the 
Frankfort Diet, he first showed his hand. He de- 
clared that other pretenders having arisen, he was in 
doubt after all of the value of Prince Frederick's 
claim to the duchies; indeed, the succession being 
so doubtful, no lawful ruler could be acknowledged 
save the king of Denmark. Inasmuch, however, as 
by the treaty of Vienna the king had ceded his 
rights to the German powers, the position of affairs 
was quite clear: "his majesty the king and his 
majesty the emperor of Austria are the duke of 
Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg." ^ 

This position adopted by Bismarck removed the 
question from the authority of the confederation* 
The endeavor of Austria, on the other hand, from the 
first was to make it a federal matter for the purpose, 
as of old, of combating her rival with the small states 
at her back. 

It was on December 13 that Bismarck first def- 
initely unmasked his desire at Vienna for a Prussian 
annexation of the duchies. Count Mensdorff inmie- 


diately compromised the moral and federal aspect of 
the Austrian cause by expressing a tacit compliance 
with the Prussian proposals, on condition that Austria 
should be compensated — by the county of Glatz, for 
instance. This was rejected by Bismarck, who on the 
22d of February, 1865, came forward with a scheme 
to recognize the prince of Augustenburg, on the con- 
dition that the control of the foreign, military, postal, 
and commercial affairs of the duchies should be super- 
vised by Prussia. At Vienna they saw no advantage 
in this scheme over that possessed by a direct annexa- 
tion, and refused it. From this time on, Bismarck 
never entertained a shade of doubt that " iron and 
blood " would settle the dispute. There was a pause in 
the negotiations, but (Jomestic affairs offered sufficient 
opportunity for the play of his energy. He had to 
smooth matters out considerably at home before he 
could proceed to greater lengths. The king himself 
was the principal impediment with his conscientious 
scruples against warring with the House of Hapsburg, 
for which he as a true HohenzoUem entertained a 
deep veneration and respect. In the summer the 
king went to Carlsbad, where Bismarck followed him. 
That the royal mind was influenced by his arguments 
was demonstrated by the fact that Bismarck soon re- 
opened the discussion with Vienna by a communica- 
tion more forcible than friendly. 

A few days later he met the president of the Ba- 
varian council at Salzburg, to whom he spoke glibly of 
an Austrian war. "Austria cannot sustain a cam- 
paign," he declared ; " a single blow will suffice, a sin- 
gle and great battle from the side of Silesia, to obtain 
satisfaction of the Hapsburg." 

The Prussian king, however, was desirous of peace, 


and hastened to Gastein to confer with the emperor 
of Austria. Thither Bismarck was also summoned 
to meet Count Blome, and arrange some compromise 
in regard to the duchies. As a result of the confer- 
ence a convention was signed on August 14, by which 
Prussia undertook the provisional government of 
Schleswig and Austria of Holstein, while both pow- 
ers " reserved to themselves the common sovereignty 
over the duchies." Prussia gained the command of 
the long-coveted harbor of Kiel, purchased of Aus- 
tria her right to Lauenburg, and with it of course 
another practical admission that the two powers had 
the right to dispose of their conquest as they pleased. 
The result of the Gastein convention was certainly a 
Prussian victory, and King William testified his ap- 
preciation of the fact by creating Bismarck a count in 

A tremendous uproar was engendered in Germany 
by this cold-blooded bargaining. There were denun- 
ciations from all quarters, and the Prussian deputies 
protested with rage and horror. The Prussian policy, 
however, was influenced by all this no more than in 
the past. Prussian troops occupied Lauenburg on 
September 15. The Austrians withdrew into Hol- 
stein, and the Prussians into Schleswig. General 
Gablenz was appointed governor of Holstein and 
General Manteuffel governor of Schleswig. 

Bismarck, at heart, had no faith in the Gastein 
contract as a preventive of war. He referred to it 
lightly as a mere " stopping of the cracks," and even 
while the conference was sitting he was suggesting to 
the Italian government an alliance against Austria. 
It was plain that Prussia would have to fight, not 
only the empire of the Hapsburgs, but the German 


confederation as well. It was to overcome the strength 
of the smaller states that Bismarck had recourse to 
Italy. Venetia was the magic word that would send 
the war fever throbbing through the veins of every 
true Italian. With Venetia as an inducement the 
Italian armies were ready at any time to throw their 
strength against the Quadrilateral. Bismarck found 
Italy, as he expected, ready and eager to hear more 
of his project. 

Early in October he turned to sound and inter- 
rogate the monarch who at the time was believed to be 
most potent in shaping the destinies of Europe. It was 
at Biarritz that he met the Emperor of the French, 
who was rusticating in the companionship of Prosper 
Merimee. It was certainly a rare trio that in those 
bright October days strolled along the beach where 
the blue waters of the Bay of Biscay broke in foam. 
The emperor was amused with the glibness with which 
this Prussian count rattled on about the future of 
Europe. " He is crazy," he whispered to Merimee. 
The novelist, however, held his own ideas. " M. de 
Bismarck pleased me. . . . He is deficient in senti- 
ment, but has a great mind," such was the tenor of 
Merimee's comments in his letters from Biarritz. 
Time was to prove whether the emperor or the writer 
was the most sagacious observer. 

Bismarck left the cliffs and cool breezes of Biar- 
ritz not without recompense. He found time for busi- 
ness as well as pleasure, and he went away with the 
belief that the emperor would be unlikely to interfere 
in a German war. There can be no question, in fact, 
that the emperor longed for such an event at that 
time. He believed he had nothing to fear from Prus- 
sia. She must of necessity be crushed by the splen- 


did Austrian army, inured to service. A chance 
would be afforded him to step in and interfere in be- 
half of Prussia, to lighten her punishment, and obtain 
from her grateful statesmen a reward, — the old Rhen- 
ish frontier, perhaps. Italy's alliance with Prussia 
gave him too an additional interest in the schemes of 
the HohenzoUem, for if Napoleon had an unselfish spot 
in his heart, it was warm toward Italy. He would 
see that Victor Emmanuel gained Venetia this time. 
Austria must of necessity acquiesce. After an ardu- 
ous campaign against Prussia she would not care to 
rufle the power which had so recently asserted its 
superiority at Solferino and Magenta. Altogether 
Bismarck's plans must have fallen as sweet music 
upon the ears of the French emperor. There was 
only one possible contingency in which a German war 
might affect France unfavorably, a contingency so 
vague that it seemed hardly worth considering, and 
that was a Prussian victory. 

The emperor had definite ideas in regard to the 
relative strength of the European military powers. 
He held the same views that the cadets at Metz 
gleaned from the text-books. " The Prussian army, 
in which service is of very short duration, is nothing 
but a kind of Landwehr school. It is a magnificent 
organization on paper, but a very doubtful weapon of 
defense, and most useless during the first period of 
an offensive war. Austria, whose population numbers 
about thirty-seven millions of inhabitants, has a large 
and splendid army, which is far superior in its organ- 
ization to the Prussian or Kussian armies. After 
France she occupies the first rank as a military 
power." Leaving the emperor to his complacent 
dreams, Bismarck, hardly less satisfied, reached Ber« 


lin fortified for the contest. Sure of Russian friend- 
ship, French neutrality, and Italian cooperation, he 
was ready to enter upon his heroic treatment of the 
Schleswig-Holstein and German questions. 

In the mean time matters in the duchies had been 
progressing exactly as he expected. In Schleswig, 
Manteuffel was upholding Prussian prestige ; in Hol- 
stein, Grablenz was encouraging agitation in favor of 
the Augustenburg prince. The Gastein arrangement 
had simply made matters worse. 
• On January 20, 1866, Bismarck forwarded to the 
Prussian envoy at Vienna a protest against the Aus- 
ti*ian policy in Holstein. After summing up the va- 
rious objectionable features of this policy, the license 
allowed the press in attacking Prussia, and the def- 
erence exercised toward the pretender, the dispatch 
continued, "All these circumstances make his (the 
pretender's) mere presence in Kiel a chronic protest 
against the rights of both sovereigns. . . . His maj- 
esty the king has a right to demand that this evil be 
remedied by the expulsion of the prince, if the im- 
perial government really feels itself unequal to putting 
a stop to the demonstrations in question." The dis- 
patch declared in conclusion, " The democratic agita- 
tion, animated by hatred of conservative Prussia, blos- 
soms out luxuriantly in the associations and the press. 
The imperial Austrian government may contemplate 
this demoralization and corruption of the populace 
with comparative indifference. Not so we. What- 
ever may be the decision ultimately arrived at respect- 
ing the duchies, their condition will always be a matter 
of importance to Prussia ; and should they become a 
nucleus of democratic and revolutionary tendencies, 
it will become Prussia's business to put them in 


On February 7 Count Mensdorff in his reply to 
Count Karolyi stated "that Austria regards each 
separate question arising within the sphere of her 
administration in Holstein, as exclusively pendent 
between herself and her lord lieutenant, and exempt 
from interference from any other quarter." Bismarck 
then took occasion to point out the fact that " Prus- 
sia's relations to Austria, despite the intimate charac- 
ter they had assumed during the past year or two, had 
now been thrust back to the standpoint they occupied 
before the Danish war, — neither better nor worse 
than those obtaining with any other power." 

Austria's attitude now became distinctly warlike. 
On March 10 a council of war was held at Vienna, to 
which General Benedek was summoned in haste from 
Verona. Not only was the attitude of Prussia threat- 
ening, but Italy was actually arming. The council 
decided upon defensive measures, and orders were 
issued for the mobilization of the army in Bohemia 
and Moravia. On the 16th Mensdorff, in a dispatch 
to the Austrian ambassadors at German courts in- 
forming them of Prussia's menacing attitude, declared 
also, " Should the danger of a breach of peace become 
still more imminent, it would be necessary to take 
measures promptly and decisively for self-defense. 
In view of Prussia's threatened attack, these measures 
could only consist of mobilizing the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 
10th federal army corps, and placing them in the field 
side by side with the Austrian army." 

On March 24 Bismarck, to offset the effect of this, 
informed the Prussian ambassadors at German courts 
that Prussia was in favor of federal reform, and was 
about to arm in self-defense, that Prussian and Ger- 
man interests were identical, and that the fall of Prus- 


sia meant the fall of G ermany . The dispatch concluded 
with the question, " Whether and to what extent Prus- 
sia could count upon assistance from the government 
addressed, in case she should be attacked by Austria 
or compelled to make war by immistakable threats ? " 
The response of the various governments was gen- 
erally evasive or hostile, and they referred Prussia to 
the Diet for a consideration of her plan of federal 
reform. This latter scheme including, as it did, the 
longed-for national representation by suffrage, was 
Bismarck's last trump-card to win over popular sym- 
pathy. In the mean time he had been pushing things 
with the government of Victor Emmanuel. On April 
8 the treaty of alliance was signed, and within a fort- 
night ratified at both Florence and Berlin. Matters 
then progressed smoothly toward war. During the 
last days of March the Prussian regiments in Silesia 
were reinforced, a fact that occasioned the protest of 
Count Mensdorff. He denied that Austria was arm- 
ing against Prussia, and claimed that the strengthen- 
ing of the imperial forces in Bohemia was due to the 
supposed imminence of outbreaks among the Jews. 
Negotiations followed between Berlin and Vienna 
concerning disarmament. Austria finally agreed to 
decrease her strength in Bohemia, but insisted upon 
the necessity of placing Venetia in a state of defense. 
Bismarck saw in this proposal merely a scheme of the 
Austrian statesmen to crush Italy and Prussia in 
detail. He refused to entertain the suggestion, and 
during the first week in May the question of disarma- 
ment was suffered to drop. 

By May 1 the whole Austrian mobilization machin- 
ery was working at its highest pitch, but it was not 
until a week later that the king of Prussia issued his 


final orders for placing the whole army on a war 
footing. The ease and celerity with which the Prus- 
sian army was mobilized, however, more than com- 
pensated for the time which Austria had gained. In 
fourteen days from the royal order nine Prussian 
army corps, were thoroughly equipped and ready for 
the field. 

On June 1, in compliance with Bavaria's motion of 
May 24, the envoys of the various German govern- 
ments which had armed made their explanations before 
the Diet. Prussia and Austria of course had done 
nothing save in self-defense, but the Austrian envoy, 
after explaining the dispute between his government 
and that of Berlin, declared that Austria placed the 
whole question of the duchies at the disposal of the 
Diet, and furthermore signified that General Gablenz 
had been instructed to summon the Holstein as- 
sembly for the purpose of obtaining its wiU as to the 
future of the duchy. This move was in direct an- 
tagonism to the Prussian i>olicy, and an assertion of 
a theory that Austria herself had denied by the sale 
of Lauenburg. Bismarck, adhering to the Vienna 
treaty and the Gastein agreement, regarded Austria's 
course in this matter as irreparable, and dispatched a 
circular message to the German courts with the dec- 
laration, " Vienna has resolved upon war ; the next 
thing to be done is to choose the most auspicious 
moment for beginning it." 

General Manteuffel received orders to enter Hol- 
stein immediately upon the summoning of the As- 
sembly by Gablenz. Bismarck's position was briefly 
this : Austria, having violated the Gastein conven- 
tion by attempting to make the question of the duch- 
ies a federal one, had violated and thereby annulled 


that conyention. The dual occupation must be re- 
newed, and in consequence Prussian troops were 
ordered to reenter Ilolstein. Gablenz summoned 
the estates for the 11th of June, and on the 8th the 
Prussian troops crossed the Eider and moved slowly 
southward. Gablenz, who had but one brigade, fell 
back to Altona, taking with him the prince of Augus- 
tenburg. On the 9th Itzehoe, where the assembly was 
to convene, was occupied by Prussian troops, and on 
the 11th the assembly hall itself was placed under 
guard. On the same evening Gablenz withdi-ew his 
forces to Harburg, and dispatched them by train 
through Hanover and Hesse to Bohemia. At last 
the Schleswig-Holstein question was settled. 

On June 10 Bismarck had submitted to the German 
governments a constitution for a new confederation, 
" to consist of those states which had hitherto been in- 
cluded in the confederation, with the exception of the 
dominions of the emperor of Austria and the king 
of the Netherlands." This bold project for the elim- 
ination of Austria as a federal power was not gener- 
ally well received at the petty courts. On the 11th, 
at an extraordinary session of the Diet, the Austrian 
ambassador retaliated by moving, in consideration of 
Manteuffel's " violent self-help " in Holstein, the mo- 
bilization of the federal army against Prussia. The 
vote was postponed until the 14th, and in the interval 
the various governments made their final preparations 
for war. The Austrians had seven corps in readiness 
in Bohemia, and the Saxon and Bavarian forces were 
ready to take the field. The Hanoverian army had not 
been mobilized, while the troops of Baden, Wilrtem- 
berg, Nassau, and Hesse Darmstadt, forming the 8th 
federal corps, were in a very backward state of prepa- 


ration. Prussia, however, had thoroughly equipped 
for service three corps in the vicinity of Gorlitz under 
Prince Frederick Charles, four in Silesia under the 
crown prince, three divisions under General Bittenfeld 
about Halle and Torgau, and a reserve corps at Berlin 
under General Miilbe. In addition to these there 
was Manteuffel's division in Holstein, the division of 
General von Falckenstein at Minden in Westphalia, 
and another under General Beyer at Wetzlar. It 
was to the roll of drums and clank of arms that the 
Diet convened on the 14th. By a vote of nine to six 
the Austrian motion was sustained. Prussia and 
Holstein were unrepresented, and Baden was the only 
one of the large states to oppose the Austrian project. 
The Prussian ambassador then pronounced the con- 
federation dissolved and withdrew from the hall. 

That night the wires all over Germany were loaded 
with messages of grave importance. Scarcely had 
the Prussian ambassador at Frankfort turned his 
back upon the palace of Thum and Taxis than there 
went flashing out from Berlin the ultimatum of Prus- 
sia to Hanover, Saxony, and Hesse, which had sup- 
ported the Austrian motion. Its tenor was simply 
this: in case within twelve hours the governments 
addressed did not signify their intention to reduce 
their armies to a peace footing and accept the Prus- 
sian proposals of June 10, the Berlin government 
would resort to arms. 

Perhaps these states had not counted upon the 
efficiency of Prussia's preparations and did not be- 
lieve it possible that she was in a position to under- 
take immediate action. At aU events they deliberated 
too long, and on the afternoon of the 15th, no reply 
having been received to its summons, the Prussian 


government declared war. At the same time there 
went forth from the Leipsiger Strasse the orders to 
set in motion those perfect battalions upon which 
such time and care had been expended. 

Before daylight on the 16th Manteuffel and Falck- 
enstein were on the march for Hanover, Beyer's divi- 
sion was grinding into dust the long road from Wetz- 
lar to Cassel, while in the east Prince Frederick 
Charles was over the Saxon frontier. 

On the night of the 16th King George of Hanover 
abandoned his capital, and with his half -constructed 
army retreated to Gottingen. At four o'clock on the 
afternoon of the next day the tramp of the Prussian 
troops awoke the echoes of the deserted streets. 

The Hessian army eluded General Beyer by re- 
treating to Fulda and thence to Frankfort. On the 
19th, however, the black and white banner was 
hoisted over Cassel, where the crestfallen elector sul- 
lenly awaited his conquerors. 

The army of Prince Frederick Charles approached 
Dresden on the 18th. The Saxons had fallen back 
upon the Austrians in Bohemia, and that evening the 
Prussian officers strolled along the Briihl Terrace 
and gravely saluted each other in the Grosse Garten. 

Thus in four days after the declaration of war by 
Prussia against Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse, her 
troops without firing a shot had subjugated and occu- 
pied those states, captured the Hessian elector, and 
hopelessly isolated the Hanoverian army at Gottin- 
gen. It was a brilliant combination, brilliantly exe- 
cuted, and there was amazement at Paris and at 
Vienna, yet it was but the first of a series of achieve- 
ments with which this mighty creation of Moltke and 
Boon was to astonish the world* 



Thb MnjTABY Situation on June 20. — Benedek's Plan op Cam- 
HEMIA. — Combats at Liebenau and Podol, and Defeat of 

SIANS. — Retreat of the Austeians upon Gitschin. — Battle 
OF Gitschin and Rout of the Austrians. — Bismarck at 
Gitschin. — Advance of the Second Prussian Army into Bo- 
SIAN 5th Corps at Nachod and Skalitz. — Discomfiture of 
THE Prussians at Trautenau. — Battle at Soor won by the 
Prussian Guards. — Arrival of the Second Army on the 
Elbe. — Communications restored between the Prussian 
Armies. — Dilemma of the Austrian Commander. — His 
Orders to his Army. — His Ignorance of the Prussian De- 
signs. — Character of thb Austrian Position on the Bis- 


The action of the Frankfort Diet on June 14 was 
virtually a declaration of war by the German con- 
federation against Prussia. On the 17th the Kaiser 
issued his manifesto to his people, and three days 
later the Italian government formally declared war 
against Austria and Bavaria. 

On the 20th the military situation was as follows : 
the Prussians by their seizure of Saxony had divided 
Germany into an eastern and western battlefield. In 
the east they had three distinct armies ready for the 
invasion of Bohemia : the army of the Elbe, compris- 
ing three divisions under General Herwarth von Bit- 


tenf eld ; the first army, made up of the 2d, 3d, and 4th 
corps under Prince Frederick Charles ; and the second 
army under the crown prince, comprising the 1st, 5th, 
6th, and Guard corps. 

The first army and the army of the Elbe in Sax- 
ony were imder orders to pass into Bohemia by sep- 
arate routes through the Iron Moimtains, and unite 
on the Iser. 

The second army was to move from Silesia through 
the moimtain passes and gain the left bank of the 
Elbe. On account of the dangerous character of the 
hilly country through which this army was to pass, 
the crown prince was ordered to delay its movements 
until the attention of the Austrians had become dis- 
tracted by the operations of Prince Frederick Charles. 
The total strength of these three armies was 254,000 
men, of which the first army comprised 93,000, the 
second army 115,000, and the army of the Elbe 


In the west Prussia had the divisions of Falcken- 
stein, Manteuffel, and Beyer in Hesse and Hanover, 
an aggregate of 48,000 men. In reserve was the 
corps of General Miilbe at Berlin, in process of mo- 

The Austrian army of the north, concentrated mainly 
about Olmiitz and Brunn, comprised the 1st, 2d, 3d, 
4th, 6th, 8th, and 10th corps, with five divisions of 
cavalry. To these must be added the 24,000 men of 
the Saxon army, which had retired into Bohemia 
before the Prussian advance. These forces, number- 
ing nearly 270,000 men, were commanded by General 
Benedek, whose brilliant conduct at Solferino had 
won him a most exalted reputation as a soldier among 
his countrymen. 


In the west, opposed to the Prussian armies, was the 
Bavarian army with its 50,000 bayonets, the troops of 
Hanover and Hesse, and the 8th federal corps. This 
made a total strength on paper of 119,000 men, of 
which, however, the 19,000 Hanoverians were isolated 
at Gottingen, and the 8th federal corps was only in 
the first stages of formation. 

It will thus be seen that while both in the east and 
west the Prussian troops were outnumbered, they 
were thoroughly prepared, advantageously posted, 
and armed with a breech-loading weapon. Benedek's 
corps, on the other hand, were badly distributed, the 
federal troops only half organized, and the whole 
dependent upon the muzzle-loading rifle. It must be 
admitted, therefore, that the situation was decidedly 
favorable to Prussia, a fact due to the foresight and 
preparation of her statesmen and the skill and vigor 
of her generals. 

It had doubtless been Benedek's plan, supported by 
the Bavarian army, to push through the passes of the 
Giant Mountains into Saxony, and in company with 
the army of that kingdom undertake an invasion of 
Prussia. The extraordinary rapidity of the Prussian 
advance overthrew his calculations. Saxony passed 
into the hands of his enemy, and with it the control 
of the passes through which the Bavarian cooperation 
was to be expected. Benedek was forced to regard 
himself as beaten in the first move of the contest, 
and compelled to stand on the defensive. 

On June 23 the Prussian armies crossed the Saxon 
frontiers into Bohemia, the first army advancing in 
three columns with the Elbe army several miles to 
the west. At daybreak Prince Frederick Charles had 
notified the Austrian outposts at Reichenberg that 


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with a li-»^ •v.Qiraiiir— n ii:.^' i* I-»r»r:Lia. It 
was in i£t^ T^i"- — r -: - -- ' :; - -_!:** *->: -*-- Hunt- 
ing of cLe >^?>--e> - . . IT"-: 1 '^ >*^ T::-' Aus- 
trians nrtzmi :Vf.?rT '' r Jf n.- - ?r^-^^ *livL^ion, 
iti^^iTi t^infn^ 4 nzn^rc ----- -*-^ 'h^rfr they 

broke the bri-Lr- -- - »- T^- '.vi r-t->atM along 

the poaa to P.>i. L H - ^ : .. v^; fj..t. and throw- 
ing a bridge ar Tirzj^- • -r.r. .-. •.'.-'iit, 

Podol ^ra« a po:— f -T-.i: .--vri-al iiiiiiortance, 
as the raUway to Prii.--- • r -- ^ the river at that 
point side »>y side w-Irh '':.^ r a-I. It was alrnrwt dusk 
when the Prussian van:riar«i r*rproa/rhf;^l the outskirts 
of the town. A sharj-. t3::'ht at onw coiiiinenct'd, 
which increased in warmth ^-ith the r-ontimied arrival 
of Prussian reinforcements. Pmlol was hehl by the 
" Iron Brigade," whieh had won the titles hy its stunly 
conduct in the Danish war. The ax^tion was wholly 
one of musketry. The Austrians wcjn* foi-ced to the 
village, and from there to the hridgohead, over- 


Prussia regarded herself as in a state of war with 
Austria. A few hours later he had taken his stand 
by the toll-house on the frontier to review the troops 
as they entered Austrian territory. The headquarters 
that night were in the Castle of Grafenstein, the seat 
of Count Clam Gallas, who had left its retirement to 
assume command of the 1st Austrian corps in Bohe- 
mia. The next day Reichenberg, the key to the 
passes, was occupied by the Prussians without a blow, 
and the various columns reunited. 

Count Clam Gallas had been ordered by Benedek 
to hold the line of the Iser from Turnau to Miin- 
chengratz, and had at his disposal in the vicinity of the 
latter place the 1st corps and the Saxons. He had 
thrown forward one brigade on the north of the Iser 
with a few companies in advance at Liebenau. It 
was in the vicinity of this village that the first fight- 
ing of the campaign occurred on the 26th. The Aus- 
trians retired before Von Home's Prussian division, 
maintaining a running fight to Turnau, where they 
broke the bridge over the Iser and retreated along 
the road to Podol. Home followed fast, and throw- 
ing a bridge at Turnau continued the pursuit. 

Podol was a point of great strategical importance, 
as the railway to Prague crosses the river at that 
point side by side with the road. It was almost dusk 
when the Prussian vanguard approached the outskirts 
of the town. A sharp fight at once commenced, 
which increased in warmth with the continued arrival 
of Prussian reinforcements. Podol was held by the 
" Iron Brigade," which had won the title by its sturdy 
conduct in the Danish war. The action was wholly 
one of musketry. The Austrians were forced to the 
village, and from there to the bridgehead, over- 


matched by numbers and the rapid discharge of the 
needle-gnns. Podol, in fact, was the first fair trial of 
the Prussian weapon, and was terribly satisfactory in 
its results. Shortly after midnight the Austrians 
drew oflf toward Miinchengratz, leaving the Pnissians 
in undisputed possession of Podol and the bridges. 

On the same day as the action at Podol communi- 
cation was reestablished between the first and Elbe 
armies, and on the 27th the latter, after a sharp skir- 
mish at Hiihnerwasser, compelled the retirement of 
the Austrians across the Iser at Miinchengratz. A 
combined movement was immediately undertaken 
against that town with the purpose of capturing the 
whole Austrian force. While Bittenfeld moved from 
Bohmisch-Aicha and Hiihnerwasser toward Miinchen- 
gratz, Prince Frederick Charles sent his troops down 
the valley against the same place. He also dispatched 
the 1st corps from Tumau to turn the Austrian posi- 
tion on the heights east of Miinchengratz and cut oflf 
their retreat on Gitschin. Miinchengratz was captured, 
but the Austrians escaped, their commander realizing 
the dangers attaching to a prolonged defense. The 
whole line of the Iser was thus relinquished to the 
Prussians. In five days, and with losses aggregating 
hardly 500 men, they had massed four and a half 
corps in the very heart of the enemy's country. 

Clam GaUas retreated upon Gitschin, and seized a 
strong position with his left resting on the Anna Berg, 
his centre on the heights of Brada, and his right ex- 
tending beyond Diletz east of the Turnau road. On 
the 29th the Prussians advanced upon Gitschin in 
four columns, the left from Turnau, the centre from 
Podol, the right from Miinchengratz, with the army of 
the Elbe still farther south. About four o'clock Wer- 


der's division of the 2d corps forming the Prussian 
centre began to engage the enemy on the road be- 
tween Sobotka and Gitschin. About the same time 
General Tiimpling's division from Tumau encountered 
the Saxon posts in advance of Brada and Diletz. 
Werder's troops attacked without delay. The coun- 
try west of Gitschin is broken by several ravines 
into which the road dips. Through and over these 
ravines a desperate fight was maintained, the Aus- 
trians fighting stubbornly under cover of the woods, 
but suffering terrible losses when exposed on the 
open ground to the rapid fire of the Prussians. It 
was nearly midnight when Werder's men finally ap- 
proached Gitschin. 

General Tiimpling on the north had succeeded in 
carrying the village of Podultz, thereby cutting the 
Austrian right in two. Werder's division, moreover, 
being well on the road to Gitschin, the retreat of the 
Austrians in Brada was wholly cut off. The Saxon 
troops in Diletz retired hastily upon Gitschin under 
a murderous fire, and acted as a rearguard to the dis- 
comfited army. They held Gitschin until midnight, 
resisting successfully the efforts of the Prussians to 
gain the market-place, and then withdrew. Gitschin 
was a better contested action than any of its predeces- 
sors, and the losses were correspondingly heavy. On 
the 30th a detachment of Prussian cavalry opened 
communication with the second army at Amau on 
the Elbe. On that same day Bismarck and the king 
started for the front, leaving Berlin uproariously en- 
thusiastic over the tidings of victory. Two days later, 
and " the iron count " was mingling with the military 
men in Gitschin, himself adorned with the white coat 
and helmet of the cuirassiers. In the midst of the 


bustle at headquarters he still found leisure to write 
his wife, " I have just arrived, the ground is heaped 
with corpses, horses, and arms. Our victories are 
much greater than we thought. Send me some 
French novels to read, but not more than one at a 
time. May God bless you." 


In the mean time the troops of the crown prince 
had been discharging their duties with the same suc- 
cess, though at a greater expenditure of blood than 
their comrades on the Iser. It was on June 20 that 
the crown prince notified the Austrian outposts of his 
intention to commence hostilities. His plans were 
already formed for an advance in three columns. 
The 1st corps and cavalry division on the right were 
to move from Landeshut through the mountains to 
Trautenau. The Guards in the centre were to march 
from Wiinschelburg via Braunau to occupy the pass 
at Eypel, while on the left the 5th corps, followed by 
the 6th, was to move by Reinerz to Nachod. 

On the evening of the 26th the Guards passed the 
frontier. The 5th corps under Steinmetz occupied 
the town of Nachod after a slight skirmish, seizing 
also the castle commanding the defile, which the Aus- 
trians with unaccountable negligence had left unde- 
fended. In the morning, upon resuming the march, 
the vanguard of this corps found itself in the pres- 
ence of the Austrian 6th corps under General Ram- 
ming. Finding his way blocked by such superior 
forces, Steinmetz seized the woods fringing the road, 
where, partially screened from the Austrian shells, his 
infantry stood stoutly on the defensive. It devolved 
upon this detachment in the wood to cover the de- 


bouching of the main body of the corps, which was 
still tangled up in the narrow defile. Thanks to the 
excellence of their weapons and the presence of the 
crown prince, who had forced his way to the front 
through the confusion of the crowded road, their de- 
fense was successful. The Austrian infantry were 
unable to face the murderous fire that blazed from all 
comers of the wood. At last the Prussian corps, 
having extricated itself from the pass, began to 
assume the oflfensive. The general advance was pre- 
ceded by a cavalry combat in which the Austrian 
cuirassiers who had been threatening the flank of the 
wood were overthrown. The Austrian retreat com- 
menced shortly after. Ramming drawing off in the 
direction of Skalitz. At that place the Austrian 8th 
corps was already stationed under the Archduke Leo- 
pold. There was only time to send the 6th corps to 
the rear for recuperation when on the 28th General 
' Steinmetz came up with his leading brigades. Skalitz 
was bravely defended by the Austrian jagers, though 
they were finally driven across the Aupa. Toward 
evening the archduke relinquished the heights be- 
yond, and began his retreat, leaving 4,000 prisoners 
and eight guns in the hands of the Prussians. On 
the 29th, after some artillery fighting, General Fes- 
tetics with three brigades of the Austrian 4th corps 
abandoned Schweinschadel, the troops of Steinmetz 
pushing on the same night to the village of Gradlitz 
on the Elbe, about two miles from Koniginhof. 

The 1st Prussian corps, forming the right of the 
second army, did not cross the frontier until dawn on 
the 27th. The day was intensely warm, and the 
troops were already somewhat fatigued when shortly 
before noon they encountered the Austrian outposts 


in front of Trautenau, a hill - girdled town on the 
Aupa. The Prussians immediately crossed the river, 
and forced the fighting in the streets of the town. 
The Austrians, not being in force, slowly retired to a 
position on the hills beyond. About one o'clock they 
were dislodged from there, and by three they had 
relinquished the village of Hohenbruck south of 
Trautenau and the heights southeast of that place. 
General von Bonin was so well satisfied with the 
progress of affairs that he rejected an offer of assist- 
ance from the 1st division of the Guards, which had 
halted at Qualitch upon hearing the heavy firing at 
Trautenau. But Von Bonin was deceived, for about 
3.30 General Gablenz came up with the other three 
brigades of the Austrian 10th corps, and fell heavily 
upon the weary Prussians. By five o'clock the Prus- 
sians were giving ground in all directions, and the 
Austrian infantry streamed through Hohenbruck at 
the charge. Von Bonin bivouacked that night on the 
same ground occupied by his corps in the morning. 

The battle of Trautenau was an Austrian victory, 
inasmuch as it forced the Prussian corps back into 
the mountains. The losses of the Prussians, however, 
were only 1,300 men to the 5,500 of the victors. This 
contest alone is sufficient to prove the hopeless char- 
acter of the struggle which Austria was waging with 
her better armied antagonist. 

After receiving Bonin's refusal of aid on the 27th, 
the 1st division of the Guards had taken up the 
march to Eypel. That night the prince of Wiirtem- 
berg commanding the Guard corps received tidings 
from the crown prince of the battle at Trautenau with 
orders to proceed immediately to extricate the 1st 
corps. Pushing the 1st division^ rapidly forward with 


the 2d a few miles in the rear, the prince of Wiirtem- 
berg crossed the Aupa early on the 28th and moved 
toward Koniginhof. This compelled Gablenz who 
was facing northward against the 1st corps to change 
his front, a feat which he skillfully accomplished just 
in time to receive the attack of the Guards all along 
the heights of Soor. The attack, however, was suc- 
cessful, and Gablenz fell back toward Koniginhof. 
Later in the afternoon the 2d division of the Guards 
came up, stormed Trautenau, and captured the greater 
portion of the Austrian brigade engaged there. This 
opened the way for the advance of the 1st corps, 
which pushed on to Arnau and fell in with the cav- 
alry patrols of Prince Frederick Charles. The 
Guards on the 29th continued their advance, storming 
Koniginhof, thus completing the union of the second 
army on the Elbe. 


Communications were reopened between the three 
Prussian armies in Bohemia on the 30th of June, or 
just one week from the time the first battalion passed 
the frontier. Unquestionably Benedek's plan had 
been to detain the crown prince in the mountains 
while with his main army he overwhelmed Prince 
Frederick Charles. Military critics claim that had 
Benedek reversed this plan, standing on the defensive 
on the Iser while he massed his strength against the 
crown prince, better fortune might have attended the 
Austrian arms. It is also asserted that Benedek 
committed a grave error in delaying his attack upon 
the crown prince's columns until they had debouched 
from the mountain passes ; that by so doing he left 
his isolated corps to be beaten in detail by superior 


forces, and exhausted the strength with which he 
should have succored Clam Gallas on the Iser. It is 
certainly to the credit of the Austrian commander, 
that he did not lose his head when the tidings of 
disaster poured in upon him from all quarters. No 
sooner had he received information of the actions 
at Miinchengratz and Skalitz than he issued orders 
for the army to form on a new line, from Josephstadt 
to Gitschin. For this purpose he urged Clam Gallas 
to hold firm at the latter place. Scarcely had he 
done so when the news arrived that Clam Gallas was 
in full retreat. Nothing daunted by this disappoint- 
ment Benedek with commendable promptness ordered 
the retreat of the whole army under the guns of the 
fortress of Koniggratz, though he must have real- 
ized before this that the chances of the campaign 
were against him. His enemies were consolidating 
in his front after he had lost 40,000 men in the at- 
tempt to keep them divided. In this crisis it seems 
to be generally admitted that Benedek made the most 
of the opportunities afforded him by seizing a strong 
defensive position in the hilly country between the 
Elbe and the Bistritz rivers. 

On the afternoon of July 2d Benedek issued his 
orders in anticipation of a Prussian attack. " The 
royal Saxon corps will occupy the heights of Popo- 
witz. . . . The 10th corps will take post on the right 
of the Saxon corps, and lastly the 3d corps will oc- 
cupy the heights of Lipa and Chlum, on the right of 
the 10th corps. The principal duty of the 8th corps 
will be to serve as support to the Saxon corps, behind 
which it will station itself. Troops not herein named 
have merely to hold themselves in readiness so long 
as the attack is confined to our left wing ; but should 


the enemy's attack assume greater dimensions, and be 
directed against our centre and right wing as well, 
then the whole army will be formed in order of bat- 
tle, and the following measures will be taken: the 
4th corps will move up on the right of the 3d to the 
heights of Chlum and Nedelist, and the 2d corps on 
the extreme right flank, next to the 4th." These 
orders also provided that the 1st and 6th corps should 
act as a reserve, the former to take position near 
Eosnitz, the other to occupy the heights of Wsestar. 
Of the five cavalry divisions two were on the left 
near Prim, one on the right, and two in reserve in the 
rear of the 1st and 6th corps. 

These dispositions were made clearly with a view 
to repelling an attack from the west. Benedek held 
the opinion that the mass of the Prussian second army 
had moved toward Gitschin, and that the forces left 
on the Elbe were too weak or too distant to be danger- 
ous. He anticipated a Prussian attempt to turn his 
left, but he seems to have given himself no uneasiness 
respecting his right. This is demonstrated by the 
tone of his instructions to the 2d and 4th corps form- 
ing the latter wing, which were to apply only in case 
of the action becoming general, a contingency which 
he plainly regarded as improbable. He clung tena- 
ciously to the theory that his enemies were all before 
him, and this was the fatal blunder of his campaign. 
Whether it was due to lack of information or faulty 
information, to the sluggishness of patrols or to ob- 
tuseness on the part of the commander himself, it 
was the blunder that was destined to decide a great 
battle, and settle the long dispute between the Ger- 
man powers. 

The heights on which the Austrian army took 


position overlooked the Bistritz, and no labor was 
spared to render their slopes unassailable. A chain 
of redoubts was thrown up to protect the central 
positions between Lipa and Nedelist, while the woods 
above Sadowa and Benatek were obstructed by ab- 
batis. Other works were ordered for the protection 
of the Saxons on the left, but the Prussian advance 
prevented their completion. 

The main road from Koniggratz to Horsitz inter- 
sected the centre of the Austrian position, passing 
south of Sosberitz and Chlum and crossing the Bis- 
tritz at Sadowa. The Austrian line was in the shape 
of a half circle sprung from the vicinity of Prim on 
the left through Lipa and Nedelist nearly to the Elbe 
on the right. The Saxon outposts were in Nechanitz 
on the Bistritz, the Austrians in Mokrovous, Do- 
halicka, Dohalitz, Sadowa, and Benatek farther up 
the stream. To hold this Kne, nearly seven mUes in 
length, Benedek had eight corps, comprising perhaps 
200,000 men. All but two of these corps, however, 
were suffering from the depression and demoralization 
consequent upon recent contact with the needle-gun. 
The pluck of the Austrian army was still good, but 
its enthusiasm was gone. 




Pbince Frederick Charles prepares for Battle. — Night 
March of the First Prussian Army upon the Bistritz. — 
Arrival of the EIinq of Prussia at Dub. — Opening of the 
Battle of Eoniggratz. — The Prussians cross the Bistritz. 

— State of the Battle at Noon. — Critical Position of the 
Prussian Left. — Anxiety of the Prussian Staff. — Ap- 
proach OF THE Crown Prince to the Field. — He threatens 
the Austrian Right. — Confused State of that Wing and 
Causes therefor. — The Crown Prince moves upon Chlum. 

— Capture of Chlum by the Prussian Guards and its Re- 
sults. — Benedek's Amazement upon learning of the Fall 
of Chlum. — He heads his Reserves in the Effort to re- 
take it. — Failure of the Attack. — Total Defeat of the 
Austrian Army. — Heroism of the Austrian Artillery. — 
Immediate Results of the Battle. — Archduke Albrecht 
ASSUMES Command of the Austrian Armies* — The Prussian- 
Advance UPON Vienna. — Benedek^s Retreat. — Battle of 
Blumenau. — The Armistice. 

On the afternoon of July 2 Prince Frederick Charles 
was at Kammenitz, having just returned from a coun- 
cil of war at the royal headquarters in Gitschin. This 
council had decided that on the following morning 
the first army should push a reconnoissance in the 
direction of Koniggratz, and the prince returned to 
Kammenitz to direct the intended movements. Im- 
mediately upon his arrival, however, he received in- 
formation that led him to assume the responsibility 
of disregarding the decision of the high military con- 


clave he had just quitted. The reports of the officers 
whom he had sent out in the morning to explore the 
country in his front demonstrated clearly that the 
Austrians were in force all along the Bistritz River 
from Benatek to Nechanitz. He immediately con- 
cluded that Benedek was on the point of assuming 
the offensive with his entire army. Recognizing that 
his present position was unfavorable for the accept- 
ance of a great battle, the prince determined upon 
an immediate advance. The plan he hastily evolved 
had for its object the decisive overthrow of Benedek's 
army. While the first army advanced against Sa- 
dowa, the army of the Elbe was to move on its right 
against Nechanitz, the second army on the north 
threatening meantime the Austrian right and rear. 
Considering the distance that separated the first and 
second armies, there was a strong element of risk in 
this scheme. The strength of the Austrian army was 
not definitely known, but it was certain that the first 
and Elbe armies would be obliged to hold their own 
against vastly superior forces until the crown prince 
had time to develop his attack. 

Prince Frederick Charles immediately ordered Gen- 
eral Bittenf eld to advance upon Nechanitz, while he 
dispatched a messenger to the crown prince request- 
ing his cooperation. It was not imtil after these 
orders had been issued that he acquainted the king 
at Gitschin with his proposed movements and secured 
his hearty approval. Indeed a royal messenger was 
hurried off to the crown prince with orders for the 
immediate advance of his entire army. 

Before midnight on the 2d the first army was on 
the march toward the Bistritz. While the 8th divi- 
sion, supported by the 5th and 6th, followed the Konig- 




'a' a 


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jCJ \^lllMbMBr 


^ \^i 



gratz road, the Sd and 4th divisions moved through 
the cultivated country on their right. The 7th divi- 
sion marched on the left of the main army from 
Horsitz toward Cerekwitz. The night was dark, save 
occasionally when the moon broke through the driv- 
ing clouds and revealed ghmpses of the trees and 
cornfields waving in the damp wind. The dawn was 
ushered in by a dismal rain that transformed field 
and road into sloughs that seriously clogged the 
progress of the artillery. About four o'clock the 
head of the columns began to ascend the long hill on 
which stands the village of Dub. From the crest of 
the hill the Bistritz valley burst upon the view from 
Benatek on the north to the clustering roofs of 
Nechanitz four miles below Sadowa. All along the 
river nestled little hamlets, backed by hills and woods 
that showed dimly through the rain and mist of the 
gray morning. 

It was half past eight when the king of Prussia 
and his staff came within sight of the battlefield, and 
then the contest had fairly begun. Franzecky's 7th 
division was hotly engaged on the left in front of 
Benatek, while Sadowa and the villages farther down 
the stream were belted with the smoke of the Aus- 
trian riflemen, whose fire increased as the Prussian 
skirmishers advanced. All along the heights above 
the Austrian guns were at work, flashing through the 
haze and mingling their billowy smoke with the mist 
and fog. Their practice was good, and the shells 
swept the Koniggratz road in front of Sadowa, and 
went rushing up the hillside into the environs of Dub 
where the royal staff had taken position. 

Before ten o'clock Benatek had been set on fire 
and occupied by the Prussian 7th division. About 


this time, too, the Austrian artillery on the slope be- 
tween Dohalitz and Mokrovous began to show signs of 
weakening under the continually increasing weight of 
the Prussian fire. Prince Frederick Charles, noticing 
this, gave the word ^f or the infantry to advance against 
the villages along the river. The 8th division moved 
against Sadowa, the 4th against Dohalitz, and the 3d 
against Mokrovous. It was no part of the Austrian 
plan to sacrifice much for these positions, and Colonel 
Proshaka commanding the garrison of Sadowa re- 
ceived orders to retire. The abandonment of Sadowa 
settled also the fate of Dohalitz, Dohalicka, and 
Mokrovous, and before eleven o'clock the whole left 
bank of the Bistritz had passed into the hands of the 
Prussians. The army of the Elbe had driven the 
Saxon outposts from Nechanitz, and was crossing the 
river at that place preparatory to turning the left of 
Benedek's position. 

At noon, however, the state of affairs was hardly 
satisfactory to the Prussians. Franzecky was barely 
able to maintain himself in the wood above Benatek, 
while all along the river from Sadowa to Mokrovous 
the Prussians were subjected to a murderous and 
crushing artillery fire. Shortly after noon Prince 
Frederick Charles sent the 5th and 6th divisions for- 
ward to the support of those already engaged in the 
woods on the slope above Sadowa.^ At one o'clock, 
with all their reserves engaged, the Prussian staff 
could trace no improvement in the situation. The 
Austidan artillery still maintained its terrible fire. 

^ The Prussian generals at no time meditated a strong offensive by 
their centre, but dreaded such a movement on the part of the Aus- 
trians. The reserves went forward to be at hand in case of a general 
assault by their enemy. 


Franzecky's position on the left had become one of 
absolute peril,^ while on the right the army of the 
Elbe was stiU painfully defiling through the swamps 
at Neehanitz, and unable to gain ground. 

Everything depended upon the prompt arrival of 
the crown prince. The royal staff recognized this 
fact. The king, erect and white-haired, turned his 
gaze from the wood where the Austrian shells were 
playing sad havoc with his devoted troops, for some 
sign of his son, whose arrival was to decide the day. 
Bismarck turned in his saddle and peered anxiously 
from under the vizor of his helmet in the vain en- 
deavor to penetrate the smoke that hung over the 
valley about Benatek. Even Moltke's furtive glances 
beUed the habitual imperturbability of his face. 
Every eye was strained for some glimpse of the 
second army, every ear alert to catch the music of its 
approaching artillery. The moments dragged heavily. 
At two o'clock the situation was still unchanged.^ 
The soldiers of the Kaiser were fighting a grand 
battle. Just before three the Prussian 8th division 
received orders to retire, and the cavalry was held in 
readiness to cover a retreat. 

The Prussian staff was anxious and Benedek was 
complacent, but the condition of each was induced 
by ignorance of the true position of affairs. The 
crown prince was in reality keeping his engagements 

^ Franzecky had 14 battalions and 24 guns against 51 Austrian 
battalions and 128 guns. Indeed, nearly the whole strength of the 
Austrian 2d and 4th corps was employed against him. The Prussian 
headquarters, however, did not feel justified in reinforcing Franzecky 
at the expense of their centre. 

^ Von Moltke knew at this time that the crown prince was ap- 
proaching the field, but did not realize his troops were really en- 
gaged. At 1.45 he informed General Bittenfeld, ''tlie crown prince 
is at Zizelowes." 


to the letter. His information as to the position of 
the enemy was very indefinite, but he commenced 
his advance at five in the morning. The 6th corps 
crossed the Elbe near Jaromir and marching south- 
west formed the left of his army. The 1st corps on 
the right headed for Gross Burglitz, while the Guards 
in the centre, accompanied by the crown prince in 
person, moved from Koniginhof on Lhota and Jericek. 
After passing Daubrowitz the crown prince obtained 
his first distant view of the battle, but not until he 
gained the hills opposite Horenowes did he appreciate 
its extent, and the fact that the Prussian left was in 
actual danger. About noon he directed the Guards 
toward the two famous trees on the hiUtop above 
Horenowes, covering their left by an attack of the 6th 
corps upon Sacitz. Both of these villages and the 
heights were carried with slight loss, their garrisons 
consisting only of weak detachments of the Austrian 
2d corps. The commander of the Austrian 4th corps 
had long since left his intrenchments between Chlum 
and Nedelist and plunged forward to engage the 
Prussian 7th division in the wood of Maslowed. This 
he did on his own responsibility, while the 2d corps, to 
which had been assigned the ground between Nedelist 
and the Elbe, moved up on his right. As a result, 
at one hour before noon Benedek's right wing stood 
on the line Maslowed-Horenowes-Eacitz, with its main 
strength massed in the vicinity of the first-named 
place. It was only after suffering great losses, and 
after Benedek's order had been twice repeated, that 
the insubordinate corps commanders began to retire 
upon their original positions. Indeed, at the time 
when the crown prince was developing his attack 
upon Racitz and Horenowes these weary, demoralized 


battalions were in the confusion of executing this 

The crown prince saw his opportunity. The Guards 
seized Maslowed ; the 6th corps pushed from Sacitz 
upon Lochenitz to cut the bridge at that place. From 
Maslowed the leading regiments of the Guard marched 
along the rear of the Austrian detachments still en- 
gaged in the Maslowed wood, and headed for the 
conspicuous church tower of Chlum. They reached 
the precincts of that village almost unopposed and 
stormed it from the east. The slender garrison was 
immediately overpowered, while a Prussian battalion 
seized the callage of Rosberitz farther down the hill, 
from which point they easily commanded the main 
avenue of the Austrian retreat on Koniggratz. At 
three o'clock the 1st division of the Prussian Guards 
were in full possession of the heart of the Austrian 
position. All about them the battle was still raging. 
Just below toward Koniggratz they could see the 
huge masses of the Austrian reserves. A few rods 
to the east Benedek was confidently directing what he 
regarded as a satisfactory battle, little dreaming that 
the key of his position was already in the iron grasp 
of his adversaries. 

Benedek was certainly satisfied with the progress 
of events. Strong in the belief that he had the whole 
Prussian army before him, with his line nowhere 
broken, and with ample reserves, he felt he had the 
contest well in hand. He had no anxiety for his 
right. It is true he was annoyed with the com- 
mander of the 4th corps for quitting his allotted 
position and for not promptly obeying his orders to 
return to it. Apparently, however, he thought these 
instructions were obeyed earlier than they were. 


It was a little before noon that Benedek learned 
that his right was threatened by a Prussian corps. 
He was undisturbed by the information and merely 
sent orders for the 2d corps to hold its ground. What 
followed can readily be included among the marvels 
of military history. No tidings reached the Austrian 
commander that his 2d corps was being worsted near 
Maslowed, or that the Prussian Guards had gained 
that place. Indeed, he was never more complacent 
than when, shortly before three o'clock, an orderly 
came dashing up to his side with the information that 
the Prussians were in Chlum. 

If Feldzeugmeister von Benedek had been informed 
that the Prussian army had taken to itself wings and 
was flying away in the direction of Vienna, the tidings 
would have been no more astonishing or incredible. 
He refused to credit the news, and followed by his staff 
galloped away through the Lipa wood to where the 
church spire of Chlum was revealed through the smoke. 
The rolling of the needle-guns and the deadly volley 
that came pelting among his followers at the entrance 
of the village left no doubt as to the truth. He turned 
to his reserves and ordered the 6th corps against 
Kosberitz and Chlum in a wild effort to recover the 
day. Determined that he would not survive the dis- 
aster he put himself at the head of the storming 
columns. Kosberitz was cleared, but the attack failed 
at the churchyard and orchards of Chlum. The 
dense masses of the Austrians only served as better 
food for tlie close discharges of the needle-guns. The 
losses suffered at this point were simply enormous. 
Whole battalions were literally annihilated, blown 
away in the hot blasts of fire and iron. Every 
moment of delay added to the hopelessness of the 


Austrian efforts, for the whole of the crown prince's 
army was approaching the field. Benedek was con- 
spicuous in the meZee, powder blackened and furious, 
but no kindly bullet found his breast. 

Alas for Benedek! Eaised to the supreme com- 
mand on the wave of popular approval earned by 
good service on Italian battlefields, he was destined 
to lose the opportunity to render his name forever 
illustrious. He was trained in the wrong school and 
fought the wrong foe to make a great military name. 
Perhaps no general in Europe with troops similarly 
equipped could have contended successfully with the 
hosts which Prussia poured into Bohemia. Certain 
it is that the remodeled Prussian army was an obsta- 
cle against which reputations even more brilliant and 
secure than Benedek's were destined to be shivered 
to atoms. 

At half past three the Austrian army was beaten ; 
on the left the Saxons were retiring, and the reserves 
had exhausted themselves in their useless struggle at 
Chlum. The 2d Austrian corps had been driven 
across the Elbe, and the 4th corps was hopelessly lost. 
The 2d division of the Prussian Guards stormed the 
batteries in front of Chlum which had been holding 
the first army so long in check. This attack revealed 
for the first time the position of the crown prince to 
the king and his staff. They could descry the dark 
masses of the Prussian infantry struggling across the 
fields on the heights. They appreciated the situation, 
and ordered a general advance. The Austrian guns 
in position were hastily abandoned, but the artillerists 
saved many fieldpieces, and covered themselves with 
glory before night.' The whole Austrian army, in 
fact, proved its high discipline by its conduct in these 
trying circumstances. The retreating infantry never 


broke under the murderous Prussian fire, nor allowed 
their retreat to become a rout. Again and again the 
Austrian artillerists unlimbered, and checked their 
pursuers. The Austrian cavalry also added to its 
high reputation, charging infantry and artillery alike, 
and shedding its blood like water to cover the retreat 
of the discomfited army. 

The battle of Koniggratz, in the point of numbers 
engaged, the losses sustained, and results achieved, 
must be designated as one of the mightiest militaiy 
conflicts of the century. The Austrian army sustained 
a loss of over 40,000 men, 174 guns, and 11 stand- 
ards, while the Prussian army was reduced by 10,000 
men killed and wounded. The Prussians only appre- 
ciated the full magnitude of their success when, on 
the day following the battle. General Gablenz passed 
through their lines with Benedek's proposal for an 
armistice. His mission was wholly unsuccessful. In 
fact, his errand stimulated such confidence at the 
royal headquarters as to cause Bismarck himself some 
misgivings. He had " the thankless task of pouring 
water into the foaming wine, and reminding his peo- 
ple that they were not living alone in Europe, but 
with three other neighbors." 

So far as Austria was concerned, there was little 
more to fear. The army of the north which Benedek 
had addressed with such flowery assurance a fortnight 
before was a mere wreck cowering under the intrench- 
ments of Olmiitz. Vienna was ablaze with rage, and 
Benedek was its unhappy object. His resignation 
which followed was a matter of necessity. The Arch- 
duke Albrecht was called from Italy to the command 
of the united Austrian armies,* and on his arrival 
bent his energies to placing Vienna in a state of de- 
fense. He dispatched imperative orders to Benedek 


at Olmiitz to forward his army by rail as rapidly as 
possible, at the same time instructing his successor in 
Venetia to hurry all his available troops to the de- 
fense of the capital. 

The three Prussian armies renewed their advance 
on the 5th, the crown prince moving upon Olmiitz, 
while Frederick Charles and Bittenf eld marched for 
Vienna, — the former via Brunn ; the latter by Iglau 
and Znaim. The monotony of the long marches was 
broken only by occasional alarms and cavalry skir- 
mishes. The tide of advance swept on, leaving the 
crops waving uninjured to await the harvesting of 
their owners, and the stolid villagers with bare larders 
but abundance of Prussian coin. 

On the 13th the vanguard of the first army entered 
Briinn unopposed, and the next day cut the railway 
line at Lundenburg over which Benedek had been 
hurrying his troops to Vienna. It was at Brunn that 
the equipage of M. Benedetti first appeared, a har- 
binger of peace and of would-be French aggrandize- 
ment. On the 20th the Prussian columns gained the 
banks of the Danube, and the soldiers obtained the 
long-coveted view of the spire of St. Stephens float- 
ing dimly over the haze of Vienna. 

Before the cutting of the railway line Benedek had 
sent four of his broken corps to the capital. With 
the remainder of his army he determined to move 
down the March valley to the same destination. On 
the 15th, however, his right flank was struck savagely 
by the cavalry of the crown prince, an event that led 
him to abandon his line of march and adopt a more 
circuitous route westward over the Carpathian Moun- 
tains. On the 21st he reached Pressburg, and opened 
communications with the archduke at Vienna. 

In the mean time the Austrian cabinet had come to 




the conclusion that an armistice could alone prevent 
the humiliation of a Prussian military pageant on the 
King-Strasse. The archduke had succeeded in bring- 
ing up but a small portion of the army from Venetia, 
while the troops from Olmutz were still in a state of 
partial demoralization. The news that Benedek's 
weary battalions were streaming into Pressburg pro- 
duced no change in the conviction of the government. 
On the 22d Count Karolyi and General Degenfeld 
repaired to the Prussian headquarters at Nikolsburg 
to arrange an armistice and discuss the preliminaries 
of a peace. 

On this day an action was fought in the vicinity of 
Blumenau between the 7th and 8th Prussian divisions 
and four Austrian brigades of the 2d and 10th corps. 
The action was interrupted by news of the armistice, 
though not until the Austrian position had been seri- 
ously compromised. Blumenau was a useless contest, 
but it brought laurels to General Franzecky and will 
remain conspicuous as the last action of the Seven 
Weeks' war. 

The armistice was to expire on the 27th, but on the 
26th, after conferences in which M. Benedetti essayed 
to play a part, preliminaries of peace were signed. 
The tenor of these preliminaries alone attested the 
extent of the Austrian reverse. She agreed to with- 
draw from the confederation, to pay a heavy war in- 
demnity, and to oppose no objection to Prussia's re- 
organization of North Germany. Everything which 
Austrian statesmen since Schwarzenberg had been 
contending for was hopelessly lost in the development 
of Bismarck's policy of " iron and blood." The ar- 
rangement of details devolved upon the diploma- 
tists, and the Prussian army withdrew to the line of 
the Thaya to await the signature of a definite peace. 



The Campaign in the West. — Critical Situation of the 
Hanoverian Army. — Indifference of Prince Charles op 
Bavaria. — Victory of the Hanoverians at Lanoensalza. 

— Capitulation of the Hanoverian Army. — Indecision in 
THE Federal Councils. — Advance of the Prussian Gen- 
eral Falckenstein upon Frankfort. — Prussian Occupa- 
tion OF FuLDA. — Battle of Kissingen and Defeat of the 
Bavarians. — Defeat of the 8th Federal Corps at Lau- 


FORT. — Junction of Prince Alexander with Prince 
Charles. — General Manteuffel succeeds Falckenstein. 

— He marches from Frankfort. — Indecision of the Fed- 
eral Commander. — Fighting on the Tauber. — Retreat 
OF THE Federal Army upon WUrzburg. — Bobibardment of 
Wurzburg by the Prussians. — The Armistice. 

During the progress of the campaign in Bohemia, 
the Prussian armies in the west had been gaining 
most decisive successes. In three days after the dec- 
laration of war they had occupied Hanover and Cas- 
sel, and held the Hanoverian army in their power. 
In fact, the only chance for the escape of King 
George and his devoted troops lay in the cooperation 
of the Bavarian army then massed in the vicinity of 
Bamberg and Wiirzburg. Prince Charles of Bavaria 
refusing to recognize the gravity of the crisis, it 
devolved upon the hard-pressed Hanoverians to ex- 
tricate themselves unaided from the necessity of a 
capitulation. King George was despondent, reahzing 
the unpreparedness of his troops and the utter dilap- 



idation of his commissariat. He opened negotiations 
with Berlin in the hope of securing a free passage for 
his army into Bavaria on the condition that they 
would not turn their arms against Prussia during the 
succeeding six months. The delay caused by this 
correspondence was fatal to him. The Hanoverian 
army had been slowly moving in the direction of 
Gotha, and on the 26th bivouacked about the town 
of Langensalza. That night four Prussian divisions 
were closing in upon it from the northwest and south 
On the morning of the 27th the Prussian General 
Flies advancing from Warza with 12,000 men en- 
countered the Hanoverian outposts in front of Lan- 
gensalza. The conflict that ensued was the last which 
the Hanoverians were destined to wage for their royal 
house. Poorly armed, poorly organized, with every 
circumstance dispiriting, the raw battalions of King 
George proved themselves nevertheless invincible. 
General Flies was compelled to abandon the field to 
his foes, and draw off toward Warza. 

The victory, however, stirred no enthusiasm in the 
Hanoverian ranks. The king recognized the fact that 
a prolongation of the contest could only result in 
useless slaughter. Forty-two thousand Prussians were 
concentrating upon his position, and there was no sign 
of help from the Bavarians. Even the cannon of 
Langensalza had failed to awake Prince Charles from 
his lethargy. On the 29th, finally despairing of aid, 
the king accepted the Prussian terms and capitulated. 
The soldiers laid down their arms and were dismissed 
to their homes. The king became an exile from his 

The Hanoverians disposed of, there remained to 
confront the Prussians the Bavarian army and the 


8th federal corps which was still in process of mobil- 
ization. The plan conceived at Vienna for the move- 
ment of the federal forces in the west comprised an 
early junction of the Bavarians and the 8th corps and 
an invasion of Prussian territory. The fall of the 
Hanoverian army, which was to lend its support to 
this movement, threw all the military calculations out 
of joint. Prince Charles, after allowing his opportu- 
nity to slip, made a tardy advance to succor the Han- 
overians. At Meiningen he received tidings of the 
battle of Langensalza and the subsequent capitula- 
tion. Upon this he began a hurried retreat to join 
the 8th corps, which at the same time commenced its 
northward march from Frankfort. The rapid move- 
ments of the Prussians, however, again frustrated the 
federal commander. 

General von Falckenstein, who had been appointed 
to the command of all the Prussian forces in the west, 
rapidly concentrated his army after the capitulation 
of the Hanoverians, and moved upon Frankfort via 
Fulda. On July 4 he worsted the Bavarian detach- 
ment at Wiesenthal, inducing the retirement of the 
whole Bavarian army beyond the Saale. Prince 
Alexander, commanding the 8th corps, upon learning 
of this commenced his retreat on Frankfort. On the 
6th General von Falckenstein occupied Fulda, and in 
view of the fact that seventy miles of country sepa- 
rated the two corps of the federal army, he determined 
to overwhelm them in detail. He did not overrate 
the demoralization in Prince Alexander's ranks when 
he concluded that there was little to fear from the 8th 
corps for some days to come. On the 8th he broke 
up his quarters at Fulda, on the 9th he crossed the 
Hohe Rhon, and the next morning hurled his forces 


against the astonished Bavarians at Hammelburg, 
Kissingen, and Waldasehach on the Saale. At every 
point the Bavarians were outnumbered, and so far 
separated from their supports that no aid was possible 
during the day. Kissingen became sadly changed in 
a few hours. Its fashionable devotees were awakened 
by the uproar of military preparations, and found 
themselves enforced witnesses of a fierce combat. 
The bridges over the Saale were destroyed and the 
streets barricaded ; but before these precautions were 
completed Goeben's Prussian division was attacking. 
The Bavarians fought well, but under cover of their 
superior artillery the Prussians crossed the river, and 
carried the fight into the streets of the town. In the 
Kurgarten, where twice a day fashion held high car- 
nival, the combatants closed with the bayonet. At 
three o'clock the Prussians had carried the town, 
leaving its finery sadly battle-scarred. The Bavarians, 
doggedly retreating, maintained desultory skirmishing 
until dark. The retreat from Hammelburg had com- 
menced earlier in the day, while at Waldasehach Gen- 
eral Manteuffel's division encountered only feeble 

By these successes General Falckenstein won the 
line of the Saale, and temporarily paralyzed the Ba- 
varian army for offensive movements. On the 11th 
he turned against the 8th corps, directing Beyer's 
division to Hanau, and Goeben's division against As- 
chaffenburg via Laufach, where the troops of Hesse 
Darmstadt were in position. On the 13th Goeben 
carried Laufach, and the next day encountered the 
Austrian brigade of the 8th corps at Aschaffen- 
burg. The action there was not especially severe. 
The Austrian artillery was well served, but their in- 


fantry, composed largely of Italians, was thrown into 
confusion, and lost 2,000 prisoners by becoming 
jammed in the streets of the town. This fight set- 
tled the fate of Frankfort, and there was a general 
stampede of federal functionaries, civil and military. 
Alarmed at the defeat of his advanced brigades, 
Prince Alexander hastily withdrew from the city, and 
on the 15th had his whole army on the south side of 
the Main. On the 16th General Falckenstein entered 
Frankfort, the public buildings were placed under 
mihtary guard, and the Prussian colors hoisted upon 
the palace of Thurn and Taxis. The free city of 
Frankfort, the capital of the German confederation, 
was to be from henceforth a Prussian municipality. 

From this time the federal cause in the west was 
hopeless. On the 15th Prince Alexander effected a 
junction with the Bavarians, but it was then too late 
to reap the benefits that would have attended an ear- 
lier consummation of the movement. Both the fed- 
eral corps were dispirited by their lack of success as 
well as by the tidings of Kbniggratz and the Prussian 
advance on Vienna. The Bavarians had lost confi- 
dence in their leaders, and the heterogeneous soldiery 
of the 8th corps had fought without enthusiasm from 
the first. 

As for the Prussians, their condition was exactly 
the reverse. General von Falckenstein was called to 
assume the military governorship of Bohemia, but he 
was ably succeeded by General Manteuffel. Further- 
more, a reserve corps had been formed at Leipsic, and 
under the command of the grand duke of Mecklen- 
burg-Schwerin was preparing to invade Bavaria in 
the direction of Hof. The army of the Main, as 
Manteuffel's army was now styled, had been strength- 


ened also by the military contingents of Oldenburg, 
Hamburg, Liibeek, Waldeek, Bremen, and Sehwarz^ 
burg-Sonderhausen, aggregating 10,000 men. 

On the 21st Manteuflfel advanced from Frankfort. 
Prince Charles of Bavaria was at a loss what course 
to pursue. If he stood fast against Manteuffel he 
left the road open for the grand duke of Mecklen- 
burg to march on Miinich. If he retreated to cover 
the capital he permitted a union of the two Prussian 
armies. While he was thus undecided, on the 24th 
Manteuffel attacked the 8th corps on the Tauber. 
At Werbach where the Badeners were in position, 
and at Tauberbischofsheim held by the Wiirtemberg- 
ers, there was some sharp fighting, but at both places 
the Prussians forced a passage of the river. Prince 
Alexander retired to Gerscheim midway between 
Wiirzburg and Tauberbischofsheim. That night the 
Bavarian army came up on his right, prolonging the 
line of battle to the vicinity of Utingen and Helm- 
stadt on the north. 

There was desultory fighting all along this front of 
ten miles on the day following. After dark Prince 
Alexander began his retreat upon Wiirzburg. Prince 
Charles, ignorant of this movement, and having his 
troops better in hand, moved against Utingen on the 
morning of the 26th. He was not long in discover- 
ing that his left fiank was uncovered, and that his 
communications with Wiirzburg were threatened by 
Goeben's victorious troops. A hasty retreat at once 
commenced, and before night the whole federal army 
was reunited at Wiirzburg. With the Main in its 
rear and a determined foe in front, the position of 
this army was most critical. It was literally besieged, 
while the troops of the Prussian reserve corps at 


Baireuth had an open march to Munich. The one 
hope of the federal forces lay in the efforts of Herr 
von der Pf ordten, the Bavarian ambassador, who had 
been at Nikolsburg for some days endeavoring to 
arrange an honorable peace with Prussia. 

Bismarck's dealings with Pfordten were more brief 
than conciliatory. Bavaria must yield all her terri- 
tory north of the Main, and consent to the payment 
of a war indemnity. In vain the Bavarian protested 
against these harsh conditions. When it became 
clear that Vienna was at the mercy of the Prussians, 
and he learned that the great fortress of Wiirzburg 
was fast becoming a rubbish heap under the bombard- 
ment of Manteuffel's artillery, Pfordten yielded to 
the inevitable. News of the armistice reached Wiirz- 
burg on the 29th after a day of terrific cannonade. 
Hostilities were immediately suspended, and before 
the close of the month preliminaries of peace had 
been signed between Prussia, Bavaria, and all those 
states whose contingents made up the 8th federal 



Itauak Affaibs aftbb thb Dsiath op Cavoub. — Garibaldi 
AGAIN. — Thb Battle at Aspbomonte. — Fall op thb Ra- 



National Govebnment to Flobencb. — Joy of the Floben- 
TiNEs. — Declaration of War upon Austria. — Condition 
op the Opposing Abmies. — Thb Gebman Plan fob thb 
Italian Campaign and its Rejection at Florence. — Thb 
Italian Army crosses the Mincio. — The Plans of the Op- 
posing Commandebs result in a Collision. — The Theatre 
of Action. — Opening op the Battle of Custozza on thb 
Italian Right. — Fighting at Ouosi and Rout op thb 
Italian Left Wing. — Bold and Successful Move of thb 
Italian Genebal Pianelli to check the Austbian Pubsutt. 
— Progress of the Battle in the Centre. — La Marmo- 
ra's Incapacity. — State op the Battle at Two o'Clock. — 
Concentric Attack of the Abchduke upon Custozza and 
Retreat of the Italians. — The Italian Army recrosses 
THE MtNCio. — Responsibility of La Mabmoba for the De- 
feat. — The Abchduke Albbecht summoned to Vienna. — 
Advance op the Italian Abmy under Cialdini. — Defeat 
OP THE Italian Fleet at Lissa. — Degradation of Admiral 
Pebsano. — GtooD Faith of the Italian Govebnment in 1866. 

On the evening when Prince Frederick Charles 
was concentrating his troops at Reichenberg, prepara- 
tory to their first contest with the Kaiserliks, the last 
echoes of a stem battle were reverberating among the 
hills of the Lago di Garda, and an Italian army was 
retreating from a disastrous field. 

The course of events in Italy since Cavour's death 


liad been marked by bitter parliamentary strifes, by 
the fall of ministries, and by inglorious insurrections, 
until the battle-cry of ** Venetia " united the nation 
anew. The ministry of Baron Ricasoli, who succeeded 
Cavour, fell in a few months for alleged lukewarm- 
ness on the Koman question. Signor Satazzi would 
have left an enviable record as prime minister except 
for this same Koman question. After a few months 
of prosperity, however, during which the diplomatic re- 
lations of Italy steadily improved, and numerous inter- 
nal improvements were instituted, he was confronted by 
a Garibaldian revolution with its battle-cry of " Kome 
or death." This was in July, 1862. Garibaldi made 
his appearance in Sicily, and simunoned his old com^ 
rades about him for the march upon the eternal city. 
Perhaps Cavour would have found a way of turning 
even this crowning folly of Garibaldi to some good 
accoimt, but Eatazzi saw but one course of action in 
the crisis. He immediately placed the Two Sicilies 
in a state of siege, and dispatched General La Mar- 
mora to restore order. On the 29th of August Gari- 
baldi was confronted by the royal troops at Aspro- 
monte. There was but little fighting, but an unlucky 
bullet inflicted a wound upon Garibaldi's ankle that 
was attended with the most serious political conse- 
quences. The republican faction heading all disaffeo- 
tions started a fierce agitation against the Eatazzi 
ministry. Guribaldi was held up as a patriot and 
martyr. The prime minister was decried as an im- 
perialist and a traitor. The ministry resigned, and 
in the fall of 1862 was succeeded by that of Signor 
Farini. HI health brought his administration to an 
end in a few months. Signor Minghetti followed, 
and infused new vigor into the government. Brig- 


andage in the southern provinces was mercilessly 
hunted down, new railways were opened, and the 
whole financial system was reformed. 

At length (1864) the incessant importunity of the 
Italian government with reference to Home began to 
bear fruit at Paris. The emperor wanted Austria 
driven from Italy, but so long as he held Rome he 
could hardly lay stress upon this point. At length 
he agreed to withdraw his troops on the promise of 
the Italian government to protect the Papal See ; a 
promise accompanied by the transfer of the royal 
capital from Turin to Florence as a pledge of good 
faith. " Of course this will all end in your going to 
Rome," was the whispered remark of M. Drouyn de 
Lhuys to the Italian minister at Paris, "but it is 
important that between this event and that of the 
evacuation such an interval may elapse, and such a 
series of incidents occur, as to do away with the pos- 
sibility of establishing any connection between them : 
France must not be held responsible." 

The Italian government accepted the conditions, 
and yet so bitter was the feeling engendered through- 
out Piedmont, and especially in Turin, upon its an- 
nouncement that the Minghetti ministry resigned. 
The king summoned General La Marmora to form 
a new cabinet, and he proved the right man for the 
crisis. He supported the odious arrangement in a 
curt and military fashion. " The king's signature is 
there — and that is enough," he declared in the Cham- 
ber. The arrangement was finally indorsed and by a 
large majority. Turin became simply the chief city of 
Piedmont, the ancient seat of the Sardinian kings. 
Florence became the capital of united Italy. If Turin 
was grieved and angry, Florenqe welcomed the king 


with open arms. In November, 1865, the parliament 
convened in the great hall of the Palazzo Vecchio, 
from the walls of which the strong features of the 
Medici looked down through the dimness of the cen- 
turies. Florence rang her bells anew, not in warn- 
ing but in joy. The banner of the republic or the 
arms of the Medici had never been so glad a sight to 
Florence as the tricolor with the emblem of Savoy 
that now floated from the battlements of the Palazzo 

Having so far settled the Koman question as to 
have gained a promise of the withdrawal of the 
French troops, Victor Emmanuel and his ministry 
turned their attention to Venice. The hostility be- 
tween Austria and Prussia proved their opportunity. 
The king through the French emperor sought to 
induce Austria to yield Venetia as the price of Italian 
neutrality in the approaching contest, but Austria 
was too confident at this time to heed such a pro- 
posal. In the mean time General Govone concluded 
the Italo-Prussian alliance with Bismarck at Berlin. 
From this time Italy steadily prepared for war. 

The Italian declaration of war was issued on the 
20th of June. The king left Florence to take the 
command of the army. General La Marmora acting 
as chief of staff. The army consisted at this time of 
four strong corps, the 1st under General Durando at 
Cavriana, the 2d under Cucchiari at Castellucchio, 
the 3d under Delia Rocca at Gazzoldo, and the 4th 
under Cialdini in the vicinity of Ferrara, a total 
strength of nearly 160,000 men. The Archduke Al- 
brecht, who commanded the Kaiser's forces in Vene- 
tia, could muster about Verona scarcely more than 
one third as many bayonets as his foe. He had the 


5th corps under General Rodich, the 7th under Field 
Marshal di Madonna del Monte, the 9th under Gen- 
eral Hartung, and a reserve infantry division com- 
manded by General Eupprecht. Each of these corps 
comprised three infantry brigades of an average 
strength of 5,000 men. 

It seems that a plan of campaign was forwarded 
from Berlin for the. consideration of the royal staff. 
It provided for the masking of the Quadrilateral and 
the embarkation of the main Italian army for some 
point near Trieste from which it could conveniently 
march upon Vienna. In other words, the Prussian 
idea was for the Italians to fight a defensive battle 
on the Mincio and the Po, while they threatened 
Vienna from Styria. In consideration of the great 
numerical superiority of the Italians, this plan was 
feasible from a military point of view, but it did not 
find favor with La Marmora. His preference and 
the sentiment of Italy was for a march on Venice 
rather than on Vienna. 

The plan adopted at the Italian headquarters at 
Goito was to occupy the Quadrilateral in force, to 
isolate the fortresses, and push back the Austrian 
field army. On the 23d, in pursuance of orders 
issued from headquarters on the day previous, the 
Italian armies began their advance. The 1st corps 
passed the Mincio at Monzambano, Borghetto, and 
Molino di Volta, Pianelli's division being retained on 
the right bank to watch the garrison of Peschiera. 
The entire 3d corps crossed at Goito and bivouacked 
between Massimbona and Pozzolo. The 2d corps was 
badly distributed. Three of its brigades were directed 
upon Mantua, another brigade detailed to watch Bor- 
gof orte, while two divisions remained at Castellucchio 


with orders to cross the Mincio on the 24th as a sup- 
port to the 1st and 3d corps. 

General La Marmora took it for granted that the 
archduke would not accept a battle west of the Adige. 
On the 23d he issued his orders to the commanders 
of the 1st and 3d corps to occupy the heights of Sona 
and Sommacampagna. No one seems to have an- 
ticipated that it might be necessary to fight for these 
positions. Consequently at daybreak on the 24th the 
men commenced their march with empty stomachs, in 
heavy marching order, and without even the protec- 
tion of patrols. 

The Archduke Albrecht kept himself well informed 
as to the whereabouts of his enemy and used his 
cavalry to good advantage. The passage of the 3d 
Italian corps at Goito and the position of Durando's 
forces led him to infer that the Italian armies were 
aiming at concentration in the vicinity of Albaredo 
on the Adige. With this impression in mind he gave 
orders on the 23d to occupy the heights of Somma- 
campagna. His plan was excellently conceived. His 
forces took position on a line from Sandra through 
Sona to Sommacampagna, and pivoting on the latter 
place executed a wheel to the left, establishing a new 
line from Castelnuovo to Sonmiacampagna facing 
southwest. It wiU thus be seen that on the morning 
of June 24, when La Marmora's hungry and heavily- 
laden troops were marching loosely to occupy the 
coveted positions, the Austrians were also advancing 
excellently prepared for combat. 

The theatre of action was a memorable one in Aus- 
trian and Italian military history. For the Italians 
it was teeming with gloomy and bitter memories. 
Here in Villafranca, resounding this morning with 


the rumble of artillery and the blare of the bugles of 
Prince Humbert's division, the hateful convention 
of 1859 was signed by Napoleon and the Kaiser. 
Hardly a league distant, drowsily sleeping among 
those hilltops above the hot valley of the Tione is 
the village of Custozza where the Sardinians were 
defeated by Radetsky in 1849. A few miles away 
toward the west, invisible it is true, is the shot- 
scarred tower of Solferino and the grave-sprinkled 
slope before San Martino. It was indeed a sad coun- 
try for the Italians, and destined to become more so. 

About seven o'clock Prince Humbert's division, 
advancing from Villafranca upon Ganfardine and 
Dossobuono, fell in with the Austrian outposts. Upon 
this General Brignone, whose division had crossed 
the Tione and was approaching Staffalo, promptly 
seized the heights of Custozza and the Monte Croce, 
whose summits command the road from Custozza to 
Sommacampagna. This movement was executed none 
too soon, for when the first troops gained the Monte 
Croce the Austrians could be descried on the heights 
of the Berettara across the valley to the north. Bri- 
gnone was soon warmly engaged, the Lombard grena- 
dier brigade on the heights of Custozza, the Pied- 
montese grenadiers on the Monte Croce. 

About the same time the Italian left wing on the 
eastern bank of the Tione had begun the action. 
General Cerale's division, after having lost its way at 
Monzambano and marched nearly to Valeggio in the 
efforts to find Castelnuovo, came up with the Austrian 
division of reserve infantry near Oliosi about six in 
the morning. The Pisa brigade drove the Austrians 
from Mongrabia and from their strong positions on 
the Monte Cricol. The other brigade of the division, 


however, was thrown into disorder by a flank attack 
of Piret's brigade of the 5th corps, which had arrived 
to General Rupprecht's succor. General Cerale was 
wounded in the melee^ and the Pisa brigade had no 
alternative but to retire. The young soldiers, so full 
of elan in the advance, became panicky when the 
buglep sounded the retreat. The reserve of the 1st 
corps arrived at Monte Vento about half past ten and 
covered the retreat of the discomfited battalions. 

General Sirtori with his division had likewise been 
warmly engaged with the Austrian 6th corps on the 
Pernisa plateau and between that point and Santa 
Lucia. About two o'clock, however, despairing of 
supports, he abandoned the latter place and began 
his retreat upon Valeggio. This movement also ne- 
cessitated the withdrawal of the reserve from Monte 
Vento, the right flank of the position being exposed, 
and no hope remaining of rallying Cerale's division. 

In the mean while, unknown to his colleagues. Gen- 
eral PianeUi had crossed the Mincio and adminis- 
tered a severe repulse to the extreme Austrian right. 
He retired to Monte Sabbione with several hundred 
prisoners, and had his presence there been known 
earlier the retreat of Sirtori and the reserve artillery 
would hardly have been necessary. 

The dissipation of the Italian left wing compro- 
mised the central positions about Custozza. The fight 
in that vicinity had been stubbornly maintained 
throughout the morning, the Archduke Albrecht em- 
ploying the 7th and 9th corps in repeated efforts to 
gain the heights. The Lombard grenadiers were 
driven from Custozza in disorder and Prince Amedeo 
wounded. The Piedmontese made good the Monte 
Croce against all assaults, but were relieved about 


ten o'clock by Cugia's division. Brignone's division 
had been subjected to such losses as to be considered 
out of the fight. Govone's division covered Cugia's 
left, and after some hard fighting recaptured Cus- 
tozza. Before this La Marmora had left his centre, 
and was riding away to Valeggio to hunt up his 
missing divisions. The Italian commander had no 
staff with him on this critical day, and in his efforts 
to be at every point and keep track of the battle was 
never to be found when wanted and always laboring 
under erroneous impressions. At noon La Marmora 
at Valeggio believed the army to be lost, but in point 
of fact at two o'clock Pianelli, Sirtori, Cugia, and 
Govone were still unshaken, while Bixio and Hum- 
bert had not been fairly engaged and were being held 
in inaction by the movements of a few audacious cav- 
alrymen. But at 3.30 another face was put upon 
matters* Sirtori was then in retreat, and Pianelli 
moving toward the Mincio. The Archduke Albrecht, 
with his right wing free, inaugurated a strong concen- 
tric movement against the heart of the Italian posi- 
tion. One brigade of the 6th corps, advancing from 
Santa Lucia, threatened Govone's flank and rendered 
the heights of Custozza untenable. In vain the Ital- 
ian general pleaded for reinforcements. The divi- 
sions of Bixio and Humbert continued idle, though a 
movement by them upon Sommacampagna would have 
paralyzed the Austrian attack. Govone retired slowly, 
relinquishing Custozza about six o'clock, while Cugia, 
finding himself abandoned by his colleague, also be- 
gan to retread When at last the archduke foimd 
himself master of the heights of Custozza, the strength 
of his troops was spent. The intense heat of the 
cloudless day had been almost insufferable. No pur- 


suit was attempted, and the soldiers of Bixio and 
Humbert had scarcely an opportunity to foul their 
gim-barrels in covering the retreat upon Yillaf ranca. 
The retrograde movement did not cease at that point, 
and through the darkness of the sultry night the 
broken battalions of the Italian army plodded heav- 
ily over the roads to Goito and Valeggio. Even the 
bridge at the latter place was destroyed, a move that 
for the first time led the archduke to appreciate the 
magnitude of his success. This unwarrantable act 
proclaimed that the Italian commander, far from 
meditating a renewal of the march upon Venice, had 
entirely abandoned the Quadrilateral, and deemed 
the imbroken current of the Mincio necessary to the 
safety of his rear-guard. 

Most military critics agree that La Marmora's neg- 
ligence in not keeping his staff near him was the 
principal cause of the defeat of Custozza. It was 
Cerale's fugitives streaming through Valeggio that 
frightened the Italian general into the idea that all 
was lost, and that Bixio and Humbert must be held 
intact to cover the rout. If he had been in commu- 
nication with his whole line, and spent more time on 
the Tione and less on the Mincio, Sirtori need not 
have abandoned Santa Lucia, and Custozza would 
have been impregnable. 

The Archduke Albrecht showed himself a capable 
soldier, and handled his troops wisely, if not bril- 
liantly. He became the idol of the army, and a fort- 
night after the battle was summoned to Vienna to 
succeed the hapless Benedek. The 5th and 9th corps 
were also called to the defense of the capital, leaving 
a force of barely 25,000 men for the defense of the 


The battle of Custozza cost La Marmora his com- 
mand, which was conferred upon Cialdini. On the 
7th of July, the confidence of the Italian army hav- 
ing been somewhat restored, he commenced an ad- 
vance, pushing his vanguard across the Po that even- 
ing. The Austrian general did not attempt to oppose 
him. On the 14th the Italian vanguard occupied 
Padua ; on the 15th Vicenza. On the 18th the divi- 
sion of General Nunziante drove the Austrian garrison 
from Borgoforte. On the 22d, when a truce was con- 
cluded, Cialdini's left was on the Isonzo and his right 
within view of Venice. 

But the improved military status was offset by an- 
other humiliation. On July 20 the Italian fleet of 
Admiral Persano was worsted by an inferior squadron 
off Lissa. Three Italian iron-clads, the Affondatore, 
Ee d' Italia, and Palestro were sunk. Lissa was Cus- 
tozza repeated at sea. While Persano had the advan- 
tage in ships, tonnage, and weight of metal, the Italian 
seamen were always fighting at a disadvantage against 
odds. A feeling of pity for Persano is irresistible, 
for he had served his country well in past years. He 
was brought before the senate, of which he was a 
member, for trial, charged with cowardice, disobe- 
dience, incapacity, and negligence. The upper Ital- 
ian house had not attained the spirit that animated 
the Roman Senate when they received the consul who 
had commanded the legions at Cannae. Persano was 
acquitted of cowardice on a close vote, but found 
guilty of all other charges and deprived of command 
and rank. 

The events of 1866 have always been humiliating 
memories to Italians. They gained Venetia, but not 
by the force of their own arms. Though the military 


pride of Italy was wounded, she certainly has high 
claims to satisfaction. The policy of the royal gov- 
ernment throughout the year 1866 was conspicuously 
honorable. The king since 1859 had always insisted 
upon his determination to carry Italian freedom to the 
Adriatic. His position was thoroughly understood at 
Vienna, and his practical avowal that the cession of 
Venetia was the only inducement which would keep 
him neutral in a German war was no surprise to the 
Austrian statesmen. After the conclusion of the treaty 
with Prussia the king, though tried, proved himself 
above temptation. In the spring Austria, thoroughly 
alarmed, agreed to his proposition made in the winter. 
But she met with a rebuff, for Victor Emmanuel 
was then boimd, not only to Venetia, but to Prussia 
as well. After the battle of Koniggratz, with his 
army still demoralized by Custozza, he again put aside 
Venetia and the blessings of peace until his duty 
toward Prussia was thoroughly fulfilled. Cialdini's 
advance into Venetia was ordered after the Austrian 
cession of that province to the Emperor of the French, 
The Italian army was poorly organized, poorly 
equipped, and badly directed, but its prowess was 
unquestionable. If it did not win a battle, it detained 
75,000 good Austrian soldiers, who might have turned 
the scale on the Iser or at Koniggratz, 

Italy need not blush for Custozza or Lissa, but she 
may take pride in the whole-souled commendation of 
her powerful ally. On December 20, 1866, Prince 
Bismarck made the following declaration in the Prus- 
sian Chambers: "We had powerful support in the 
incorruptible fidelity of Italy — fidelity which I can- 
not too highly commend, whose value I cannot too 
highly appreciate. The Italian government resisted 


firmly the temptation to violate the alliance on ao* 
count of Austria's gift (the cession of Yenetia), who 
was oar mutual foe; from this fact we may draw 
strong hopes that in the future the most cordial rela- 
tions will xmite Germany and Italy." 



The Treaty op Prague. — The Four Great Results op the 
Seven Weeks' War. — The Federal Reichstag. — Bismarck 


Era in Austria. — The Transfer op Venetia. — Victor Em- 
manuel IN Venice. — Critical Condition op Europe in 1867. 

Prussia concluded peace with all the South Ger- 
man states except Darmstadt before the close of 
August. On August 23 the treaty of Prague was 
concluded with Austria, and on October 3 the treaty 
of Vienna waa signed between Austria and Italy. 

The treaty of Prague was a substantial ratification 
of the Nikolsburg preliminaries. South Germany 
procured peace at the expense of heavy indemnities, 
and in the case of Hesse Darmstadt and Bavaria the 
cession of territory north of the Main. The treaty of 
Vienna ratified the union of Venetia with the Italian 

The results of the Seven Weeks' war may be 
simimed up imder four heads : first, the exaltation of 
Prussia and the formation of the North German con- 
federation under her leadership ; second, the disap- 
pearance of Austria as a German power ; third, the 
realization of Italian freedom from the Alps to the 
Adriatic; and fourth, the shattering of Napoleon's 
air-castles. England and Kussia were not seriously 
influenced. The London government experienced 


some misgiving over what it regarded as the downfall 
of continental conservatism, while St. Petersburg was 
still inclined to regard with complacency any humilia- 
tion of Austria. ^ 

Bismarck returned to Berlin with his policy vin- 
dicated and his popularity assured. In 1849 he had 
publicly declared that the most prominent charac- 
teristic of Prussian nationality was its warlike ele- 
ment. It remained for the first battles in Bohemia 
to demonstrate the truth of his words. The news 
of victory worked a transformation throughout the 
nation, and the very men whose names had been 
prominent on peace petitions joined lustily in the 
popular shout of " to Vienna," The soldiers who 
left their occupations with reluctance, and entered 
the ranks without enthusiasm, took kindly to the 
bloody work on the heights above Sadowa, and even 
grumbled over the early cessation of hostilities. It 
was remarked by foreigners that there was a tinge of 
ferocity in the joy which animated Berlin when the 
regiments from the Danube began to throng the Lin- 
den, suggesting that it was induced more by victorious 
war than the satisfaction of renewed peace. 

Bismarck upon returning to the Diet found a spirit 
of congratulation and adulation, where two months be- 
fore he had encountered oidy hostility and invective. 
The houses almost unanimously acquiesced in the 
proposed incorporation of Hanover and Hesse Cas- 
sel and Nassau into the Prussian kingdom, and the 
amalgamation of all the German states north of the 
Main into a commercial and military confederation. 
In June, 1866, Prussia had an area of 127,350 square 
miles and a population of 19,000,000. Before the 
close of that year she had extended her sway over 


160,000 mUes and 23,000,000 souls. Every state 
north of the Main was either incorporated in the 
Prussian monarchy or joined with it in the iron bands 
of the North German confederation. The fate of 
Saxony himg for a time in the balance, and but for 
the efforts of Austria backed by France its ancient 
house would have shared the fate of that of Hanover. 
The settlement reached was complex and satisfactory 
only to Prussia. The Saxon throne remained intact 
on the following conditions : That Saxony entered the 
confederation, that the military and postal affairs 
passed under the control of Prussia, that the fortress 
of Konigstein should receive a Prussian garrison, and 
Dresden a garrison half Prussian, half Saxon, under 
a Prussian commandant. The salt tax was abolished 
and a war indemnity exacted of 10,000,000 thalers. 

But matters in the federal Keichstag did not run 
smoothly. Bismarck, having mollified his old ene- 
mies, found new ones in the delegations from Hano- 
ver, Hesse, and Saxony. He had no mercy upon these 
imhappy patriots with their complaints and protesta- 
tions. " They who dealt us a stab in the side in the 
hour of our danger," he stormed, "have no right 
afterwards to become sentimental and complain of 
hard usage." When in July, 1867, Bismarck was 
proclauned chancellor of the confederation, he could 
look back upon a great work accomplished. The an- 
nexed states were still turbulent, but for all that they 
recognized that the confederation was a safeguard 
against foreign menace. All the military forces were 
in process of reorganization on the Prussian plan, and 
the closer union of commercial interests was bearing 
good fruit. 

Bismarck was preparing even at this time for a 


danger that the German people and the world at large 
did not suspect ; he alone could see it looming darkly 
in the west and casting its shadow over the Rhine- 
land. M. Benedetti moved conspicuously in diplo- 
matic circles at Berlin ; he was frequently in confer- 
ence with the chancellor ; he passed restlessly back and 
forth between Paris and Berlin. Even the diplomatic 
world did not know what this portended, nor that 
the French ambassador in his efforts to " indenmify 
France " had placed in the hands of the wily chan- 
cellor a weapon that was destined to make Germany 
a military imit from the Baltic to the Alps. South 
Germany hated Prussia and the northern confedera- 
tion, princes as well as people. When, however, 
Bismarck placed before them the paper which Bene- 
detti had confided to him, they, too, caught a glimpse 
of the tempest gathering in the west. In fact, before 
the close of August, 1866, while the graves at Kis- 
sengen and Laufach were still fresh, the armies of 
South Germany as well as those of the confederation 
were at the disposal of the king of Prussia in case of 
war. Six months passed before this was developed, 
but in the cabinet at Berlin, and in certain circles in 
Mimich, Darmstadt, and Stuttgart, they knew that 
French diplomacy had miscarried, and that the would- 
be trickster had been tricked. 

Austria, though humiliated in the field, turned her 
losses to excellent accoimt. Driven from the Ger- 
man brotherhood at the point of the bayonet, it is 
questionable if she gained less by her reverse than 
did her conqueror by the victory, Austria since 
1815 had been endeavoring to " rim " Europe, so to 
speak, or at least a large portion of it. Menacing 


Russia on the eastern Danube, ruling Italy from 
Venice and Milan, snubbing Prussia at Frankfort, 
and grappling with Denmark in Schleswig, she had 
been creating foes upon all hands and frittering away 
her strength. The warning of 1859 passed unheeded, 
and it remained for the disaster of Koniggratz to 
teach the Kaiser the lesson he had persistently re- 
fused to learn by milder methods. His reputed mili- 
tary power was proved a mere bubble. His soldiers 
fought stubbornly but without enthusiasm. It was 
plain that greater content must be achieved at home 
before conquests either of a moral or military nature 
could be achieved abroad. With Himgary hostile or 
indifferent, it was impossible to make the will of 
Vienna a powerful factor in the politics of Europe. 

The battle of Koniggratz closed an epoch of Aus- 
trian history and inaugurated a new era. The Kaiser 
extended the olive branch to his Magyar subjects, and 
gracefully conceded the national parliament for which 
they had been clamoring since 1848. The result 
demonstrated the wisdom of the act. The warm- 
hearted Hungarians expressed their satisfaction by 
electing the emperor and empress king and queen of 
Hungary, and establishing the hereditary succession 
in the House of Hapsburg. Austria had at last en- 
tered upon the path that was destined to secure for 
her the strength and cohesion she had always lacked. 
If the power of the Kaiser was felt no longer on the 
Rhine it became doubly potent on the Danube. If 
his soldiery had held* their last parades at Frankfort 
and Mayence, there was more than a compensating 
satisfaction in the newly gained assurance that their 
presence was no longer necessary in the loyal streets 
of Buda-Pest, At Vienna they could not fail to 


remark how contentedly the empire developed without 
the responsibility of Europe upon its shoulders. The 
enthusiasm that attended the coronation ceremonies 
at Buda-Pest in July, 1867, formed a most happy 
contrast to many of the then recent political events in 
the Hungarian capital. With a parliament at Buda- 
Pest and another at Vienna the internal machinery 
of the Austro-Himgarian monarchy worked smoothly 
enough, while in the Delegations ^ the Kaiser found 
no more loyal subjects than the men who had been 
nurtured in bitter hatred of Austria, and who had 
followed the standard of Kossuth. 

The transfer of Yenetia was a move beneficial alike 
to the Venetians and the contracting powers. Aus- 
tria lost a discontented province that had brought her 
nothing but trouble and expense. Italy gained an 
intensely patriotic people, who only required political 
content to make them prosperous. When in October 
the question of their fate was placed in their own 
hands to be decided by ballot, the Venetians by an 
almost unanimous vote declared for annexation to the 
kingdom of Italy. 

So the Austrian garrison sailed from the Lagune, 
and the broad folds of the tricolor displaced the 
Uack and yellow banner on the arsenal. It remained 
for the 7th of November to furnish the culmination 
of this most dramatic period in the history of north- 
em Italy. On that day Victor Emmanuel passed, 
amidst the plaudits of his newly gained subjects, 
across the crowded piazza and up the dim nave to 
the altar of San Marco. The work of Italian libera- 

^ The Delegfations is the national parliament which sits at Vienna, 
representing Austria and Hungary alike, its members being chosen 
by the houses in session at Vienna and Pest. 


tion inaugurated by the mysterious interview at 
Plombieres was thus dramatically consummated on 
the shores of the Adriatic within the walls of the 
cathedral of Venice. 

It was a conspicuous fact that none of the powers 
participating in the war of 1866 laid down their 
arms upon the conclusion of peace. A spirit of un- 
rest pervaded diplomatic circles. In Italy the king 
was in constant correspondence with the French gov- 
ernment respecting Kome, while at the same time he 
suppressed the feverish enthusiasm of " Young Italy." 
The Austrian chancellor, Baron Beust, while apply- 
ing himself indefatigably to the restoration of the 
resources of the empire, kept an ever watchful eye 
upon Prussia, and smiled encouragingly upon France 
as a possible avenger of Koniggratz. And the chan- 
cellor of the north German confederation, while main- 
taining his military strength, was looking for an ally 
against France. He chatted pleasantly with the 
French ambassador at Berlin and hinted at great pos- 
sibilities, but in the mean time he was using soft 
words on the Danube, and talking business on the 

France was the centre in 1867 around which Europe 
was revolving. She held the key to the Eoman ques- 
tion and Italy was her suitor ; she possessed an un- 
beaten army and Austria was her flatterer ; but she 
sought a sHce of Khineland and Prussia was her foe. 



Napoleon's Dream is shattebed. — The Crisis of his Reion. 
— Drouyn de Lhuys' Conception of the Crisis. — Indeci- 

IN 1866. — The French Government unable to meet the 
Military Situation. — Benedetti at Nikolsburq. — Bene- 
detti in Berlin. — Efforts of the Paris Government to 
indemnify itself through Diplomatic Channem. — Refusaii 
OF THE French Propositions by Bismarck. — Policy of 
Drouyn de Lhuys and his Removal from Office. — Bis- 

States. — Second Attack of M. Benedetti. — Confidencb 
IN Paris over the Success of his Mission. — Benedetti's 
Discomfiture and Return to Paris. — Desperation of the 
French Government. — The Contemplated Purchase of 
Luxemburg frustrated by Bismarck. — Prussia consents 
TO remove her Garrison from Luxemburg. — Summary of 
THE French Diplomacy for 1866-67. — The Decline of the 
Empire. — Paris in 1867. 

The Emperor of the French had counted upon a 
Prussian defeat. Indeed, dreading lest Austria's vic- 
tory might be too sweeping, he had gone so far as to 
offer the services of the French army to the Berlin 
government on the basis of a territorial remunera- 
tion in Bavaria, Hesse, and Khenish Prussia. This 
suggestion, however, meeting with no favor at Berlin, 
he guaranteed Austria his neutrality, and determined 
to wait a later opportunity to arouse Prussia's grati- 
tude, and gain his long-coveted acquisitions in the 


The emperor regarded a long campaign as a neces- 
sity of the situation, and the astonishing news of 
Koniggratz was wholly unexpected. Austria was 
beaten to her knees, and he had no understanding 
with Prussia. The crisis of his reign was suddenly 
forced upon him ; and if in his first bewilderment he 
failed to realize this, his foreign minister was fully 
alive to it. In fact, M. Drouyn de Lhuys insisted 
that the necessities of the situation demanded a 
French army on the German frontier to enforce the 
emperor's demand that no remodeling of Central 
Europe should take place without his sanction. M. 
Benedetti, ambassador at Vienna, also warmly urged 
this course. " Let the emperor make a simple mili- 
tary demonstration," he wrote, " and he will be aston- 
ished at the facility with which he will become arbiter 
and master of the situation without striking a blow." 
On July 5 at a cabinet council M. Drouyn de Lhuys 
warmly urged his project, and was seconded by Mar- 
shal Kandon, minister for war. When the council 
broke up, it was understood that the emperor would 
on the following day promulgate his manifesto con- 
voking the Chambers, but during the evening he was 
importuned by M. de Lavalette and other leaders of 
the Prussophile party. Broken by disease, his power 
of decision impaired, the unhappy emperor was led to 
change his mind, and choose the course that was to lead 
his dynasty to ruin. 

The army was in a wretched state, and it has even 
been asserted that it would have been a physical im- 
possibility for the war office to have carried out the 
scheme of M. Drouyn de Lhuys at that time. It 
seems hardly reasonable, however, to believe that the 
French military establishment had sunk so low as this 


would imply. It is more probable that the emperor 
had misgivings lest the " simple military demonstra- 
tion " might result in hard blows. In this case his 
recent losses in Mexico and the tried excellence of the 
Prussian weapons must have exerted an influence 
upon his mind. Again, in case of war, where were 
his generals capable of coping with such masters in 
the science as the Prussians had proved themselves ? 
What could be expected from such a trio as Niel, 
MacMahon, and Canrobert, who were always at each 
other's throats ? It was a bad quandary, and unques- 
tionably the decision of the emperor made it worse. 

We cannot refrain from speculating at this time 
upon what the result would have been, had Marshal 
Kandon been ordered to move two corps d'armee to 
the Prussian frontier during those critical July days. 
We can hardly doubt that the disaster which over- 
whelmed the empire would have been at least delayed. 
We know, too, that the possibility of French inter- 
ference was a danger which Bismarck had foreseen, 
dreaded, and against which he had been unable to 
make any adequate provision. We have it from his 
own lips in reference to this crisis, " If France had 
then had only a few available troops, a small body of 
French soldiers would have sufficed to make quite a 
respectable army by joining the numerous corps of 
South Germany, which on their part would furnish 
excellent materials, and whose organization alone was 
defective. Such an army would have first placed us 
in the prime necessity of covering Berlin and of 
abandoning all our successes in Austria." ^ 

^ " I was mnch interested by the opinion expressed by his majesty 
(King William of Prussia) .that the war of 1866 was the rain of 
France, ' because Napoleon should have attacked us in the rear I ' He 
-went on to say that in 1866 he never wquld believe in the neutrality 


The French emperor, when he abandoned military 
coercion as a means of restraining Prussia from ex- 
orbitant territorial demands, adopted an extraordinary 
substitute. He determined to appeal to her sense of 
honor and of gratitude, which should certainly have 
been awakened by his friendly course since 1864. 
The gratitude of Prussia with Bismarck Schonhausen 
to dispense it ! It was in pursuance of this meek and 
gentle policy that M. Benedetti sought Bismarck at 
Nikolsburg. The conversations there developed to 
Bismarck the object of the French desires, and that 
the emperor was in reality inclined to allow Prussia 
free scope in disposing of Austrian territory, provided 
he was allowed certain privileges in the Shineland as 
" indemnification " for her increased area. 

Bismarck's reception of Benedetti's schemes seems 
to have been distinctly non-committal, but he said 
enough to leave hope still bright in the bosom of the 
French ambassador. He enlarged upon his 4esire for 
a good imderstanding between France and Prussia, 
and pointed out the fact that were their interests 
similar their position was such they could unitedly 
bid defiance to aU Europe. There is a touch of the 
pathetic in the eagerness with which M. Benedetti 
seized these crumbs from the rich man's table, and in 
the manner in which he displayed them upon the im- 
perial board at the Tuileries. Benedetti was not only 
hopeful, but sanguine. The emperor began to turn 
his energies in real earnest to effect that good under- 
standing which Bismarck had so pleasantly referred 
to at Nikolsburg. 

of France, and that only after a long struggle did he consent to re- 
move his forces from the Rhine provinces. He had always been 
grateful to the Emperor Napoleon for his neutrality on that occa- 
sion." — BeuBt, Yol. ii. p. 280. 


Bismarck returned to Berlin, where he was followed 
by Benedetti armed with a form of treaty to be sub- 
mitted to the Prussian government for approval. The 
gist of this project was the restoration to France " of 
the territories which were within the French frontiers 
of 1814," including all districts of Bavaria and Hesse 
on the left bank of the Rhine. Benedetti heartily 
approved of these demands. " Convinced," he said, 
" that the imperial government has kept within the 
bounds of equity by thus limiting itself to demanding 
the guarantees rendered necessary by Prussia's terri- 
torial aggrandizement, I shall not be easily induced 
to put up with alterations of any moment. ... I 
shall steadfastly point out that Prussia would ignore 
the dictates of justice and prudence, beside proving 
her ingratitude, were she to refuse us the guarantee 
which the enlargement of her frontiers compels us to 

On August 5 a draft of this secret treaty came 
under Bismarck's eye. On the day following he sum- 
moned the French ambassador, and met him with an 
imqualified refusal. In vain Benedetti expostulated, 
wheedled, and threatened. As a last resort, finding 
himself refused on all points, he hinted that the just 
rage of his sovereign might lead hinj to " let slip the 
dogs of war." " Very well," was the curt rejoinder, 
" then we will have war ; but " — and one can im- 
agine a keen irony in the chancellor's tones — " let his 
majesty well observe that such a war could become in 
certain eventualities a war with a revolution, and 
that in presence of revolutionary dangers the German 
dynasty would prove to be much more firmly estab- 
lished than that of Napoleon." In short, the project 
which Benedetti had approved as just, and which he 


had determined to insist upon without modification, 
had been squarely refused. Prussia had shown no 
compunction whatever about "proving her ingrat- 
itude." Furthermore, M. Benedetti had been dis- 
missed by the " iron count " with an assurance that 
Prussia had even outgrown the traditional fear of the 
French army. 

The idea of war which Benedetti had hinted at as 
a last resort seems not to have been seriously enter- 
tained at Paris. The causes that prevented military 
measures in July were quite as potent in August ; 
France was no better prepared and Prussia had both 
hands free again. In this humiliating perplexity a 
scapegoat was found in the person of the foreign 
minister. Judging his views in the light of subse- 
quent events, M. Drouyn de Lhuys seems to have 
comprehended the political situation at this time far 
better than the majority of his contemporaries. He 
was firmly opposed to the party represented by M. 
Benedetti, though the exigencies of the times served 
to swell its ranks. He laughed at the idea that what 
the government had shown itself too nerveless to 
grasp was to be placed at its disposal by a govern- 
ment whose army was already in the field flushed 
with victory and capable of sustaining a long cam- 
paign. An alliance with Prussia was to M. Drouyn 
de Lhuys an absurdity. Prussia and France were 
natural enemies. To disguise that fact was to make 
a cat's-paw of France. 

M. Drouyn de Lhuys was bestirring himself ear- 
nestly to lighten the burdens imposed by Prussia on 
the conquered states when Benedetti returned from 
Berlin after his discomfiture. The emperor was still 
firm in the conviction that nothing was to be gained 


by war. Can anything be imagined more humiliating 
than the French position at this time ? A proposal 
approved by the emperor himself had been submitted 
to the Prussian government, and rejected even in the 
teeth of threats of military enforcement. What was 
the course of the French government to recover their 
shattered prestige ? They disavowed the scheme that 
had aroused the admiration of Benedetti himself as 
an act of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who had extorted the 
sanction of the emperor while he was ilL M. Drouyn 
de Lhuys passed from office, and the Prussophile 
party seized the helm. The Berlin government thor- 
oughly appreciated the political situation, however, 
and were not to be misled by apologies and official 
decapitation. France had tasted the cup of humilia- 
tion, she had proclaimed her weakness and military 
impreparedness to the power which of all others she 
should have held in ignorance of it. 

Prussia in the mean time kept quietly at work 
demonstrating the enormity of her ingratitude. Dup- 
ing August Bismarck had made Germany a military 
unit. He merely displayed the French project, that 
freak of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as the new regime at 
the foreign office chose to regard it, with its damning 
clauses concerning the cession of Bavarian and Hes- 
sian territories, and the South German confederation 
was quickly brought to terms. Between the 17th 
and 23d of August informal military treaties were 
concluded against France between Prussia and the 
states lately in arms against her. Bismarck hastily 
threw off these important duties in season to welcome 
Benedetti to Berlin once more. 

That the government of the emperor should have 
approached Prussia again on the question of indemni- 


fication seems almost incredible, and yet it was an- 
other project of this nature that Benedetti presented 
to Bismarck during the last week of August. There 
is nothing in the diplomatic history of the period to 
show the grounds on which the French ambassador 
based his assurance of success in this second effort. 
Certainly it was no less objectionable than the first in 
its tenor. The Ehenish frontier was avoided, it is 
true, but Luxemburg and Belgium formed a substi- 
tute. A strong military alliance between the two 
governments was also provided for. Great stress was 
laid by the emperor's government upon the necessity 
of maintaining the absolute secrecy of these negotia- 
tions. The tone of feeling at the foreign office on 
the Quai d'Orsay seems really to have approached 
confidence. Day after day, too, the reports from 
Benedetti were encouraging. He returned the draft 
of the treaty for inspection, and the emperor sug- 
gested certain alterations. Upon receiving the draft 
again Benedetti confidently placed it in the hands of 
Bismarck. The Tuileries waited expectant, but they 
were not to be long held in suspense. 

General Manteuffel suddenly turned up in Berlin, 
and after a few hours' conference with the chancellor 
left for St. Petersburg. Benedetti's alarm was natu- 
ral, and the information carried a chill to the heart of 
the French emperor. " I asked the president of the 
council," wrote Benedetti, " if this general officer had 
been informed of our overture ; he answered that he 
had had no occasion to make him a party to it, but 
that he could not guarantee to me that the king had 
not told him the substance." 

Bismarck's reception of this teeaty waa far differ- 
ent from that with which he met the first. There was 


no refusal whatever ; he merely demurred, meditated, 
and then apparently forgot it, for he left Berlin and 
shut himself up for weeks from the worry of political 
life, without even taking the trouble to return the 
document in question. 

Poor Benedetti I It was his hard fate, not only to 
be the prominent actor in these inglorious proceed- 
ings, but to break the doleful news of failure to the 
sanguine officials of the Qua! d'Orsay. " They have 
elsewhere obtained assurances which dispense with our 
aid," he wrote shortly after Manteuffel's arrival at 
St. Petersburg. " If they decline our alliance, it is 
because they are already provided or on the eve of 
being." Prussia needed the alliance of a great power, 
and she arranged it on the Neva. 

After these repeated rebuffs, cidminating in a Russo- 
Prussian alliance, it would surely seem that the 
French emperor would have desisted from his fruit- 
less attempts to obtain " indemnification " at the 
hands of his heartless and athletic neighbor. The 
dregs in the cup of shame, however, yet remained to 
be swallowed. Trusting apparently to some vague re- 
marks made by Bismarck in 1866 respecting the 
existing relations between Luxemburg and the north 
German confederation. Napoleon opened negotiations 
with the king of the Netherlands direct for the pur- 
chase of the duchy. That is, notwithstanding his 
former lack of success the emperor was persuaded 
that, could the matter be peacefully arranged with 
Holland on a financial basis, Bismarck would not take 
the trouble to interfere. 

Everything progressed smoothly for a time ; the 
king of the Netherlands was willing and it only re- 
mained to consult Prussia. On March 21, 1867, M. 


de Moustier, then foreign minister, expressed himself 
as follows in relation to the Luxemburg purchase : 
" We believe that the grand duke possesses the un- 
restricted right to dispose of Luxemburg with the 
consent of its inhabitants, and that we have as indis- 
putable a right to acquire that country under similar 
conditions. But we, as well as the king of the Neth- 
erlands, entertain the sincere wish to maintain good 
relations with the court at Berlin ; and it is impos- 
sible not to take into accoimt the presence of a Prus- 
sian garrison, although no longer justified by a Jegal 
right. . . . We have no objection to the cabinet of 
Berlin being made acquainted with these negotia- 
tions, but we wish that the information may reach it 
through ourselves." 

In this latter wish the French government was dis- 
appointed. The information leaked out prematurely 
through the Dutch envoy at Berlin. The details 
received an uncomfortable publicity, and all Germany 
was stirred with rage. Then the emperor's diplomatic 
fabric came crashing down again. Bismarck seized 
the opportunity of making himself popular with the 
masses, and again placed himself squarely in the path 
of French aggrandizement. M. de Moustier hastened 
to inform the Chambers that the negotiations respect- 
ing Luxemburg had not assumed an official character, 
and were in reality merely an exchange of ideas. 

There was no dignity in the final forlorn demand 
of France that if she was not to be allowed to con- 
summate her bargain, Prussia must at least consent 
to remove her garrison from Luxemburg. It was a 
demand little better than trivial, but Bismarck re- 
fused to accede to it. It was a matter, however, that 
involved the powers and was referred to a conference. 


Finally Prussia agreed to withdraw the garrison, and 
raze the fortress, on the condition that the powers 
guaranteed the neutrality of the duchy. 

At last the Tuileries had scored a success. The 
French government between May, 1866, and May, 
1867, had demanded of Prussia a military alliance, 
the frontiers of 1814 including Mayence, and free- 
dom of action concerning Belgium and Luxemburg. 
Refused on all these points, they had the mortifica- 
tion of facilitating the Russo-Prussian alliance. Fi- 
nally with the desperation of despair they had in- 
sisted upon the withdrawal of the Prussian garrison 
from Luxemburg, and this amid the laughter of 
diplomatic Berlin had been allowed them. This was 
their " indemnification " for the benefits accruing to 
Prussia from the campaign of Koniggratz. 

That other attempts were made by the French 
government during the spring of 1867 to bring about 
a Franco-Prussian alliance there can be no question, 
but before this the hopelessness of the situation was 
apparent even to the infatuated statesmen of the 
second empire. One by one the deluded diplomatists 
found themselves forced to adopt views held by 
Drouyn de Lhuys months before. For a government 
dependent upon its prestige, the empire had been 
subjected to an appalling list of slights and insults. 
It had abased itself in so far that, had the full truth 
been made public, a victorious war would have been 
a necessity to its maintenance. It was with this 
eventuality fully in mind that the emperor confided 
to Marshal Niel the reorganization and rearming of 
the army which had proved itself so inadequate to 
meet the crisis of the summer of 1866. 

So far as external appearances were concerned, 


however, it must be admitted that in 1867 the French 
empire was at the zenith of its splendor. The count- 
less thousands who visited Paris in the spring and 
summer of that year could hardly fail to be impressed 
by the air of elegance and conscious power that 
seemed to pervade the city. The monarch who had 
made his name illustrious by his victories over the 
proudest military states in Europe had gathered 
within his capital the products of the globe, and in- 
vited his faithful subjects and the world at large to 
inspect them. The splendor of the exhibition was 
worthy of the city, at last incontestably the most 
splendid in the world. The marks of Napoleonic 
taste and prodigality were everywhere apparent. 
Streets crooked and dark had mysteriously disap- 
peared, and been supplanted by broad avenues 
straight as the Boman roads, and lined with noble 
edifices in every stage of completion. The magic 
initial N with its laurel wreath again appeared upon 
all sides in stone and metal, and to the group of 
thoroughfares known by the stirring titles of Fried- 
land, Eylau, and Wagram had been added those of 
Sebastopol, Solferino, and Magenta. St. Cloud had 
never been more gay even in the days of Marie An- 
toinette, and at Fontainebleau, never since the time 
of Louis le Grand had such gorgeous companies fol- 
lowed the stag through the mazes of the forest. In 
a word, Paris had become the resort of all lovers of 
the splendid and beautiful. Everything was gayety 
and frivolity, from the atmosphere and conversation 
of the Tuileries or St. Cloud to the atmosphere and 
conversation of the cafe tables. Indeed, the manners 
and customs of the cafe and boulevard only reflected 
the standard of the court, whose fair and trivial mis- 


tress had become the emulation of feminine society in 
Paris and the toast of every mess-room. The merely 
casual observer was in ignorance of the secrets of the 
foreign office, and could not recognize in the pomp 
and luxury about him the signs of debility and decay. 
Gorgeous the empire certainly was, but its virility 
was waning. The intrigues and dissipations of the 
court did not beget loyalty, the bitter feuds and jeal- 
ous wrangling of officers did not promote military 
discipline or sagacity. The pampered garrison of 
Paris did not truly represent the army, any more 
than the reports of ministers truly represented the 
state of their departments. Everything was corrupt, 
shifting, unreliable, and false. 

Among the visitors to Paris in 1867 was Count 
Bismarck, and as he strolled through the exhibition 
halls and along the Champs Elysee, where fashionable 
Paris amused itself after the questionable methods of 
the day, he was asking himself how it would have 
been had the Luxemburg quarrel been fought out ? 
Would he have been in Paris or the French in Ber- 
lin ? He moved about comparatively imobserved, for 
royalty itself was at this time enjoying the hospitality 
of the Tuileries, but in less than four years his name 
was to be on the lips of every Parisian, and the igno- 
rant were to see in the glow of the Aurora Borealis 
the sign of his bloody hand. 



Condition of Eubopb in 1867. — The Powers at Peace. — Un- 
settled State of Spain. — Garibaldi in the Field again. — 
The Battle of Mentana. — Bitter Feeling engendered by 
IT IN Italy toward France. — Power of the Empress in the 
French Councils. — Her Ai^bition. — Efforts of the Em- 
peror TO steady his Throne. — The Reorganization of the 
Army. — Warlike Sentiment in Paris. — The Hohenzollern 
Incident. — The Rage of France. — Excitement in the Corps 
L^gislatif. — M. Benedetti seeks the Prussian King at 
Ems. — The French Government becomes unreasonable. — 
Insulting Demand upon the King of Prussia. — Bismarck's 
Circular in Reference to it. — Ollivier's Bellicose Speech 
IN THE Corps L6gislatif. — Enthusiasm in Paris. — The Em- 
peror's Misgivings. — His Hopes and Fears. — The Shatter- 
ing of his Hopes. — Baron Beust's Letter. — The Isolation 
OF THE French Government in Europe. — The Emperor's 
Proclamation and Departure for Metz. — Wretched Con- 
dition OF Affairs there. — Impatience of Paris — The 
" Affaire " of Saarbruck. 

At the opening of the year 1867 the great con- 
tinental peoples were turning their attention to the 
husbanding of their resources and developing the 
arts of peace. Though imposing military forces were 
maintained, the political atmosphere seemed purified 
by the seven weeks' tempest of blood and iron, and 
at no time since 1850 had the public mind been so 
free from forebodings of the future. Bussia seemed 
absorbed in the awkward effort to accustom herself 
to the new regime inaugurated by the emancipation 


of the serfs, wliile Austria-Hungary was likewise en- 
deavoring to turn to the best account her newly 
gained blessings of constitutional ' liberty. As for 
France, the great exhibition at Paris seemed to indi- 
cate that the emperor was inclined to convert the 
sword into the plowshare, and abandon the paths 
of military glory for those of domestic improvement. 
In Spain and Italy alone were there any indications 
of political unrest. So far as Spain was concerned, 
however, her struggles and contentions had long since 
failed to arouse the apprehension of Europe. Insur- 
rections, banishments, executions, and assassinations 
were regarded as inseparable features of the politi- 
cal life of a people once among the most cultivated, 
patriotic, and chivalrous the world has ever known. 
Indeed, when in the early summer of 1868 Prim and 
Serrano returned from their enforced exile and set 
up the standard of revolt on Spanish soil, no serious 
alarm was felt north of the Pyrenees. The army 
enthusiastically espousing the cause of the distin- 
guished rebels, the days of the debauched and priest- 
ridden court were numbered. Isabella fled to France, 
and Serrano seized the reins of government. With 
the dethronement of the queen the direful question 
of the succession was again laid open, but still with 
Serrano as regent and the army in the hands of so 
just and capable a soldier as Prim, quiet in Spain 
seemed far better assured than at any time for years. 
Indeed, there was nothing to indicate in 1869 that 
Madrid was to furnish the spark which was to set 
Europe in warlike flame again. 

The time-worn dispute betwixt church and state was 
still agitating Italy in 1867. A long step was taken 
towards its settlement when on the 4th of Decem- 


ber, 1866, the French emperor withdrew his troops 
from Rome. Scarcely had this long delayed move- 
ment been consummated, when " Young Italy " again 
forced itself into serious prominence. Garibaldi 
once more started the Soman battle-cry, and had set 
a respectable revolution afoot before he was seized 
and conveyed to Caprera. In vain the king en- 
deavored to allay the popular excitement. The papal 
government, alarmed, appealed to Paris for protec- 
tion. Despite the assurances of Victor Emmanuel 
that his government was fully equal to the emergency, 
and against his protests as well, the French emperor 
dispatched a military expedition to Civita Vecchia. 
This proved too much for Garibaldi's self-control. 
Once again he broke from Caprera and joined the 
ranks of the insurgents. Before this, one attack on 
Rome had been repulsed by the papal guard. Gari- 
baldi hurried from the sea-coast at the head of a 
motley but determined band, and at Monterotundo 
routed a detachment of the pontifical mercenaries. 
Encouraged by this he pushed rapidly on toward 
Rome, and at Mentana encountered a detachment of 
the newly arrived French troops under General de 
Failly. These troops represented the reorganized 
army of Marshal Niel, and were armed with the new 
breech-loading rifle known as the chassepot. There 
was no fighting ; the unhappy Italians were literally 
mowed down by the steady fusillades. " The chasse- 
pot rifle has done wonders," was De Failly's enthu- 
siastic comment in his report of the battle. The 
demonstration of the effectiveness of the new weapon, 
however, scarcely compensated for other results of 
Mentana. On November 6 the Marquis Pepoli, who 
had succeeded Minghetti as head of the government, 


wrote to the emperor at Paris : " The late events have 
suffocated every remembrance of gratitude in the 
heart of Italy. It is no longer in the power of the 
government to maintain the alliance with France. 
The chassepot gun at Mentana has given it a mortal 
blow." It is not too much to say that this skirmish 
which General de Failly regarded merely as a happy 
test of firearms was the means of depriving the 
French emperor of the only allies possible to him in 
Europe. The personal regard in which Victor Em- 
manuel held the emperor continued imtil death, but 
the slaughter of Mentana forever estranged the na- 
tion, whose gratitude had been awakened by Magenta 
and Solf erino, and had even survived the disappoint- 
ment of Villafranca. The emperor definitely sealed 
his fate in Italy when he refused to again withdraw 
his garrison from Rome. 

Most assuredly a change had been wrought in the 
Italian policy of France. The influence of the em- 
press had begun to make itself felt in the schemes of 
the foreign office. In her the Catholic Church had a 
powerful champion, and every word from the Vatican 
came to be all potent at the Tuileries. In Cavour's 
time the emperor had not hesitated to incur the wrath 
of Rome ; in 1868-69 his policy came to represent in- 
difference to the interests of his old ally at Florence. 
The empress aspired to see France the acknowledged 
protector of the Romish Church. The emperor, with 
a deadly disease sapping his strength and weakening 
his nerve, resigned himself to the guidance of the 
empress, the church, and the army. The empress 
and the church urged that Protestant Prussia must 
be humbled, and the army clamored that it might be 
allowed to execute the task. 


The emperor dreaded this struggle with Prussia, 
which was represented to him as a necessity of the 
situation. The elections of 1869 certainly seemed to 
indicate that his prestige at home had sunk so low 
that he must choose between a foreign war and a do- 
mestic revolution. In the election of 1852 the city 
of Paris had sustained his government by a majority ^ 
of 46,000; the country had sustained it by over 
7,000,000. In 1869 Paris rolled up an adverse ma- 
jority of 150,000, while the government majority in 
the country at large had fallen to 755,000. It was 
plain there must be more glory earned in some quar- 
ter with which to prop the failing strength of the 
dynasty. With this necessity in view in 1868 the 
emperor had made advances for a triple alliance be- 
tween France, Austria, and Italy against Prussia. 
Matters progressed so far that a draft treaty stipulat- 
ing a general plan for a German campaign passed 
between the governments. Then the fruits of Men- 
tana made themselves manifest. The Florence gov- 
ernment made the evacuation of Rome the condition 
of its acceptance of the French project. The em- 
peror was compelled to make choice between the 
friendship of Italy and the friendship of Rome. The 
clerical party with the empress at its head gained the 
day. Italy refused to consider the alliance in conse- 
quence, and Austria, whose cooperation depended 
upon Italy, was also lost to the scheme. The empire 
and the Roman Church stood alone in Europe. 

The reorganization of the army progressed slowly, 
but the enthusiasm of the empress and the swagger 
of generals failed to arouse the confidence of the em- 
peror for the future. The minister of war pronounced 
everything satisfactory, and it was the opinion of that 


officer which the emperor proclaimed to the Chambers 
on the 18th of January, 1869 : " The military law 
and the supplies voted by your patriotism have 
strengthened the confidence of the country, which is 
now proudly conscious that it is in a position to en- 
counter whatever may betide. . . . Our perfect arma- 
ments (chassepots and mitrailleuses), our replete ar- 
senals and magazines, our trained reserves, our mobile 
National Guard, our reconstructed fleet, and our pow- 
erful fortresses impart an imperative necessary devel- 
opment of our might. The permanent object of my 
endeavors is attained;^ our military resources will 
henceforth be adequate to their mission in the world." 
This declaration, the truth of which on many fimda- 
mental points the emperor was inclined to doubt, was 
generally accepted in France and elsewhere as a just 
presentation of the military condition of the country. 
It also marked an epoch, for from this time all the 
influential factions at court were agreed as to the 
advisability of seizing the first provocation for a quar- 
rel with Prussia. The emperor, balancing his dread 
of revolution against his dread of war, was borne 
along on the current of brag and bluster. The talk 
in military circles became bellicose and swaggering ; 
the tone of the foreign office, especially toward Prus- 
sia, became supercilious and irritable. 

It was in this frame of mind that the summer of 
1870 found the sanguine and adventurous schemers 
of the French court. But the diplomatic sky seemed 
unpropitious for their schemes, inasmuch as it was 
unflecked by a menacing cloud. It was remarked at 
the foreign office in London that for years there had 
never been "so great a lull in foreign affairs." 
Wearied diplomatists began to throng the watering- 



places of Austria and South Germany. The king of 
Prussia left Berlin for the retii*ement of Ems ; the 
French court exchanged the Tuileries for the more 
rural magnificence of St. Cloud. The great tide of 
simmier travel swept through Paris and up the Bhine 
to Switzerland. Official life was at a standstill ; noth- 
ing more sinister was developed than a imiversal tend- 
ency toward rest and recreation. 

It was on July 3 that the news was telegraphed 
from Madrid to liie European courts that the crown 
of Spain had been tendered to Prince Leopold, of 
HohenzoUern, a kinsman to the king of Prussia. So 
far as France was concerned, the news was not un- 
expected. The fact had been recognized that Serrano's 
regency could not last forever, and the French ambas- 
sador at Madrid had fully acquainted his government 
with the prospects. To the French people, however, 
the news came like a thunderbolt from a clear sky. 
In the nomination of a Prussian prince for royal hon- 
ors in Spain they could see the hand of Bismarck at 
his favorite task of Prussian aggrandizement. There 
was a furious outburst of public disapproval. All 
parties became a unit in the Chambers in urging the 
government to resist what was regarded as a Prussian 
scheme. The French government suddenly foimd it- 
self forced by popular opinion to adopt an attitude for 
which for months they had been seeking a justification. 
The Due de Gramont declared in the Corps L^gis- 
latif that the action of the Madrid government had 
"imperiled the interests and honor of France," at 
the same time informing the Prussian ambassador at 
Paris that the government expected Prussia to insist 
upon the withdrawal of Prince Leopold as a candidate 
to the Spanish throne, and that a failure to do so 



would be regarded as a casus belli. The press repre- 
sented accurately the public excitement. The " Moni- 
teur " proclaimed that the time had come to put an end 
to Prussia's pretensions to acquire preponderance in 
Europe. The " Pays " declared that Prussia had 
reached the Caudine forks, and that her humiliation 
was at hand. The " Temps " shrieked that the mon- 
archy of Charles V. was being revived. The " Lib- 
erte " claimed that Prussia must be driven across the 
Bhine with the butt-end of French muskets. 

The grievance of the French nation lay simply in 
the fact that a prince related to the House of Prussia 
was to be elevated to the Spanish throne. The remedy 
for this seemed simple enough ; indeed, the Due de 
Gramont stated to the English ambassador as early 
as July 8 that the voluntary withdrawal of the prince 
of Hohenzollern would be a "most fortunate solu- 
tion" of the trouble. This was by no means, how- 
ever, what was desired by the powers at court. On 
the 9th M. Benedetti, the French ambassador at Ber- 
lin, received instructions from Paris to repair to Ems, 
and demand of the king of Prussia that he should 
insist upon the withdrawal of his kinsman as a candi- 
date for the Spanish throne. The attitude of the 
king was dignified and just. He informed the am- 
bassador that Prussia could have no interest in the 
matter whatsoever, and that if the French govern- 
ment objected to the choice of the Spanish authorities 
they could settle the matter to better advantage at 
Madrid than at Berlin. On the 12th, the day follow- 
ing this interview, the news was telegraphed to Paris 
and Ems that Prince Leopold had revoked his accept- 
ance of the Spanish crown. "The fortunate solu- 
tion " that Gramont had suggested had been brought 


about. It was believed that the last menace to peace 
had been cleared away, and an inexpressible feeling 
of relief animated every European capital. Up to 
this point the French government had been justified 
in its course by the state of public feeling. On the 
13th, however, they committed themselves to a delib- 
erate effort to plunge the nation into war. On that 
day instructions were telegraphed to M. Benedetti to 
demand of the king of Prussia a pledge that he would 
at no time in the future allow the name of any mem- 
ber of the Hohenzollern family to be used in connec- 
tion with the Spanish throne. Inasmuch as the king 
had already stated that he regarded the matter as one 
altogether outside the province of the Prussian gov- 
ernment, there could be no doubt as to the reception 
this demand would meet. The action of the French 
government was as deliberate as it was unjustifiable 
and unnecessary. 

In the Kurgarten at Ems a marble tablet marks 
the spot where, on the 13th of July, 1870, M. Bene- 
detti encountered the king of Prussia and presented 
the latest demand of his government. The tidings 
of the day's proceedings reached Count Bismarck in 
Berlin the same evening as he was dining with Gen- 
erals Moltke and Boon. In their presence the chan- 
cellor prepared the following statement, which was 
transmitted to the Prussian ambassadors at foreign 
courts, and appeared in the Berlin papers on the 
morning of the 14th. 

" Telegram from Eras, July 13, 1870 : When the 
intelligence of the hereditary prince of Hohenzollern's 
renunciation was communicated by the Spanish to the 
French government, the French ambassador demanded 
of his majesty the king, at Ems, that the latter should 


authorize him to telegraph to Paris that his majesty 
would pledge himself for all time to come never again 
to give his consent, should the Hohenzollerns revert 
to their candidature. Upon this his majesty refused 
to receive the French ambassador again, and sent 
the aide-de-camp in attendance to tell him that his 
majesty had nothing further to communicate to the 

That this document was issued by Bismarck with 
the purpose of inflaming French wrath may reason- 
ably be doubted, but that he was well awai'e of the 
consequences which would attend its publicity there 
can be no question. It was the truth expressed in 
bold language, and not in the circumspect and care- 
fuUy-chosen sentences that a timid diplomacy would 
have dictated. It is certain that M. Benedetti did 
not regard the king's action as in any way disrespect- 
ful, and it was not until the receipt of Bismarck's 
version that the Paris government decided upon forci- 
ble measures. On July 15 the Due de Gramont de- 
clared to the English ambassador that " the Prussian 
government had deliberately insulted France by de- 
claring to the public that the king had affronted the 
French ambassador." On that day amid tremendous 
excitement M. Ollivier addressed the Corps Legis- 
latif in a manner that left no doubt of the intentions 
of the government. Amid a tempest of applause the 
minister declared that the government accepted the 
responsibility of the crisis with " a light heart." There 
was an attempt at debate, but the credit asked for by 
the government for military purposes was enthusiasti- 
cally granted by a majority of four fifths. That night 
vast crowds filled the boulevards and swarmed in the 
brilliantly lighted Champs Elysees, singing the Mar- 


seillaise, and raising the cries of " A Berlin " and 
" Vive la Guerre." So far as it was possible to judge, 
the course adopted by the French government met 
with the unqualified approval of Paris. 

On this same day, when Paris was running mad 
with turbulent patriotism, the emperor remained at 
St. Cloud, heavy-hearted and dreading the issue of 
events into which his government was so confidently 
plunging. He had yielded his consent to the war 
party almost upon compulsion.^ He certainly had no 
cause to complain of lukewarmness and disloyalty in 
the temper of the capital, and except for the reason 
that he had learned to distrust his servants he might 
have looked into the future with some assurance. 
Marshal Leboeuf had declared that the army was 
" thrice ready for war to the last button on the last sol- 
dier's gaiter." He had placed in the hands of the em- 
peror a document affirming his ability to place 400,000 
men on the eastern frontier in fifteen days from an 
order for mobilization. This certainly was an excel- 
lent showing. The emperor did not underestimate 
the strength of the North German confederation, but 
he counted upon atoning for his numerical deficiencies 
by his early preparation, which would enable him to 
overthrow the enemy while their corps were in pro- 
cess of formation. He also anticipated the powerful 

^ ** Before the final resolve to declare war the emperor, empress, 
and ministers went to St. Cloud. After some discussion, Gramont 
told me that the empress, a high-spirited and impressionable woman, 
made a strong and excited address, declaring that * war was inevitable 
if the honor of France was to be sustained.' She was immediately 
followed by Marshal Leboeuf, who, in the most violent tone, threw 
down his portfolio, and swore that if war was not declared, he would 
give it up and renounce his military rank. The emperor gave way, 
and Gramont went straight to the Chamber to announce the fatal 
news.'' — Malmesbury, p. 665. 


cooperation of the fleet with its division of marine 
infantry, and looked for great results from the new 
equipment of chassepots and mitrailleuses. Up to 
the time, too, of M. Ollivier's bellicose speech in the 
Corps Legislatif the emperor had not counted upon 
the South German states as foes, and was even in- 
clined to the belief that a victory for the French arms 
would bring them into the field as allies. So far as 
Austria and Italy were concerned, he had not on 
July 15 abandoned hope of their cooperation in arms. 
Taking everything into consideration, then, the out- 
look for France from the emperor's standpoint was 
by no means cheerless. With 400,000 men standing 
ready to cross the Rhine, with a fleet threatening the 
German ports on the North Sea, with Austria, Italy, 
and South Germany neutral and perhaps friendly, his 
ultimate success seemed assured. From this time, 
however, every day developed the falseness of the 
basis on which the emperor had been calculating. 
On the 19th the king of Bavaria set the example for 
South Germany by placing his army under the com- 
mand of the king of Prussia. It was not North Ger- 
many, then, but Germany united with which France 
was to contend. On the 20th Baron Beust strangled 
the hope of Austrian cooperation in this dispatch to 
the Austrian ambassador at Paris : " You wiU repeat 
to the emperor and his ministers that — true to the 
engagements defined in letters that passed between 
both sovereigns last year — we regard France's cause 
as our own, and shall, within the limits of possibility, 
contribute to the success of her arms. The^e limits 
are prescribed by foreign considerations and our own 
domestic conditions. We have reason to believe that 
Eussia adheres to her connection with Prussia, so 


that the intervention of Russian forces, under certain 
eventualities, may be regarded, not only as probable, 
but as certain. Our participation in the struggle 
would be immediately followed by that of Russia, 
who threatens us on the Pruth and Lower Danube, as 
well as in Galicia. . . • Under these circumstances 
the word neutrality — which we do not pronounce 
without regret — is an imperative necessity, as far as 
we are concerned." This was bitter news to the Paris 
statesmen. Not only united Germany, but Russia 
was pitted against them. " Russia has done us great 
harm," groaned the Due de Gramont, as he began to 
comprehend the hopeless isolation of France. Only 
one possible aUy remained, and that was Italy, but 
the price of her cooperation was still unchanged, the 
evacuation of Rome. The French government could 
not yield at this crisis without betraying weakness. 
So a curt message settled the affair: "We can do 
nothing whatsoever with respect to Rome. If Italy 
does not choose to march, she can stay at home." 

Thus one by one the air castles of the French em- 
peror melted into mist. The neutral powers had 
developed into enemies ; his friends had become neu- 
tral. It was upon its own strength alone that the 
empire must rely for its success. Paris was enthusias- 
tic, but clamored for the march on Berlin to begin. 
Something was evidently wrong in the military situa- 
tion on the frontier. The emperor issued his proc- 
lamation to the people, and on the 28th, accompanied 
by the prince imperial, stepped aboard the train at 
St. Cloud that was to carry him to the front. The 
same night he entered Metz, and found it gay with 
uniforms and uproarious with warlike enthusiasm. 
Twenty-four hours at the front, however, convinced 


him that he had been cruelly deceived. In every 
hotel, cafe, and mess-room irreparable disasters to the 
Prussians were freely predicted, and yet no intelligent 
opinion as to their whereabouts or plans was forth- 
coming. Jealousy was rampant among the corps com- 
manders. Discipline was lax, and generals inspected 
their commands in cushioned barouches, accompanied 
by wives, families, and mistresses. The regiments 
were far below their war strength ; indeed, of the 
400,000 bayonets which Marshal Leboeuf had pro- 
mised only 220,000 were with the colors on August 1. 
The state of the commissariat was little better than 
chaos ; chassepots, and ammunition were scarce ; the 
troops were littered with useless baggage and in no 
condition for rapid marching.^ 

In the mean time Paris was clamoring for a victory. 
Miserably conscious of the state of his army, and 
aware that every hour was swelling the German hosts, 
the unhappy emperor set himself stolidly to await 
whatever the future might bring. His judgment 
urged a consolidation of his corps, and a retirement 
upon a strong line of defense. The temper of Paris 
would not permit such a move. To advance was im- 
possible ; to stand fast was to court destruction from 
the German armies ; to retreat meant the unloosing 
of the "red revolution" in his capital. There is 
something at once pathetic and ludicrous in the affair 
of Saarbriick on the 2d of August. It was the last 
feeble effort of Napoleon III. to arouse the enthusiasm 

^ General Michel's dispatch of July 21 to the war office at Paris, 
quoted in Hooper's Campaign of Sedan, is indicative of the confu- 
sion pervading the French army. *' Have arrived at Belfort. Can't 
find my brigade ; can't find the general of division. What shall I 
do ? Don't know where my regiments are." 


of Paris for his dynasty. In Saarbriick village lay 
a German infantry battalion and a squadron of cav- 
alry. On the heights above a division of Marshal 
Frossard's corps was encamped. The emperor came 
down by train from Metz with the prince imperial, 
and gazed upon the evolutions which he had ordered. 
The infantry deployed, wheeled, and skirmished. 
Brilliant troops of cuirassiers cantered along the 
road; the mitrailleuses whirred and rattled. The 
sun glanced and glinted upon a scene that would have 
adorned the peaceful acres of the Champ de Mars. 
The Prussian battalion retired ; the French divisions 
entered Saarbriick. The emperor had done what he 
could to satisfy Paris and steady his throne. That 
evening the news was posted up in sight of the shout- 
ing devotees of the boulevards, that the campaign had 
opened, a battle had been fought, the French were 
victorious, and Prince Louis had received " his bap« 
tism of fire." 



Delivery of the French Declaration of War at Berlin. — 
Perfect Preparation of Prussia for War. — Mobilization 
AND Organization of the Prussian Army. — Composition 


ON August 3. — Fight at Weissenburg akd Defeat of 
THE French. — MacMahon prepares to receive an Attack 
on the Sauer. — His Confidence on the 5th of August. — 
Opening of the Battle of W6rth. — MacMahon is out- 
flanked. — Heroism of the French Cavalry. — Destruc- 
tion OF MacMahon's Army. — Hard Fighting on the Saar. 

— Critical Situation ov- the German Force engaged 
THERE. — Final Retreat of the French. — Consternation 
AT Metz over the Result of the Day's Fighting. — De- 
spair OF THE Emperor. — He turns to Bazaine as a Saviour. 

— Bazaine assxtmes the Command under Protest. — He 
appreciates its Full Import. — He is embarrassed by the 
Emperor. — The Condition of Affairs at the German 
Headquarters. — Moltke's Plan. — The March through 

It was on the 19th of July that Le Sourd formally 
delivered the French declaration of war at Berlin. 
On the same day King William of Prussia addressed 
the North German Reichstag in words that received 
the hearty indorsement of both houses. The army 
was in process of mobilization, and by the 20th the 
South German princes had placed their armies at 
the disposal of the king of Prussia. For the jBrst 
time Europe began to comprehend the fullness of Bis- 
marck's diplomatic skill. He had used the machina- 
tions of his enemies for their confounding. He had 


used the Napoleonic proposition of 1866 concerning the 
Ehenish frontier to bring South Germany into line. 
Later, too, he caused the publication of Napoleon's 
proposals concerning Luxemburg and Belgium. The 
result of this was to shatter the emperor's influence in 
every continental capital, while it completely estranged 
England, which had been inclined on the whole to 
support the French views in the Hohenzollern quarrel. 
Austria and Denmark were hostile, but Bismarck by 
his Polish policy, supported by ManteujEfel's visit, had 
maxle of £.ussia a friend sufficiently strong to guar- 
antee their neutrality. Bismarck had made Germany 
a military unit, and it remained for the declaration of 
war to consimimate the work by effecting a union of 
hearts, interests, and power. No sooner had the bel- 
licose speeches of July 15 in the French Chambers 
been made public, than the entire people, " from the 
shores of the sea to the foot of the Alps," sprang en- 
thusiastically to arms. The reserves rushed to join 
the colors, and the stout Landwehrmen swarmed to 
the depots. Every city, village, and town was ablaze 
with enthusiasm, and every train that rolled toward 
the threatened frontier was densely packed with sol- 
diers. Munich, Dresden, and Stuttgart vied with 
Berlin in the fervor of their patriotism, and sent their 
sons forth to fight in the cause of the German father- 

Notwithstanding the fact, however, that the mo- 
bilization of the German armies progressed with even 
greater rapidity and precision than that which four 
years before had astonished Europe, the suddenness 
with which the emperor's government had unmasked 
its policy and drawn the sword left the frontier for 
ten days but scantily defended. Lideed, in Germany 


the affair of Saarbriick was not appreciated in all its 
absurdity tUl some weeks later, inasmuch as it was 
recognized that had Frossard pushed his advantage 
he would have hardly met with serious resistance west 
of the Shine. By the middle of the first week in 
August, however, the danger for Germany and the 
opportunity of France had passed away. The Ger- 
man armies had entered in huge force that tract of 
country lying between the Shine and the Lower Mo- 
selle, and their pickets were close to the French fron- 
tier. The command was nominally vested in the king 
of Prussia, though Von Moltke as the chief of staff 
planned and directed everything. As in the Austrian 
campaign the huge host was divided into three armies. 
The first army of General Steinmetz crossed the 
Shine about Bingen, and followed the Moselle toward 
ThionviUe. It comprised the 7th, Sth, and 10th corps 
of the North German confederation, the latter corps 
representing the Hanoverian army. The second army 
under the command of Prince Frederick Charles of 
Prussia comprised the Prussian Guard corps, and 
the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 9th, and Saxon 12th corps of the 
North German confederation. This army passed the 
Shine at Mayence, and moving on the left of the first 
army was directed upon Kaiserslautem. The third 
army consisted of the Sth, 6th, and 11th corps of the 
North German confederation, the two corps of Ba- 
varia, and the divisions of Baden and Wiirtemberg, 
This was by far the most interesting of the three 
armies, for united Germany was embodied in its 
ranks. The popular crown prince of Prussia was in 
command, an appointment that proved at once the 
wisdom and the conciliatory spirit of the German 
headquarters. This army concentrated in the angle 


formed by the Rhine and the Lauter. The diplomats 
at Miinich and Stuttgart loved Prussia no better than 
in 1866, but at the front old feuds were forgotten. 
The Prussian soldiers in bivouac broke into cheers as 
the straight-stepping Bavarians passed them on their 
march. A glimpse of the Prussian prince threw the 
camps of Baden and Wiirtember^ into tumultuous 
enthusiasm. The colors of North and South Ger- 
many floated in unmistakable amity over the sea of 
bayonets that rolled along the eastern base of the Vos- 
ges during those early August days. 

So far as the French army was concerned, no mar 
terial change in its position was effected during the 
days when Germany was in a measure defenseless. 
On August 3 the various corps were in the same posi- 
tions they had occupied for a fortnight. The 1st corps 
of Marshal MacMahon was massed between Hagenau 
and Strasburg. The 2d corps of General Frossard, 
instead of improving the advantage of the 2d, still 
clung to the heights above Saarbriick. Marshal 
Bazaine with the 3d corps was at St. Avoid, the 4th 
corps of Ladmirault in the vicinity of ThionviUe, 
the 5th corps of General de Failly at Saargemiind. 
These were all the troops the emperor had instantly 
available on August 3. The Imperial Gnard was just 
arriving at Metz, and the 6th corps of Canrobert was 
on the road from Chalons to Nancy. The 7th corps 
was detained far away at Belf ort to cover that weak 
point in the frontier. Altogether the French army 
in line between Metz and Strasburg mustered some- 
thing less than 175,000 men, nor was full advantage 
taken of this strength* The corps about Metz were 
loosely posted, while MacMahon was hopelessly iso- 
lated. With thin ranks, but vain in their own con- 


ceit, the French commanders indolently awaited the 

The German hosts congregated in the angle be- 
tween the Khine and the Moselle on August 3 aggre- 
gated more than 400,000 men. The outposts of the 
first army were on the Saar, the vanguard of the 
second army had passed Kaiserslautem, while the 
crown prince was approaching the Lauter. 

In the mean time the French general Douay with a 
division of MacMahon's corps had gone into camp on 
the Lauter, occupying the old fortress of Weissen- 
burg and the heights to the south. On the morning 
of the 4th, when the French troops were preparing 
tlieir coffee, tlie Bavarian forces suddenly appeared 
on the heights of Schweigen. At the same time their 
ai*tillory opened a terrific fire upon the camps and 
tlio town of Weissenburg itself. Douay, upon find- 
ing himself so suddenly forced into the presence 
of grim-visaged war, demeaned himself like a stout 
soldier. The Bavarians from the north, assisted by a 
jwirt of the 5th corps on the east, stormed Weissen- 
burg, and capturtHl the garrison after a sanguinary 
figlit in the streets, while the mass of the 5th corps 
and a division of tlie 11th corps from the south closed 
in on the Geisl>erg and the farm of Sehaf sberg, where 
the main strength of the French was concentrated. 
The chateau of Geisberg on its commanding hUl-top 
was stublwrnly defended, and only capitulated when 
the contest in other quarters was hopelessly lost. 
TKniay was killeil by a sheD, and the survivors of his 
division went streaming away into the Vosges. 

The news of this disastrous affair reached ilao- 
^[ahou at ]^[otx« where it eauseil grvat consternation. 
A council of war was immediatelv held, as a result 


of which MacMahon left that night to join his corps, 
while the emperor ordered General De FaiUy with the 
6th corps to his support. MacMahon, appreciating 
the necessity of an early atonement for the disaster 
of Weissenbnrg hastened to oppose the advance of 
the crown prince with all his forces. On the 5th he 
was reinforced by Dumesnil's division of the 7th 
corps and Bonnemain's cuirassier brigade of the 6th 
corps. These with his four divisions made a total 
strength of nearly 50,000 men, with which he seized 
the heights that skirt the Sauer between Neewiller 
and Morsbronn. His centre occupied Froschweiler 
and Elsasshausen with its advance posts in Worth. 
His left crested the heights from Froschweiler north- 
westerly to Neewiller. His right occupied the Nieder- 
wald south of Froschweiler with its extremity rest- 
ing upon the Lansberg that overlooks the village of 
Morsbronn. MacMahon had the divisions of Ducrot, 
Eaoult, and Lartigue on this line, while he held 
Felly's division, which had been shattered at Weis- 
senbnrg, in the rear of Froschweiler as a reserve. 
Dumesnil's division was stationed in the vicinity of 
Eberbach as a support to Lartigue in the Nieder- 
wald. The position was well chosen for purposes of 
defense, while it covered the road to Strasburg and 
afforded good lines of retreat. That MacMahon's 
army was too small to make the most of the position 
there can be no question, though with the exception 
of the division which had fought at Weissenburg 
the " morale " of his troops was excellent. They 
comprised several of those superb Algerian regiments 
that had made a world-wide reputation on Cri- 
mean and Italian battlefields. The artillery was also 
strengthened by several batteries of the much vaunted 


mitrailleuses. Naturally, too, the marshal looked for 
support from De Failly. Indeed, when on the even- 
ing of the 5th he received notice from the emperor 
that the 5th corps was to act under his orders, he ex- 
claimed in his joy, " Messieurs les Pmssiens, I have 
you." He was not aware at that time of the demoral- 
ized and broken condition of De Failly's corps con- 
sequent upon a multiplicity of conflicting orders from 

The crown prince of Prussia passed the Lauter 
in force on the 5th, and that evening the 5th corps 
bivouacked along the road between Dieffenbach and 
Worth, while the 2d Bavarian corps halted at Lan- 
gensulzbach. At dawn on the 6th the 6th corps 
began to skirmish in front of Worth, while the Bava- 
rians advancing from their bivouacs drew the French 
fire in front of Neewiller. The crown prince had not 
intended to attack MacMahon that day, and upon 
hearing of the engagement ordered it to be broken 
off immediately. While the Bavarians who had ac- 
tually gained a foothold on the heights of Neewiller 
began reluctantly to retire. General von Kirchback, 
commanding the 5th corps, found himself too deeply 
involved to allow of such a movement. As a result 
he dispatched messengers to his Bavarian neighbor as 
well as to the commander of the 11th corps which 
was just arriving on the field, to help him continue 
the contest. 

The crown prince, upon learning, how far the action 
had progressed, ordered the 1st Bavarian corps and 
the Wiirtembergers to hasten their march to the 
front where he himself arrived at one P. M., shortly 
after the 11th corps had gone into action on the left 
of the 5th, against the French in the Niederwald. 


The German batteries occupied the heights northwest 
of Gunstett with 120 cannon and rained a perfect 
tempest of shells upon the opposing hills from Frosch- 
weiler to the Lansberg. About twelve o'clock the 
Prussians crossed the Saner and carried Worth* 
Against the heights of Froschweiler, however, they 
could make no impression, the French fighting su- 
perbly at this point despite the terrific artillery fire 
to which they were subjected. The crown prince, see- 
ing the terrible slaughter inflicted upon his centre 
and despairing of success at that point, determined to 
use his superior strength by outflanking the French 
position. While the 1st Bavarian corps was pushed 
forward between the 5th corps and the 2d Bavarians 
against the French left centre, the 11th corps began 
to exert a pressure against the French right too 
strong to be resisted. The Niederwald was soon 
rendered untenable, and the German columns pushing 
forward between Eberbach and Morsbronn threat- 
ened to envelop the French flank. MacMahon in the 
desperation of the crisis hurled Michel's cavalry bri- 
gade against the advancing Prussians. The cuiras- 
siers and lancers rode well to their death, and heaped 
the fields about Morsbronn with their slain. Their 
sacrifice enabled Lartigue's and Dumesnil's divisions 
to extricate themselves from their precarious position 
and rally on Elsasshausen. At 1.30 the line of battle 
of the Prussian 11th corps extended from Eberbach 
to the foot of the hill of Elsasshausen, while the ex- 
treme French right was flying in disorder toward 
Hagenau. The resources of the French marshal were 
nearly exhausted. He had fought a good battle and 
was yielding to overwhelming numbers. He sent 
appeal after appeal to De Failly for aid, but his glass 


swept the coimtry in vain for a glimpse of his ap- 
proaching regiments. At two o'clock the French 
abandoned Elsasshausen to the flames and to the 
Prussians. Realizing that his salvation depended 
upon the recapture of this village, MacMahon threw 
his last infantry reserve against it, and a few mo- 
ments later ordered Bonnemain's cuirassier brigade 
to charge. The wreck of this fine corps soon strewed 
the hopfields between Elsasshausen and the Nieder- 
wald ; the infantry recoiled from the hornet's nest of 
Elsasshausen; Ducrot's division on the heights of 
Neewiller was crumbling to pieces ; worse than all, 
assailed on three sides, Froschweiler was yielding. It 
was not until four o'clock that MacMahon ordered 
the retreat, but before this a genuine rout had set in. 
All along the heights, however, the carnage still con- 
tinued. The sun shone crimson through smoke clouds 
upon the blazing village, within which fragments of 
regiments that had never learned to fly still fought 
madly on, upon broken batteries whose hot cannon 
still thundered the French defiance, and upon the 
sea of glistening helmets that crested the Prussian 
advance. It was nearly dusk, the roads leading to 
Saveme and Niederbronn were crowded with the 
wreck of MacMahon's corps, when De FaiUy's first 
regiments arrived. They came rushing into Nieder- 
bronn incredulous over the rumors that had reached 
them, fierce and angry at the mere supposition of a 
French reverse. They had come to support Mac- 
Mahon ; they were scarcely able to cover his retreat. 
At all events, shortly after dark the Bavarians 
stormed into Niederbronn, wrested the railway station 
from their grasp, and drove them back. So the bat- 
tle of Worth ended. The crown prince had little 


cavalry available and the French rout streamed on 

At the same time that Marshal McMahon was 
being driven from his carefully chosen positions the 
corps of General Frossard was recoiling shattered 
and demoralized from the disastrous battle of For- 
bach. On the Saar as well as on the Sauer the Ger- 
mans had struck a savage blow. The conflict at 
Forbach, like that of Worth, was unpremeditated, 
and the result of insubordination on the part of 
Frossard, and the extraordinary daring of the Prus- 
sian General Kamecke. Frossard, who had been en- 
camped on the Spicheren heights since his skirmish 
on the 2d, was under orders from the emperor to 
retire upon St. Avoid. Although twenty-four hours 
had passed since the receipt of these orders, the morn- 
ing of the 6th found his rear guard just breaking 
camp on the heights, while the mass of his corps was 
only approaching Forbach. He might have made 
good progress during the day had not a Prussian 
force suddenly appeared in Saarbriick. The slender- 
ness of this force tempted him to resume the offen- 
sive. He recalled his troops and occupied his old posi- 
tions on the Spicherenberg. General Kamecke, who 
had but one division of the German 7th corps, was in 
no sense overawed at being confronted by a superior 
force in an almost unassailable position. He was not 
even content to stand on the defensive, but trusting 
to the cannon thunder to bring him supports, he 
hurled his infantry against the Spicherenberg. These 
gallant troops shed their blood like water on the steep 
fire-swept slopes, but to no purpose. At noon Kar 
mecke's position was grave ; at two o'clock it was des^ 
perate ; at three the battle was saved by the arrival 


of General Goeben with Bamekow's division of the 
8th corps. A portion of the 5th division of the 3d 
corps also arrived and Goeben, who had assumed 
command, renewed the offensive with energy. The 
French continued to dispute the possession of the 
Spicherenberg until dark, when in a broken and 
panic-struck condition they began their retreat. 

In the mean time Gliimer's division of the 7th 
corps, having crossed the Saar six miles west of Saar- 
briick, marched southward upon hearing of the events 
transpiring at that place. In the evening they ap- 
proached Forbach, and notwithstanding the fact that 
huge quantities of stores were collected here the 
French garrison evacuated and retreated upon Metz. 

The victory of Saarbriick or Forbach was due to 
the superb steadiness of Kamecke's Westphalian in- 
fantry, to the splendid marching of the supporting 
divisions, to the overweening confidence of General 
Frossard, and to the confusion of orders that left him 
unsupported. Three divisions of Bazaine's corps 
were within half a dozen miles of the Spicherenberg, 
but none of the leaders cared to move on their own 
responsibility. Bazaine's early proffer of assistance 
was rejected by Frossard, and after that the various 
divisions spent their time in marching and counter- 
marching in the vain efforts to execute the erratic 
orders of an incompetent commander-in-chief. 

The 6th of August witnessed the crippling of the 
French army of invasion. Worth annihilated the 
right wing, Forbach shattered the centre. De Failly, 
finding himself in danger of being cut off at Bitsche, 
started on a wild chase after MacMahon. Not a field 
battalion was left to confront the Prussians between 
Metz and Strasburg. 


At Metz the news was received first with incredulity 
and then with consternation. The cries of " A Ber- 
lin " suddenly ceased and noncombatants began prepa- 
rations for a hasty flight. The temper of the imperial 
staff from a confident flippancy became despondent in 
the extreme. The army was beaten, France was beaten, 
the German empire was an accomplished fact, — these 
sentiments were frequently expressed at headquarters 
during Sunday the 7th of August. The sense of dis- 
couragement pervaded all classes from the emperor 
down to the ranks. At the opening of the second 
week in August the emperor had under his command 
the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th corps, with the Guard, a 
total of 125,000 men, but of these, Frossard's corps 
was too much demoralized to be immediately avail- 
able. With this force the emperor had to contend 
against two armies aggregating 300,000 men, flushed 
with success. It required a soldier of rare genius 
and energy to maintain the contest against such odds, 
and unhappily the emperor even in his prime was 
never a military leader of the first order. In these 
days, moreover, of bodily pain and mental weariness, 
he lost all heart and turned from Lebceuf and the 
carpet soldiers of the Tuileries, to men of sounder 
judgment and less selfish impulses. From the crowd 
of brilliant hangers-on and would-be advisers he se- 
lected two men to aid him in the crisis ; the first was 
General Changamier, the other Marshal Bazaine. 
In 1851 the emperor had committed the former to 
prison because he was hostile to his interests and too 
popular with the army. Forgetting the past, Chan- 
garnier left his retirement and placed his sword at 
the disposal of the emperor. The political prisoner of 
1851 became the trusted imperial adviser in 1870. 


As for Bazaine, he had come by his honors honestly, 
and fought his way upward through the grades at the 
cannon's mouth. The emperor looked upon Bazaine, 
and Changamier concurred in his judgment, as the 
man who might pull him through his difficulties. 
These days at the French headquarters succeeding 
the early August battles are memorable in modem 
European history, and we have their details from the 
pens of the principal actors. The first move of the 
emperor after the 6th of August was the appoint- 
ment of Bazaine to the command of the 2d, 3d, and 
4th corps, with orders to bring them back under the 
guns of Metz. In the mean time the emperor was 
contemplating his resignation. The army and the 
nation had lost confidence in him, he never had much 
confidence in himself, and Paris was imcomf ortably 
peremptory in its demands for a new commander. 
On the 12th Leboeuf fell from his position a9 chief 
of staff, and on the day following the emperor for- 
mally resigned the command of the army of the Rhine 
in favor of Bazaine. These events were well received 
by the army, and Paris was satisfied. The influ- 
ences that were exerted to effect these changes have 
long been in dispute. The emperor claimed that the 
interests of France determined his course ; in reality 
it was determined for him by the ministry. There is 
a strong chain of evidence to indicate that the Paris 
statesmen foresaw the magnitude of the coming disas- 
ters, and the necessity of finding a scapegoat who 
should take the responsibility from the imperial shoul- 
ders. As far as the emperor is concerned, he doubt- 
less yielded to what he regarded as a public as well as 
a ministerial demand. He called upon Bazaine not 
to save the empire by a personal sacrifice of all that 


a soldier holds dear, but by his military genius and 
force of arms. 

Bazaine, however, appreciated fully what his ap- 
pointment meant. Canrobert and MacMahon were 
his seniors, but they never thought of contesting the 
dangerous honor of the supreme command. Bazaine 
tried to evade the appointment, but the emperor en- 
treated. Then .in a manly, soldierly fashion the mar- 
shal succumbed, and shouldered the duty which he 
recognized was almost certain to bring upon him the 
rage and contempt of his countrymen. The army, 
we know, was ill-disciplined, dispirited, and terribly 
outnimibered, but this was not the worst feature of Ba- 
zaine's dilemma. He was destined to be hampered by 
the emperor just long enough to complete the misery 
of the military situation. Bazaine had a plan, a rare 
thing among the French marshals of those degenerate 
days, and upon it he had laid some stress. He wished 
to move the whole army to a position on the Nied, to 
accept a battle there, and if victorious, to fall away 
southward, effect a junction with MacMahon, and take 
up a new position in front of Nancy. This scheme 
was perhaps the only feasible one of the French cam- 
paign, and it was the last upon which the emperor 
exercised an influence. He opposed it. Unquestion- 
ably Bazaine might have insisted, but he yielded as 
conmiander-in-chief as he had been wont to yield 
when a general of division. As a result the army 
began to execute the move substituted by the em- 
peror, and commenced the retreat to Verdun. The 
orders for retreating fell like a deathblow upon the 
already disheartened soldiers of the army of the 

In the mean time all the machinery of the German 


headquarters was moving with perfect precision. In 
every direction the lieutenants of Von Moltke were 
vigorously pushing his carefully elaborated plans. 
Every one was at work, and working for some def- 
inite end. No one had prophesied or anticipated an 
«asy victory, and yet there was no undue elation over 
recent events. All the armies had been engaged, the 
first and second touching shoulders in front of the 
Spicherenberg. If some gnmibled over the risks 
taken by Kamecke, the splendid marching of the sup- 
porting divisions seemed to indicate that a Prussian 
officer could afford to take some risks. There was 
certainly something more than commendable in the 
swift rush of the Brandenburgers and Rhinelanders 
toward the '* kannonendonner " on the day of For- 
bach. Regiments that in the morning were a score 
of miles from Saarbriick had turned off the dusty 
leagues under the exhilarating influence of thie dis- 
tant artillery, and been found at sunset in the fight- 
ing line on the crest of the Spicherenberg. 

Moltke had a plan far-reaching in its aims, for it 
meant the bagging of the French army of invasion 
with Metz and the emperor included. He divined 
the emperor's purpose of retreating on Verdun. The 
crown prince directed his march upon Nancy, but the 
army of Prince Frederick Charles moved on Pont a 
Mousson on the Moselle, while Steinmetz covered his 
right, and threatened Metz from the east and north- 
east. If Bazaine moved up the Moselle against Fred- 
erick Charles, he laid open his flank to Steinmetz. 
If he turned against Steinmetz, or took the roads to 
Verdun, his flank was exposed to Frederick Charles. 
If he remained quiescent, he rendered it possible for 
Frederick Charles to pass the Moselle in force, push 


his columns northward from Pont a Mousson, and cut 
the roads to Verdun. 

The villagers of Lorraine still tell with wonder, if 
with sadness, of that mighty flood of German inva- 
sion that engulfed them during the summer days of 
1870; of the never-ceasing tide of the soldiers of 
the Fatherland that poured out of the Rhineland, — 
cavalry clattering and jingling through the village 
street, dust-covered infantrymen timing their march 
to martial chorus or tap of drum, and artillery rum- 
bling and jolting over the rough ways. 

From dawn until dusk and even after darkness fell 
and weary regiments bivouacked by the roadsides, 
still the steady muffled tramp continued as fresher 
troops pursued their march. Days and weeks passed, 
and still Germany poured forth her sons, and still 
they streamed westward into the heart of France. 
" It is not an army," groaned the Lorrainers, " but a 
nation that has come among us." At last the helmets 
became scarce, and the shakos appeared crowning fore- 
heads that were wrinkled and hair that was streaked 
with gray. It was the Landwehr going to the front 
to teach the " youngsters " how to fight. They came 
on by tens of thousands, the memories of other days 
clustering about their standards, the memory of wife 
and children clustering about their hearts, strong, 
sturdy, arousing the echoes of the Lotharingian woods 
and hills with the f tdl-voiced chorus, — 

** Dear Fatherland no danger thine, 
Firm stand thy sons to guard the Rhine." 



The French Retreat upon Verdun begins. — Battle op 
BoRNY. — Bazaine's Night Visit to the Emperor. — Flight 
OF THE Emperor to Gravelotte. — Bazaine visits hem 
there. — Farewell between Bazaine and the Emperor 
ON THE Departure of the Latter for Verdun. — Position 
OF THE Armies on August 16. — General von Alvensleben 
OPENS the Battle of Vionvtllb. — Character of the Bat- 
tle AND its Results. — Bazaine takes up a New Position. 
— Moltke's Plan for August 18. — The Battle of Grave- 
lotte. — Repulse of Steinmetz. — Incapacity of Bazaine. 
— Second Repulse op Steinmetz. — Canrobert overpow- 
ered. — Capture of St. Privat and Turning of the French 
Right. — Close op the Battle. — Influence of the 'Battle 
UPON THE Military Situation. — Formation of the Army 
OF THE Meuse. — The Siege of Metz begins. 

It was dawn on the 14th of August when the 
French army of the Rhine commenced its passage of 
the Moselle and inaugurated the retreat upon Ver- 
dun. The immediate result was chaos, the blockading 
of roads with cumbersome baggage and artillery trains 
that caused at once confusion and delay. To make 
matters worse, about four p. M. the 3d corps and a por- 
tion of the 4th corps, which still retained their positions 
between Columbey and Nouilly on the east of Metz, 
were furiously attacked by the first German army 
under Steinmetz. The effect of the cannon thunder 
in their rear was most demoralizing upon the French 
army. The retreat came to a standstill ; the Guard was 
moved to Bomy to support the troops in action, while 



the army began to recross the Moselle. The French 
fought well, outnumbering their assailants ; and when 
the action ceased at dark they claimed the victory. 
The German purpose, however, had been fully accom- 
plished. They had held three entire corps d^armee 
on the east of Metz, checked Bazaine's movement in 
retreat, and enabled the columns of Prince Frederick 
Charles to make good progress westward. 

Bazaine, who from the first had deprecated the re- 
treat, recognized distinctly after this action its prob- 
able issue. From the battlefield about Borny he 
made his way at midnight across the Moselle through 
the streets of Metz crowded with weary, grumbling 
soldiery, threading his way among the wreck And dis- 
order that strewed the roads beyond the town, until 
he reached the emperor's quarters at the Chateau de 
Longueville. There he eased his mind of his fore- 
bodings, and disclosed his dread of being outflanked. 
The miserable emperor merely entreated caution and 
the avoidance of any fresh defeat. Bazaine rode 
away through the military confusion to his quarters, 
while shortly before dawn the emperor was apprised of 
the proximity of the Germans by the shells that came 
crashing into the chateau garden. The army of the 
Bhine had sunk so low in efficiency that it was in- 
competent to protect its sovereign from this audacious 
field battery that unlimbered on the farther bank of 
the Moselle. So the emperor commenced the day, 
the day of the great Napoleonic festival, by a hurried 
flight. Accompanied by Prince Louis and a small 
escort he made the best of his way to Gravelotte. 
At the inn of this village he received Bazaine in the 
afternoon, while along the road in front the sullen, 
dispirited regiments passed in retreat without raising 
a cheer at the sight of their unhappy monarch. 

General von Alveusleben conunanding the 3d Ger- 
man corps pushed the 6th infantry division across the 
Moselle at daybreak, and inarched by Gorze upon 
Vionville. It was Redem's cavalry, supported by 
this division, that first surprised the French. Fros- 
sard's corps was encamped about Vionville and Ma- 
vigny, and the effect of the sudden attack was to 
bring up the 6th corps on his right and establish a 
line of battle from Flavigny to Bruville. In other 
words, the French corps, which had been facing west- 
ward, executed a partial wheel to the left and faced 
southwest. Bazaine seems tn have had no conception 
of the slendemess of the forces opposing him, and to 
have exercised undue caution. The small force of 
German infantry on the ground rendered it necessary 
to use the cavalry immoderately, and a series of bril- 
liant but murderous charges resulted. The position 
of the German forees was critical throughout the day ; 
and even at five o'clock when the entire 3d and 10th 
corps had come up, they were confronted by no less 
than five French corps. Indeed, the battle of Vion- 
ville was a marvel of military audacity. General von 
Alvensleben, realizing the great importance of holding 
Bazaine in Metz, risked everything for its accomplish- 
ment, hurling battalions against brigades, and driving 
his depleted cavalry squadrons again and again 
against the blazing lines of French cannon. The 
strong men of Brandenbui^ and Hanover proved 
equal to the emergency. The Hanoverians arrived 
late on the field, but tliey did grand service. The 
nppiug fair-haired men who under their king drove 
~~ " s at Langensalza fought no less stoutly 
) of the Fatherland when they faced the 
t Vionville. 



the army began to recross the Moselle. The French 
fought well, outnumbering their assailants ; and when 
the action ceased at dark they claimed the victory. 
The German purpose, however, had been fully accom- 
plished. They had held three entire corps d^armee 
on the east of Metz, checked Bazaine's movement in 
retreat, and enabled the columns of Prince Frederick 
Charles to make good progress westward. 

Bazaine, who from the first had deprecated the re- 
treat, recognized distinctly after this action its prob- 
able issue. From the battlefield about Borny he 
made his way at midnight across the Moselle through 
the streets of Metz crowded with weary, grumbling 
soldiery, threading his way among the wreck And dis- 
order that strewed the roads beyond the town, imtil 
he reached the emperor's quarters at the Chateau de 
Longueville. There he eased his mind of his fore- 
bodings, and disclosed his dread of being outflanked. 
The miserable emperor merely entreated caution and 
the avoidance of any fresh defeat. Bazaine rode 
away through the military confusion to his quarters, 
while shortly before dawn the emperor was apprised of 
the proximity of the Germans by the shells that came 
crashing into the chateau garden. The army of the 
Rhine had sunk so low in efficiency that it was in- 
competent to protect its sovereign from this audacious 
field battery that unlimbered on the farther bank of 
the Moselle. So the emperor commenced the day, 
the day of the great Napoleonic festival, by a hurried 
flight. Accompanied by Prince Louis and a small 
escort he made the best of his way to Gravelotte. 
At the inn of this village he received Bazaine in the 
afternoon, while along the road in front the sullen, 
dispirited regiments passed in retreat without raising 
a cheer at the sight of their unhappy monarch. 


Bazaine and the emperor met but once more, and 
that on the following morning, the 16th. The mar- 
shal being summoned by an aide found the emperor 
seated in his carriage, suffering depicted on his usu- 
ally imperturbable face. His words betrayed his 
utter hopelessness. " I have decided to leave for 
Verdun and Chalons. Make the best of your way to 
Verdun. The gendarmes have abandoned Briey to 
the Prussians." The marshal found the gigantic task 
upon his shoulders of consummating with a disorgan- 
ized and crestfallen army a movement which from the 
first he had regarded as suicidal. Almost before the 
dust raised by the imperial escort had faded from sight, 
the roar of cannon that was borne to his ears on the 
south wind told him that another battle was afoot. 

The action fought on this day was the most san- 
guinary of the entire war. It was commenced by the 
army of Prince Frederick Charles to intercept Ba- 
zaine's retreat on Verdun, and maintained by it 
throughout the day against vastly superior forces. 
The position of the two armies at daybreak on the 
16th was substantially as follows: the French were 
preparing to retreat upon Verdun, the 2d, 6th, and 
Ghiard corps by the southern road via Mars la Tour, 
the 3d and 4th corps moving over the northern route 
via Etain. On the other hand, the mass of the German 
second army was still distant from the Moselle, only 
the 3d and 10th corps being close up to its banks. 
The 19th infantry division of the 10th corps and the 
5th division of the 3d corps had even crossed the river, 
the former being in the vicinity of Thiaucourt, and the 
other between OnviUe and Gorze. The 5th cavalry 
division was near Mars la Tour, while the Guard dra- 
goon brigade was with the 19th division at Thiaucourt. 


General von Alvensleben commanding the 3d Grer- 
man corps pushed the 6th infantry division across the 
Moselle at daybreak, and marched by Gorze upon 
VionviUe. It was BMem's cavalry, supported by 
this division, that first surprised the French. Fros- 
sard's corps was encamped about Vionville and Fla- 
vigny, and the effect of the sudden attack was to 
bring up the 6th corps on his right and establish a 
line of battle from Flavigny to Bruville. In other 
words, the French corps, which had been facing west- 
ward, executed a partial wheel to the left and faced 
southwest. Bazaine seems to have had no conception 
of the slenderness of the forces opposing him, and to 
have exercised undue caution. The small force of 
German infantry on the ground rendered it necessary 
to use the cavalry immoderately, and a series of bril- 
liant but murderous charges resulted. The position 
of the German forces was critical throughout the day ; 
and even at five o'clock when the entire 3d and 10th 
corps had come up, they were confronted by no less 
than five French corps. Indeed, the battle of Vion- 
ville was a marvel of military audacity. General von 
Alvensleben, realizing the great importance of holding 
Bazaine in Metz, risked everything for its accomplish- 
ment, hurling battalions against brigades, and driving 
his depleted cavalry squadrons again and again 
against the blazing lines of French cannon. The 
strong men of Brandenburg and Hanover proved 
equal to the emergency. The Hanoverians arrived 
late on the field, but they did grand service. The 
strapping fair-haired men who under their king drove 
the Prussians at Langensalza fought no less stoutly 
in the cause of the Fatherland when they faced the 
French lines at Vionville. 


The battle of Vionville settled the fate of Bazalne's 
army. The marshal was outmanoeuvred, and at the 
close of the action, while he claimed the victory, could 
not disguise the fact that the command of the south- 
em route to Verdun had passed into the control of 
his foe. From this time date the first charges against 
the marshal, which in the end were to bring about his 
ruin and disgrace. It is asserted that had he shown 
any energy on the 15th, fought with more spirit on 
the 16th, or improved his opportunities on the 17th, 
he might have shaken himself free from the steel 
talons which the German headquarters was closing 
upon him. Bazaine's excuses are based upon the de- 
moralization of his army and the insubordination of 
his coi'ps commanders. These facts rendered him un- 
willing to attempt another move on Verdun. On the 
17th he led his army back to an impregnable position 
under the gims of Metz. He occupied with all his 
forces the high plateau west of the Moselle, his left 
resting on St. Ruffine, his right on Roncourt. In the 
choice of this position the marshal displayed excel- 
lent judgment, and his engineers rendered its natural 
strength even more formidable. At no point save 
perhaps on the extreme right could the enemy attack 
except at a great disadvantage and exposed to a ter- 
rific artillery fire. The marshal had in his first line 
the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th corps, while he retained the 
Guards as a reserve in the rear of his left wing. 

On the same day that Bazaine was taking up these 
positions the German headquarters in a high state of 
satisfaction was making preparations for a final blow. 
Long before dawn on the 18th all the corps of the 
German second army were marching rapidly north- 
ward in the rear of the first army that was confront- 


ing the French left in front of St. Knffine. Von 
Moltke was ignorant of Bazaine's intentions and 
whether it would devolve upon him to receive or 
deliver an attack. The movements of the German 
corps had been ordered with a view to meeting either 
eventuality. At ten o'clock the king of Prussia was 
on the ground, and Von Moltke had become con- 
vinced that the French were standing on the defen- 
sive. The entire first army under Steinmetz was 
detailed to act against the almost impregnable French 
left southward from the farms of Moscow and St. 
Hubert. The 6th and 9th corps went in about V^me- 
ville against the positions among the farms of Mon- 
tigny-la-Grange, La Folie, and Leipsig. The Saxons 
followed by the Guards continued their march along 
the rear of this line to find the French right, and 
turn it. . 

The artillery of the 9th corps opened the action 
about eleven o'clock, and for three hours it raged 
furiously all along the extended line from Amanvil- 
lers to the extreme French left. The 6th and 9th 
corps were cautiously handled, and made no progress 
in their front, while Steinmetz, after wresting St. 
Hubert from the French, failed at the Point du Jour, 
and was thrown back with frightful slaughter. 

Moltke's plan was to hold the French centre and 
left while the turning movement of the Guards and 
Saxons was being developed. Bazaine's conduct on 
this day strongly suggested that of Benedek at Konig- 
gratz. He posted himself in the fortress of Plappe- 
ville where he commanded an excellent view of Fros- 
sard on the left, of Leboeuf and Ladmirault in the 
centre, while Canrobert on the right was out of sight 
and in poor communication. Bazaine gave no uneasy 


The battle of Vionville settled the fate of Bazaine's 
army. The marshal was outmanoeuvred, and at the 
close of the action, while he claimed the victory, could 
not disguise the fact that the conmiand of the south- 
em route to Verdun had passed into the control of 
his foe. From this time date the first charges against 
the marshal, which in the end were to bring about his 
ruin and disgrace. It is asserted that had he shown 
any energy on the 15th, fought with more spirit on 
the 16th, or improved his opportunities on the 17th, 
he might have shaken himself free from the steel 
talons which the German headquarters was closing 
upon him. Bazaine's excuses are based upon the de- 
moralization of his army and the insubordination of 
his coi'ps commanders. These facts rendered him un- 
willing to attempt another move on Verdun. On the 
17th he led his army back to an impregnable position 
under the guns of Metz. He occupied with all his 
forces the high plateau west of the Moselle, his left 
resting on St. Ruffine, his right on Roncourt. In the 
choice of this position the marshal displayed excel- 
lent judgment, and his engineers rendered its natural 
strength even more formidable. At no point save 
perhaps on the extreme right could the enemy attack 
except at a great disadvantage and exposed to a ter- 
rific artillery fire. The marshal had in his first line 
the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th corps, while he retained the 
Guards as a reserve in the rear of his left wing. 

On the same day that Bazaine was taking up these 
positions the German headquarters in a high state of 
satisfaction was making preparations for a final blow. 
Long before dawn on the 18th all the corps of the 
German second army were marching rapidly north- 
ward in the rear of the first army that was confront- 


ing the French left in front of St. Knffine. Von 
Moltke was ignorant of Bazaine's intentions and 
whether it would devolve upon him to receive or 
deliver an attack. The movements of the German 
corps had been ordered with a view to meeting either 
eventuality. At ten o'clock the king of Prussia was 
on the groimd, and Von Moltke had become con- 
vinced that the French were standing on the defen- 
sive. The entire first army under Steinmetz waa 
detailed to act against the almost impregnable French 
left southward from the farms of Moscow and St. 
Hubert. The 6th and 9th corps went in about V^me- 
ville against the positions among the farms of Mon- 
tigny-la-Grange, La Folic, and Leipsig. The Saxons 
followed by the Gnards continued their march along 
the rear of this line to find the French right, and 
turn it. . 

The artillery of the 9th corps opened the action 
about eleven o'clock, and for three hours it raged 
furiously all along the extended line from Amanvil- 
lers to the extreme French left. The 6th and 9th 
corps were cautiously handled, and made no progress 
in their front, while Steinmetz, after wresting St. 
Hubert from the French, failed at the Point du Jour, 
and was thrown back with frightful slaughter. 

Moltke's plan was to hold the French centre and 
left while the turning movement of the Guards and 
Saxons was being developed. Bazaine's conduct on 
this day strongly suggested that of Benedek at Konig- 
gratz. He posted himself in the fortress of Plappe- 
ville where he commanded an excellent view of Fros- 
sard on the left, of Leboeuf and Ladmirault in the 
centre, while Canrobert on the right was out of sight 
and in ppor conimun^cation. Bazaine gave no uneasy 


thought to his right, notwithstanding the fact that it 
was naturally the weakest point in his line. The f ury 
of Steinmetz's attacks upon Frossard and Lebceuf 
held all his attention exactly as Moltke intended they 
should do, although it was clear that the positions 
held by these generals were little less than impreg- 

At five o'clock no change had been effected in the 
state of the battle, the French line being everywhere 
intact. The lull that prevailed at this time was rudely 
broken by another furious assault of the first army* 
Steinmetz, who had been chafing at his temporary in- 
action, stimulated by the debouching of the 2d corps 
from the Bois des Ognons for his support, ordered 
another rush against the French positions beyond 
the Mance. The attacking columns were withered 
by a fiery blast that nothing human could endure* 
The French sallying from their trenches in great 
force, an incipient panic ensued. The opportune 
arrival of supports alone prevented a rout; and when 
darkness fell, the weary soldiers of the first army 
were standing fiercely on the defensive under a crush- 
ing fire of chassepots and mitrailleuses. 

In the mean time the stubborn battle had been 
decided on the extreme left. Canrobert backed by 
the strong high viUag« of St. Privat held his position 
without difficulty during the day against the attacks 
of several weak detachments of the Saxon and Prus- 
sian Guard corps. At sundown, however, anothei^ 
face was put upon matters in that vicinity. The 12th 
corps had completed its turning movement, and was 
fighting its way southward through Roncourt toward 
St. Privat, which had been already set on fire by the 
German artillery. The Prussian Ghiards moving up 


from the vicinity of Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes also de- 
ployed for the attack upon St. Privat. Canrobert 
was left unsupported at this crisis. Bourbaki was in 
the vicinity with a few thousand grenadiers of the 
French Ghiard, but the battle was raging fiercely then 
about Amanvillers, and he was at a loss where to 
strike in. The sun sank below the forests, and in its 
stead the glare of the blazing village illuminated the 
darkening country. In the flame-swept streets a 
handful of Frenchmen lingered to cross bayonets 
with the Prussian guardsmen and meet the fate they 
courted. Canrobert drew off his corps slowly and in 
tolerable order, notifying Ladmirault of his move- 

All through the evening the combat was maintained 
here and all along the line. Malmaison sent a pillar 
of fire skyward, while St. Privat was visible for miles 
by the light of its own destruction. The king of 
Prussia and his staff left the position they had oc- 
cupied during the day upon the gratifying intelligence 
from the left wing, but it was later still before Fros- 
sard's cannon ceased to illuminate the air over Point 
du Jour and Leboeuf 's musketry to belt the hillsideB 
north of the Verdun road with an incessant blazing. 
At midnight silence reigned, and the German pickets 
were holding the line from Vern^ville through Aman- 

The battle of Gravelotte or Amanvillers, as the 
French demoninate it, was the last of that bloody trio 
that, commencing with Bomy on the 14th, cost the 
German armies a loss of 42,000 and the French 34,000 
officers and men. Though the Germans had shed 
their blood like water, they had in every case achieved 
their end. The battle of Bomy was fought to gain 


time to cut the roads to Verdun, VionviUe to check 
the French retreat, and Gravelotte to " nail " the 
French to Metz. On the other hand, Bazaine aim- 
lessly wasted his army. He fought Borny because he 
had no other alternative ; at VionviUe he was fright- 
ened into the defensive when a bold use of his strength 
would have given him the victory ; at Grravelotte he 
fought to retain a hold on the road to Verdun, and 
lost it. 

The military situation was simplified. Only one 
field army was left to France, the one gathering at 
Chalons, and against which the crown prince of Prus- 
sia was moving. On the day following the battle of 
Gravelotte the German fourth army (of the Meuse) 
was formed to cooperate with the third army, and the 
command given to the prince royal of Saxony. It 
comprised the 4th and 12th corps, the Prussian 
Guards, and the 5th and 6th cavalry divisions, and on 
the 20th began its westward march in search of the 
French army of Chalons. The strength of this army 
was close upon 100,000 men, that of the third army 
about 120,000 men. The first and second armies 
united were 225,000 strong, and upon their shoulders 
devolved the siege and subjection of Metz. The king 
of Prussia and General von Moltke left the lines 
before Metz to f oUow the headquarters of the third 



Confusion at the French Headquabtebs at ChIlons. — Mac- 
Mahon^s Abbtvaii thebe. — Result of the Miutabt Coun- 
cils. — The Paris Cabinet takes a Hand. — MacMahon's 
Ibbesolution. — Finally concludes to mabch upon Metz. — 
Stbenoth and Condition of his Fobce^. — Despebation of 


Mahon's Movement. — Moltke moves to checkmate him. — 
Situation on the 27th of August. — On the 29th. — Battle 
of Beaumont. — Rout of De Failly's Cobps. — Discomfitubb 


Demobalization of MacMahon*s Abmy. — The Retbeat upon 
Sedan and MacMahon's Telegbam to the Ministby. — The 
Gebmans close in upon Sedan. — The Fbench Position at 
Sedan. — First Attack of the Gebmans on Septembeb 1. — 
MacMahon wounded. — Splendid Wobk of the Saxon Artil- 
lery. — The Quarrel at the French Headquarters and its 
Result. — General de Wimpffen. — Heroism of the French 
Marines. — Terrible Fighting at Bazeilles. — Awful Ef- 
fect OF THE German Artillery Fire. — Misery of the Em- 
peror. — The White Flag at Sedan. — The Prussian King 
on the Heights of Fresnois — Napoleon's Letter. — Even- 
ing ON the Battlefield. 

Meanwhile all was confusion and indecision at 
Chalons. The emperor arrived on the evening of the 
16th and found little encouragement in the military 
situation. The newly formed 12th corps and a few 
battalions of the Mobile Guard were in camp, and on 
the 18th MacMahon brought in his corps that had 
been so rudely handled at Worth. On the 20th the 
5th corps, which had followed MacMahon in his flight 


from the Sauer, began to make its appearance, while 
the 7th corps was reported en route from Belf ort via 
Paris, and the 13th corps in process of formation at 
the capital. The emperor held anxious conferences 
with Prince Napoleon, Marshal MacMahon, and 
General Trochu, the commander of the 12th corps. 
Prince Napoleon urged that it was time to reject the 
advice of the empress and her Jesuit advisers and to 
cultivate the friendship of Italy. He carried his 
point, and on the 19th left for Florence to inform his 
royal father-in-law " that he might do as he pleased 
with Rome if he would come promptly to the aid of 
France in arms." General Trochu insisted that the 
mobiles should be shipped back to Paris, as their 
uproarious insubordination threatened to contaminate 
the entire army. MacMahon urged that the army 
should retreat upon the capital and accept if need 
were a battle for its defense. It was decided, further- 
more, that the emperor should return to Paris, whither 
General Trochu was to precede him and assume the 
miUtary governorship of the city. 

As a result then of the conference of Chalons, 
Prince Napoleon was sent to Florence, Trochu to 
Paris, and the army directed upon Keims* On the 
evening of the 21st the army reached the environs of 
the latter place, where it was reinforced the next day 
by the 7th corps. The retreat of the army and the 
proposed return of the emperor to his capital had 
been bitterly opposed from the first by the ministry 
of the empress. On the 22d the emperor received 
another dispatch from Paris to this effect : " If you 
do not march to Bazaine's assistance the worst is to 
be feared in Paris." At the same time a hopeful 
message was received from Bazaine in which he spoke 

SEDAN. 331 

confidently of breaking through the German lines of 
investment on the north. The first of these telegrams 
frightened the emperor, while the two together shook 
MacMahon's resolution. He had previously informed 
the ministry that he knew nothing of Bazaine's con- 
dition, and that it would be inexcusable foolhardi- 
ness to attempt his relief with demoralized and half- 
trained troops. The telegram received from Metz 
on the 22d divulged Bazaine's plans, and MacMahon 
became convinced that he had no alternative but to 
march to his relief. Consequently on the 23d he 
issued his orders for an advance of the whole army 
upon Montmedy. 

The strength of MacMahon's army was about 
140,000 men. Of the corps composing it,, however, 
the 1st had been shattered by battle, the 5th and 7th 
dispirited by forced retreats, and the 12th, while it in- 
cluded an excellent division of marine infantry, was 
made up largely of raw regiments. A long period of 
arduous training was necessary to lend anything like 
cohesion to this force, and there was not an hour to 
spare. The success of a movement for Bazaine's re- 
lief depended upon celerity, and of this MacMahon's 
regiments were incapable. The first day's march 
filled the coimtry with stragglers. The intendance 
broke down, and orders were issued from headquar- 
ters for the army to live upon the country. 

On the 27th, after a laborious march, the head- 
quarters were at Le Chesne-Populeux. MacMahon 
was alarmed by unmistakable evidences that the crown 
prince of Prussia was moving northward against his 
flank. On the evening of that day he telegraphed 
to the ministry that he had determined to abandon 
Bazaine, and issued orders for retreat upon Mezidres. 


A few hours later and the agonized response of the 
ministry was placed in his hand. " If you leave 
Bazaine in the lurch there will be a revolution in 
Paris." This was supplemented by another message 
more imperative in tone from the minister of war. 
" I require you to march to the relief of Marshal Ba- 
zaine, by utilizing the thirty hours' start which you 
have over the crown prince (of Prussia). I am send- 
ing Vinoy's corps (the 13th) to Reims. The dy- 
nasty is lost, and we, all of us, with it, unless you 
accede to the wishes of the inhabitants of Paris." 
The emperor entreated MacMahon to hold to his 
resolution to retreat. It had been a struggle from 
the first between the headquarters and the Paris 
cabinet for the direction of the army of Chalons. 
The former manoeuvred with reference to the Ger- 
man armies, the latter with reference to the Paris 
mob. The headquarters succimibed, and the army 
and the emperor marched on to their ruin. 

In the mean time at Bar-le-Duc General von Moltke 
could hardly credit the reports that the French army 
was advancing on the Meuse. General Bliunenthal 
with the map of northeastern France before him ex- 
claimed, " These French are lost, you see. We know 
they are there, and there, and there, MacMahon's 
whole army. Where can they go to ? Poor foolish 
fellows. They must go to Belgium or fight there and 
be lost," and his finger was close to the fortress of 
Sedan. On the 25th the orders were issued from 
headquarters that were to checkmate the army of 
Chalons. The Meuse army was already in the Ar- 
gonnes, the third army was approaching the Aisne 
farther south and one day's march in advance. The 
orders of the 25th wheeled both these armies to the 

SEDAN, 333 

right. The march " nach Paris " was suspended and 
200,000 German soldiers turned their faces north- 
ward. The orderly promptitude with which this 
change of front was accomplished, and the new march 
sustained has long been a subject for admiring com- 
ment among military men. 

On the 27th of August the French 7th corps had 
not crossed the Aisne, while the rest of the army held 
a line from Vouziers to Stonne. The 6th German 
cavalry division was hovering on the flank of the 7th 
corps. The Saxon 12th corps already held the line 
of the Meuse from Mouzon to Dun, while the Prus- 
sian Guards, 4th corps, and the two Bavarian corps 
were distant but a day's march to the south. 

So heavy and painful were the movements of the 
French army that MacMahon could not issue his 
orders for passing the Meuse imtil the 29th. At 
nightfall on that day the 12th corps alone had crossed 
and was in bivouac about Mouzon. The Saxon 12th 
corps, which had repassed the Meuse to take a posi- 
tion on the flank of the French advance, fell upon a 
brigade of the 5th corps and drove it in upon the 
main body at Beamnont. 

On August 30 the French 5th corps at Beaumont 
received orders to cover the crossing of the army at 
Villers and RemiUy, and to cross itself at Mouzon 
later in the day. Notwithstanding the well proven 
fact that the whole country southward was swarming 
with the enemy, De Failly took no precaution against 
a surprise. He had one division in camp on the 
plain south of Beaimiont and the rest of his corps on 
the heights to the north. Toward noon the German 
4th corps fell on the leading division, surprised and 
routed it. The position north of Beaumont was 


stoutly defended under the personal direction of De 
Failly, but assailed on front and flank by the 4th 
and Saxon corps was soon rendered untenable. Then 
began a disorderly retreat upon Mouzon. A brigade 
of the French 12th corps sent by General Lebrun to 
cover the flight of De Failly's battalions was roughly 
handled and only added to the confusion. The artil- 
lery of the 12th corps, well served on the heights east 
of Mouzon, checked the German pursuit. 

During this combat the 1st Bavarian corps, which 
had been threatening De Failly's right, unexpectedly 
encountered a brigade of the French 7th corps which 
had lost its way. The baggage and supply trains 
were thrown into confusion by the Bavarian artillery 
and nearly annihilated. The French General Douay 
saw his corps demoralized without fighting, and, de- 
spairing of reaching Villers, directed its march upon 
Remilly. One division pursued a confused march to 
Sedan, where it crossed the Meuse the following 

This day's work threw the French army into ter- 
rible confusion. The 5th corps had been badly beaten, 
as had one brigade of the 12th corps. The 7th corps 
had been hotly pursued and lost a portion of its bag- 
gage. The 1st corps alone remained intact. The 
emperor had met MacMahon on the hills above Mou- 
zon late in the afternoon, and the latter had then no 
idea of the magnitude of the disasters that had over- 
taken the army. When the rout of the 5th corps 
came streaming through Mouzon, however, he grasped 
the situation. He could only choose between giving 
battle at Mouzon and retreating northwest in the hope 
of finding an open road to Paris. He determined 
upon the latter course, and the ministry were in- 



SEDAN. 335 

formed of it by this curt telegram, " MacMahon in- 
forms the minister of war that he is compelled to 
direct his march on Sedan." Through the dense 
darkness the army struggled on, crossing and block- 
ing itself on unknown roads, the emperor making his 
way miserably on foot through the crowded streets of 
Sedan. After this night of panic, doubt, and confu- 
sion, MacMahon still failed to recognize the full 
gravity of his situation, although he was sufficiently 
uneasy to hurry the prince imperial off to M^zieres, 
where he had pretty much determined to retreat the 
next day. 

Throughout the day of the 31st the Germans 
advanced with wonderful energy. At sundown the 
jagers of Von der Tann's Bavarian corps were close 
up to the Meuse at Bazeilles, — near enough, indeed, 
to prevent the destruction of the bridge at that point, 
while the artillery engaged in a fierce duel with that 
of the French 12th corps. This action was main- 
tained by the German commanders to hold the French 
marshal at bay while they cut his line of retreat upon 
Mezieres, although they were not inclined to believe 
that their efforts to delay his march would meet with 
such complete success. It is worthy of note that the 
German headquarters invariably overvalued the mili- 
tary sagacity of its foes. All through the night of 
the 31st the 5th and 11th German corps were on the 
march, passing the Meuse at Donchery and moving 
northward to cut the road to Mezieres. Shortly after 
one o'clock on the morning of September 1 the crown 
prince of Saxony issued orders to the 12th corps to 
direct their march from Douzy upon Sedan via La 
Moncelle, the Guard corps to move on their right 
upon the same point, the 4th corps to act as a reserve 
to these as well as to the Bavarians, 


The Frencli army was crowded into that narrow 
tract between the Meuse and Givonne, bounded on 
the north and northeast by a tangled wooded country 
that extends beyond the Belgian frontier. The only 
feasible lines of retreat were over the road to Me- 
zieres and up the Chiers to Carignan. MacMahon, 
as a precaution against an attack from the east, 
placed the 1st and 12th corps to cover the line of the 
Givonne from Bazeilles to the village of Givonne. 
He posted the 7th corps on the high land between 
Floing and Illy facing northwest, prepared to in- 
augurate a movement upon Mezieres, at which place 
General Vinoy had arrived the day previous with one 
division of the 13th corps. 

At daybreak on the morning of September 1 a 
heavy fog enshrouded the Meuse valley about Sedan, 
and before the sun had dissipated its fleecy folds a 
messenger came galloping up to the French head- 
quarters with the tidings that the Bavarians were 
attacking Bazeilles. Hastening to the threatened 
point, MacMahon found the village stoutly defended 
by the marine infantry of the 12th corps. The Saxon 
artillery opening fire upon La Moncelle, the marshal 
next rode in that direction. As he was engaged in 
studying the country he was struck by a fragment of 
a shell and painfully wounded. His early incapaci- 
tation was certainly an unfortunate episode for the 
French. It was followed by a conflict of authority 
that was attended with the most serious results. 
General Ducrot, the general of the 1st corps, as- 
sumed the command upon MacMahon's fall. The 
Saxon corps was developing a strong attack against 
the whole French line between Daigny and Bazeilles, 
while the corps artillery massed on the highlands to 

SEDAN. 837 

the east fired with a power aad precision that stirred 
at once the awe and admiration of the French gen- 
erals. Ducrot decided that no time was to be lost in 
getting away to Mezieres, and issued orders accord- 
ingly to the 12th corps to begin their retreat. No 
sooner had this been done than General de Wimpflfen 
appeared on the scene, produced an order of the 
minister of war appointing him to the command of 
the army of Chalons in case of the disabling of Mac- 
Mahon, and angrily countermanded Ducrot's orders. 
General de Wimpffen had been with the army only 
two days. He had been summoned to Paris by 
Palikao, and armed with instructions to supersede De 
Failly in command of the 5th corps. Before leaving 
for the front Palikao had also given him the order 
which he produced on the morning of the 1st of Sep- 
tember. He was a confident, energetic, blustering 
man, and in Paris seems to have been impressed with 
the idea that he was destined to restore the fading 
lustre of the French arms. He first saw the army of 
Chalons at Mouzon on the evening of the 30th of 
August, when the panic-stricken refugees of the 5th 
corps were executing their " sauve qui pent." He 
presented himself to MacMahon but was coldly re- 
ceived, while his orders in reference to the 5th corps 
were entirely disregarded. The next morning he 
took the field, and upon hearing of MacMahon's 
wound hastened to assert himself before General 
Ducrot, who had more respect for the orders of the 
minister of war. Ducrot gave way only after a 
heated altercation in which General Lebrun of the 
12th corps seems also to have borne a hand. Wimpf- 
fen reiterated his orders, and declared with bombast 
that he was going to throw the Bavarians into the 
Meuse and cut his way to Carignan. 


During the morning the emperor wandered aim- 
lessly about, watching gloomily the ever - increasing 
fire of the German artillery, an object of no consid- 
eration in the general melee. The 12th corps had 
begun to retire in obedience to Ducrot's order, and 
had lost ground which it must recover in order to 
lead the way to Carignan. The brightest spot in the 
French defense was at Bazeilles, where the marine 
infantry held the Bavarians at bay. Von der Tann 
had not met opponents like these since he crossed the 
Lauter. Ducrot's men at Worth were stubborn fight- 
ers, but these marines laughed at odds and held Ba- 
zeilles for hours against nearly the whole power of 
King Ludwig's realm. The villagers joined in the 
conflict and wreaked vengeance upon the Bavarian 
wounded after each repulse. As a result the fighting 
became embittered, and a veritable heU raged within 
the flaming streets. At last the Bavarians, assisted by 
the vacillation of the French headquarters, obtained 
possession of the ruins of Bazeilles, and supported 
by the heavy fire of their splendid artillery advanced 
upon Balan. By ten o'clock the French army was 
beaten, and lost as well. The position on the Givonne 
had fallen into the hands of the Guards and Saxons ; 
the Bavarians had carried Balan. Douay was appeal- 
ing frantically for help against the German 5th and 
11th corps, which had deployed between St. Menges 
and Fleigneux, and were extending their lines toward 
Oily. His artillery had been literally knocked to 
pieces by the fire of these two corps assisted by the 
guns of the Prussian Goiard near Givonne. His can- 
nons were dismounted, his tumbrils blown up, while 
his infantry could find no shelter from the terrific 

SEDAN, 839 

Rarely, if ever, has an opportunity to anniliilate an 
army with artillery been more relentlessly improved 
than by the Germans at Sedan. A French army 
nearly 100,000 strong, crowded into an area of hardly 
eight square miles, was subjected to the fire of 426 
cannon served by the most perfect artillerists in the 
world. What wonder that the town of Sedan became 
blocked with military fugitives, that soldiers threw 
away their arms and rushed into churches and cellars 
for protection ? There is no need of following the 
despairing efforts which the French made to recover 
a long lost day, to describe the hopeless contest waged 
by Douay against the Poseners and Hessians at Flo- 
ing and Illy, to recite the heroism of Marguerittes' 
chasseurs and their bold ride to death, to depict the 
agony of the emperor and the fierce wrangling of his 
generals. It was by order of the emperor that the 
white flag was hoisted on the citadel. It was torn 
down by General Faure, MacMahon's chief of staff. 
" Why does this useless struggle go on ? " groaned 
Napoleon, " too much blood has been shed." He re- 
jected the proposition to lead a forlorn hope upon 
Balan and insisted upon closing the contest. Wimpf- 
fen in a rage tendered his resignation, but was 
shamed into its withdrawal. The white flag again 
went aloft, the German batteries ceased their roaring, 
and, freed from the engulfing smoke, the cannon and 
their defenders became revealed on the encircling 
hillsides. The uproar about the gate of Torcy where 
the Bavarians had been knocking hard for admission 
was stilled. A Prussian officer with a message to the 
commander-in-chief was admitted to the presence of 
the emperor. He had come to summon the surrender 
of Sedan. When he rode back it became known for 


the first time at the German headquarters that the 
French emperor was with the ill-fated army. 

About six o'clock the king of Prussia, the crown 
prince, and their staffs stood on the heights of Fr^ 
nois awaiting a message from Napoleon III. concern'- 
ing the capitulation of the army. The air had be- 
come cleared of smoke, and the golden evening light 
streamed into the valley and glowed upon the placid 
surface of the river. A dun cloud of smoke still 
brooded over Bazeilles, but save for this and the 
dark clumps of steel-fringed warriors visible here and 
there, there was little sign of the iron hand of war to 
be traced from this airy height. At last the French 
General Reille came toiling up the hill with the ex- 
pected letter from his emperor. The king breaking 
the seal read the words now familiar to the whole 
world : " Sire, my brother, — Having failed to meet 
death in the midst of my troops, it only remains for 
me to place my sword in the hands of your majesty." 

The Emperor of the French had surrendered, but 
not his army. Upon being informed that De Wimpf- 
fen was in command, the king requested his presence 
at Donchery in the evening to discuss the terms of 
capitulation with General von Moltke. Then the 
brilliant assemblage on the heights broke up amid 
general congratulations. The king and his staff rode 
away to Vendresse. Bismarck made his way to 
Donchery, where he was joined by Moltke. Darkness 
fell on the field that registered the downfall of the 
second empire. A loiterer on the heights of Frenois 
might still have marked the position of Bazeilles by 
its lurid smoke-pall ; he might have traced the course 
of the river as the moon broke through the windy 
clouds and silvered its bosom. All through the val- 

SEDAN. 841 

ley bonfires flashed out, lit by jubilant soldiers of 
the Fatherland. The progress of the king toward 
Vendresse was marked by distant cheering, and then 
as night deepened from bivouac after bivouac came 
the sound of singing, until the air throbbed with the 
strains of the grand old choral, ^^Nun danket alio 


Thb Militaby Conference at Donoheby. — Bismabck^s Ao- 


EACH. — Scene at the Weavebs' Cottage. — Signatube of 


The two prominent actors in the events following 
the battle of Sedan were the French emperor and the 
German chancellor. Both have given their narrative 
to the public, and one may well discard all other au- 
thority for theirs.^ 

In a small room in the village of Donchery the con- 
queror and the conquered met for consultation on the 
evening of the battle of Sedan. The incident has 
been perpetuated on the canvas of a distinguished 
artist.2 On one side of a baize table is Wimpffen, and 

^ Bismarck's narratiye of the capitulation has heen made public 
-with the full consent of the chancellor by Dr. Moritz Busch in his 
work entitled Bismarck in the Franco-German War. The extracts 
in this chapter have been taken from the authorized English transla- 
tion of this work. Napoleon's story of the war of 1870 was edited 
after his death by the Count de la Chapelle, with other sundry papers, 
in a volume styled Posthumous Works and Urq)uUished Autographs 
of Napoleon III. in Exile. The count was war correspondent for the 
London Standard during the campaign of 1870, a,nd later held a 
confidential post in the house of the exiled emperor. He has written 
an account of the war that is a model of historical misrepresentation 
and inaccuracy, but the military memoir he has edited as the work 
of Napoleon is generally accepted as authentic. 

^ A. von Werner's Capitulation of Sedan. 


behind him a few crestf alien officers in the uniform 
of the second empire. On the other side are Bis- 
marck, Moltke, and behind them partially visible in 
the dim lamplight four or five of those clear-headed 
men who had helped to build up Germany's military 
power. Here are the events of that meeting in the 
words of Bismarck himself : — 

" Besides Moltke and myself, Blimienthal and three 
or four other officers of the general staff were pres- 
ent. General Wimpflfen was the spokesman for the 
French. Moltke's terms were short: the whole 
French army to surrender as prisoners of war. 
Wimpffen found that too hard. 'The army,' said 
he, 'had merited something better by the bravery 
with which it had fought. We ought to be content 
to let them go, under the condition that as long as 
this war lasted the army should never serve against 
us, and that it should march off to a district of France 
which should be left to our determination, or to 
Algiers.' Moltke coldly persisted in his demand. 
Wimpffen represented to him his own unhappy posi- 
tion : that he had arrived from Africa only two days 
ago; that only towards the end of the battle, after 
MacMahon had been wounded, had he undertaken the 
command ; now he was asked to put his name to such 
a capitulation. He would rather endeavor to main- 
tain himself in the fortress, or attempt to break 
through. Moltke regretted that he could take no 
account of the position of the general, which he quite 
understood. He acknowledged the bravery of the 
French troops, but declared that Sedan could not be 
held, and that it was quite impossible to break 
through. He was ready, he said, to allow one of the 
general's officers to inspect our positions, to convince 


him of this. WimpfiFen now thought that from a 
political point of view it would be wise for us to 
grant them better conditions. We must, he said, 
desire a speedy and an enduring peace, and this we 
could have only by showing magnanimity. If we 
spared the army, it would bind the army and the 
whole nation to gratitude, and awaken friendly feel- 
ings ; while an opposite course would be the begin- 
ning of endless wars. Hereupon I put in a word, 
because this matter seemed to belong to my province. 
I said to him that we might build on the gratitude 
of a prince, but certainly not on the gratitude of a 
people — least of all on the gratitude of the French. 
That in France neither institutions nor circumstances 
were enduring; that governments and dynasties were 
constantly changing, and the one need not carry out 
what the other had bound itself to. That if the em- 
peror had been firm on his throne, his gratitude for 
our granting good conditions might have been counted 
upon ; but that as things stood, it would be folly if 
we did not make full use of our success. That the 
French were a nation full of envy and jealousy ; that 
they had been much mortified with our success at 
Koniggratz, and could not forgive it, though it in no 
wise damaged them. Now, then, should any mag- 
nanimity on our side move them not to bear us a 
grudge for Sedan ? This Wimpffen would not admit. 
' France,' he said, 'had much changed latterly ; it had 
learned under the empire to think more of the inter- 
ests of peace than of the glory of war. France was 
ready to proclaim the fraternity of nations;' and 
more of the same kind. It was not difficult to prove 
the contrary of all he said, and that his request, if it 
were granted, would be likelier to lead to the prolonga- 


tion tlian to the conclusion of the war. I ended by 
saying that we must stand to our conditions. 

" Thereupon Castehiau became the spokesman, and 
as the emperor's personal commissioner declared that 
on the previous day he had surrendered his sword to 
tlie king only in the hope of an honorable capitula- 
tion. I asked, 'Whose sword was that — the sword 
of France or the sword of the emperor?' He re- 
plied, * The emperor's only.' ' Well, there is no use 
talking about any other conditions,' said Moltke 
sharply, while a look of contentment and gratification 
passed over his face. * Then, in the morning we shall 
begin the battle again,' said WimpfiFen. ' I shall re- 
commence the fire about four o'clock,' replied Moltke ; 
and the Frenchmen wanted to go at once. I begged 
them, however, to remain and once more to consider the 
case ; and at last it was decided that they should ask 
for a prolongation of the armistice in order that they 
might consult their people in Sedan as to our demands. 
Moltke at first would not grant this, but gave way at 
last, when I showed him that it could do no harm," 

So through the darkness the unhappy Frenchmen 
made their way to Sedan, where WimpfiFen told his 
pitiful story to the emperor. He, poor man, prom- 
ised his general to seek the king of Prussia in the 
morning, and personally intercede for better terms 
for the army. Here is an extract from Napoleon's 
recital of the events of that morning : -. — 

"On the morning of the 2d of September Napoleon 
III., accompanied by the prince of Moskowa, entered 
a droschky drawn by two horses, and drove towards 
the Prussian lines. General Keille preceded him on 
horseback in order to inform Count von Bismarck of 
the emperor's arrival. As the latter reckoned upon 


retuniing to the town, he did not take leave either of 
the troops which surrounded it or of the battalion of 
grenadiers and the eentgardes who formed his custom- 
ary escort; when the drawbridge of the south gate 
of Sedan was lowered, the zouaves who were on duty- 
there again saluted him with the cry of ' Vive I'Em- 
pereur.' It was the last adieu which was to meet his 
ears. When he arrived within a quarter of a league 
of Donchery, not wishing to proceed to the Prussian 
headquarters, the emperor stopped at a small house 
which stood by the road, and there awaited the arrival 
of the chancellor of the northern confederation. The 
latter, having been apprised of this by General Keille, 
soon arrived." 

" I met him on the high road near Fr^nois," says 
Bismarck, describing the same event, "a mile and 
three quarters from Donchery. He sat with three 
officers in a two-horse carriage, and three others were 
on horseback beside him. ... I gave the military 
salute. He took his cap off, and the officers did the 
same ; whereupon I took mine off, although it is con- 
trary to rule. He said, ' Couvrez-vous done' I 
behaved to him just as if in Saint-Cloud, and asked 
his commands. He inquired whether he could speak 
to the king. I said that would be impossible, as the 
king was quartered nine miles away. I did not wish 
them to come together till we had settled the matter 
of the capitulation. Then he inquired where he him- 
self could stay, which signified that he could not go 
back to Sedan, as he had met with unpleasantnesses 
there, or feared to do so. The town was full of 
drunken soldiers, who were very burdensome to the 
inhabitants. I offered him my quarters in Donchery, 
which I would immediately vacate. He accepted this. 


But he stopped at a place a couple of hundred paces 
from the village, and asked whether he could not re- 
main in a house which was there. I sent my cousin, 
who had ridden out as my adjutant, to look at it. 
When he returned, he reported it to be a miserable 
place. The emperor said that did not matter. He 
went across to the house, and came back again, appar- 
ently not being able to find the stairs, which were at 
the back. I went up with him to the first floor, where 
we entered a little room with one window. It was 
the best in the house, but had only one deal table and 
two rush-bottomed chairs. Here I had a conversation 
with him which lasted nearly three quarters of an 

Says Napoleon in his account, " The conversation 
first entered upon the position of the French army, 
a question of vital urgency. Count von Bismarck 
stated that General Moltke alone was competent to 
deal with this question. He afterwards inquired of 
the emperor if he wished to commence negotiations 
for peace, and the latter replied that his present situa- 
tion prevented him entering upon this subject ; also 
that the regent, being in Paris, and surrounded by 
her ministers and the Chambers, could in complete 
independence negotiate for the attainment of an end 
so desirable for all. . . . 

" When General von Moltke arrived. Napoleon III. 
requested of him that nothing should be settled before 
the interview which was to take place, for he hoped 
to obtain from the king some favorable concessions 
for the army. M. von Moltke promised nothing ; he 
confined himself to announcing that he was about to 
proceed to Vendresse, where the king of Prussia then 
was, and Count von Bismarck urged the emperor to 


go on to the Chateau de Bellevue, which had been 
selected as the place of the interview. It became 
evident that the latter would be delayed until after 
the signature of the capitulation." 

Napoleon divined rightly in regard to this last fact, 
*'I was determined," says Bismarck, "that the mili- 
tary men who can be harder should have the whole 
affair to settle." 

For a short time the Emperor of the French and 
his staff were left alone in front of the little yellow 
cottage as Bismarck rode away to Donchery to see 
about their q^uarters. The Emperor of the French sat 
there on the edge of the weaver's potato patch, gaped 
at by German teamsters and curious rustics, awaiting 
the pleasure of the German chancellor. Did the days 
of Paris and Biarritz come to the emperor's remem- 
brance ? An hour later, when he was rolling along 
toward the chateau with the helmets and breastplates 
of the cuirrassier guard flashing on all sides, did he 
recollect that he had pronounced the iron man who 
cantered his charger at his side as one " of no conse- 
quence ? " Bismarck recalled it, but he tells us laugh- 
ingly, " I did not think myself at liberty to remind 
him in the weaving shed at Donchery." 

While Napoleon awaited the king of Prussia at the 
Chateau Bellevue, in one of the lower rooms General 
de WimpfEen in despair was signing the capitulation. 
Says Napoleon, " When it was signed, General de 
Wimpffen came to inform the emperor, who had re- 
mained all this time on an upper floor. A few min- 
utes afterwards, the king of Prussia arrived on horse- 
back, accompanied by the crown prince and attended 
by a few officers, 

" It was now three years i 


France and Prussia had met, under very different cir- 
cumstances. . . . Now, betrayed by fortune, Napo- 
leon III. had lost everything, and had surrendered 
into the hands of the conqueror the only thing left 
hun — his liberty." 

The ink was hardly dry upon the papers that con- 
verted the French soldiers into prisoners of war than 
the orders were issued for the march to Paris. With 
the exception of Vinoy's corps at Mezieres, which be- 
gan its retreat upon the capital as soon as apprised of 
the result of the battle of Sedan, no troops remained 
to oppose it. 

On the 4th of September Napoleon left Sedan for 
the castle of Wilhelmshohe near Cassel, which the 
Prussian king had placed at his disposal. The day 
was dark and sad, and the falling rain converted the 
roads into mire. So, bidding adieu to France for- 
ever, escorted by a hostile soldiery, the Man of Decem- 
ber, the Arbiter of Europe, the Modem CaBsar, was 
whirled away northward into the mist and gloom that 
enshrouded the Belgian hills. 


go on to the Chateau de Bellevue, which had been 
selected as the place of the interview. It became 
evident that the latter would be delayed until after 
the signature of the capitulation." 

Napoleon divined rightly in regard to this last fact. 
"I was determined," says Bismarck, "that the mili- 
tary men who can be harder should have the whole 
affair to settle." 

For a short time the Emperor of the French and 
his staff were left alone in front of the little yellow 
cottage as Bismarck rode away to Donchery to see 
about their quarters. The Emperor of the French sat 
there on the edge of the weaver's potato patch, gaped 
at by German teamsters and curious rustics, awaiting 
the pleasure of the German chancellor. Did the days 
of Paris and Biarritz come to the emperor's remem- 
brance ? An hour later, when he was rolling along 
toward the chateau with the helmets and breastplates 
of the cuirrassier guard flashing on all sides, did he 
recollect that he had pronounced the iron man who 
cantered his charger at his side as one " of no conse^ 
quence ? " Bismarck recalled it, but he tells us laugh- 
ingly, " I did not think myself at liberty to remind 
him in the weaving shed at Donchery." 

While Napoleon awaited the king of Prussia at the 
Chateau Bellevue, in one of the lower rooms General 
de Wimpffen in despair was signing the capitulation. 
Says Napoleon, " When it was signed. General de 
Wimpffen came to inform the emperor, who had re- 
mained all this time on an upper floor. A few min- 
utes afterwards, the king of Prussia arrived on horse- 
back, accompanied by the crown prince and attended 
by a few officers. 

" It was now three years since the sovereigns of 


France and Prussia had met, under very different cir- 
cumstances. . . . Now, betrayed by fortune. Napo- 
leon III. had lost everything, and had surrendered 
into the hands of the conqueror the only thing left 
hun — hisUberty." 

The ink was hardly dry upon the papers that con- 
verted the French soldiers into prisoners of war than 
the orders were issued for the march to Paris. With 
the exception of Vinoy's corps at Mezieres, which be- 
gan its retreat upon the capital as soon as apprised of 
the result of the battle of Sedan, no troops remained 
to oppose it. 

On the 4th of September Napoleon left Sedan for 
the castle of Wilhelmshohe near Cassel, which the 
Prussian king had placed at his disposal. The day 
was dark and sad, and the falling rain converted the 
roads into mire. So, bidding adieu to France for- 
ever, escorted by a hostile soldiery, the Man of Decem- 
ber, the Arbiter of Europe, the Modern Caesar, was 
whirled away northward into the mist and gloom that 
enshrouded the Belgian hills. 



The Early War Days is Paris. — False Report op Victory. 
— Popular Rage over the Deception. — The Empress re- 
ceives THE News op Disaster. — The Government contin- 

Chambers. — Fall op the Olltvier Ministry. — Palikla.o. — 
The Empress at the Tuileries. — Demoralization in the 
Palace. — The News of Sedan. — Night Session op the 
Corps L:6gislatip. — The 4th op September. — The Blood- 
less Revolution and Fall op the Empire — Flight of 
THE Empress from Paris. — General Trochu. — The De- 
fenses OP Paris. — The Defenders of Paris. — Regulars, 
Mobiles, and Nationals. — The Marines and the Fortress 
Artillery. — Arrival op Vinoy's Corps at Paris. — Favre 
and Bismarck at Ferri^sres. — Paris invested. — First 
Combats op the Siege. — Dispositions op the Besieging 
Army. — The Temper op Paris. — More Sorties. — Destruc- 
tion OP THE Chateau at St. Cloud. — Insubordination in 
THE National Guard. — Aspect of Paris during the Last 
Weeks op October. — The Besiegers. 

In the mean time great events had taken place in 
Paris. Upon the departure of the emperor for the 
front the empress regent continued her residence at 
St. Cloud, and awaited confidently the tidings of vic- 
tory. On the evening of August 2 came news of 
"the baptism of fire," which aroused some enthusi- 
asm but more ridicule in Paris. On the 3d and 4th 
no news was made public, but on the evening of the 
5th the London papers arrived with a description of 
Douay's rout at Weissenburg. Paris became strongly 
agitated by the news of defeat and the conviction 


that the government was suppressing news from the 

On the afternoon of August 6 it was announced 
at the Bourse that the French had won a great victory 
against overwhehning odds, that they had captured 
the crown prince of Prussia with 25,000 prisoners, 
and occupied Landau. The effect of this news upon 
the anxious Parisians was indescribable. In a twin- 
kling great crowds swarmed into the squares and 
boulevards, the tricolor appeared qji. all hands, and 
above the cheers and manifestations of delight the air 
resounded with the exhilarating strains of the Marseil- 
laise. The name of MacMahon was in every mouth, 
and the cries of " A Berlin en huit jours " thundered 
out with renewed intensity. Gradually the Parisians 
came to their senses. The government was obliged to 
profess ignorance of the reported victory. Rage took 
the place of enthusiasm. The tricolor disappeared 
as if by magic. The people stormed the Bourse, 
broke furniture, and beat and ejected the few remain- 
ing occupants. All through the evening agitated 
crowds thronged the boulevards, while a great mob 
besieged the residence of M. Ollivier and demanded 
freedom and truth in the press reports. It was a 
hard day for the police and military authorities of 
the city, and their vigilance alone prevented serious 
and violent disturbances. 

On this evening when Paris was seething with 
violent emotions, the empress was anxiously awaiting 
more definite news from the front. Shortly after mid- 
night came this telegram from the emperor : " Mac- 
Mahon has lost a battle. Frossard has been com- 
pelled to retreat from the Saar. The retreat was 
effected in perfect order." Then followed the omin- 


ous words, " Tout peut se retablir." Within a few 
hours after the receipt of this dismal message the 
empress had abandoned St, Cloud; and when the 
morning of the 7th broke gloomily over the restless, 
troubled city she was conferring with her ministry at 
the Tuileries. 

The government made an effort to break the news 
gently. A bulletin announcing, " The corps of Gen- 
eral Frossard is in retreat. No details," only stimu- 
lated popular anxiety. Then followed the statement, 
" It almost appears as if the enemy wished to offer us 
battle on our own territory. This would insure us 
great strategical advantages." The supposition from 
this combination was that Frossard was retreating for 
strategical reasons. The proclamation of the empress 
in the afternoon, however, dispelled all delusions. 
She announced that the army had suffered a check, 
declared Paris in a state of siege, convoked the Cham- 
bers for the 9th, and published the emperor's doleful 
telegram of the 6th in full. 

The Corps Legislatif convened on the 9th, and it 
was deemed advisable to surround the Palais Bour- 
bon with a cordon of troops. The morning session 
was tumultuous beyond description. Ollivier was 
repeatedly interrupted and insulted. Jules Favre 
declared that the country had been compromised by 
the imbecility of its chief, and declared that the em- 
peror should be brought back to Paris and not allowed 
to embarrass the military councils at the front. Gra- 
nier de Cassagnac, a firm Bonapartist, replied to Favre, 
denounced his propositions as " the beginning of rev- 
olution," and amid fist-shaking and general uproar 
advocated arraigning the entire Left before a military 
tribunal. A babel of uproar followed in which men 


lost their heads and tempers. Before night the Olli- 
vier ministry had fallen on a vote of confidence, and 
been succeeded by that of Count de Palikao, Palikao 
was a bluff soldier with a good record, and he stirred 
a ripple of enthusiasm in the Chambers when he en- 
treated the members to pardon the weakness of his 
voice, as he carried a bullet in his chest. But the 
Chamber was no place for weak lungs in these days, 
and honorable wounds would not sufl&ce to secure for 
an imperial minister the favor of the Left. Palikao's 
regime was brief and turbulent. 

The life of the empress at the Tuileries was an 
anxious one. She had moments of flickering confi- 
dence, but she left her gay spirits at St. Cloud. On 
the 14th she held her last state reception ; the next 
week she was busily engaged in poring over the dis- 
patches that narrated the details of the great battles 
before Metz. They were all recited as victories, and 
yet Bazaine had become hemmed in ; the empress could 
not understand this. It is said that after the middle 
of August the atmosphere of the Tuileries became so 
hopeless and dejected that well-known faces began to 
disappear ; that all discipline was lost in the palace ; 
that articles of bric-a-brac and wearing apparel were 
missed simultaneously with pages and maids. Of 
these facts, however, the empress took little note. 
The army in the field and the mob in Paris held her 
attention ; of the latter she lived in daily dread. She 
agreed with Palikao that the emperor must not return 
to Paris, and that MacMahon must march to the aid 
of Bazaine, who was enjoying such singular fruits of 
victory. The real danger in which MacMahon and 
the emperor stood was not appreciated until Septem- 
ber 1, when a telegram was received from General 


Vinoy at M^zieres, requesting full discretionary pow- 
ers. This, coupled witii MacMahon's dispatch that he 
was "compelled" to retire upon Sedan, awoke serious 
misgivings at the war office. On the afternoon of 
September 3 the worst fears of the government were 
realized. A telegram from the emperor epitomized 
the disaster of Sedan: "The army is defeated and 
captured. I myself am a prisoner." The terrible 
news leaked out, and by evening Paris was aware 
that some new misfortune had fallen upon the country. 
At one o'clock on the morning of the 4th the Corps 
L^gislatif convened. Palikao gloomily announced the 
news, and requested that all discussion be postponed 
for a few hours. Jules Favre then offered a proposi- 
tion under three heads : 1, That Napoleon and his 
dynasty be declared fallen ; 2, The nomination of a 
conmiittee of defense; 3, The retention of General 
Trochu as governor of Paris. The assembly then 
adjourned until 1.30 p. M. 

The 4th of September will long be remembered in 
the history of Paris and of France. At dawn Paris 
began to make its presence felt. The cries of " De- 
cheance " and " Vive la R^publique " were raised on 
the boulevards and in the Place de la Concorde, and 
were audible in the gilded saloons of the Tuileries. 
Before night the French empire had become a thing 
of the past, and a French republic had arisen. A 
revolution vast, irresistible, but bloodless had swept 
away the last vestige of imperialism, and left an up- 
roarious democracy in possession. 

Let us look at the events of the day through the 
eyes of an American bystander.^ It is noon in the 
Place de la Concorde crowded with excited humanity. 

^ Sheppard's Shut-up in Paris, 


** The Garde Mobile are scattered here and there, 
armed with muskets, without order or commander. 
The blouses are cariying muskets, yelling ' Vive la 
Bepublique.' They look like bandits. A distant 
group starts the Marseillaise. It is caught up by 
all the immense concourse. • . . 

** The day is bright. The sun is kindly. The blue 
sky smiles. Turn round once at the Egyptian obe- 
lisk, and you shall see the Arc de Triomphe ; . . . the 
Madeleine pillars, standing sentinel against the angry 
horrors of the hour ; the palace of the Tuileries, with 
the flag of the empire still floating from its top, and the 
Corps Legislatif , where all the interest has now con- 
centred, while beyond it the gilded dome of the tomb 
of the other exiled Napoleon glistens under the blaze 
of noon. The fountains are playing as usual. . . . 

" The Tuileries clock strikes twelve. The flag is not 
down yet. The empress is still there. Crowds assem- 
ble — and so does the Corps Legislatif at twenty 
minutes past one. The National Guard and some 
mounted sabres protect the bridge and the approaches. 

" Again the galleries are packed to overflowing. No 
ventilation, great smell of unclean democrats. The 
diplomatic corps are in full force. Wonderfully 
magnificent ladies, and the time-honored revolution- 
ary dames of dauntless front and enormous diameter. 
The Corps Legislatif are debating. In a few min- 
utes there is a fearful uproa; outside — soldiers and 
people fraternize, and in the briefest time the edifice 
is inundated with soldiers and people, young and old, 
both men and women, as well as little boys and girls ; 
they burst through the door opposite the president's 
desk, and fill the chamber, shoxiting 'Decheance' 
and * Vive la Republiquo.' 


" Some are in the costume of the National Guard ; 
some in that of the Guard Mobile. Many carry chas- 
sepots, and some short swords. The women carry 
only their native arms, bare and brawny, and uplifted. 
There is the usual proportion of these masculine 
dames, and of young women with their babes, and of 
family men, taking no part particularly, simply smok- 
ing and watching, and of boys laughing and shouting. 
It is an indescribable tableau ; and after all attempts 
at description, one returns to the only adequate one 
— it is French. 

" President Schneider rises, looks down upon the 
tumult with a most disconsolate countenance, not 
unmixed with disdain, rings the bell nervously, and 
says : ' All deliberation is impossible under these 
circumstances. I accordingly pronounce the sitting 
at an end.' 

" The president puts on his hat at about 3.20 p. M., 
steps down, and disappears, followed by all the depu- 
ties present, except those of the extreme Left, several 
of whom, and particularly Gainbetta, in vain endeavor 
to control the new ' government.' 

" The owners of the blouses, petticoats, and shirt- 
sleeves continue to dance and howl, to brandish fists, 
babies, and chassepots, as it may happen ; they cry 
* Decheance,' ' Vive la Republique.' . . . 

" Jules Favre tries to pacify them by saying : ' Union 
is necessary ; the Repul^ic has not been declared, but 
it will be presently.' 

" The noise grows more unearthly, — dancing, howl- 
ing, babies screaming, women and men gesticulating, 
dogs joining in the chorus of cries with all their 
might, till the 'extreme Left' are driven to their 
wits' end. Some of the National Guard mount the 


president's rostrum; a villainous, ill-looking fellow 
takes the chair and shakes the bell ; the green sprigs 
in the muskets are waved ; one man in a blue shirt 
mounts the tribune and makes a speech, but it is in- 
audible. Some men seize the pens and ram them 
into the inkstands, and pretend to write ; but as they 
do not know how, they can only ' make their mark,' 
and spill the ink around. The ill-looking man rings 
the bell furiously ; the members of the ' extreme 
Left' continued their exertions on behalf of 'law 
and order,' but at length they give up in despair, 
and depart, leaving the mob in possession. 

" The * extreme Left ' is succeeded by the extremer 
Left. Somebody thinks of Eochef ort, and cries, ' To 
St. Pelagic.' Nobody stirs, however. But the next 
cry, 'To the Hotel de Ville — to proclaim the Re- 
public,' carries all before it ; and they move tumult- 
uously and noisily to the Hotel de Ville. 

" In one of the rooms of the Hotel de Ville the 
members of the ' extreme Left ' assemble and declare 
the Republic, and themselves its rulers. Favre chooses 
the portfolio of foreign affairs. Gambetta prefers 
that of the interior. Trochu is continued governor 
of Paris. The legislative body and senate are pro- 
nounced dissolved. All political prisoners and exiles 
are pardoned." 

The fall of the empire was dramatically registered 
as the clock of the Tuileries sounded for half past 
three, by the lowering of the imperial flag. This was 
the signal to all republicans who were not otherwise 
engaged. The Tuileries were stormed. The soldiers 
on guard interposed little resistance, but appealed to 
the people with good effect to refrain from pillage 
and vandalism. Just before the mob broke into the 


building Signor Nigra, the Italian ambassador, en- 
tered the apartments of the empress and informed her 
that she must fly. Hastily bidding a tearful adieu 
to the little knot of adherents who remained faithful 
to her, under the escort of Signor Nigra and Prince 
Metternich she made her way to the street, where a 
close cab was in waiting. She was driven to the 
house of Dr. Evans, the American dentist, where she 
rested a few hours. She left the same mght, how- 
ever, for the north, and made her way in disguise to 
the little seaport town of DeauviUe. Here she em- 
barked on the yacht of Sir John Burgoyne, and after 
a perilous and protracted voyage landed in England, 
a weary, saddened woman, her bright hopes blighted, 
her husband an exile, his dynasty lost, her son a mere 

As president of the government of national defense 
and military governor of Paris, General Trochu oc- 
cupied an unenviable position. He was the servant 
of a turbulent people, the head of a dubious govern- 
ment, the commander of a motley army of doubtful 
efficiency. Before the downfall of the empire he had 
commenced his extraordinary efforts to place the city 
in a state of defense. Paris was protected, first, by the 
enceinte with its ninety-eight bastions ; and, second, 
by an outlying chain of detached forts fifteen in num- 
ber and occupying a circle thirty-six miles in circum- 
ference. On the north of the city about St. Denis 
were the strong works of La Briche, Double Couronne 
du Nord, and De I'Est. On the northeast between 
St. Denis and the Canal de I'Ourcq was the fort of 
Aubervilliers. On the east between the canal and 
the Mame, well situated on a commanding plateau, 
were Forts Romainville, Noisy, Kosny, and Nogent. 


The Fort of Charenton stood southeast of Paris in 
the angle formed by the Seine and Marne. The hilly 
wooded country in the peninsula formed by the bend 
of the Seine south of the city was protected by a Une 
of five forts, Ivry, Bicetre, Montrouge, Vanves, and 
Issy. On the west Paris was protected by a single 
fort, the largest and most formidable of all, Mont 
Valerien, perched on a commanding hiUtop 363 feet 
above the Seine, and commanding with its fire all the 
low adjacent country. Beside these there was the 
wood embowered, fortified chateau of Vincennes with 
its formidable outworks, which, however, did not play 
a prominent part in the outer line of defense. Ad- 
vantageous points between and in advance of the 
forts were occupied by redoubts. The ooimtry be- 
yond the northern forts was inundated by damming 
the river Rouillon, the magnificent bridges over the 
Seine were blown up, houses and forests that threat- 
ened to interfere with the action of the fortress artil- 
lery were ruthlessly demolished or burned. The 
armament of the forts and enceinte was ample, though 
many of the pieces were antiquated. Indeed, as 
regards defenses and armament combined, Paris may 
be said to have been strongly, though by no means 
perfectly, protected. 

Trochu had, to defend the city, a force more niuner- 
ous than the necessity required, and more motley than 
nimierous. The garrison may be classed under three 
heads : first, the regular troops ; second, the Mobile 
Guard ; ^ and third, the National Guard. The regu- 

^ The Mobile Gnard while strong in nnmbers was defectire in or* 
ganization and indifferently drilled. It was made np of men nnder 
thirty years of age and officered by the vote of the rank and file. It 
corresponded in many respects with the state militia of the United 


lar troops were Miade up largely of the ISth and 14tli 
army corps, the mariiles, pompiers, gendarmerie, etc., 
aggregating about 90,000 men. The Mobiles com- 
prised 115,000 men, 15,000 being the Paris contin- 
gent, the remainder having been brought in from the 
provincial districts. The influence of Paris upon 
these latter troops was baneful in the extreme. " They 
obstructed the boulevards and cafes ; idleness and 
debauchery caused almost as great ravages in their 
ranks as the fire of the enemy," such was General 
Ducrot's criticism upon them. The National Guard 
was literally Paris in arms, and was ever swelling in 
numbers and fomenting disorder.^ By the last of 
October the garrison of Paris numbered nearly half 
a million of men, 300,000 of which were ill-drilled 
National Guardsmen. 

Trochu in assigning duties to the different branches 
of his vast army made the best of a bad dilemcma. 
To the marines he confided the fortress artillery. 
When as the siege progressed he was accused of 
throwing undue hardship and danger upon the shoul- 
ders of this gallant corps, he retorted, " How in God's 
name am I to help it ? I must have men at the guns 
who will not run away at the first round." The Mo- 
bile Guard was detailed to garrison* the forts and 
redoubts. The National Guard occupied the enceinte. 
The regular troops and picked battalions of the Mo- 
bile Guard were held for fighting in the open country, 

^ General Ducrot's comnient on these troops was as follows : " The 
Parisian as a soldier is either very good or very bad, rather good 
than bad on the field ; bat when enrolled in the Mobile or National 
Guard he is always a detestable soldier, because his instincts of lax- 
ness and revolt always dominate his natural courageous qualities. . . • 
They could not be preserved from the evil contact of the masses, and 
they took part in many political manifestations.'* 


for sortie work, and it must be confessed for intimidat- 
ing the National Guard as well. 

On the afternoon of September 7 the Parisians were 
served to a tangible evidence of the French defeats,, 
when the weary corps of Vinoy entered after its 
breathless run from Mezieres. Hardly a foilnight 
before it had left for the front with all its " fuss and 
feathers," new uniforms, bands, and standards. It 
returned in a sad plight. The " jaded columns of red 
legs and disordered mass of guns and wagons looked 
like nothing so much as the floating in of a wreck 
upon the beach." ^ 

On the 16th of September the last mail left Paris ; 
on the day following clouds of Uhlans were reported 
in sight. Paris began to realize that the enemy was 
at her gates and that a siege was impending. The 
new government recognized the fact earlier and trans- 
ferred its seat to Tours. M. de Cremieux, minister 
of justice, was detailed to represent the government at 
the latter place, whither nearly all the diplomatic 
fimctionaries hastened after him. M. Thiers left for 
England in the hope of gaining mediation, while 
Jules Favre visited Bismarck at Ferrieres in the hope 
of arranging an armistice. Unfortunately Favre and 
Bismarck were so far apart in their views of what 
the occasion demanded that any agreement was hope- 
less. Bismarck mistrusted the stability of the new 
government and refused to consider an armistice ex- 
cept on the basis of the capitulation of Bitsch, Toul, 
and Strasburg, and the surrender of several of the 
Paris forts. As regards peace he stood for territorial 
cession. Favre planted himself squarely on the prin- 
ciple, " not an inch of our territory or a stone of our 

^ Sheppard's Shut-up in Paris, 


" France will as little forget Sedan, as Waterloo or 
Sadowa which did not concern you. ... As we shall 
shortly have another war with you, we intend to enter 
upon it in possession of all our advantages," such 
were Bismarck's chilling comments. '* We can perish 
as a nation, but we cannot dishonor ourselves," was 
the heated rejoinder of Favre. In short, Bismarck 
would not consider an armistice unless France gave 
up even the slight military advantages that she yet 
held. He would not discuss peace imtil the principle 
of the cession of territory was fully accepted. Favre 
returned to Paris in great dejection. 

In the mean time the city had become invested. 
The third German army crossed the Seine on pontoon 
bridges near Villeneuve, the fourth closed in from 
the northwest. There was skirmishing on the I7th 
and 18th of September between the vanguard of the 
third German army and the Parisian forces between 
Villeneuve and Creteil, and on the 19th the first sharp 
action occurred on the plateau between Meudon and 
Sceaux. General Ducrot, who had occupied this 
position in force, was attacked by the 10th Prussian 
division.^ Later the 2d Bavarian corps assumed the 
burden 'of the action, and the 5th corps pursued its 
march to Versailles. The French fought well for a 
time, and then became demoralized. The Bavarians 
carried the plateau of Chatillon-Clamart and the re- 
doubt at Moulin de la Tour. The 5th corps occupied 
Versailles that evening, and seized the unfinished 
works at Montretout and Sevres. The fugitives from 
Ducrot's forces rushed madly into Paris, where they 
told wild stories of the action and spread consterna- 
tion abroad. The conduct of the troops was anything 

^ Of the 5Ui corps. 


but satisfactory, and Trochu was compelled to pub- 
licly expose certain battalions. On the 21st the 
headquarters of the third German army was trans- 
ferred to Versailles.^ The next day the investment 
was practically complete. The outposts of the fourth 
army were on the line Bezons, Argenteuil, Epinay, 
Pierrefitte, Stains, Dugny, Le Bourget, Villemonble, 
Neuilly. The third army was on the line Brie, 
Champigny, Creteil, Choisy-le-Roi, Thiais, Chevilly, 
L'Hay, Bourg, Meudon^ Sevres, Bougival. 

Paris blustered, threatened, and fumed. The affair 
at Chatillon-Clamart shook public confidence for a 
time. The citizens and National Guard " manifested " 
repeatedly before the Hotel de ViUe with shouts of 
" La guerre a outrance " and " A bas les Prussiens." 
Cries of " Vive la Commune " also became noticeable 
on these occasions. A clamor was raised for deci- 
sive measures, for a sortie in force. The command- 
ant of Mont Valerien was removed because " protests 
against the silence of this fort were so loud and 
strong." 2 His successor felt compelled to keep his 
guns warm, and fired continually. On October 2 came 
the news of the fall of Strasburg and Toul. An- 
other "manifestation" resulted, in which the com- 
munistic element again developed great strength. 

On September 30 General Vinoy conducted a re- 
connaissance in force against the 6th German corps 
between Choisy-le-Roi and La Belle Epine. The 
French fought well, and even carried the little village 
of L'Hay. They were finally expelled, however, and 
General Guilhelm was killed. This attack through- 

^ The king of Prussia transferred his headquarters from Ferri^res 
to Versailles on October 1. 

^ Labouchere's Diary of a Besieged Resident. 


out was ably seconded by the fire of forts Montrouge 
and Bieetre. 

On October 13 Vinoy conducted another attack 
against the Bavarian lines in the direction of Bagneux 
and Chatillon. General Susbielle's division carried 
the latter village, but the Mobiles failed at Bagneux.^ 
where the young Count Dampierre lost his life. 
Chatillon was then evacuated, and the French retreat 
began. In the afternoon of this day a demonstration 
was made from Mont Valerien toward St. Germain. 
The king of Prussia witnessed the operations from 
the viaduct of Marly until the withdrawal of the 
French. Mont Valerien maintained a lazy fire dur- 
ing the evening, and shelled the Park of St. Cloud. 
The chateau was set on fire and burned throughout 
the night. Much of its valuable contents had been 
removed before the siege began, considerable more 
was saved by the Prussian soldiers, but at dai^v-n 
nothing remained .of the building but bare walls and 
smoking ruins. 

The first three weeks of the siege indicated that 
the army of Paris was no match for its foe. The 
mass of the National Guard had no stomach for fight- 
ing, and the Mobiles and the line were unsteady. In 
the National Guard there was little improvement in 
discipline ; soldiers wrangled over political problems, 
and threatened their officers. The hope of Paris 
was transferred from her own defenders to the armies 
organizing under the direction of the Tours govern- 
ment on the Loire and in the northern provinces. 
News from these forces was received only by balloon 
or- carrier-pigeon, and anxious suspense was the result. 
Gambetta left Paris for Tours in a balloon on the 7th 
of October, and arrived safely at his destination. 


Had the traveler who visited the International 
Exhibition of 1867 found himself again in Paris 
during the last weeks of October, 1870, he would 
have been shocked at the change that had come over 
the city. The imperial flag no longer floats from the 
Tuileries, the gay turnouts are gone, the superb sol- 
diery of the Guard has given place to the slouchy ill- 
dressed National and Mobile. The garden of the 
Tuileries is a bivouac ; the Champ de Mars a camp ; 
the Cii'que de I'lmperatrice a barrack; the Palais 
de rindustrie a hospital ; the Luxembourg and Ely- 
see military headquarters. In the Place de la Con- 
corde crowds gather, chatter, and " manifest " about 
the statue of Strasburg; the quais along the Seine 
are blocked with soldiery. In the Place de I'Etoile 
and at the Trocadero knots of citizens gather, watch 
Mont Valerien, and search in vain for a trace of the 
enemy. The restless inhabitants of Belleville and St. 
Antoine are busily drilling or lounging about in uni- 
form at the expense of " the government." As dark- 
ness falls, a full sense of the change that has come 
to the city of gayety and light is apparent. The 
boulevards are dimly lighted, many of the cafes and 
theatres are closed. The semi-military population is 
omnipresent, the gay loungers of happier days have 
disappeared. The deep ominous roar of the fortress 
artillery forms a dismal accompaniment to these 
scenes. Does the traveler desire to drive in the Bois 
de Vincennes or the Bois de Boulogne ? He is in- 
formed first that horses are scarce and beginning to 
be devoted to other uses than excursions of pleasure. 
He also learns that these fashionable parks have been 
converted into camps where the Prussian " obus " is 
a frequent visitor. At the silent railway stations 


crowds gather about the balloons that are preparing 
to wing their uncertain way to Tours. St. Denis, no 
longer a centre of attraction for the tourist, is re- 
ported under the fire of the Prussian artillery. 

The traveler wishes to pass the lines. Many apply, 
but few receive permission. These happy mortals 
who do succeed in getting out and in satisfying the 
importunities of the German outposts in these days 
have little desire to linger in the vicinity, but hasten 
to place the water between themselves and La Belle 
France. If our traveler is successful, and allowed 
by the German headquarters to make the " tourist's 
round," he is struck first with the invisibility of the 
besieging army. Nothing so dismays the Parisian 
soldier as this same facility of his foe for keeping 
out of sight. No one woidd dream from the evidence 
of his eyes on the German forepost line that 250,000 
sons of the Fatherland are around the capital of 
France. Yet on a moment's warning these quiet vil- 
lages, these still woods, are ready to bristle with spiked 
helmets and bayonets, and wrap themselves in battle 

At Versailles the traveler finds the quietude of the 
old chateau town rudely disturbed. Here his atten- 
tive eye is rewarded by a glimpse of the German 
princes and generals by the score. Bismarck's white 
coat is as conspicuous here as at Gitschin or at Nik- 
olsburg. Orderlies come and go galloping, cavalry 
troops clatter along the avenues, swords and spurs 
clanking and jingling. The bronze figure of Louis 
XIV. before the chateau still points grimly in the 
direction of Paris as though turned traitor and urging 
the national foe to the attack. The picture-gallery is 
not to be inspected. The pictures have been covered. 


and the cMteau turned into a hospital. One wing 
forms the residence of the king of Prussia, who lives 
and sleeps under the same roof with his wounded 

From the terrace of Meudon the traveler gains the 
same view that charmed him three years before, Paris 
lying resplendent amid her favored suburbs. The 
Bavarian artillery has usurped the ground where the 
Parisian loves to lounge and recreate. The erect 
officer in the sky-blue uniform peering through his 
field glass is not admiring the towers of Notre Dame 
or the dome of the Invalides : he is sweeping his eye 
along the French fore post line and up the glacis of 
Fort Issy. 

At Sevres the outposts of the 5th corps are un- 
appreciative of porcelain and china, but grim profi- 
cients in the use of steel and lead. The hand of 
Mont Valerien lies heavily upon St. Cloud with its 
guard of Poseners. The sun and stars shine through 
the gaping windows of the desolate fire-blackened 
pile which has been the delight of Marie Antoinette, 
and of the great Napoleon, and which only a few 
weeks ago was gay with the court of Eugenie.^ 

^ History has repeated itself at St. Cloud during the present cen- 
tury. These stanzas are from Sir Walter Scott's St. Cloudy written 
during the allied occupation in 1815. They are equally applicable to 
the events of 1870. 

" The evening breezes gently sighed 
Like breath of Lover true, 
Bewailing the deserted pride 
And wreck of sweet Saint Cloud. 

** The drum's deep roll is heard afar, 
The bugle wildly blew, 
Good night to Hulan and Hussar 
That garrison Saint Cloud." 



Strasbubg and its Garrison. — The Bombardment. — BuBNnra 
OP Kehl. — Firmness op General Uhrich. — General Web- 


Bazaine's Sortib. — Capitulation of Metz. — Bazaine's CuIj- 
PABiLiT Y. — Complex Nature of the Military Problem from 
THE German Standpoint. — Vitality of Republican Francs. 

— A French Force appears on the Loire. — Its Defeat be- 
fore Orleans. — Formation of the Army of the Loire. — Its 
Organization by General d* Aurelle de Paladines. — Wins a 
Victory at Coulmieius. — Retreats upon Orleans. — Conflict 
between Gambetta and the French Commander. — Appear- 
ance OF THE French Army of the North. — Prince Freder* 
icK Charles marches upon Orleans from Metz. — Advance 
OF the Army of the Loire. — Its Right Wing is beaten at 
Beaune. — Gambetta insists upon a Continuation of thb 
Advance. — The Left Wing defeated at Loigny and Pou- 
PRY. — Frederick Charles assumes the Offensive. — Thb 
Two Days' Battle in Front of Orleans and Rout of thb 
Army of the Loire. — Chanzy rallies the Left Wing and 
TAKES Position at Josnes. — Is attacked by the Grand Dukb 
of Mecklenburg. — Retreat op Chanzy upon Le Mans. — 
Inaction of the First Army of the Loire under Bourbaki. 

— Gambetta marches it Eastward. — Frederick Charles 
AND Mecklenburg concentrate against Chanzy. — Severity 
OF the Weather and Suffering by the Troops. — The Bat- 
tle before Le Mans and Defeat of Chanzy. — The Seconi> 
Army of the Loire and its Record. — Destruction of thb 
French Army of the North by Manteuffel. — March of 
Manteuffel to Werder's Succor. — Bourbaki crosses thb 
Swiss Frontier. 

When MacMahon took up his position on the 
heights of Worth, the fortress of Strasburg was left 


in charge of an infantry regiment of the line and a 
few thousand Mobile guardsmen. This slender force 
received a substantial reinforcement on the day fol- 
lowing the battle, when 10,000 fugitives from Mac- 
Mahon's right wing poured into the city. General 
Uhrich, the commandant, reestablished order and 
confidence among these refugees to such an extent 
that when, on the 8th, the German General Beyer at 
the head of the Baden division of the third army sum- 
moned him to surrender, he was enabled to return a 
firm refusal. As a residt the Baden division, rein- 
forced by a Pomeranian regiment from Rastatt and 
a few Bavarian batteries, sat down before the place. 
General Werder of the Prussian army was appointed 
to command the besieging army, while the Landwehr 
division of the Guard and the first reserve division 
were ordered to Strasburg from their stations in the 
north of Prussia. Moltke was eager for the im- 
mediate reduction of the place, and Werder, with a 
just idea of the character of the garrison, thought to 
bring it to terms by a short bombardment. Stras- 
burg being undefended by detached forts, the besieg- 
ers were enabled to approach at short range and ply 
their field artillery. On August 17 the batteries in 
front of Kehl on the eastern bank of the Rhine 
opened fire. The French, far from being overawed, 
responded by raining shell upon the unprotected 
town of Kehl, while they attempted numerous sorties 
against the German infantry in the suburban villages 
on the western bank of the river. On the 24th the 
fire of the besiegers assumed greater precision and 
intensity, and was maintained incessantly for three 
days, a period which was improved by the engineers 
in pushing their shelter trenches closer to the French 


bastions. The destruction wrought by the French as 
well as the German guns was considerable. Several 
of the villages in which the Prussian infantry had 
found shelter were destroyed, while Kehl itseU was 
set on fire and vied with Strasburg in the intensity of 
its conflagration. The scene at night was grand 
beyond description. The delicate spire of the cathe- 
dral seemed to float in the midst of the lurid glare 
that rose from the burning city, while the dark waters 
of the Khine glowed angrily as they swept seaward 
between the stricken shores. 

Though the inhabitants of Strasburg clamored for 
capitulation, Uhrich was immovable. General Wer- 
der desisted from his bombardment, sent to Prussia 
for siege trains, and prepared for a regular invest- 
ment. The northwest front of the Strasburg defenses 
was selected as the weak point in the line, being open 
to flanking fire, and on September 1 the siege began. 
The full strength of Werder's corps was then on the 
ground. Parallels were opened and the work covered 
by a heavy fire from the siege batteries. The siege 
operations of the Prussians form an interesting and 
instructive study to the engineer and the sapper. 
Every day witnessed progress. The mining galleries 
of the French were unearthed and turned to account 
by the Prussian engineers. An indirect breaching 
fire was maintained with admirable success. The Ba- 
deners occupied the Sporen island where the French 
mortar batteries had been located. At length on 
September 27, when two French lunettes had been 
converted into Prussian works and breaches opened 
in the main wall for an infantry attack, when the 
citadel had been battered into rubbish and the streets 
of the city placed at the mercy of buUets and shrap- 


nel, Ullrich hoisted the white flag on the cathedraL 
On the morning of September 28 the terms of capitu- 
lation were arranged, and on the day following the 
garrison marched out. Their utter demoralization 
was evident ; many were drunk and raised shouts of 
" Vive la Prusse." More than 19,000 prisoners, in- 
cluding 2,000 sick and wounded, fell into the hands 
of the Germans, these latter representing the loss of 
the besieged during the seven weeks' contest. Un- 
happily, three or four himdred citizens also perished, 
though Werder allowed several hundred of this class 
to pass out, and sent word into the city that the 
cathedral would form a safe refuge to noncombat- 
ants. The roof of this magnificent structure was 
partially burned by shells fired at the tower, where 
the French established a post of observation, but the 
interior remained uninjured. 

In strong contrast to the events at Strasburg were 
the episodes of the blockade of Metz. There was no 
bombardment and but little fighting. A great French 
army 175,000 strong lay sullenly in the midst of the 
encircling forts and pined away day by day, week by 
week, from stagnation and disease, until at last it 
succumbed to the iron embrace of its conqueror. It 
might almost be said that this vast army gave up 
without a blow. The only sortie in force, undertaken 
primarily with the object of breaking through the 
investors' lines, occurred on August 31. Bazaine was 
induced to make this attempt by messages which had 
been smuggled through the German lines from Thion- 
ville, announcing the presence of MacMahon's army 
upon the Meuse. He determined upon breaking 
through on the east of Metz in the direction of St. 
Barbe, and brought no less than four corps into ac- 


tion for that purpose. His attack was not delivered 
until late in the day, and the noise and bustle of his 
preparation had thoroughly aroused the Germans. 
The French right carried Columbey and the centre 
Noisseville. This latter village was taken and re- 
taken, but at ten in the evening remained in the 
hands of the French. The 1st German corps, upon 
which the brunt of the afternoon's fighting had fallen, 
was heavily reinforced during the night from the 7th 
and 9th corps, and on the morning of the 1st of 
September assumed a vigorous offensive. The French 
seemed to have lost all the Uan of the day before. 
Canrobert was. driven in on the left; Leboeuf lost 
Noisseville. At noon the whole army was in retreat 
and the sortie was a failure. If we omit the feeble 
attempt of October 7 against the Prussian Landwehr 
on the north of Metz, we have done with the offensive 
operations of Marshal Bazaine as commander of the 
army of the Khine. He signed the capitulation at 
the Chateau of Frescati on the 27th of October which 
delivered the virgin fortress into the hands of Ger- 
many, and with it three marshals of France, 50 gen- 
erals, 6,000 officers, 173,000 men, 53 eagles, 66 mi- 
trailleuses, 541 fieldpieces, and 800 fortress guns. 

The principal charges against Bazaine, which were 
sustained by the Trianon court-martial, were as fol- 
lows : that he made no serious attempt to break 
through the lines of an enemy but little his superior 
in numbers, and upon whom devolved the guardian- 
ship of a line thirty-eight miles in length ; that he 
communicated with the deposed emperor; that he 
engaged in an illicit correspondence with the Prus- 
sian headquarters ; and that his final capitulation 
was not a necessity. Bazaine's defense to the first 


charge was the disorganization of his army, and his 
lack of horses which were short of fodder. As to the 
second charge, Bazaine claimed that his oath was to 
the emperor, and when the empire fell he regarded 
the war as at an end. He had no faith in the repub- 
lic and deprecated further bloodshed. He certainly 
corresponded with the German headquarters, and 
even suggested that his army might be used to restore 
domestic order in France. Bazaine claims that his 
capitulation was a necessity. To subsist longer in 
Metz was out of the question. The hospital and pub- 
lic buildings were crowded with 20,000 sick and 
wounded, the water was impure, salt had given out, 
there were no horses for the artillery. Without 
attempting to settle the question as to whether or 
not the marshal was guilty of treason, the penalty of 
which he suffered until his death, we must recognize 
the fact that the fall of Metz sealed the fate of 
France. Two hundred and twenty-five thousand Ger- 
man soldiers were let loose upon the raw levies which 
the republic was everywhere organizing in the frantic 
hope of saving Paris. 

With the fall of Metz the last soldiers of the empire 
crossed the Rhine as prisoners of war. Yet the mili- 
tary situation had attained from the German stand- 
point a more tangled complexity than at any previous 
period of the campaign. The republic was display- 
ing extraordinary vitality. It reflects great credit 
upon the energy of the government of national de- 
fense, as impersonated by Gambetta at Tours, that 
when the armies of Prince Frederick Charles and 
Manteuffel commenced their westward march from 
Metz, there were more men in arms beneath the tri- 
color than at any time since the emperor's declara- 
tion of war. 


While Metz still held out Moltke had made great 
effoi-ts to check the organization of new French 
armies. Cavalry columns were pushed in all direc- 
tions from Paris to overawe the country but without 
effect. The peasantry flocked to the colors in great 
numbers, until by the middle of October a strong 
French corps was reported in the vicinity of Lie 
Mans, another was known to be organizing on the 
Somme, while a German cavalry division was com- 
pelled to abandon Toury to the advance of the French 
15th corps, which had sprung up in a night on the 
banks of the Loire. The latter force was rightly 
judged by Moltke as the most threatening. Con- 
sequently the 1st Bavarian corps, the 22d division of 
the 11th corps, and the 2d and 4th cavalry divis- 
ions were directed southward. On October 10 these 
troops encountered the 15th corps near Chevilly, and 
after some preliminary skirmishing crushed it on 
the day following, capturing three guns and seven 
thousand prisoners. The panic-stricken survivors fled 
through Orleans and across the Loire in such terror 
that another Joan of Arc could hardly have brought 
them to their senses and saved the city. The Ger- 
mans entered at midnight, having sustained the most 
insignificant losses. 

With the Bavarians in possession of Orleans, and 
with the surrounding country well patrolled by two 
cavalry divisions, Moltke withdrew the 22d division 
and 4th division of cavalry to Chartres. This column 
arrived at its destination after a lively fight at Ch&- 
teaudun, which had been barricaded by a force of 
mobiles and Franc-tireurs. The grand duke of Meck- 
lenburg assumed command at Chartres, and held him- 
self in readiness to support Von der Tann at Orleans, 


to march to Paris, or threaten the French army m 
the west. 

Moltke hardly did justice to the extraordinary 
vitality of republican France. Before the close of 
October a 16th corps under Chanzy had taken the 
field, the 16th had been reorganized, and a 17th was 
in process of formation. General d' Aurelle de Pal- 
adines was appointed to the command of all these 
forces by the government at Tours. He found them 
without the esprit and discipline indispensable to a 
formidable army. Their nucleus was formed by some 
15,000 regulars, more than half of whom had escaped 
during the early morning hours from the carnage of 
Sedan, and around these were grouped the raw peas- 
antry and Mobile Guards. Thanks to the energy of 
the new commander, the chaotic battalions soon as- 
sumed a more military bearing. At last it was 
thought they might reasonably undertake an impor- 
tant enterprise. D'Aurelle fixed his mind upon the 
Bavarians at Orleans and determined upon their cap- 
ture or annihilation. When it is considered that he 
had a force of at least 70,000 men, while the Bavarians 
had no substantial supports nearer than Chartres, this 
plan cannot be pronounced imprudent. He decided 
upon November 9 as the day for his great stroke. 
No time was to be lost, as Metz had capitulated and 
the first and second German armies were moving 
westward by forced marches. 

General d' Aurelle was a good strategist, and he 
laid his plans carefully. While the 15th and 16th 
corps concentrated on Orleans from the west and 
south. General Pallieres with one division of the 
former corps was to cross the Loire east of Orleans, 
and march in the direction of Chevilly to bar the 


Bavarian retreat on Paris. Fortune, however, was 
not favorable to the French. Von der Tann, warned 
by his cavalry of the French concentration, left one 
regiment in Orleans, and with the balance of his 
troops crossed the Loire to reinforce his division near 
Coulmiers. In this vicinity he was attacked on the 
9th by the 15th and 16th corps. Divining the trap 
that was being laid for him, and sending word to the 
regiment in Orleans to retreat upon Artenay, he 
evacuated Coulmiers, and fighting hard began to retire 
over the road to Patay. At nine o'clock in the even- 
ing, after suffering a loss of less than one thousand 
men, the main body of his corps was approaching that^ 
place. D'Aurelle had been foiled utterly in his " en- 
veloping " scheme. His extreme left had been thrown 
into disorder by a cavalry panic, while on the right 
Pallieres only reached Chevilly at midnight. The 
influence of the action upon the French soldiery, how- 
ever, was very inspiriting. They had seen the backs 
of German columns, and this unwonted exhibition was 
productive of wild sensations in the raw and enthusi- 
astic troops. Von der Tann halted at Toury, where 
he placed himself in communication with the 22d 
division at Chartres. The 17th division was moved 
from the Paris army to the south, and the command 
of the united forces conferred upon the grand duke 
of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. His four divisions of in- 
fantry and three of cavalry constituted a force of 
nearly 50,000 men. 

The battle of Coulmiers marked a great crisis for 
France. M. Gambetta enthusiastically hailed the 
army as conquerors, and urged an immediate advance 
upon Paris. He became convinced in his joy that 
the ardent soldiers of the republic were man for man 


superior to their experienced adversaries. General 
d'Aurelle de Paladines, on the other hand, regarded 
matters from another standpoint. Far from advocat- 
ing a movement upon Paris, he insisted that the army 
should return to the intrenched camp at Orleans. 
The 9th of November convinced him that these same 
soldiers whom Grambetta regarded as invincible were 
inclined to be panicky and incapable of great manoeu- 
vres. Even the knowledge that Prince Frederick 
Charles with his whole army was approaching the 
Loire could not shake D'Aurelle's determination. In 
spite of Gambetta's remonstrance that he was wasting 
valuable time, he brought the army back to Orleans 
for reorganization and drill. This was the commence- 
ment of a struggle between the government and the 
military authorities. M. Gambetta failed to profit 
by the dismal experience of Palikao ; and while the 
army of the Loire was marked by defects that must 
of necessity have seriously compromised its fortunes, 
yet, as we shall see, upon his shoulders must rest a 
large portion of the responsibility for its greatest 

On the 15th of November France had become 
divided into four distinct battlefields. In the north- 
em provinces two French corps under Bourbaki were 
preparing to withstand the German army which Man- 
teuffel was bringing up from Metz ; at Paris Trochu 
and his discordant legions still fumed within their 
iron girdle ; on the Loire the rapidly swelling ranks 
of D'Aurelle's corps were at last confronted by the 
combined forces of the grand duke of Mecklenburg 
and Frederick Charles ; while in the southeast Werder 
with the 14th German corps had invested Belfort, and 
was watching the south of France as far as Dijon. 


Gambetta never ceased to urge upon the French 
commander the necessity of assuming the offensive. 
During the last weeks of November he received in- 
formation from General Trochu that the garrison of 
Paris was on the eve of a great sortie, and his urgency 
became imperative. D'Aurelle was ordered to under- 
take a movement in cooperation with the army of 
Paris. The German lines at this time extended from 
the vicinity of Beaune la Kolande on the east, pass- 
ing north of Artenay, to Ogeres on the west. The 
French commander found himself under the necessity 
of breaking through or turning this line in the hope 
of giving the hand to a successful army from Paris. 
Consequently, on the 28th of November he directed 
the 18th and 20th corps against Beaune la Kolande 
with orders to push the German left back from the 
road to Paris. Beaune was held by the 10th corps 
and stubbornly defended. The French troops made 
a determined fight, but the arrival of the German 3d 
corps finally accomplished their discomfiture. With 
the retreat came the usual panic, both the French 
corps losing numerous prisoners, and falling back 
upon Bellegarde on the outskirts of the forest of 
Orleans. The French commander after this would 
willingly have abandoned the offensive, but Gambetta 
was again excited over a dispatch from Trochu, stat- 
ing that Ducrot had broken through the German 
lines of investment, and was marching upon Epinay, 
D'Aurelle, who had rested passively since the 28th 
in dread of an advance by Prince Frederick Charles, 
was once more induced to march northward. He 
seems to have made no attempt at a general advance, 
— indeed, the forest of Orleans would have hopelessly 
divided his corps in such a move, — but in this case 


used his left wing exclusively, as on the 28th of 
November he had used his right. General Chanzy 
with the 16th corps commenced his advance on Decem- 
ber 1, driving before him the outposts of the grand 
duke of Mecklenburg. On December 2 he struck 
heavily against the main body of Von der Tann's war- 
worn Bavarian corps, and bearing them down by sheer 
weight of numbers carried Loigny, Villeprevost, and 
Chateau-Goury. At this crisis, however, the Bava- 
rian general was supported on his left by the 17th 
division, while the cavalry division of Prince Albrecht 
covered his right. The grand duke of Mecklenburg 
assumed the offensive, drove Chanzy from all the 
ground he had gained, and by a concentric attack 
carried Loigny. The 15th corps on Chanzy's right 
had in the mean time encountered the 22d German 
division, and been driven before it out of Poupry at 
the point of the bayonet. The French 17 th corps 
also took part in the contest between Poupry and 
Loigny, but was finally worsted and driven back with 
the entire wing upon Terminiers. At night the 
French army rested in the positions it had occupied 
in the morning. The grand duke of Mecklenburg 
had engaged his entire force, four weak divisions, or 
about 35,000 men. The French employed the greater 
part of their corps, at least 80,000 men. 

The result of the combats at Beaune and at Loigny 
only served to convince the French commander of the 
unreliability of his young troops. There was no time 
to argue with Gambetta over the advisability of fur- 
ther offensive movements, for on the 3d Prince Fred- 
erick Charles began a concentric advance upon 
Orleans, the second army forming on a line from Arte- 
nay to Beaune, the grand duke of Mecklenburg mov- 


ing southward against the French left wing and later 
upon Orleans over the Chateaudun road. The oper- 
ations of the 3d and 4th of December, which have 
become known as the battle of Orleans, were a suc- 
cession of combats ill-sustained by the French, who 
at many points seemed more ready to lay down their 
arms than to use them. The German artillery espe- 
cially exercised a powerful influence upon their raw 
soldiery, spreading consternation beyond the reach of 
its shells. The excitement in Orleans was intense. 
The French commander, thoroughly disheartened by 
defeat, and irritated by Gambetta's interference, 
compromised the vigor of his defense by his indeci- 
sion. On the 3d the fighting was distant from the 
city, and the muffled rumbling of the artillery by day 
and the nimierous conflagrations that flared on the 
moonlit plain at night alone told of the German 
devastation. On the 4th, however, the pluck of civil 
and military authorities gave way, and the evacuation 
commenced. All through the day the firing came 
nearer, until the rattle of musketry echoed in the 
streets and the ground trembled with the reverbera- 
tion of the artillery. Great crowds of terror-stricken 
soldiers streamed through the streets in flight. As 
darkness fell the roar of the battle was at the city 
gate ; the troops of Prince Frederick Charles were in 
the suburbs. In the evening the last fight took place 
about the railway station. After that it was a gen- 
eral sauve qui peut^ and shortly after midnight the 
German troops were tramping unmolested through 
the city streets. The battle of Orleans cut the French 
army of the Loire in halves. D'Aurelle with the 15th, 
18th, and 20th corps retreated upon Bourges, while 
Chanzy with the 16th and 17th corps retreated along 


the other bank of the Loire under cover of the newly- 
formed 21st corps as far as Beaugency. These two 
forces were immediately denominated by Gambetta 
as the first and second armies of the Loire. D'Aurelle 
was removed from the command of the former, and 
General Bourbaki simimoned from the north to suc- 
ceed him. General Chanzy was appointed as com- 
mander of the other. The first army was in a 
wretched condition, and Gambetta found Bourbaki 
little more energetically inclined than his precedessor. 
Prince Frederick Charles had wholly allayed the 
imeasiness that prevailed at Paris in reference to 
Gambetta's armies, yet it was determined to follow 
up the divided fragments, and if possible utterly to 
dissipate them. While Prince Frederick Charles held 
himself between Orleans and Vierzon to watch Bour- 
baki, the grand duke of Mecklenburg moved against 
Chanzy. That general had little of the timidity or 
misgiving that characterized his colleagues, and hav- 
ing succeeded in infusing into his men something akin 
to confidence, he promptly established himself in a 
strong position, his right resting on the Loire at Beau- 
gency, his centre upon the plateau of Josnes, and his 
left covered by the forest of Marchenoir. In this 
position he was attacked by the grand duke of Meck- 
lenburg on the 6th. The grand duke was too weak 
numerically to attempt a turning movement, and con- 
sequently attacked boldly the face of the position. 
The brunt of the fighting fell upon Von der Tann's 
Bavarians in the centre ; and though they lost ground 
in the afternoon, they still held the village of Cravant 
which they had wrested from the French in the morn- 
ing. On the left, in the mean time, the 17th Ger- 
man division advanced steadily along the Loire from 


Meung, fought combat after combat, and after mak- 
ing several hundred prisoners carried Beaugency it- 
self in the evening. The 22d division on the extreme 
right had no serious fighting during the day in front 
of the forest of Marchenoir. On the next day the 
grand duke again assumed the offensive, the 17th divi- 
sion and the Bavariaiis driving in the French right, 
and approaching close to Josnes, the heart of the 
French centre. In the evening the opinion prevailed 
at the grand duke's headquarters that Chanzy would 
not attempt to maintain himself longer, and would 
take advantage of the night to draw off. Chanzy, 
however, again registered his intrepidity and individ- 
uality by resuming the struggle at daybreak, driving 
in Von der Tann's outposts and well-nigh throwing 
his whole corps into confusion. This attack was 
beaten back by a heavy artillery-fire, under cover of 
which the infantry rallied* The grand duke had been 
reinforced by the 10th corps, which Prince Frederick 
Charles had detached to his assistance upon becom- 
ing convinced of Bourbaki's lethargy, while the 9th 
corps was approaching Blois on the left bank of the 
Loire on its march for Tours. Chanzy claims 
that it was this corps threatening his rear and not 
the grand duke's assaults that finally induced him 
to retreat. At all events retreat he did, leaving sev- 
eral hundred prisoners with the Germans. In the 
prolonged combat at Beaugency and Josnes Chanzy 
had to defend his almost impregnable position the 
16th, 17th, and 21st corps, beside a new division 
which had been brought up from Tours. These 
troops, numbering at least 100,000 men, were nearly 
all engaged. The grand duke on his part employed 
less than 55,000 men, including the 22d division, 


which had no serious fighting, and the 10th corps 
which acted as a reserve. Chanzy retreated rapidly 
upon Le Mans in severe weather and over bad roads. 
He was followed closely by Frederick Charles, and 
at Vendome in a rear-guard engagement lost a few 
hundred prisoners. He arrived at Le Mans on the 
16th of December, where he was joined by the 19th 

Moltke now determined to give his weary troops 
a respite. The second army was ordered to adopt a 
passive attitude and not press Chanzy at Le Mans ; 
the 1st Bavarian corps, weary fi'om incessant cam- 
paigning, was recalled to Orleans to observe Bourbaki. 
The troops of the grand duke of Mecklenburg were 
withdrawn to Chartres, from which point they could 
move promptly upon Le Mans, Orleans, or Paris. 

Bourbaki's long inaction was due to the wretched 
condition of his army and the differences that existed 
between Gambetta and his generals. Chanzy inces- 
santly urged a hearty cooperation of the two southern 
armies with the army in the north in a simultaneous 
march upon Paris. Paris was always Chanzy's objec- 
tive point, and it is beyond dispute that the plans he 
advocated were the ones which the German staff most 
dreaded. Gambetta, on the other hand, little by little 
had his attention drawn from the famishing capital, 
and began to regard with favor a plan for cutting the 
German communications with the Fatherland. In 
an unhappy hour he decided to march to the relief 
of Belfort. Werder would be overwhelmed, Baden 
invaded, Carlsruhe and Stuttgart bombarded, the 
German army isolated in France. On December 20 
Bourbaki received his orders from Bordeaux, whither 
the government had fled after the loss of Orleans. 


Bourbaki's movements were slow, and the German 
staff at Versailles was late in divining his destination. 
They continued to believe that a combined movement 
would be undertaken against Paris, and firm in this 
conviction Moltke determined to annihilate Chanzy. 
The new year found Prince Frederick Charles and 
Mecklenburg concentrating towards Le Mans in 
obedience to the instructions from Versailles. The 
weather was terribly severe, the roads frozen into ruts 
or impassable from ice, snow fell frequently, and the 
artillery and baggage trains were moved with diffi- 
culty. The imiforms and shoes of the men were 
badly worn and unfit for the season, and the move- 
ments as a result were slow and painful. On the 10th 
of January the grand duke after a series of skirmishes 
succeeded in establishing himself northwest of Le 
Mans in the left rear of Chanzy's position. The 3d and 
9th corps in the mean time were approaching from 
the east, and the 10th corps from the. southeast. The 
country east of Le Mans is hilly and heavily wooded 
in parts, and the heights rising abruptly from the 
Huisne admit of easy defense. Chanzy was confident 
of holding his own, the more so as he anticipated that 
the Germans would be unable to bring up their artil- 
lery on account of the slippery condition of the 
ground. On the 9th and 10th of January there was 
considerable fighting, resulting in the loss of advance 
positions and several thousand prisoners for the 
French commander. On the day following Prince 
Frederick Charles struck home. The French centre 
made a determined resistance, but the left was threat- 
ened from the north by the grand duke of Mecklen- 
burg, while on the right the mobiles disgracefully 
abandoned La Tuilerie to the advance of the German 


10th corps. Upon this Chanzy's retreat commenced, 
and Le Mans was soon abandoned. 

The second army of the Loire does not again attract 
notice as a military force in any formidable sense. It 
is true Chanzy rallied it beyond the Mayenne, and 
continued to assert its worth to Gambetta until the 
capitulation of Paris ended all. Yet the fact of its 
preservation was due more to the cold weather and 
long nights than to its own cohesion or the admitted 
ability of its chief. More than once the darkness and 
frost stood Chanzy in good stead by stopping a los- 
ing fight and driving the Germans into the villages 
for warmth and shelter. The rival commanders wit- 
nessed the close of a day's campaigning with widely 
different sensations. While the Red Prince yearned 
for the power of Joshua to stay the sun in his course, 
Chanzy bade a glad adieu to the last rays that streamed 
through the gray forests. 

In glancing at the record of the second army of 
the Loire, we notice first that it invariably fought 
against inferior numbers, and yet was invariably 
worsted. Where perhaps five or six thousand of its 
troops met the soldier's fate in wounds or death, 
nearly twenty thousand laid down their arms in ter- 
ror. The achievements of this army are simg more 
loudly in republican France than those of the army 
of the Rhine, and yet with equal numbers and equal 
lack of success we find the latter made the greater 
sacrifices. The army of the Rhine lost as many men 
in a few hours at Vionville as the army of the Loire 
endured in six weeks' campaigning. Furthermore, 
the army of the Rhine inflicted losses upon its foe at 
the battle of Gravelotte three times as great as the 
army of the Loire imposed from the day of its first 


fight until the armistice. A well-commanded amiy 
may, it is true, accomplish great results without suf- 
fering great losses ; skillful manoeuvring may prevent 
butchery. The army of the Loire, however, accom- 
plished nothing, and while admitting that it com- 
prised some excellent material, the lesson taught by 
its campaign is that patriotism, enthusiasm, and en- 
ergy are not the only requisites to an efficient army. 
It is difficult to agree with Chanzy that France was 
humiliated because she had lost confidence in herself. 
After the battle of Le Mans France did wisely in 
recognizing that she no longer had a military basis to 
build confidence upon. 

The army of the north (22d and 23d corps), which 
never attained the cohesion of the army of the Loire, 
was shattered at Pont-a-Noyelles in December by 
Manteufifel, and practically destroyed on the 19th of 
January in a fight at St. Quentin. Lideed, so im- 
potent had this force become that Manteuffel was 
enabled to march southward with the 2d and 7th 
corps to succor Werder at BehEort. He marched hard 
and fast, passed over bad roads within a few miles of 
Dijon under the very nose of Garibaldi and his volun- 
teers ; and yet when he approached Belf ort he found 
Bourbaki already defeated. Werder with 40,000 men 
had maintained the siege of Belfort, frightened Gari- 
baldi into inaction at Dijon, hoodwinked Bourbaki by 
a demonstration, while he chose a defensive position 
on the Lisaine, and then in a three days' battle com- 
pletely foiled and demoralized the three corps of the 
first army of the Loire. There can be no more inter- 
esting study to the student of military strategy than 
this campaign in the southeast. It was but a by-play, 
however, to the great drama that was almost played 


out on the Seine and in the west. When the starv- 
ing, freezing levies of Bourbaki, caught in the toils 
between Manteuffel and Werder, crossed the Swiss 
frontier for disarmament, the curtain which had risen 
in August upon the emperor's military pageant at 
Saarbriick had already fallen at Paris upon the last 
hopeless struggle of the republic against an invincible 


The Eastern and Italian Questions beopened. — The London 


The German Fobeion Office at Yebsailles. — Its Attitude 
ON European Questions. — Condition. of Affairs in Paris. — 
Events of the 31st of October. — Temporary Success of the 
Commune. — Unreliability of the National Guard. — Prep- 
aration FOR the Great Sortie. — The Battle of Champigny. 
— Its. Character and Results. — Increasinq Gravity of the 
Situation in Paris. — Fighting near Le Bourget. — Opening 
OF THE German Bombabdment. — Abandonment of Mont 


OF Prussia hailed German Emperor at Versailles. — Bat- 

Versailles. — Capitulation of Paris and Signature of the 
Armistice. — The French Assembly meets at Bordeaux. — 
Appoints Thiers Chief of the Executive Power. — Thiers 
AND Bismarck at Versailles. — The Preliminaries of Peace 


INTO Pabis. — The Peace of Fbankfobt. — Eubope at the 
Pbesent Day. — Prevalence of Militarism and the Causes 

During these exciting autumn days when the Ger- 
man hosts were closing in upon the capital of France, 
the cabinets of St. Petersburg and Florence were 
turning the crisis to good account. Gortschakoff 
officially proclaimed to Europe that Russia no longer 
felt bound by the terms of the treaty of 1856 respect- 
ing her standing in the Black Sea. The Italian 
premier formally declared his intention to immedi- 
ately occupy Rome as the national capital. 


The contemplated seizure of Rome aroused no pro- 
test in Europe, even the Austiian chancellor stating 
that he " considered the course which the Italian gov- 
ernment had taken was reasonable, just, and such as 
would conduce to an equitable solution." The action 
of the Czar, while an affront to all the powers repre- 
sented in the Paris Congress, was especially galling to 
England. Lord Granville presented Russia's treaty 
obligations very clearly from a moral standpoint, but 
the Czar was not inclined to postpone the restoration 
of Sebastopol and the Black Sea fleet for moral 
considerations. England could find no ally on the 
troubled continent, and war was out of the question. 
Bismarck was induced to suggest a conference, and 
Gortschakoff gracefully accepted London as the place 
of meeting. The first session convened on January 
17, 1871, and the sittings concluded on March 13. 
There had never been a question about the success of 
the revision named in the Russian circular, but the 
conference smoothed England's vanity and lent an 
air of official respectability to the whole proceeding. 

Li the mean time (September 19) the Italian troops 
imder General Cadorna went into bivouac about the 
Eternal City. On the day following, the Pope having 
reiterated his intention to resist, the royal artillery 
battered a breach in the ancient walls, and the in- 
fantry entered to an almost bloodless victory. As the 
tricolor of the Italian nation was flung to the breeze 
from the walls of the capitol the great beU pealed 
out above the joyous tumult in the streets, announ- 
cing to the world that the Italian question was settled 
forever, and that Rome was free. 

What was the attitude of the German confedera- 
tion on continental questions at this time ? To solve 


this question scores of diplomatists made their way to 
the sleepy chateau town of Versailles, where in the 
residence of Madame Jess^ in the Rue de Provence 
the German foreign office was established. There 
the German chancellor was to be found, bluff and 
busy as ever, with his finger on the throbbing pulse of 
Europe. While the soldiers watched the great city 
before them he watched the world and guided it. 
Every day brought new conferences, now with Favre 
or Thiers about the fate of Paris, now with some 
churchman on the Roman question, again with Odo 
Russell or the Russian ambassador on the Black Sea 
clause. Yet among his own people he found time for 
unbending to laugh at great men, and mix his diplo- 
matic comments with narrations of youthful experi- 
ences at the university, or of hairbreadth escapes in 
hunting. The Italian episode simply seemed to arouse 
his curiosity : " I am curious to see what the Pope 
will do. Will he leave the country, and where will 
he go ? . . . There is nothing left for him but Bel- 
gium or North Germany. . . . People with lively 
imaginations, especially women, when they are in 
Rome, with the incense and splendor of Catholicism 
about them and the Pope on his throne dispensing 
blessings, feel an inclination to become Catholics. In 
Germany where they would have the Pope before 
their eyes as an old man in want of help, a good, 
kind gentleman, one of the bishops eating and drink- 
ing like the others, taking his pinch, perhaps even 
smoking his cigar, there would be no such great 

Odo Russell and the English tried the patience 
of the chancellor in these days. When the former 
appealed to him for support against the Russian 


claims he saw no reason to trouble himself about it. 
" For the rest," he remarked to his subordinates one 
night at dinner, " I was not of Opinion that gratitude 
was without its place in politics. The present em- 
peror had always showed himself friendly. • • • As 
for England, he knew well enough how much we had 
to thank her for. The Kussians ought not to have 
been so modest in their requirements; if they had 
asked for more they would have had no difficulty in 
getting what they want about the Black Sea." 

If we were to judge of Germany's position during 
these days by the remarks of the chancellor made for 
trusty ears in the seclusion of Madame Jesse's dwel- 
ling, we should say first that she was following a 
Prussian policy with a warm side toward Russia, 
induced by the gratitude which M. Benedetti had 
wholly failed to evoke, that the occupation of Rome 
and the wrath of England were alike of trivial in- 
terest, while the Pope had become merely the object 
of a humorous sympathy. 

Within Paris matters drifted from bad to worse. 
The troops had been reorganized into three armies, 
the first under General Thomas, comprising the bulk 
of the National Guard, while the regulars and mo- 
biles were embodied in the second army under Du- 
crot, and the third imder Trochu's personal direction. 
Had this numerous force approximated the army of 
Metz in military worth the siege might have been 
raised. As it was, however, the confusion caused by 
the wholesale conversion of the Parisian populace 
into citizen soldiery seriously interfered with disci- 
pline and cohesive organization. The unsuccessful 
October fighting also produced an unwholesome effect 
upon the city. A temporary ripple of satisfaction 


was caused on October 29 by General Bellemare*s 
capture of Le Bourget on the northeastern front of 
Paris. This news was neutralized by the failure of 
Thiers' conference with Bismarck, and when on the 
31st the fall of Metz and the recapture of Le Bourget 
by the Prussian Guards were officially proclaimed 
Paris fairly lost its reason. Thousands of soldiers, 
citizens, and women congregated before the Hotel de 
Ville yelling for the Commune and no surrender. 
The infuriated people broke down the gates, and 
headed by a detachment of the National Guard under 
Major Hourens stormed into the building. Windows 
and furniture fared harshly at the hands of these 
zealous patriots. Stray shots were fired and added 
to the excitement. The twenty mayors were uncere- 
moniously ejected from the chamber; Trochu was 
visited in his private room and his clothing and dec- 
orations torn. Favre and Rochefort were placed 
under arrest, but Ferry slipped away, and while the 
new government of the Commune was organizing, 
proceeded to rally the loyal troops for the rescue of 
his colleagues. The new government was ejected 
during the evening with as much noise and as little 
bloodshed as had characterized its conquest. The 
loyal battalions poured into the square with shouts of 
"Vive Trochu" and "A bas la Commune." The 
soldiery who had been engaged for hours in crying 
" A bas Trochu " and " Vive la Commune " suddenly 
melted away. At midnight the government of na- 
tional defense was busily repairing damages prepara-.. 
tory to resuming its functions. At that time Paris 
had become absolutely quiet again. " What a city 1 * 
remarked the United States minister as he threaded 
the silent streets, " one moment revolution and the 
next the most profound calm." 


General Trochu after this emeute found that he 
had not only the Prussians but the Commune to deal 
with. Worse than all, the latter raised its hideous 
head from the very ranks of the first army. From 
that day the governor of Paris ceased to reckon upon 
the National Guards as a reliable force. With the 
city feverish and excitable and his soldiery infected 
with Communistic sentiment, Trochu realized that 
some decisive action was necessary without the walls 
to maintain the peace within. Paris is much the 
same under all governments and will have her way. 
Napoleon III. made war to appease her, MacMahon 
marched to Sedan to placate her, Mont Valerieii 
burnt its powder to satisfy her, and Trochu must now 
do his part. 

A fortnight of busy preparation heralded the great 
sortie. Trochu's plan was to engage the Prussian 
circle by the fire of the forts and infantry demonstra- 
tions, while he pushed his main forces across the 
Marne in the vicinity of Nogent and Joinville, broke 
the German lines on the southeast of Paris, gained 
the road to Fontainebleau, and opened communica- 
tions with the army of the Loire. 

The management of this movement was confided to 
General Ducrot, who proclaimed his determination to 
come back dead or victorious. The 29th was set as 
the day, but the sudden rising of the Marne threw 
the plans into confusion. General Vinoy attacked 
the Prussian positions about L'Hay and Chevilly, 
but the remainder of the troops could not cross the 
swollen flood to cooperate. As a result Vinoy fell 
back after sustaining some loss. On the evening of 
this day, however, the f oi-ts opened a heavy fire on all 
sides for the purpose of concealing the main point of 


attack, and at daybreak on the 30th General Renault 
led the 2d corps across the Mame at Nogent against 
the Saxon lines, while the 1st corps crossing at Join- 
ville attacked the Wiirtembergers in Champigny, 
The fighting that followed was the most desperate of 
the entire siege. By noon Ducrot had 70,000 men in 
action, had captured Champigny and Brie, and was 
brought to a stand only by the well-defended park 
walks of Villiers and Coeuilly. Night put an end to 
the struggle, leaving the French in possession of the 
lines held by the German outposts in the morning. 

The roar of the battle reverberating through the 
streets caused intense excitement in Paris, which in- 
creased as it became apparent that the garrison had 
made progress. The return of light brought no con- 
tinuance of the contest. The French were occupied 
in the burial of their dead, while the Germans brought 
up their 2d corps to support an offensive movement 
on the morrow. Trochu must have realized before 
this that his great sortie was a failure. Everything 
depended on celerity, and his inactivity on the 1st was 
a confession of his defeat. 

At dawn on the 2d the storm of battle again burst 
forth with the Germans as the aggressors. The fire 
of the forts with that of the artillery in position be- 
yond the Marne alone prevented the complete recap- 
ture of Champigny and Brie. When night feU the 
French army, weary and crestfallen, began to recross 
the Marne. 

The main attack had been ably seconded by demon- 
strations in force from Fort Charenton and St. Denis. 
On the whole, however, the influence of the battles 
upon the French soldiers was extremely dispiriting. 
They had been encouraged to regard success as eer- 


tain, and they never recovered from the consequent 
disappointment and chagrin. They lost one of their 
ablest generals in Renault, who fell in the attack upon 

After the failure of the great sortie Paris settled 
down disconsolately to siege life again. The insub- 
ordination in the National Guard increased, and 
General Thomas publicly denounced several battal- 
ions. The army of Paris was plainly going to pieces. 
Food and fuel became daily more scarce. Horse 
meat brought fabiilous prices, while hungry, shivering 
soldiers were detailed to guard wood yards and potato 
stores from the famishing populace. Paris demon- 
strated her preference to starve rather than surrender, 
but so long as the Germans were well fed there was 
no hope of any beneficial result from these tactics. 
Paris starved better than she fought. 

After General Ducrot's withdrawal across the 
Mame the occasional sorties and conflicting reports 
from the provinces hardly stirred the popular enthu- 
siasm. On December 21 General Trochu's efforts to 
open communication with the army of the north by 
an attack on the German lines northeast of Paris re- 
sulted in another discomfiture. The heaviest fighting 
was about Le Bourget, which bristled with batteries 
supported by infantry, whose presence was only to be 
determined by the smoke and crash of their musketry. 
The French were falling back when the sunset and the 
bitter cold night came on. Despite the efforts of the 
Red Cross societies, hundreds of wounded men froze 
to death before relief or morning came. 

On the 27th of December the first gun of the Ger- 
man bombardment was fired against the French ad- 
vance posts on the plateau of Mont Avron. For 


weeks the German staff had been preparing for this 
final grim argument with the defenders of Paris. 
The bombardment was delayed day by day, however, 
at first to enable the completion of all arrangements, 
and later in the hope that it might not be necessary 
to resort to this extreme measure. This delay did 
not meet with the unqualified approval of the foreign 
office, where the fear was expressed that the powers 
would construe it into a symptom of weakness. " If 
they would give me the command-in-chief for four 
and twenty hours, and I were to take the responsibil- 
ity on myself," stormed the chancellor, " I shoiild give 
just one order — fire ! " 

The German batteries on the east of Paris contin- 
ued their fire on the 28th. Though the air was filled 
with snow and fog, so accurately had the gunners 
obtained their range that the practice was admirable. 
Mont Avron was rendered untenable, and during the 
night the French abandoned their positions. On the 
30th and 31st the Germans steadily maintained their 
fire, raining a ceaseless storm of projectiles upon the 
forts Bosny, Noisy, and Nogent. 

Paris was hardly to be recognized on the first day 
of the year 1871. New Year's day in beleaguered 
Paris ! There was the old life of the boulevard still 
struggling for existence like the glimmer of the petro- 
leum lamps that flickered in the wind. There was 
still a suggestion of the thoughtless throngs of a year 
before ; the theatres were open ; while here and there 
a dimly-lighted cafe beckoned mournfully to its old 
devotees. There was nothing in these symptoms to 
blind one to the universal misery and despondency. 
The icy wind that swept the streets was charged with 
the roar of the German siege guns. It was an anx- 


ious, despondent day, and the sinking sun left a de- 
spondent city wrapped in sleet and darkness. 

The sound of the bombardment that chilled the 
heart of Paris was borne faintly on the frosty air, to 
fall like sweet music on the ears of the German 
princes and generals in the palace of Versailles, who 
thronged about the king of Prussia, as he raised his 
glass to welcome the new year. Eighteen days later, 
with the air throbbing to the fire of the siege guns 
south of Paris, the German princes again gathered 
about the Prussian king to proclaim him emperor of 
united Germany. 

On the 19th of January, the day following this 
dramatic episode at Versailles, the army of Paris 
made its last effoi*t to break the iron talons that were 
crushing it to death by an attack from Mont Valerien 
upon the German lines between Rueil and St. Cloud. 
As usual the French swept away the German fore- 
posts only to be checked by the main lines of defense. 
At Montretout, Buzanval, and Malmaison there was 
bloody work, but the impetuous valor and superior 
numbers of the assailants availed nothing against the 
cool discipline of their foe. The sound of the heavy 
firing so close at hand stirred Versailles from its 
stately lethargy, and brought the princes, emperor 
and all, galloping to the front. A brigade of the 1st 
Bavarian corps was also moved to Versailles to be at 
hand in case of need. About dark Trochu ordered 
the retreat after suffering terrible losses. 

The immediate result of the battle of Buzanval was 
the transfer of the military command from Trochu to 
Vinoy, but the last battle had been fought, and hope 
had even departed from so stout a soldier as Vinoy. 
Jules Favre had again become a daily visitor at the 


German foreign office. He was deputed to negotiate 
for an armistice and the capitulation of Paris. He 
no longer advanced the principle "not an inch of 
our territory or a stone of our fortresses." The state 
of affairs was briefly this : The government in Paris 
recognized the futility of longer resistance, but that 
goverament had never been recognized by France, 
and was powerless to conclude a peace. An armis- 
tice must be signed to allow of an appeal to the coun- 
try ; Paris must be delivered to the Germans as the 
price of the armistice. On the afternoon of Jan- 
uary 28 the capitulation of Paris was signed, and an 
armistice agreed upon to expire on February 19 at 
noon. The provinces occupied by the armies of Bour- 
baki and Manteuffel were alone excluded from this 
agreement. On January 29 the German troops quietly 
took possession of the Paris forts. The regulars and 
mobiles became prisoners of war, with the exception 
of 12,000 men who were left under arms to preserve 
order. At the earnest request of Favre the National 
Guard were allowed to retain their arms. If Favre 
urged this as a measure to counteract the imperialistic 
ideas supposed to be still cherished by the prisoners 
returning from Germany, it was a political crime as 
well as a military folly. The National Guard became 
the armed Commime. It finally devolved upon the 
veterans of MacMahon and Bazaine to reconquer 
Paris for the republic. 

While the armies withdrew to the lines stipulated 
in the armistice, the elections went quietly forward. 
The assembly convened at Bordeaux, and manifested 
a spirit that won for it universal respect. On Feb- 
ruary 17 M. Thiers was appointed chief of the execu- 
tive power, and having named his ministry, he r©- 


paired to Versailles to arrange the j)relimiiiaries of 
peaee. The conferences that followed with the Ger- 
man chancellor were perhaps the most trying ordeals 
to which the Frenchman had ever been subjected. 
No peace was possible save on the basis of the cession 
of miles of territory and the strongest of fortresses. 
France must also pay a war indenmity of no less than 
five milliards of francs. Bismarck, it is true, thought 
Thiers " too sentimental for business . . . hardly fit 
indeed to buy or sell a horse," but no diplomatist, 
however astute, could have made better terms for 
stricken France. So thought the assembly at Bor- 
deaux ; and when Thiers announced the result of his 
mission with a quivering lip, he had its sympathy and 
support. On the 2d of March the assembly formally 
ratified the peace preliminaries by a vote of 646 to 

It had been stipidated in the armistice that the 
German troops should not occupy Paris. The exten- 
sion of time granted by the Germans entitled them 
to some compensation, and the entry of Paris was the 
compensation claimed. The troops detailed for this 
purpose were not chosen at random. To the French- 
man who on the 1st day of March beheld them pass 
along the Avenue de Malakoff or the Champs Elys^es 
it was an ominous pageant. It was a German and 
not a Prussian army that he beheld. Prussians there 
were in the Silesians of the 6th corps, but there, too, 
were the war-worn regiments of the 11th corps, Nas- 
sauers, who had lost their grand duke four years be- 
fore, and the " kinder " of the exiled elector of Hesse. 
There also were the faded blue lines of Hartmann's 
Bavarians. Surely Bavaria deserved the honor ac- 
corded her of leading the way up the Avenue of the 

4jOO the reconstruction of EUROPE. 

Grand Army, for the blood of her gallant sons had 
been given unsparingly in behalf of the common Fa- 
therland, not only at Weissenburg, Neewiller, and 
Bazeilles, but in the frost-bound valley of the Loire. 
Sullenly the Parisians eyed the march as it moved 
u]) the Avenue of the Grand Army, the bayonets 
djmmed for an instant in the shadow of Napoleon's 
arch broadening into a glittering sea as they swept 
into the Champs Elys^es. When the head of the 
column entered the Place de la Concorde, the command 
to halt was passed along the lines. The remorseless 
tread that for six long months had been trampling 
France in blood was stilled at last. That night the 
Hessians smoked their pipes on the Trocadero, and 
the Bavarians stacked their arms in the Place de la 
Concorde, while the lights blazing from the palace of 
the Elysee announced the German military head- 

On the third day of the month, the Bordeaux As- 
sembly having ratified the peace preliminaries, the 
German troops marched out, and Paris was left to 
"herself again. The war was over. Beyond the 
Khineland, in Bavaria and Wiirtemberg as well as in 
trhe north, all was joy and enthusiasm over the return 
of the army that had answered before the world the 
question, " What is the German Fatherland ? " On 
the 10th of May the definite treaty of peace was 
signed at Frankfort by which France ceded Alsace 
and a portion of Lorraine, including the fortresses of 
Metz and Strasburg, to her conqueror. The prompt 
and patriotic manner in which the French nation dis- 
charged their enormous war debt astounded Europe, 
and won the admiration of the world. It displayed 
more truly the spirit of the French people than did 


the hideous events that occurred in Paris during the 
early spring months. 

The siunmer of 1871 found Europe at peace. The 
German question was settled with the Kaiser at Ber- 
lin ; the Italian problem was solved with the king in 
Kome. But out of the war which had finally rid the 
continent of two of its greatest thorns grew a new 
complication from the severing of the Khineland prov- 
inces from France. The traveler from the new 
world who visits Europe to-day is amazed at the mil- 
itary influence that everywhere dominates the conti- 
nent. Above the roar of the city street sounds the 
sharp drum-beat of the passing regiment ; in the sweet 
rural country the village church-bell cannot drown the 
bugle peal from the fortress on the hill. Why is it 
that France sinks her millions in frontier strong- 
holds, that Kussia masses troops in Poland and on 
the Pruth, that Austria strengthens her fortresses in 
Galicia, that Germany builds railways to the Khine 
and bridges to span its yellow flood ? It means that 
the Eastern and Alsatian questions are not settled ; 
that Republican France broods darkly over the ex- 
actions of 1871, while it casts friendly glances upon 
aggressive and despotic Russia ; that Austria, dread- 
ing Russian power, draws nearer to Germany, and 
that Germany still united, with Austria and Italy 
friendly, holds fast what she has won by the sword, 
while with the old assurance that has never yet 
betrayed him Bismarck proclaims both to the east 
and west, " We Germans fear God and nothing in 
the world beside." 


Justin McCakthy's History of Our Own Times gives a read- 
able Tdsnmd of English political events since the accession of 
Qaeen Victoria, with a general reference to continental affairs. 
Files of the English newspapers and periodicals show the de- 
velopment of public sentiment, the most powerful factor in the 
national political life. Our Chancellor^ by Moritz Busch, pre- 
sents an able delineation of Bismarck's policy in reference to 
Austria, Russia, and France. Busch's works have a peculiar 
value, he being a member of Bismarck's official family. Julian 
Klaczko's Two Chancellors is a brilliant work from an anti-Prus- 
sian standpoint, with special reference to Bismarck .and Gort- 
schakoff. Ward's translation is plentifully supplied with notes. 
They direct one to every work of any value concerning the 
diplomacy of the period. The Memoirs of Count von Beusty 
edited in England by Baron Henry de Worms, are valuable in 
connection with Busch and Elaczko. Lord Malmesbury's Me^ 
moirs of an Ex-Minister abound in interesting comments on the 
great leaders and events of contemporaneous continental his- 
tory, as do the GrevUle Memoirs, 

Among biographies should be mentioned Charles Mazade's 
Life of Count Cavour (translated from the French), Wilhelm 
G<>rlach's Prince Bismarck, a translation which appears in the 
Tauchnitz Library, and G. S. Godkin's Life of Victor Emmanuel 
IL Mazade's work is the very best on the Italian statesman ac- 
cessible to English readers. G<)rlach traces Bismarck's political 
development by quotations from his speeches and letters. God- 
kin's work is based on the best Italian authorities, and gives 
excellent portraits both of the king and Cavour. J. T. Bent's 
Life of Griuseppe Garibaldi should also be read in connection 
with Italian affairs. Theo. Dwight's Life of General Garibaldi 
furnishes picturesque details of the Sicilian expedition drawn 
from contemporary letters and other sources. 


Victor Hugo's History of a Crime and Maupas's Story of the 
Coup d^Etat give extreme and opposed views of the events 
which destroyed the French republic in 1860. Paris in Decem- 
ber, 1851, by Eugene Tdnot, is a calmer and more just presenta- 
tion of the case. M. Hippolyte Magen's Histoire popuLaire du 
Second Empire draws a dark picture of the social features of 
Napoleon III.'s regime. 

Alexander Kinglake's Invasion of the Crimea is the most elab- 
orate work on the Eastern Question and the Crimean War. It 
also touches upon the coup d'etat and scores Napoleon without 
mercy. General Todleben's Defense de Sebastopol should be 
read in connection with Kinglake. William Howard Russell 
has an excellent review of the first volumes of this work. E. 
Bruce Hamley's Story of the Campaign of Sebastopol is the vivid 
narrative of an English officer, now a leading authority in Eng- 
land on military matters. The works of Bazancourt and Ca- 
mille Rousset present the French view of the campaign, the 
former abounding in picturesque and heroic incident, the other 
being the more conservative and valuable work. Mr. Russell's 
war correspondence is interesting reading ; his letters exercis- 
ing a g^eat influence upon English public opinion at the time 
they were written. Nathan Haskell Dole's American edition of 
Rambaud*s History of Russia contains very readable chapters on 
the Crimean campaign. 

Luigi Carlo Farini's Roman State has been translated un- 
der the direction of Hon. W. E. Gladstone. The high charac- 
ter and position which Farini enjoyed among his countrymen 
is a sufficient voucher for the worth and reliability of this work. 
The letters appended to the fourth volume and addressed to 
Mr. Gladstone give a startling picture of the condition of Italy 
in 1850. John Webb Probyn's Italy 1815-1878 is based on 
the best Italian authorities. No good work exists in English 
on the Italian campaign of 1859. The official French work, 
edited under the direction of Marshal Randon, has little value 
now. Bazancourt's Ckroniques are picturesque but unreliable. 
Alfred Duquet's book is a sharp arraignment of the French 
commanders. La Guerre d* Italic, by the Due d'Almazan, is 
concise, interesting, and impartial. 

Rustow's Der Deutsch-Danische Krieg narrates the events of 
1864 in Denmark. A. Gallenga*s Invasion of Denmark is a pen- 
picture of the war by a writer with Danish sympathies. 


The standard work on the war of 1866 is the Prussian official 
report executed under the direction of Moltke himself. It hus 
been translated into English (The Campaign of 1866 in Ger- 
many, Compiled by the Department of Military History of the 
Prussian Staff), The Austrian staff report is obtainable in both 
French and German, and if less methodical than the Prussian is 
more picturesque and interesting. H. M. Hozicr's Seren WeeL^* 
War is the most readable narrative in English, being based on 
letters written from Bohemia to the London " Times." J. V. 
Lemoyne's Campagne de 1866 en Italie is a thoroughly satisfac- 
tory work on the Italian operations. Hozier also has chapters 
on this campaign. 

The German staff report is again the most reliable work on 
the Franco-German war. It has been only partially translated 
into English. One of the best works from the French stand^ 
point is F^lix Bonnet's Guerre Franco^Allemande, a review and 
running comment on the work of the German staff. Busch's 
Bismarck in the Franco-Prussian War is at once entertaining 
and valuable. Marshal Bazaine's Episodes de la Guerre de 1870 
et le Blocus de Metz is a defense of his course as commander 
and chief. Chanzy's Deuodem£ Armee de la Loire is interesting 
as the work of the most skillful general that France developed 
in the war. Ducrot's Defense de Paris 1870-1871 gives a fair 
idea of that event. B. von Tiedemann's Siege Operations in the 
Campaign against France is translated from the German by Ma- 
jor Tyler, R. E., and may be referred to for information con- 
cerning Paris, Metz, and Strasburg. George Hooper's Cam- 
paign of Sedan is an admirable work, the best that exists; in 
English on that portion of the war. Archibald Forbes's My 
Experiences in the War between France and Germany and W. II. 
Russell's My Diary During the Last Great War abound in inter- 
esting details picked up at the seat of war. Laboucherc's Dkiry 
of the Besieged Resident in Parisj Nathan Sheppard's Shut up in 
Paris, and E. B. Washbume's Recollections of a Minister to France 
are vivid pen-pictures of life within Paris during the sieges 
while the latter of course possesses value beyond that of an 
ordinary narrative. Files of the Almanach de Gotha and the 
Statesman's Year Book may be consulted for general statistical 


ABBBDsmr, Lord, 24, 25; forced into 
warlike measures by Napoleon, 43 ; 
fall of his ministry, 79. 

Alsace-Lorraine, ceded to (Germany, 400. 

Albrecht, Archduke, commandsAustrian 
army in Italy, 259-2G1 ; at battle of 
Custozza, 264 ; proves himself a capa- 
ble soldier, 265 ; summoned to Vienna 
to succeed Benedek, 246, 265. 

Alexander IL of Russia, of a peaceful 
temperament, 92; accepts Austria's 
peace proposals, 93 ; shows his grati- 
tude to Prussia for her Polish policy, 

Alexander, Prince of Hesse, commands 
8th federal corps m 1866, 251 ; defeated 
at Laufach and Aschaffenburg, 252; 
abandons Frankfort, 258; retreats 
upon Wurzburg, 254. 

Alma, battle of the, 55-57 ; deathblow 
of the Czar, 81. 

Alvensleben, German general, brilliant 
conduct at Vionville, 323. 

Aurelle de P&ladines, French general, 
commands army of the Loire, 375; 
imparts energy and cohesion to his 
army, 375 ; a good strategist, 375 ; 
fights battle of Goulmiers, ^6 ; brings 
his army to Orleans for drill, 377 ; his 
conflict with Gambetta, 377 ; assumes 
the offensive, 378 ; is routed at Beaune 
and Loigny, 378, 379 ; routed in three 
days* fight before Orleans, 380 ; rallies 
his right wing at Bourges, 380 ; irri- 
tated by Gambetta, 380; superseded 
by Bourbakl, 381. 

Austria, in 1850, 3; offers to support 
western powers against Russia, 47 ; 
and Prussian alliance, 47 ; orders Rus- 
sia from Danubian principalities, 39 ; 
troops enter Bucharest, 41 ; efforts to 
secure peace, 92; in Paris Goi^p*e8s. 
93 ; influence in Italy, 97-99, 110 ; and 
Roman legations, 98 ; misrule in Lom- 
bardo-Yenetia, 99 ; proposes to uphold 
despotism in Sardinia, 101 ; attempts 
to terrorize Sardinia, 103; regards 
Victor Emmanuel as incorrigible, 104 ; 
suppresses Milan revolt, 104 ; worsted 
in diplomacy by Cavour, 111 ; adopts 
pacific policy in Italy, 112 ; threatened 
at the Tuileries, 116 ; her ultimatum 

rejected by Sardinia, 118 ; imiwptilar* 
ity of the war in, 121 ; Italian cam • 
paign of 1859, 122-152; armistice a 
Villafranca, 152 ; cedes Lombardy, 
153 ; crushes Erfurt parliament, 180 ; 
supports Hassenpflug in Hesse, 181 
humiliates Prussia at Olmiitz, 181 
abolishes constitution, 182 ; holds Ger- 
man states in check during Crimean 
war, 182 ; loss of prestige in Germany 
(1859), 184; and Bismarck, 195; 
alarmed at Prussia's attitude, 196 ; en- 
rages Russia by her Polish policy, 197 ; 
agreement with Prussia regarding 
Schleswig-Holstein, 201 ; Danish cam- 
paign, 1864, 201-210 ; treaty of Vienna, 
210; bargains with Prussia for Elbe 
duchies, 213 ; Gastein convention, 214 ; 
explains her position before the Diet, 
221 ; abEindons Holstein, 221 ; moves 
mobilization of federal army against 
Prussia, 221, 222 ; state of army in Bo- 
hemia, 225 ; Seven Weeks' War, 223- 
266; benefited by her defeat in the 
war, 272 ; placates Hungary, 273 ; 
cedes Venetia, 274 ; foreign policy in 
1867, 275; refuses French proposals 
for military alliance, 293; refuses 
France military aid i^ainst Prussia, 
1870, 300; defends Italy in seizure 
of Rome, 389; her present attitude, 
Azeglio, Marquis Massimo d', prime 
minister in Sardinia, 102 ; resigns his 
post, 104 ; sent as commissioner to 
Bologna, 159; on death of Cavour, 

Balaclava, occupied by English, 59 ; bat- 
tle of, 71-73 ; results of battle, 74. 

Bavaria, invades Hesse-Cassel, 181 ; war 
of 1866, 249-255; treaty of Prague 
and cession of territory to Prussia, 
269 ; places her army under orders of 
Prussia, 1870, 300; Franco-Prussian 
War, 304-398 ; troops enter Paris, 399, 

Bazaine, Marshal, lands at Genoa, 124 ; 
at battle of Melegnano, 140 ; at battle 
of Solferino, 148 ; corps commander in 
1870, 307; consiilted by Napoleon at 
Metz, 315 ; his honorable career, 316 ; 



assumes command of the army under 
protest, 316; is embarrassed by the 
emperor, 317 ; orders the retreat upon 
Verdun, 317 ; fights battle of Boruy, 
320 ; his midnight visit to the emperor, 
320 ; interviews the emperor at Grave- 
lotte, 320 ; bids him farewell, 322 ; 
fights battle of Vionville, 323 \ takes a 
new position near Metz, 325 ; at battle 
of Gravelotte, 325 ; compared with 
Benedek at K5niggratz, 325 ; aimless- 
ness of his conduct during the battle 
week, 328 ; fights battle of Noisseville, 
372 ; surrenders fortress of Metz, 372 ; 
charges on which he was court-mar- 
tialed, 372 ; his defense, 373. 

Beaumont, battle of, 833. 

Belfort, fighting near, 38G. 

Benedek, Austrian general, his conduct 
at Solferino, 150, 151 ; sununoiied to 
council of war at Vienna, 18GG, 218 ; 
his plan of campaign against Prussia 
checkmated, 22G ; criticisms upon his 
generalship, 233, 234 ; occupies coun- 
try between the Elbe and Bistritz, 
234 : his fatal blunder, 235 ; at battle 
of Koniggratz, 243; amazed upon 
learning of the fall of Chlum, 'Ia^\ 
heads the reserves in attempts to re- 
take it, 245 ; incurs the rage of Vienna, 
24ti ; superseded by Archduke Al- 
brecht, 24C ; conducts the retreat upon 
Pressburg, 247. 

Benedetti, M., first appearance in Bohe- 
mia, 1866, 272 ; at Berlin, 272 ; urges 
military demonstration against Prus- 
sia, 277; at Xikolsburg with Bismarck, 
279; presents Rhine treaty to Bis- 
marck at Berlin, 280 ; threatens Prus- 
sia with war, 280; submits Luxem- 
burg proposition to Bismarck, 283 ; 
his note announcing his failure, 284 ; 
encounters the king of Prussia at 
Ems, 296, 297 ; his view of the king's 
conduct there, 298. 

Berger, Austrian general, 140. 

Beuret, French general, MUed at Monte- 
bello, 127. 

Beust, Count von, Austrian chancellor, 
1867, 275 ; his letter on Austria's atti- 
tude, 1870, 300, 301 ; on Italian seiz- 
ure of Rome, 389 ; his memoirs, 203. 

Beyer, German general, 222; occupies 
Cassel, 1866, 223 ; summons Strasburg, 
1870, 369. 

Bismarck, Prince, president of Prussian 
ministry, 185; his early career as a 
deputy, 185 ; champions the riglits of 
the crown, 185 ; contempt for the rev- 
olutionists of 1848, 186 ; deprecates 
use of Prussian troops in Denmark, 
186; opposed to liberal assembly at 
Frankfort, 186; opposed to German 
unity, 187 ; an uncompromising royal- 
ist at Erfurt, 187; admires Austria, 
187 ; represents Prussia at Frankfort, 
188 ; contempt for the Diet, 189 ; be- 
comes hostile to Austria, 189 ; prophe- 

sies war with Austria, 190 ; willing to 
consider German unity, 190; repre- 
sents Prussia at St. Petersburg, 191 ; 
continued distrust of Austria, 191 ; 
represents Prussia at Paris, 191 ; his 
estimate of Prussia's needs, 192; bis 
struggles with the Diet on the army 
bill, 194 ; carries his measures over the 
deputies, 194 ; opens diplomatic cam- 
paign against Austria, 195; supports 
Russia m suppressing Polish revolt, 
197 ; and Schleswig-Holstein question, 
200 ; carries Austria with him in the 
Diet, 201 ; stimulates the Danes to fight, 
203 ; his attitude on the Augustenburg 
claim after the war, 211 ; his sudden 
change of front, 212 ; traps Mensdorff 
into an indiscretion, 213 ; anticipates 
war with Austria, 213; and Gastein 
conference, 214; his opinion of the 
conference, 214 ; the king creates him 
a count, 214 ; seeks an alliance with 
Italy against Austria, 215 ; visits Na- 
poleon at Biarritz, 215 ; pushes a set- 
tlement of Schleswig-Holstein ques- 
tion, 217 ; protests against Austrian 
policy in Holstein, 217 ; endeavors to 
win favor with the German states, 
218, 219 ; concludes treaty of alliance 
with Italy, 219 ; orders Prussian troops 
into Holstein, 221 ; submits a plan for 
new confederation excluding Austria, 
221 ; joins the army at Gitschin, 230 ; 
at battle of Kdniggratz, 241 ; restrains 
the spirit of assurance at headquar- 
ters, 246 ; commends Italy for honor- 
able course in 1866, 268 ; enthusiasti- 
cally received by the Prussian Diet, 
270; his course toward Hanover, 
Hesse, and Saxony, 271 ; chancellor of 
the northern confederation, 271 ; ar- 
ranges military alliances with South 
Germany, 272 ; conversations with 
Benedetti at Nikolsburg, 279; re- 
ceives Benedetti in Berlin, 280; re- 
fuses French propositions concerning 
Rhmeland, 280; his reply to Bene- 
detti's threat of war, 280 ; uses the 
French propositions to consolidate 
Germany, 282 ; his reception of Bene- 
detti's second project, 283; arranges 
alliance with Russia, 284; combats 
French scheme to purchase Luxem- 
burg, 285 ; withdraws Prussian garri- 
son from Luxemburg, 286; at Paris 
Exhibition of 1867, 288 ; his narrative 
of the incidents at Ems, 1870, 297; 
summary of his diplomacy, 1866-70, 
304 ; at Sedan, 340 ; discusses capitu- 
lation with Wimpften after Sedan, 
342 ; his narrative of the event, 343 ; 
meets Napoleon near Fr^nois, 346; 
his narrative of this event, 346 ; con- 
ducts Napoleon to Chateau Bellevue, 
348; interviewed by Favre at Ferri- 
eres, 361 ; at Versailles, 366 ; his life 
there, 390 ; Iiis view of the papal ques- 
tion, 390; on Black Sea clause and 



Russia^ 391 ; on delay in bombarding 
Paris, 396 ; interviews with Favre on 
the armistice, 398 ; interviews Thiers 
on the peace, 399 ; comments on 
Thiers, '^ \ his latest defiance to Eu- 
rope, 401. 

Bittenfeld, German general, 222; com- 
mands army of the Elbe in 1866, 224 ; 
at batUe of Koniggratz, 240, 241. 

Blumenau, battle of, 248. 

Blumenthal, German general, on Mac- 
Mahon*s tactics, 332; at conference 
of Sedan^ 343. 

Bomba, King. See Ferdinand II. of 

Bomy, battle of, 320. 

Bosquet, French general, at battle of 
the Alma, 56; Elinglake^s comment 
on, 56 ; his remark on cavalry charge 
at Balaclava, 74. 

Bourbaki, French general, at. battle of 
Gravelotte, 327 ; commands French 
armies in the north, 377 ; appointed 
to command first army of the Loire, 
381 ; resists Gambetta's orders to ad- 
vance, 381 ; ordered to relieve Bel- 
fort, 383 ; outgeneraled by Werder, 
386 ; defeated on the Lisaine, 386 ; 
driven into Switzerland and disarmed, 

Buol, Count, Austrian chancellor, 47. 

Burgoyne, Sir John, carries Empress 
Eugenie to England, 358. 

Busch, Dr. Moritz, *' Bismarck in the 
Franco-German War," 342. 

Cadoma, Italian general, occupies Rome, 

Canrobert, Marshal, and the coup d^Siat^ 
9 ; at battle of the Alma, 56 ; assumes 
command of French army in Crimea, 
60 ; opposed to assaulting Sebastopol, 
60; resigns his command, 83; King- 
lake on reasons therefor, 83; corps 
commander in Italy, 123; enters Tu- 
rin, 125; at battle of Magenta, 133; 
lethargy at Solf erino, 148 ; corps com- 
mander in 1870, 307; commands 
French right at Gravelotte, 326, 327 ; 
at battle of Noisseville, 372. 

Carbonari, Society of the, its character 
and aims, 99. 

Cardigan, Lord, at Balaclava, 72-74. 

Castelfidardo, battle of, 173. 

Cavour, Count, in Paris Congress, 93, 
109; enters Sardinian cabinet, 102; 
forms a new cabinet, 104 ; opposed to 
violence in politics, 104 ; commits the 
state to liberation of Italy, 105; his 
domestic policy, 105; decides to join 
Anglo-French alliance, 106 ; is opposed 
b^ the Chambers, 107 ; vindication of 
his Crimean policy, 108 ; letter to Na- 
poleon, 108; his foreign policy, 109 
disappointed over England's indiffer 
ence, 112 ; his opinion of Austria, 112 
turns to France as an ally, 112; the 
Orsini incident, 113; appeases Napo- 

leon, 114; strikes at the papal gov- 
ernment, 114 ; meets Napoleon at 
Plombieres, 115; his vision of united 
Italy, 116; advocates marriage of 
Prince Napoleon and Princess Clotilde, 
117 ; impels Napoleon toward war, 117 ; 
efforts to avert peace, 118 ; refuses the 
Austrian ultimatum, 118; leaves for 
the army on news of the armistice, 
153; offends the king and resigns, 
153; makes the amende honorable, 
161 ; returns to office, 161 ; suggests 
an Italian plebiscite to Napoleon, 162 ; 
Napoleon's acquiescence and the re- 
sult, 163; and Nice and Savoy, 164; 
hated b^ Garibaldi, 164; protects 
Garibaldi's Sicilian expedition, 164 ; 
effect of this policy in Europe, 166, 
167 ; efforts to restrain Garibaldi from 
marching on Rome, 107, 168 ; his con- 
ception of the crisis, 171 ; determines 
to march upon Naples, 171 ; picks a 
quarrel with the Pope, 171 ; receives 
authority from parliament to annex 
Two Sicilies, 173; increased anxiety 
after the annexation, 174; his enor- 
mous responsibility, 174 ; on the Nea- 
politans, 175 ; to General Garibaldi, 
175 ; comparison of, with Garibaldi, 
176 ; his death, 176 ; the world's esti- 
mate of him, 177 ; Massimo d' AzegUo 
on his death, 177. 

Champigny, battles of, 394. 

Chanzy, French general, commands 
French 16th corps, 375; defeated at 
Loig^y, 379 ; rallies right wing of Loire 
army upon Beaugency, 380 ; appointed 
to command these troops, 381 ; de- 
feated by Mecklenburg at Josnes, 381 ; 
character of his troops and tactics, 
382 ; retreats upon Le Mans, 383 ; 
plans a movement upon Paris, 383 ; is 
attacked before Le Mans, 384 ; his re- 
treat, 385 ; his pluck and ability, 385 ; 
gives reasons for French humiliation, 

Changamier, French general, consulted 
by Napoleon at Metz in 1870, 315. 

Chapelle, Count de la, his work on 
Napoleon III., 342. 

Charles, prince of Bavaria, commands 
Bavarian army in 1866, 249 ; indiffer- 
ent to fate of Hanoverians, 250 ; 
his indecision and retreat, 251 ; de- 
feated at Kissingen, 252 ; joined by 
the 8th federal corps, 253 ; retreats 
upon Wlirzburg, 254. 

Charles Albert of S-irdinia, abdicates, 
5 ; and war of 1848, 100 ; and Mazzi- 
ni, 104. 

Christian VIII. of Denmark, 198. 

Christian IX. of Denmark, ratifies in- 
corporation of Schleswig with Den- 
mark, 199 ; joins the army at Schles- 
wig, 204 ; cedes Schleswig-Holstein to 
Austria and Prussia, 210. 

Cialdini, Italian general, at battle of 
Palestro, 128 ; defeats papal army at 



Castelfldardo, 173; sapenedes La 
Bfarmora in command ot the army, 
2(i6 ; his bloodless march through Ye- 
uetia, 2GG. 

Citate. battle of, 36. 

Clam Oallas, Coont, at battle of Magen- 
ta, 131 ; commands Ist Austrian corps 
iu Bohemia, 2^ ; defeated at Podol, 
228 ; retreats from Miinchengriits, 
228 ; defeated at Gitschin, 229. 

Clarendon, Lord, 46, 48. 

Coulmiers, battle of, 376. 

Coup cPStcUf the, the 2d of December, 
8 ; president's proclamation and the 
arrests, 9 ; dispersion of the assembly, 
9 ; how the coup d'Hai was managed, 
10 ; the events of the 3d, 11 ; the 4th 
of December, 11 ; state of affairs on 
the boulevard, 12 ; the massacre and 
its influence, 12; conflict of testimo- 
ny regarding the massacre, 12, 13 ; 
the president's responsibilitpr, 13. 

Crimean campaign, the, idea flrst 
broached, 61 ; landing of the allies in 
Crimea, 64 ; the battle of the Alma, 
66-67; the allies continue their ad- 
vance, 68 ; their flank march, 69 ; 
Canrobert opposes the motion to at- 
tack Sebastopol, GO ; failure of allied 
bombardment, 69 ; siege of Sebasto- 
pol begins, 70; battle of Balaclava, 
71-74 ; battle of Inkermann, 76, 76 ; 
the great hurricane, 78 ; terrible suf- 
fering of the allies, 79 ; Sardinia joins 
the fJliance, 82; the June bombard- 
ment and first assault, 84 ; capture of 
the Mamelon by the French, 86 ; fail- 
ure of the second assault, 86 ; battle of 
the Tchemaya, 88 ; the French carry 
the Malakoff , 89 ; evacuation and burn- 
ing of Sebastopol, 90. 

Custozza, battle of, 1866, qpening of 
the battle on the Italian right, 262 ; 
rout of the Italian left wing, 263; 
General Pianelli checks the Austrian 
pursuit, 263 ; the battle in the centre, 
264; state of the contest at two 
o'clock, 264 ; concentric attack by the 
archduke upon Custouca, 264 ; retreat 
of the Italians, 266. 

Danish campaign, the, allied armies 
enter Schleswig, 203 ; evacuation of 
Dannewerk by the Danes, 205 ; Aus- 
trian victory at Oeversee, 206; the 
Danish position at Duppel and Fre- 
dericia, 206 ; destruction of the Dan- 
ish army at Diippel, 209 ; evacuation of 
Fredericia, 210 ; peace of Vienna, 210. 

Dannenburg, Russian general, at battle 
of Inkermann, 76, 76. 

Dannewerk, the, 204 ; evacuated by 
the Danes, 206. 

Denmark, and Schleswig-Holstein ques- 
tion, 197-199 , popular sentinoent in, re- 
specting Schleswig, 199 ; refuses Prus- 
8o-AuslSian ultimatum, 201 ; relies for 
aid upon England and Russia, 202-201 ; 

popular reliaaoe in the Dannewexk. 
204; campaign against Austria and 
Prussia, 294-210 ; treaty of Vienna, 
210 ; cedes Schleswig-Holstein to Pm»- 
sia and Austria, 210. 

Douay, French general, defeated near 
Beaumont, 334; at battle of Sedan, 

Douay, General Abel, killed at Weissen- 
burg, 308. 

Drouyn de Lhuys, M., Frendi minister, 
urges French intervention in war m 
1866, 277 ; his views respecthig j^na- 
sia, 281 ; resigns his portfolio, 282. 

Ducrot, French general, at battle of 
Worth, 312 ; assumes command of the 
French at Sedan, 336 ; Ms altercaticm 
with Wimpffen at Sedan, 337 ; on the 
National Guard, 360; on the Mobile 
Guard, 360 ; defeated by Prussians at 
Sceaux, 362 ; in command at battle of 
Champigny, 393, 394. 

Duppel, siege of, 206-209. 

Durando, Italian general, at battle of 
Palestro, 128 ; at Solf erino, 146 ; corps 
commander in 1866, 269. 

Eastern Question, 17 ; agitated by Napo- 
leon, 17; attitude of Prussia on, 22; 
attitude of France, 22; attitude of 
England, 23; treaty of Paris, 93; trea- 
ty of Paris violated by Russia, 388, 
389 ; still unsettled, 401. 

England in 1860, 6 ; suspicion of Russia, 
*^ ; her deep interest in the Eastern 
Question, and the reason, 23 ; becomes 
bound to maintain Turkey, 30; her 
fleet enters the Sea of Mannora, 32 ; 
shocked by Napoleon's coup d'Stat^ 
43 ; enraged by Sinope massacre, 46 ; 
signature of the French alliance, 48 ; 
preparations for war, 49 ; embarkation 
of troops, 49 ; popularity of conquest 
of SebsuBtopol in, 63 ; false announce- 
ment of fall of Sebastopol, 69 ; hero- 
ism of light brigade at Balaclava, 74 ; 
heroism of troops at Inkermann, 77 ; 
Soult on the British infantry, 77 ; pop> 
nlar rage against government for con- 
duct of campaign; fall of Aberdeen 
ministry, 79; popular exaltation of 
French military eystem, 79; desires 
continuation of Crimean war, 92; 
and treaty of Paris, 94 ; losses in Cri- 
mean war, 94; induces Austria to 
adopt mQder measures in Italy, 112 ; 
and Orsini incident, 113; endeavors to 
preserve peace in Europe, 118 ; re- 
fuses to mediate in Italy, 1859, 152 ; 
friendly to Italian unity, 162 ; express- 
es satisfaction at invadon of papal 
territory by Sardinia, 172 ; and Den- 
mark, 202; abandons Denmark in 
18(H, 203 ; and conference of London, 
210 ; disturbed by Austria's defeat in 
1866, 269 ; and Black Sea clause, 389 ; 
Bismarck's comment on, 391. 

Erfurt parliament, the, instigated bj 



Frederick William of Prussia, 180; 
crushed hy Schwarzenberg, 180. 

Xiq>i]ia88e, breach general, killed at Ma- 
genta, 135. 

Eugenie, Empress of the French, her 
court and mfluence, 287 ; aspires to 
see France the protector of the Ro- 
man church, 292 ; her influence in the 
government councils, 293; advocates 
war with Prussia, 299 ; at St. Cloud, 
1870, 350; returns to TuUeries on 
news of nJlitary disasters, 352 ; con- 
vokes the Chambers, 352 ; her anxious 
life, 353; bewildered by news from 
the front, 353 ; flies from the Tuile- 
lies hi dit^B^uise, 358 ; arrives in Eng- 
land, 358. 

Eupatoria, battle of, 82. 

Failly, French general, commands 
French at Mentajoa, 291 ; his dispatch 
on the battle, 291 ; corps commander 
hi 1870, 307 ; ordered to support Mac- 
Mahon, 309; his tardy arrival at 
Worth, 312; retreats from Bitsche, 
314 ; his negligence at Beaumont, ^3. 

Falckenstein, German general, 222 ; oc- 
cupies Hanover, 223 ; commands Prus- 
siui forces in the west, 251 ; defeats 
Bavarians at Kissingen, 252 ; defeats 
8th federal cOTps, 252 ; enters Frank- 
fort, 263 ; made military governor of 
Bohemia, 253. 

Fanti, Italian general, at battle of Pales- 
tro, 128 ; occupies Perugia and Spoleto 
in Papal States, 1860, 173. 

Farini, Lnigi Carlo,** The Roman State," 
99 ; Italian minister, 257. 

Favre, Jules, in Corps L^gislatif , Sept. 
1870, 352; moves detl^onement of 
Napoleon, 354 ; becomes foreign min- 
ister in the republican cabinet, 357; 
first interview with Bismarck, 361 ; 
arrested by the Communists in Paris, 
S82 ; arranges armistice with Bis- 
marck, 398; National Guard retain 
their arms at his request, 398. 

Ferdinand IL of Naples, 110 ; his death, 

Flourens, Major, heads mob in Paris, 
1870, 392. 

Forbach, battle of, 313, 314. 

Forev, French g^eneral, and the coup 
d^etiUj 9 ; defeats Austrians at Monte- 
bello, 126, 127 ; at baUle of Solferino, 

France, revolutions of 1848 in Paris, 
2 ; her conspicuous foreign policy, 7 ; 
public opinion on Crimean campaign, 
79 ; state of the press in, 80 ; moves 
admission of Prussia to Paris Con- 
gress, 93, note ; losses in Crimean war, 
94 ; the Orsini incident, 113 ; better 
feeling against England in, 113 ; signs 
treaty of alliance with Sardinia, 117 ; 
enthusiasm over the war, 120 ; unpre- 
pared for war, 123 ; Italian campaign 
of 1850, 12^162 ; peace of ViUaf ranca. 

152 ; supports Saxony against Prusda, 
271 ; prominent position in Europe in 
1867, 275; Kuniggratz precipitates a 
crisis, 277 ; Drouyn de Lhuys' concep- 
tion of the crisis, 258 ; the French army 
unable to meet the situation, 276 ; ef- 
forts of the government to indemnify 
France through diplomacy, 279 ; refu- 
sal of their demands at Berlin, 280 ; 
second proposition of the government 
and its rejection, 283 ; desperation of 
the Paris statesmen, 284 ; negotiations 
concerning Luxemburg frustrated by 
Prussia, 285 ; summary of French di- 
plomacy for 1866-67, 286 ; the dedme 
of the empire, 288; reorganization of 
the army, 286; evacuation of Rome, 
291 ; return of French troops to Rome 
and battle of Mentana, 291 ; incurs hos- 
tility of Italy, 292 ; foreign policy in 
1868-69, 292 ; election of 1869, 293 ; 
proffer of alliance refused by Italy, 293 ; 
progress of army reform, 293 ; bellicose 
temper of the government in 1870, 294 ; 
effect of Hohenzollem incident in, 295 ; 
warlike spirit of the Chambers, 295; 
tone of the press, 296 ; demands upon 
Prussia refused, 296, 297; excitement 
caused by Bismarck's dispatch, 298; 
declaration of war against Prussia, 298 ; 
wretched condition of the army at Metz, 
302; Franco-German war, 301-398; 
overthrow of the empire, 357; Bor- 
deaux assembly, 398 ; peace of Frank- 
fort, 400 ; her present attitude, 401. 

Francis II. of Naples, spurns the Sar- 
dinian alliance against Austria, 1859, 
157 ; and revolution of 1860, 168; pro- 
claims constitutional liberty as a last 
resort, 168 ; his pitiful situation at' 
Naples, 169, 170 ; sails away in a Span- 
ish ship, 170 ; joins his army at Gaeta, 
172 ; capitulates at Gaeta, 175. 

Francis Joseph, Austrian kaiser, rees- 
tablishes Austrian prestige in Ger- 
many, 4 ; visits Venice and Milan, 112 ; 
his war manifesto, 120; takes com- 
mand of the army in Italy, 142 ; directs 
his troops at Solferino, 147 ; issues 
orders for the retreat, 160 ; concludes 
an armistice at Yillafranca, 152 ; his 
personal interview with Napoleon, 
152; reasons which induced him to 
make peace, 152 ; cedes Lombardy, 163 ; 
refuses to acknowledge Prussia's claim 
to the supreme command of the federal 
army, 1^ ; proclaims against Prussia 
from Schonbrunn, 183, 184; confers 
with the Prussian king at Gastein, 214 ; 
learns a lesson from KSniggriitz, 273 ; 
determines to placate Hungary, 273; 
crowned king of Hungary at Pest, 

Franco-German war. French declara- 
tion of war, 304 ; perfect preparation 
of Prussia for war, 305 ; position of 
contending forces on Aug. 3, 307 ; 
French defeat at Weissenburg, 308; 



MacMahon confident on the Sauer, 310 ; 
battle of Wdrth, 310-312; battle of 
Forbach, 313, 314; consternation at 
Metz, 315 ; Bazaine assumes command 
of the French, 316 ; French retreat 
upon Verdun begins, 320 ; battle of 
Borny, 320 ; position of the armies on 
Aug. 16, 322 ; battle of Vionville, 323 ; 
battle of Gravelotte, 325-327 ; forma- 
tion of Gkrman army of the Mouse, 
328 ; siege of Metz begins, 328 ; disol*- 
ganization of French army at Chfilons, 
323 ; MacMahon marches upon Metz, 
331 ; desperation of the French minis- 
try, 332 ; battle of Beaumont, 333 ; ter- 
rible condition of MacMahon's army, 
334 ; the French retreat upon Sedan, 
335 ; battie of Sedan, 336-340 ; Napo- 
leon surrenders, 340; capitulation of 
Sedan, 348 ; fall of the empire, 354- 
357 ; investment of Paris, 362 ; bom- 
bardment and capitulation of Stras- 
burg, 370-371 ; capitulation of Metz, 
372 ; French army of the Loire, 375 ; 
battle of Coulmiers,376 ; defeat of army 
of the Loire at Beaune, and Loigny, 378, 
379 ; destruction of army of the Loire 
before Orleans, 380 ; the first and sec- 
ond armies of the Loire, 381 ; battle 
of Josnes, 381, 382 ; defeat of Chanzy's 
army at Le Mans, 384 ; defeat of 
French army in the north, 386 ; first 
army of the Loire driven into Switzer- 
land, 387 ; battles of Champigny be- 
fore Paris, 394 ; bombardment of Paris, 
395-397 ; battle of Buzanval, 397 ; ca- 
pitulation of Paris, 398 ; German troops 
enter Paris, 399 ; treaty of Frankfort, 

Frankfort Assembly, 3; befriended by 
Frederick William of Prussia, 179 ; its 
offer of the German crown rejected 
by Frederick William, 180. 

Frankfort Diet, 2 ; composition and 
character of, 178; system of voting, 
179 ; understanding betwean Prussia 
and Austria in, 179; overthrown in 
1849, 179 ; restoration of, 181 ; Aus- 
trian ascendancy in, 181 ; Bismarck's 
estimate of, 189; decrees military exe- 
cution in Holstein, 199 ; refuses Axis- 
tro-Prussian demand regarding Dan- 
ish constitution, 201 ; listens to Prus- 
sia and Austria on Schleswig-Holstein, 
220 ; mobilization of federal army 
against Prussia moved by Austria, 
221 ; Austria's motion carried, 222 ; 
the Prussian envoy pronounces con- 
federation dissolved, 222 ; driven from 
Frankfort, 253 ; dissolved by treaty of 
Prague, 269. 

Frankfort, treaty of, 400. 

Franzecky, General, at battle of Kdnig- 
gratz, 239, 240; wins battle of Blu- 
menau, 248. 

Frederick VII. of Denmark, promulgates 
constitution incorporating Schleswig 
in Denmark, 198, 199 ; his death, 199. 

Frederick Charles, Prince, with Prussiaa 
army in Denmark, 201 ; commands 
Prussians before Diippel, 207; com- 
mands Prussian troops at GOrlitz, 222 ; 
crosses Saxon frontier and occupies 
Dresden, 223; commands first Prus- 
sian army, 225 ; crosses Austrian fron- 
tier, 226 ; defeats Austrians at Podol 
and MiinchengrStz, 227, 228; defeats 
Austrians at Gitschin, 229 ; decides to 
move upon the Bistritz, 238 ; opens 
the battle of Koniggrlitz, 239; com- 
mands second German army in 1870, 
306; threatens Metz from the south, 
318 ; marches from Metz upon the 
Loire, 373 ; on the Loire, 377 ; advance 
upon Orleans, 379 ; enters Orleans, 
380 ; follows Chanzy to Le Mans, 383 ; 
routs Clianzy before Le Mans, 385; 
hampered by bad roads and short days, 

Frederick William lY. of Prussia, friend- 
ly toward Frankfort assembly, 179 ; 
refuses German crown, 180 ; and Er- 
furt parliament, 180 ; falls ill in 1867, 
183 ; his death, 184. 

Fraderick William, crown prince of 
Prusoa, commands second Prussian 
army in 1866, 225; crosses Austrian 
frontier, 230; at battle of Nachod, 
231 ; his march to KdniggrStz, 242 ; di- 
rectJs the guards upon CMumand wins 
the day, 243; commands third Car- 
man army in 1870, 306 ; his popularity, 
306, 307 ; crosses the Lauter, 310 ; at 
battle of Worth, 310-313 ; marches 
upon Nancy, 318 ; at Sedan, 340 ; trans- 
fers headquarters to Versidlles, 363. 

Frossard, French general, at Saarbiiick, 
303 ; defeated at Forbach, 313, 314 ; at 
battle of VionvUle, 323; at battle of 
Gravelotte, 326, 327. 

Gkiblenz, Austrian general, commands 
Austrian troops in Denmark, 201 ; ap- 
pointed governor of Holstein, 2H ; 
favors Augustenburg, prince in Hol- 
stein, 217 ; summons Holstein assem- 
bly, 221 ; evacuates Holstein upon 
approach of the Prussians, 221 ; de- 
feats Prussians at Trautenau, 232 ; is 
worsted by Prussian Guard at Soor, 
233 ; conveys proposal for an armis- 
tice to Prussian headquarters, 246. 

Gambetta, M., in Corps L^gislatif, Sept. 
1870, 356 ; minister of the interior in 
republican cabinet, 357 ; directs gov- 
ernment of national defense at Tours, 
373 ; enthusiastic over battle of Coul- 
miers, 376 ; his conflict with General 
d'Aurelle, 377 ; deceived by Trochu's 
messages lurges the offensive, 378 ; irri- 
tates D'Aurelle, 380; appoints Bour- 
baki to succeed D'Aurelle, 381 ; ap- 
points Chanzy to command in the 
west, 381 ; complicates the military 
situation, 383 ; orders Bourbaki to re- 
lieve Belfort, 383. 



Garibaldi, General Giuseppi, 142 ; in 
first Italian parliament, 1G3; hatred 
for Gavour aiter cession of Nice and 
Savoy, 1G3 ; raises volunteers to aid 
revolutionists in Sicily, 1G4 ; lands in 
Sicily and defeats royal troops, 164 ; 
captures Palermo, 1G5; wins a vic- 
tory at Milazzo, 1G5 ; extraordinary 
character of hi3 achievements, 165; 
has but a contemptible foe to deal 
with, 166 ; refuses La Farina's request 
to annex Sicily to Italy, 167 ; his letter 
to Victor Emmanuel, 168 ; crosses to 
the mainland, 168 ; marches upon Na- 
ples, 169; enters Naples in triumph, 
170 ; meets Victor Emmanuel at Tea- 
no, 173; the sublime act of his life, 
174 ; attacks Gavour in x)arliament, 
175 ; comparison of, with Gavour, 176 ; 
his revolution of 1862, 257 ; wounded 
and captured at Aspromonte, 257; 
heads a new attack upon Bome, 291 ; 
defeated by the French at Mentana, 
^1; in Franco-Prussian campaign, 
1870, 386. 

Ctoorge, king of Hanover, abandons his 
capital to the Prussians, 223 ; attempts 
to secure free passage to Italy for his 
army, 250 ; capitulation and exile of, 

Gerlach, General, commands Danish 
army at Diippel, 207, 209. 

Germany, in 1850, 3; composition of 
the German confederation, 178 ; char- 
acteristics of the Frankfort Diet, 179 
Austria and Prussia in the Diet, 179 
overthrow of the Diet in 1849, 179 
the Erfurt parliament crushed by 
Schwarzenberg, 180; the revolt in 
Hesse, 180 ; humiliation of Prussia by 
Austria at Olmiitz, 180 ; restoration of 
the Frankfort Diet with Austria in 
control, 182; Austria dominant in 
Germany in 1854, 182 ; change in Prus- 
sian policy under the regency, 183; 
Prussia and Austria on an equal foot- 
ing in 1860, 184; Austro-Prussian 
campaign against Denmark, 203-209; 
treaty of Vienna, 210 ; Gastein con- 
vention, 214 ; Sclileswig-Holstein ques- 
tion settled, 221. 

Germany, Seven Weeks* war, 223-255 ; 
peace of Nikolsburg, 248; treaty of 
Prague, 269 ; four results of the Seven 
Weeks' war, 269; Hanover, Hesse- 
Gassel, and Nassau incorporated with 
Prussia, 270; Saxony forced to join 
the northern confederation, 271 ; Bis- 
marck as chancellor, 271 ; military alli- 
ance between North and South Ger- 
many, 272 ; the Hohenzollerns and the 
Spanish throne, 295-298 ; Franco-Ger- 
man war, 301-398 ; William I. of Prus- 
sia hailed emperor at Versailles, 397. 

Germanic Diet at Frankfort. See Frank- 
fort Diet. 

Gitachin, battle of, 229. 

Giurgevo, battle of, 40. 

Gladstone, Wm. E., and Kutchuk-Kai- 
nardji treaty, 26 ; translation of Far- 
ini's " Roman State," 99. 

Goeben, German general, 254 ; at battle 
of Forbach, 314. 

Gortschakoff, Prince Mikhail, com- 
mands Russians in Moldavia, 33; 
hampered by the Gzar, 31 ; evacuates 
Bucharest, 40; sends Todleben to 
Sebastopol, 61 ; takes command of 
Russian army in Grimea, 82 ; opposed 
to a sortie, 88 ; defeated at the Tcher- 
naya, 88 ; to his soldiers on abandon- 
ment of Sebastopol, 91. 

Gortschakoff, Prince Alexander, Russian 
chancellor, 191 ; friendship for Bis- 
marck, 191 ; gratitude to Prussia for 
PoUsh policy, 197; supports Prussia 
against England in Danish contro- 
versy, 202 ; abrogates Black Sea clause 
of Paris treaty, ^ ; and London con- 
ference, 1871, 389. 

Gortschakoff, Prince Peter, at battle of 
the Alma, 57 ; at Inkermann, 75 ; 
criticised by Todleben for his inac- 
tion, 76. 

Govone, Italian general, arranges Prusso- 
Italian alliance, 259 ; at battle of Gus- 
tozza, 264. 

Gramont, Due de, declares that Prussia 
has imperiled interests of France, 295 ; 
declares that Prussia has insulted 
France, 298 ; his narrative of final war 
council at St. Gloud, 299 ; deprecates 
Russia's policy, 301. 

Granville, Lord, and Black Sea clause in 
1870, 389. 

Gravelotte, battle of, 325-327. 

Greek Ghurch, conflict with Latin 
church with regard to Holy Places, 
18 ; French ambassador scores a suc- 
cess for the Latins, 19 ; rage of Gzar 
in consequence, 19 ; Menschikoff's de- 
mands at Gonstantinople, reparation 
for the Greeks, 20 ; settlement of the 
dispute, 20. 

Guizot, M. de, his estimate of Gavour 
and Napoleon, 117. 

Gyulai, Goimt, commands Austrian army 
in Ital^, 1859, 125 ; his career, 125 ; 
his timidity, 125; misinterprets 
French plans, 128 ; finds liis right 
threatened and hurries troops nortli- 
ward, 129; is attacked on the Naviglio 
Grande, 131 ; his conduct at Magenta, 
136 ; determines to retreat upon 
Verona, 141 ; urges the Kaiser to 
occupy the heiglits of Solferino, 142 ; 
is relieved of the command, 142. 

Hanover, invaded by Prussian troops, 
223 ; battle of Langensalza, 250 ; ca- 
pitulation of the army, 250 ; annexed to 
Prussia, 270. 

HesHC-Gassel, revolt against Hassenpflug 
in, 180 ; Prussian and Austrian troops 
enter, 181 ; Hassenpflug restored by 
Austria, 181 ; invaded by Prussian 



troops, 1866, 223 ; annexed to Pruasia, 

Hilliera, French marshal, corps com- 
mander in Italy, 123; marches ujpon 
Melegnano, 139 ; defeats the Austnans 
there, 146 ; at battle of Solf ermo, 146, 
148, 149. 

Holy Places of Jerusalem, the, 17, 18. 

Hugo, M. Victor, his '^Histoire d'un 
Grime," 12 ; assertions reapectiug ccmp 
d'etat, 13. 

Hungary, revolution of 1848 suppressed, 
4 ; granted a parliament by the Kaiser, 
273 ; elects the Kaiser king of Hun- 
gary, 273 ; becomes loyal to the Aus- 
trian crown, 274. 

Inkermann, battle of, 75, 76 ; conunents 
upon, 76, 77 ; called *' soldiers' battle " 
in England, 77. 

Italian campaign of 1859, romantic char- 
acter of theatre of war, 122 ; unpre- 
paredness of French army, 123; its 
order of battle, 123 ; arrival of em- 
peror at Genoa, 124; the Austrian 
general and his career, 125 ; his timid 
tactics, 125; combat at Montebello, 
126; Napoleon plans a flank march, 
127; battle of Palestro, 128; Napo- 
leon's orders for Jime 3, 129 ; position 
of the armies at noon on the 4th, 130 ; 
battle of Magenta, 130-136 ; entry of 
the French into Milan, 138 ; fight at 
Melegnano, 140 ; Gyulai retreats upon 
Verona, 141 ; Napoleon advances from 
Milan, 141 ; Austrian army harassed 
by conflicting orders, 143 ; it occupies 
the heights of Solferino Jime 23, 143 ; 
advance of the French army June 
24, 145; battle of Solferino, 145- 
151 ; French advance renewed July 1, 
151 ; armistice and conference at Vll- 
laf ranca, 152 ; why the monarchs made 
I)eace, 152-154. 

Italy, map of, in 1850, 96 ; political con- 
dition of, in 1850, 97-99 ; secret socie- 
ties in, 100 ; Napoleon's sohcitude for, 
108 ; and congress of Paris, 109 ; Aus- 
tria's baneful influence, 110 ; enthusi- 
asm over the Sardo-Austrian war, 119; 
campaign of 1859, 122-152 ; disappoint- 
ment at termination of war, 153 ; cen- 
tral Italy votes for annexation to Sar- 
dinia, 162; first Italian parliament, 
163; revolution in the Two Sicilies, 
164; Garibaldi enters Naples, 170; 
Sardinian troops enter Papal States, 
172 ; annexes Two Sicilies, 174 ; death 
of Cavour, 176 ; concludes treaty of 
alliance with Prussia, 219 ; activity of 
the Roman question, 257 ; Garibaldi's 
revolution, 257 ; ministries of Rica- 
soli, Ratazzi, Farini, and Minghetti, 
258 ; understanding with France on 
the Roman question, 258 ; transfer of 
the capital from Turin to Florence, 
258 ; declaration of war upon Austria, 
259 ; battle of Custozza, 262-265 ; bat- 

tle of Liasa, 266 ; commended by Bis- 
marck for her honorable course, 268 ; 
annexation of Venetia, 274 ; Rioman 
question stiU active in 1866, 275; 
withdrawal of French troops from 
Rome, 291 ; Garibaldi's revolution and 
return of the French, 291 ; battle of 
Montana, 291 ; results of Montana fa- 
tal to France in Italy, 292 ; refuses to 
enter Austro-French alliance, 293 ; re- 
fuses to assist France in 1870 unless 
Rome is abandoned, 301 ; occupies 
Rome, 389. 
Italian campaign of 1866, declaration of 
war upon Austria, 259; condition of 
the opposing armies, 259, 260; Ger- 
man plan of campaign rejected at 
Florence, 260; Italian army crosses 
the Mincio, 260; battle of Custozza, 
262-265; Italian army recrosses tiie 
Mincio, 265; advance of the It&Iiam 
army under Cialdini, 266; battle of 

Josnes, battles of, 381, 382. 

Kamecke, German general, daring con- 
duct at Forbach, 313, 314, 318. 

Karolyi, Count, Austrian ambassador at 
Berlin, 195 ; correspondence with Bis- 
marck, 196; and Nikolsburg peace 
preliminaries, 248. 

Emglake, Alex. William, on General 
Bosquet, 56 ; on Louis Napoleon and 
Ganrobert, 83 ; on Marshid P^liasier, 

Kissingen, battle of, 252. 

KdniggrStz, battle of, arrival of the 
king of Prussia at Dub, 239 ; opening 
of the battle, 239 ; Prussians cross 
the Bistritz, 240 ; state of the battle 
at noon, 240 ; critical position of the 
Prussian left, 241 ; anxiety of the 
Prussian staff, 241 ; approach of the 
crown prince to the field, 2^; he 
threatens the Austrian right, 242; 
confused state of that wing and causes 
therefor, 242 ; capture of Chlum by 
the Prussians, 243 ; Benedek's efforts 
to retake Chlum, 244 ; total defeat of 
the Austrian army, 245; heroicon of 
the Austrian artillery, 246. 

Komiloff, admiral, conimands Russian 
fleet at Sebastopol, 62 ; sinks ships at 
Menschikoff's order, 62 ; protests 
against withdrawal of the army, 63 ; 
is hopeless of defending Sebastopol, 
64 ; assumes command of Sebastopol 
garrison, 64 : his admiration for Tod- 
leben, 64 ; his patriotism and piety, 
64 ; his anxiety as betrayed in his 
diary, 65 ; induces Menschikoff to re- 
inforce garrison, 66 ; his conduct un- 
der fire, 66 ; his death, 67 ; his mem- 
ory cherished in Russia, 67. 

Kutchuk-Kainardji, treaty of, 21, 26. 

Ladmirauit, French general, at battle of 



Mel^rnano, 140; at Solferino, 149; 
corps commander in 1870, 307. 

La Marmora, general, commands Sardin- 
ian army m Crimea, 82 ; reorganizes 
army, 102; departs for the Crimea, 
107 ; defeats Garibaldi at Aspromonte, 
257 ; forms a new cabinet, 25S ; takes 
command of Italian army, 1806, 259 ; 
his careless movements, 261 ; strange 
conduct at battle of Custoxza, 2G4; 
8ui>erseded by Cialdini, 266. 

Lamorici^re, papal general, defeated by 
Sardinians at Castelfidardo, 173. 

Langensalza, battle of, 250. 

Latin Church, the, conflict with Greek 
Church in regard to holy places, 18 ; 
French ambassador scores a success 
for the Latins, 19 ; rage of the Czar 
in consequence, 19 ; Mensfehikoff de- 
mands at Constantinople reparation 
for the Greeks, 20 ; settlement of the 
dispute, 20. 

Leboeuf , Marshal, his declaration to Na- 
poleon concerning the army, 299 ; in- 
sists upon war with Prussia, 299; 
falseness of his military representa- 
tions, 302 ; falls into disfavor with the 
emperor, 315; corps commander at 
Gravelotte, 325-327; at battle of 
Noisseville, 372. 

Lebrun, French general, at Sedan, 837. 

Le Mans, battles of, 384. 

Light Brigade, English, at Balaclava, 

Liprandi, Russian general, at battle of 
Balaclava, 71. 

Loigny, battle of, 379. 

Lombardo-Venetian provinces, condi- 
tion in 1850, 98 ; Lombardy ceded to 
Sardinia, 153-159 ; grief in Venice over 
peace of Yillafranca, 157 ; cession of 
Venice to Italy, 269 ; Victor Emman- 
uel enters Venice, 274. 

Louis Nipoleon, Prince, elected presi- 
dent of the French republic ; his early 
political career, 2; oath before the 
Assembly, 7 ; speech at Dijon, 8 ; 
proclamation on the coup d^Statf 9; 
proclamation to the army, 11 ; respon- 
sibility for the boulevard massacre, 
13; his course ratified by popular 
vote, 14; becomes Emperor of the 
French, 15; unenviable standing in 
Burope ; agitates Eastern Question, 
17 ; sends fleet to Constantinople, 32 ; 
advocates to England preserving the 
integrity of Turkey, 42 ; allied fleets 
enter Black Sea at his solicitation, 
46 ; letter to the Czar, 46 ; sends ulti- 
matum to St. Petersburg, 48 ; appoints 
St. Amaud to command in the East, 
49; Kinglake's estimate of his influ- 
ence on Crimean campaign, 83, 84; 
desires peace, 92 ; the peace of Paris, 
93; his military prestige in Europe, 
94 ; receives Victor Emmanuel, 108 ; 
his solicitude for Italy, 108 ; Cavour's 
letter to, 109; is approached by Ca- 

vour, 113; and Orslni incident, 114, • 
115; is appeased by Cavour, 114; a 
member of the Carbonari, 115 ; jealous 
of Austria, 115; meets Cavour at 
Plombi^res, 115 ; threatens Austria at 
the Tuileries, 116; half repents his 
course, 117; is impelled toward war 
by Cavour, 117; his war manifesto, 
119; at the zenith of his popularity, 
120; joins army at Genoa, 124; his 
reception there, 124, 125; visits bat- 
tlefield of Montebello, 127 ; his flank 
march, 128 ; flghts battle of Magenta, 
131-134; his conduct there, 13G; en- 
ters Milan, 138 ; his reception there, 
139; decides to follow the railway, 
141 ; his uneasiness over the course of 
the Sardinians, 141 ; advances in line 
of battle, 142 ; aroused at Monte- 
chiaro by messengers from the front, 
146; arrives on battlefleld of Solferi- 
no, 146 ; interviews MacM^on, 147 ; 
determines to carry Solferino, 148; 
enga|^es the Guards, 149 ; occupies 
Cavnana, 150 ; solicits England's me- 
diation, 152; his overtures rejected 
by Palmerston, 152 ; concludes an 
armistice, 152 ; his personal interview 
with the Kaiser at Yillafranca, 152; 
returns to Paris, 153 ; reasons which 
induced him to make peace, 153, 154 ; 
and deputation from Bologna, 159 ; 
his equivocal position regarding Italy 
after the war, 160 ; is tricked by Ca- 
vour with a pl(§biscite, 162 ; demands 
Nice and Savoy of Sardinia, 1G3; se- 
cret understanding with Cavour re- 
garding the Two Sicilies, 172; first 
conferences with Bismarck, 191 ; an- 
tagonizes Russia by Polish policy, 
197 ; interviews with Bismarck at Bi- 
arritz, 215 ; his estimate of Bismarck 
and the German crisis, 215, 216; his 
ideas on the military status of Europe, 
216 ; desires Austria's expulsion from 
Italy, 258; comes to an agreement 
with Italy • respecting Rome, 258 ; 
tries to Induce Austria to cede Vene- 
tia to Italy, 259 ; his air castles dissi- 
pated by KQniggrStz, 276; confronts 
the crisis of his reign, 277 ; rejects ad- 
vice for military interference, 278; 
adopts an extraordinary substitute, 
279; seeks an understanding with 
Prussia, 279 ; his first project' refused 
at Berlin, 280; his propositions re- 
specting Belgium and Luxemburg also 
refused, 283 ; secret negotiations wi^h 
Holland for purchase of Luxemburg, 
284 ; is foiled by Prussia, 285 ; demands 
withdrawal of Prussian troops from 
Luxemburg, 285; his claim enforced 
by a conference of the Powers, 286 ; 
summary of his diplomacy in 1866- 
67, 286 ; confides to Marshal Niel re- 
organization of the army, 286 ; his 
waning power, 288; falls under the 
influence of the empress, 292 ; dreads 




war and revolution, 293; fails in ar- 
rangiug alliance with Italy and Aus- 
tria, 2^ ; proclaims his military pre- 
paredness to the Chambers, 294; 
agrees to war with Prussia against his 
will, 299; and Marshal Leboeuf^s re- 
port, 299 ; his illusions dispelled, 301 ; 
finds his empire isolated in Europe, 
301 ; joins the army at Metz, 302 ; 
becomes conscious of his unprepared- 
ness for war, 302; hopelessness of 
his dilemma, 302 ; at Saarbriick, 303 ; 
despondent over battles of Worth 
and Forbach, 315 ; seeks new ad- 
visers, 315 ; resigns command of the 
army to Bazaine, 316 ; interferes with 
Bazaine's first plan, 317; visited by 
Bazaine at midnight, 321 ; his quar- 
ters shelled, 321 ; flies with Piince 
Louis to Gravelotte, 322; his fare- 
well to Bazaine, 322 ; at Chfilons, 330 ; 
harassed by telegrams from Paris, 
331 ; urges MacM^ou to retreat, 332 ; 
' meets Iki^Mahon at Mouzon, 334 ; en- 
ters Sedan on foot, 335 ; at battle of 
Sedan, 338 ; orders the white flag dis- 
played, 339; his surrender to the 
Prussian king, 340; conference with 
Bismarck by the roadside, 346 ; inter- 
cedes with Moltke, 347 ; conducted 
by Bismarck to Bellevue, 348 ; meets 
king of Prussia, 348; his adieu to 
France, 349 ; his telegram to the em- 
press after Worth, 352 ; his telegram 
after Sedan, 354; attacked in the 
Corps Ldgislatif, 354; overthrow of 
his government in Paris, 357. 

Louis Philippe of France, overthrow of 
his government, 2. 

Lucan, Lord, at Balaclava, 72-74. 

MacMahon, Marshal, captures the Mala- 
koff, 89; corps commander in Italy, 
123 ; defeats Austrians near Turbigo, 
129 ; wins the battle of Magenta, 134, 
135 ; made duke of Magenta, 138 ; en- 
ters Milan, 138 ; marches upon Me- 
legnano, 138; at battle of Solferino, 
145, 150; corps commander in 1870, 
307 ; joins his corps on the Sauer, 309 ; 
confident of victory, 310 ; at battle of 
Worth, 311 ; his desperate and unsuc- 
cessful tactics, 312 ; at Chfilons, 329 ; 
advocates retreat upon Paris, 330 ; is 
induced to march upon Metz, 331 ; his 
fatal vacillation, 332 ; demoralization 
of his army, 333 ; meets Napoleon at 
Mouzon, 334 ; retreats upon Sedan, 
335; his position at Sedan, 330; is 
wounded, 336 ; and General de Wimpf- 
fen, 337. 

Magenta, battle of, the French Guard 
on the Naviglio Grande, 131 ; anxiety 
of the emperor, 132; critical condi- 
tion of the Guard, 132; arrival of 
Canrobert and Niel, 133; MacMahon 
carries Magenta, 135 : death of Espi- 
nasse, 135 ; r^sum^ of the battle, 136. 

Malmesbury, Lord, " Memoirs of an Ex- 
Mhiister,^' 115, 299. 

Manteuffel, German general, at Faria 
Congress, 93 ; appointed Prussian gov- 
ernor of Schleswig, 214 ; marches into 
Holstein, 221 ; occupies Hanover, 223 ; 
commands army of the Main, 1866, 
253; defeats federal troops on the 
Tauber, 254 ; bombards Wiirzburg, 
marches westward after fall of Metz, 
1870, 373; in the north of France, 
377 ; marches upon Belf ort, 386. 

Manteuffel, Prus^an minister, at Ol- 
mutz, 181 ; and Bismarck, 189. 

Maupas, M. de, appointed prefect of po> 
lice in Paris, 8 ; and cou]^ d^itaiy 10. 

Maximilian, Prince, appointed viceroy 
of Lombardo-Venetia, 112. 

Mazzini, Joseph, founds Toux^ Italy, 
100; and Milw revolt, 104; attacks 
Charles Albert of Sardinia, 104 ; 
schemes for a Neapolitan republic, 

Mecklenburg -Schwerin, grand duke of, 
in German campaign, 1866, 253, 254 ; 
commands forces south of Paris, 374, 
376, 377 ; defeats Chanzy at Loigny, 
advances upon Orleans, 379; attacks 
Chanzy at Josnes, 381 ; compels hia 
retreat, 382; witlidraws to Ctiartres, 
383 ; advances upon Le Mans, 384. 

Melegnano, battle of, 140. 

Menschikoff, Prince, sent to Constanti- 
nople by Czar, 20; character of hia 
mission, 21 ; his rough and threaten- 
ing tactics, 21 ; is opposed by Lord 
Stratford, 21 ; his ultimatum and de- 
parture from Constantinople, 29 ; 
commands Russian army in Crimea, 
55 ; occupies heights of the Alma, 56 ; 
at battle of the Alma, 56, 57 ; criti- 
cised by St. Amaud, 67; his rear 
guard surprised at Mackenzie's farm, 
58 ; his obtuseness, 69 ; slow to believe 
allies would invade Crimea, 61 ; or- 
ders sinking of ships at Sebastopol, 
62 ; withdraws army from Sebastopol, 
63 ; returns to Sebastopol, 66 ; in- 
duced by Komiloff to reinforce the 
garrison, 66 ; disappointed over battle 
of Inkermann, 77 ; relieved of com- 
mand in Crimea, 82. 

Mensdorif, Count, his damaging negoti- 
ation with Prussia, 212 ; on adminis- 
tration of affairs in Holstein, 218; 
protests against Prussian military 
movements in Silesia, 219. 

Mentani^ battle of, 291. 

M^rim^e, Prosper, 70 ; at Biarritz, 216 ; 
his opinion of Bismarck, 215. 

Mettemich, Prince, Austrian ambassa- 
dor at Paris, assists in the escape of 
Eugenie, 358. 

Mettemich, Prince, Austrian chancellor, 
calls Italy a geographical expression, 
96; on Cavour, 111. 

Metz, siege of, 1870, lethargy of the gar- 
rison, 371 ; battle of Noisaeville, 372; 



capitulation, 372 ; cluurges against Ba- 
zaine for his conduct at, 372, 373 ; ca- 
pitulation seals fate of campaign, 373 ; 
ceded to Glenuany, 400. 

Heza, Dauisli general, commands Dan- 
ish army in ^ihleswig, 204 ; evacuates 
the Daunewerk, 205; removed from 
the command, 207. 

Modena, grand duchy of, 98; revolu- 
tion of 1859, 157 ; offers allegiance to 
Victor Emmanuel, 158 ; treaty of Zu- 
rich and, 159 ; votes for annexation to 
Sardinia, 162. 

Moltke, General Von, appointed to re- 
orgauize Prussian army, 193 ; at bat- 
tle of Koniggxatz, 241 ; at the head of 
German armies, 1870, 306 ; perfect 
system at his headquarters, 318; his 
designs against Metz, 318; his plans 
at Gravelotte, 325 ; follows the third 
army westward, 328 ; amazed at Mac- 
Hahon's tactics, 332 ; moves to check- 
mate him, 332 ; joins Bismarck at 
Donchery after Sedan, 340; his dis- 
cussion with Wimpffen at Donchery, 
343-345; meets Napoleon, 347; anx- 
ious to reduce Strasburg, 369 ; en- 
deavors to prevent formation of new 
French armies, 374; defeats French 
15th corps near Orleans, 374 ; under- 
rates power of republican France, 
375 ; calls a halt on the Loire, 383 ; 
determines to annihilate Chanzy, 384. 

Montebello, battie of, 126, 127. 

Momy, M. de, and the coup d^Staij 10. 

Motterouge, French general, at battle of 
Magenta, 134. 

Nachimoff, Russian admiral, in com- 
mand at Sinope, 63; at Sebastopol, 
63 ; his death, 87. 

Napier, Sir Charles, 49. 

Napoleon, Prince, in the Crimea, 54; 
marries Princess Clotilde of Sardinia, 
117 ; corps commander in Italy, 123 ; 
at Ch&lons council of war, 330 ; urges 
an alliance with Italy, 330 ; leaves for 
Florence to arrange alliance, 330. 

Napoleon III- See Louis Napoleon. 

Nesselrode, Count, Russian chancellor, 
19 ; to Baron Brunnow, 19 ; his reply 
to Anglo-French ultimatum, 48. 

Newcastle, Duke of, 51. 

Nicholas I., sends troops into Himgary, 
4 ; protector of the Greek Church, 18 ; 
enraged at conceflsions to Latin 
Church, 19; dissatisfied with repa- 
ration made by Turkey, 21 ; deter- 
mination to cripple Turkey, 21 ; sends 
Menschikoff to Constantinople, 21 ; 
is distrusted in England, 23; visits 
London in 1844, and interviews minis- 
ters regarding Turkey, 23 ; his memo- 
randum and its reception by English 
government, 24; "sick man" inter- 
views with Seymour, 25 ; basis of claim 
to protectorate on Turkey, 20; is 
misled by Russell's letter, 27 ; orders 

troops into Danubian Principalities, 
30 ; accepts Vienna note, 31 ; rejects 
it in altered form, 31 ; at war with 
Turkey, 32 ; determines to act on de- 
fensive, 34; summons Paskevich to 
command, 36; grief over military mis- 
fortune and Austria's ingratitude, 39 ; 
his cause hopeless, 41; unjustly cen- 
sured for action at Sinope, 45 ; galled 
by passage of allied fleets into Black 
Sea, 46; recalls legations from Paris 
and London, 46 ; replies to Napoleon^s 
letter, 47 ; reception of the allied ulti- 
matum, 48; his death, 81. 

Niel, Frencli general, corps commander 
in Italy, 123; at battle of Magenta, 
133; his able conduct at Solferino, 
147, 148-150 ; appointed to reorganize 
the army, 286. 

Nightingale, Miss Florence, her hospital 
work in the East, 79. 

Nigra, Italian ambassador at Paris, as- 
sists in the escape of Eugenie, 358. 

Nolan, Captain, carries order to light 
brigade at Balaclava, 72; his death, 

OUivier, M. Emile, bellicose speech in 
Corps L^gislatif, 298; besieged by a 
mob, 351 ; fall of his ministry, 353. 

Olmlitz, Austro-Prussian conference at. 

Omar Pasha, siunmons Russians to 
evacuate Danubian PrlncipaJities, 32 ; 
crosses Danube, 34 ; retires to Shumla, 
38 ; fights Russians at Giurgevo, 40. 

Orleans, captured by the Germans, 374 ; 
evacuated by Germans, 376; three 
days' battle before, 380 ; recaptured by 
the Germans, 380. 

Orsini, Felice, attempts to assassinate 
Napoleon, 113. 

Palestro, battles of, 128-129. 

Palikao, Count de, French minister, in- 
terferes with army of Ch&lons, 332; 
and General de Wimpffen, 337 ; forms 
a ministry, 1870, 353 ; advocates return 
of the emperor to Paris, 354; an- 
nounces Sedan in the Corps L^gialatif, 
354; overtlirow of his government, 

Palmerston, Lord, and coup d^itait 17 ; 
on French alliance, 42 ; resigns from 
cabinet, 45; returns on pledges of 
warlike policy, 46 ; forms a ministry, 
79 ; hostile to Austria, 152 ; refuses to 
mediate in Italian war, 152 ; his war- 
like speech on Danish question in 
1863, 202 ; looks about for allies to 
sustain Denmark, 203. 

Papal States, condition in 1850, 97; 
Bologna revolts in 1859, 158 ; military 
and priestly oppressors abandon 
Bologna, 158 ; state of affairs in Rome 
during '1859, 158; Bologna asks for 
annexation to Sardinia, 159 ; Bologna 
receives a Sardinian commissioner, 



159; correspondence between the 
Pope and Victor Emmanuel, 161 ; 
Bologna and the Legations annexed to 
Sardmia, 163 ; Sardbiian troope enter, 
172 ; defeat of Papal troops at Castel- 
fidardo, 173; Umbria and the Marches 
declare for Victor Emmanuel, 174; 
evacuation of Rome by the French, 
291 ; battle of Montana, 291 ; Italian 
troops enter Rome, 389. 

Paris Congress of 1856, the, 93. 

Paris, treaty of, 93-96. 

Paris, revolutions of 1848 in, 1 ; its char- 
acteristics in 1867, 287, 288 ; elections 
of 1869. 293; in 1870, 350; false report 
of victory in, 360 ; news of Sedan in, 
353, 354 ; the bloodless revolution, 365- 
358 ; defenses of, 358-C59 ; defenders 
of, 360; aspect of, in October, 1870, 
965 ; demoralization of army in, 391 ; 
the communistic itncaie of Oct. 31, 
392 ; battles of Champigny, 394 ; suf- 
fering in, 395 ; on Nlew Year's <lay 
1871, 396; battle of Buzanval, 397; 
the capitulation, 398 ; entry of (Ger- 
man troope, 399-400. 

Parma, Grand Duchy of, 98 ; revolution 
of 1859, 157 ; offers allegiance to Victor 
Emmanuel, 158 ; treaty of Zurich and, 
159 ; vote for annexation to Sardinia, 

Paskevich, Prince, subdues Hungary, 4 ; 
his prestige in Poland, 5 ; in command 
on the Danube, 36 ; early career, 36 ; 
prepares to invade Turkey, 37; is 
hopeless of success, 38; wounded at 
Silistria, 38. 

P^lissier, Marshal, commands French 
army in Crimea, 84 ; Kinglake on, 84 ; 
captures the Mamelon, ^ ; his impa- 
tience, 86 ; assault upon Malakoff re- 
pulsed, 86 ; captures the Malakoff, 89 ; 
made Due de Malakoff, 89. 

Pioard, French general, at battle of Ma- 
genta, 132. 

Piedmont. See Sardinia. 

Pius IX., Pope, forfeits love of subjects, 
98; returns to Rome, 98; receives 
Count Siccardi, 102 ; protests against 
anti-clerical movement in Sardinia, 
106; his attitude during the war of 
1859, 158 ; and treaty of Zurich, 159 ; 
corresponds with Victor Emmanuel, 
161, 162 ; excommunicates Victor Em- 
manuel and his subjects, 163 ; refuses 
to surrender Rome, 389; Bismarck's 
comment on, in 1870, 390. 

Podol, battle of, 227. 

Poland, revolution of 1863, 197. 

Prague, treaty of, 269. 

Prussia and Eastern question, 22 ; Aus- 
trian alliance, 47 ; admitted to Paris 
congress on motion of France, 93 ; at- 
tempts to terrorize Sardinia, 103 ; insti- 
gates Erfurt parliament, 180 ; supports 
popular cause in Hesse, 181 ; humili- 
ated by Austria at Olmlitz, 181 ; change 
of domestic policy under the regency, 

183; refuses to support Austria in 
Italy, 183; Accession of William I. 
to the throne, 184 ; and Bismarck, 192 ; 
opening of diplomatic campaign againfet 
Austria, 195; supports Russia in Po- 
land, 197 ; entices Austria into inde- 
pendent action in Denmark, 201 ; Dan- 
ish campaign, 1864, 201-210 ; treaty of 
Vienna, 210 ; aims at annexation of 
Elbe Duchies, 212; Gastein conven- 
tion, 214; alUance with Italy, 219; 
occupies Holstein, 221 ; defeated in the 
Diet, 221; declares war upon Hano- 
ver, Hesse-Cassel, and Saxony, 223; 
Seven Weeks* war, 223-269 ; treaty of 
Prague, 269; influence of war upon, 
270, 271 ; and HohenzoUem incident, 
295-297; Franco-Prussian war, 301- 
398 ; William I. becomes German "Em- 

Quadrilateral, Austrian, in Italy, 98, 104 ; 
restored to Austria after war of 1859, 

Radetsky, Marshal, subdues revohition 
in Italy, 4; his offer to Victor Em- 
manuel, 101. 

Raglan, Ix>rd, appointed to command 
English army in the East, 49 ; his pre- 
vious career, 49 ; opposed to Crimean 
campaign, 51 ; at battle of the Alma, 
57 ; criticised by St. Amaud, 57 ; ad- 
vocates an assault upon Sebastopol, 
60 ; mortified by false report of fall of 
Sebastopol, 70 ; his orders at battle of 
Balaclava, 73; his responsibility for 
charge of Light Brigade, 74 ; his suc- 
cessful attack upon the Quarries, 86 ; 
repulsed at the Redan, 86 ; his death, 

ReiUe, French general, sent by Napo- 
leon to Prussian king at Sedan, 340 ; 
after Sedan, 345, 346. 

Renault, French general, at battle of 
Champigny, 394 ; his death, 395. 

Roon, General von, appointed to reor- 
ganize Prussian army, 193. 

Russell, Odo, at Versailles, 390. 

Russell, Lord John, accuses France of 
disturbing the peace in the East, 17 ; 
his damaging note on Eastern Ques- 
tion, 27 ; and Denmark, 202. 

Russia, tranquil in 1848 and causes there- 
for, 5, 6 ; condition on accession of 
Alexander 11. , 92 ; losses in Crimean 
war, 94 ; treaty of Paris, 93, 94 ; Po- 
lish revolution of 1863, 197 ; refuses to 
support Denmark against Prussia, 
202 ; regards Austria's defeat in 1866 
with satisfaction, 270 ; holds Austria 
inactive in 1870, 300, 301 ; abrogates 
Black Sea clause in Riris treaty, 388 ; 
and London conference, 389 ; Bis- 
marck's comment on, 391. 

Russian people, the, their tranquillity in 
1848, 5, 6 ; their religious and super- 
stitious character, 18 ; desire to pos- 



fleas Constantinople, 22 ; take pride in 
their defense of SebaStopol, (>7. 

8aint Cloud, burning of the chfiteau, 
1870, 364. 

Sanfedisti, society of, its character and 
aims, 99, 100. 

Sardinia, potation in Ital^ in 1850, 5; 
enters i^f^lo-French alliance, 82, 106 ; 
in Paris Congress, 93; losses in Cri- 
mean war, 94 ; only real gainer by the 
war, 95; war of 1848 with Austria, 
100; accession of Victor Emmanuel, 
101 ; abolition of ecclesiastical priv- 
ileges in, 102; influence of French 
coup d''Stai in, 103 ; foreign policy un- 
der D' Azeglio, 103 ; domestic policy 
of Cavour, 105; aud France, 108; 
opening of Parhament, 1859, 116 ; the 
Idng's speech, 116 ; treaty of alliance 
with France, 117 ; diplomatic contest 
with Austria, 118; rejects Austrian 
ultimatum, 118 ; enthusiasm for the 
war, 119; battles of Palestro, 128; 
battle of Solferino, 145-151 ; cession 
of Lombardy to, 153-159 ; annexation 
of Central Italy, 162; first Italian 
parliament in Turin, 1(30 ; cedes Nice 
and Savoy to France, 163 ; annexation 
of the Two Sicilies, 174; annexation 
of the Marches and Umbria, 174. 

Saxony, invaded by Prussian troops, 
223 ; Seven Weeks' war, 226-248 ; con- 
ditions of the peace with. Prussia, 271; 
joins North German confederation,271. 

Scarlett, Enghsh general, his charge at 
Balaclava, 72. 

Schleswig-Hol»tein question, sketch of, 
previous to 1863, 198 ; state of, in 1863, 
199; and Oastein convention, 214; 
finally settled, 221. 

Schwarzenberg, prince, Austrian chan- 
cellor, 180 ; determines to abase Prus- 
sia, 181 ; espouses Hassenpflug's cause 
in Hesse, 180; humiliates Prussia at 
Olmi'itz, 181. 

ScQtt, Sir Walter, " St. Cloud," 367. 

Sebastopol, desire in England and France 
to reduce, 53 ; description of, 59-61 ; 
allied fieet appears, 62; sinking of 
ships to close the harbor, 62 ; fortifi- 
cations as plannad by Todleben, 65; 
abandoned by Menschikoff 's army, 66 ; 
allied bombardment of October 17, 
and its failure, 66, 67 ; council of war, 
87 ; condition of, in July, 1855 ; the 
final sortie, 88 ; loss of tlie Mala^ofF, 
89 ; evacuation and burning of tlie 
city, 90, 91 ; destruction of forts and 
docks by allies, 91 ; 'restored to Rus- 
sia, 94. 

Secret societies in Italy, 99. 

Sedan, battle of, 336-340. 

Seven Weeks' war, advance of Prussians 
into Bohemia, 226 ; combats at Liebe- 
nau and Podol, 227 ; capture of Miin- 
chengr'at*; by the Prussians, 228 ; bat- 
tle of Gitschin, 229; Prussian victo- 

ries at Nachod and Skalitz, 230, 231 ; 
Prussian defeat at Trauteuau, 232; 
battle of Soor, 233 ; restoration of 
communications between the Prussian 
armies, 233 ; character of the Austrian 
position on the Bistritz, 234-236; 
night march of the first Prussian 
army upon the Bistritz, 239 ; battle of 
KoniggrStz, 239-246 ; immediate re- 
sults of the battle, 246; advance of 
the Prussians upon Vienna, 247 ; bat- 
tle of Blumenau, 248 ; the campaign 
in the west, 249; battle of Langen- 
salza, 250 ; capitiilation of the Hano- 
verian army, 250 ; Prussian advance 
upon Frankfort, 251 ; battle of Kissin- 
gen, 252 ; Prussian entry into Frank- 
fort, 253 ; figliting on the Tauber, 264 ; 
retreat of the federal army upon 
Wurzburg, 254 ; the armistice, 255. 

Seymour, Sir G. Hamilton, his *'sick 
man " interviews with Czar Nicholas, 

Siccardi, Count, Sardinian envoy to 
Rome, 102 ; introduces bill abolishing 
ecclesiastical privileges, 102. 

" Sick Man," the, mterviews, 25, 95. 

Silistria, siege of, 38, 39. 

Sinope, battle of, regarded as a masaap 
ere ui England, 44, 45. 

So'imonoff, Russian general, killed at 
Inkermann, 76. 

Solferino, battle of, repulse of the Sar- 
dinians, 146 ; arrival of Napoleon on 
the field, 147 ; heavy fighting at Sol- 
ferino and on the French right, 147 ; 
Solferino abandoned by the Austrians, 
149 ; Wimpffen fails to f etrieve the 
day, 150; general advance of the 
French, 150 ; firmness of Gtoneral Ben^ 
edek, 151. 

Soor, battle of, 233. 

Soult, Marshal, his remark on the Brit- 
ish infantry, 77. 

Spain, revolt of 1868, 290 ; tender of the 
crown to prince Leopold of Hohenzol- 
lem, 295. 

Stadion, Austrian general, conducts 
reconnaissance against Voghera, 126 ; 
defeated by Forey at Montebello, 
126, 127. 

St. Amaud, Marshal, appointed minister 
of war, 8; appointed to command 
French array in East, 49 ; at battle of 
the Alma, 57 ; criticism on Raglan and 
Menschikoff, 57 ; his death, 59. 

States of the Church. See Papal States. 

Steinmetz, German general, at battle of 
Nachod, 230; defeats Austrians at 
Skalitz, 231 ; commands first German 
army, 1870, 306 ; threatens Metz from 
tlie east, 318 ; figlits battle of Bomy, 
320 ; at battle of Gravelotte, 325, 326 

Strasbnrg, siege of, character of garrison 
in 1870, 369 ; its defense by General 
Uhrich, 3(59, 370; suffers terribly 
from German artillery, 370 ; capitur 
lates, 371 ; ceded to Germany, 400. 



Stratford, Lord, English ambMsador, at 
Goiibtaiitinople, ^ ; aetUes dispute 
over Huly Places, 20 ; opposes Men- 
schikoif *8 demana for a jprotectorate, 
28 ; advises Turkic ministry, 28 ; 
writes to Menschikoff, 28; privately 
assures the Sultan of support of Eng- 
lish fleet, 30; counsels Sultan to re- 
fuse Vienna note, 31. 

Szabo, Austrian general, 128. 

Tchemaya, battle of the, 88 ; birthday of 
kingdom of Italy, 95 ; effect of news 
in Sardhiia, 108. 

Thiers, M., intercedes with England in 
behaJf of France, 361 ; interviews with 
Bismarck, 390; appointed president 
by the new assembly, 398 ; arranges 
preliminaries of peace at Yersailles, 
399 ; Bismarck's comment on, 399. 

Tlionuus, French general, in Paris, 391 ; 
denounces National Guard, 395. 

" Times," The London, advocates reduc- 
tion of Sebastopol, 54 ; publishes false 
statement of fall of Sebastopol, G9. 

Todleben, Lieutenant-Colonel, comments 
on battle of the A.lma, 57 ; arrives at 
Sebastopol, G2 ; his reception by Men- 
schikoff, G2, ; hopeless of defending 
£iebastopol, G3 ; proceeds to fortify 
Sebastopol, G4 ; relieved by arrival of 
reinforcements, G6; criticises Gort- 
schakoff for inaction at Inkermann, 
76 ; is wounded, 87. 

Trautenau, battle of, 232. 

Trochu, French general, at Chfilons, 
330 ; appointed military governor of 
Paris, 330 •; confirmed as militarv gov- 
ernor by Corps L^gislatif, 354; his 
unenviable position on the fall of the 
empire, 358 ; character of his troops, 
359 ; on the marines, 3G0 ; his messages 
to Ganibetta announcing great sortie, 
378 ; reorganizes army in Paris, 391 ; 
insulted by communistic mob, 392; 
feels compelled to sortie, 393 ; plans 
the battle of Champi^y, 393; de- 
feated at Le Bourget, ^3 ; failure of 
his great sortie from Mont Valiirien, 
397 ; is superseded by Vinoy, 397. 

Turkey, importuned by France and 
Russia resi)ecting rights of rival 
churches in Jerusalem, 18; yields to 
France, 19; is threatened by Russia, 
20 ; yields to Menschikoff's demands, 
21 ; is supported by Stratford against 
Menschikoff, 21 ; gains pledge of naval 
support from Stratford, 29: rejects 
Vienna note, 31 ; growth of war feel- 
ing, 31 ; is placed in a state of war 
with Russia, 32 ; character of sol- 
diers, 34; accepts Austrian aid, 39; 
and treaty of Paris, 94; losses in 
Crimean war, 94. 

Tuscany, Grand Duchy of, 98 ; declares 
for annexation to Sardinia, 1G2. 

Two Sicilies, Kin^^dom of, condition of, 
in 1850, 96; Francis II. continues 

misrule in, 157 ; revolution in, 164 ; 
royal troops defeated at Palermo, 165 ; 
again defeated at Milazzo, 165 ; sur- 
render of Messina, 165 ; wretched 
character of royal army, 166 ; rioting 
at Naples, 169 ; hopeless position of 
Francis II., 170; he sails from Naples, 
170; Victor Emmanuel in Naples, 
174 ; votes for annexation to Italy, 
174; deplorable condition of, 175; 
Cavour on the Neapolitans, 175. 

Uhrich, French general, in command at 
Strasburg, 369, 370. 

Victor Emmanuel, king of Sardinia, his 
oath at Novara, 5 ; refuses Radetsky*B 
offer of support, 101 ; dissolves the 
chambers, 101 ; concludes peace with 
Austria, 101 ; his first estimate of 
Cavour, 103 ; known as II R6 Galan- 
tuomo, 103 ; in favor of joining Anglo- 
French alliaiice, 106 ; domestic afflic- 
tions and political trials, 107 ; reviews 
troops destined for Crimea, 107 ; vidta 
Paris and London, 108 ; and Napoleon^a 
question, 108 ; wins confidence of 
Italian patriots. 111 ; his warlike dec- 
laration at Turin, 116 ; his war proc- 
lamation to Italians, 1859, 119; at 
battle of Palestro, 128 ; enters Milan 
with Napoleon, 138 ; his reception 
there, 139; his rapid advance from 
Milan, 142; signs the preliminaries 
of peace, 153; disgusted with peace, 
indignant with Cavour, 153 ; receives 
deputations offering alliance of Cen- 
tral Italy, 158 ; warned by the Pope, 
159 ; reconciled to Cavour, 161 ; cor- 
respondence with the Pope, 161, 162 ; 
excommunicated by the Pope, 163; 
opens first Italian parliament, 163; 
announces cession of Nice and Savoy, 
163 ; urges Garibaldi to desist from 
military operations, 168; regards his 
reply witli uneasiness, 168 ; orders his 
army over the paptd frontier, 172; 
meets Garibaldi at Teano, 173 ; enters 
NaplcF, 174 ; proclaimed king of Italy 
at Turhi, 175; visits Cavour on his 
deatlt-bed, 176 ; takes command of the 
army against Austria, 259; enters 
Venice, 275; protests against return 
of French troops to Rome, 291 ; per- 
sonnl regard for Ns^soleon III., 292. 

Vienna note, the, 31. 

Vinoy, French general, at battle of 
Magenta, 133 ; arrives at M^izeres, 
336 ; retreats upon Paris, 349 ; arrives 
at Paris, 361 ; is defeated at L'Hay, 
363 ; is defeated at B^neux, 364 ; at- 
tacks L'Hay and Chevilly, 393; ap- 
pointed to command Paris army, 397. 

Vionville, battle of, 323. 

Von der Tann, Bavarian general, on the 
Meuse, 335; at Sedan, 338; at Or- 
leans, 374; evacuates Orleans, 376; 
foils the French at Coulmiers, 376 ; at 



battle of JoEtnes, 382; Burprised by 
Ghanzy, 382 ; withdraws to Orleans, 
Yrevski, Russiaa general, arrives at 
Sebastopol, 88 ; his death, 88. 

Weissenburg, battle of, 308. 

Werder, German general, at battle of 
Gitschin, 229; commands Germans 
before Strasburg, 369-71 ; deceives 
Bourbaki before Belf ort, 386 ; defeats 
Bourbaki on the Lisaine, 386. 

William I. of Prussia, as regent 183; 
succeeds to the Prussian throne, 184 ; 
his earl^ career, 184 ; insists on reor- 
ganization of the army, 184 ; his strug- 
gle with the Diet, 184 ; summons Bis- 
marck to the head of the ministry, 
185; venerates House of Hapsburg, 
213 ; meets Austrian emperor at Gas- 
tein, 214 ; leaves Berlin for the army, 
229; arrives on the Bistritz, 239; at 
battle of Kdniggratz, 241 ; refuses 
to comply with Benedetti's demands 
in 1870, 296 ; his reply to Benedetti at 
Ems, 297 ; addresses North German 
Reichstag, 304 ; commands German 
armies against France, 306 ; at battle 
of Gravelotte, 327 ; at Sedan, 340 ; re- 

ceives the surrender of Najwleon, 340 ; 
meets Napoleon at Belle vue, 348 ; es- 
tablishes headquarters at Versailles, 
363 ; occupies the palace, 367 ; hailed 
German emperor at Versailles, 397. 

Wimpffen, French general, his d^but at 
Sedan, 337; assumes supreme com- 
mand, 337 ; meets Bismarck and 
Moltke at Donchery, 343 ; pleads for 
honorable terms for his army, 343; 
his discuE&ion with Bismarck and 
Mol^ike, 344, 345 ; visits the emperor, 
345 ; signs the capitulation of Sedan, 

Wimpffen, AuEtrian genera], at Solferi- 
no, 147 ; Ih'r futile effort to restore 
the battle, 150. 

W6rth, battle of, 311, 312. 

Wrangel, Marshal, commands Prussian 
army in Denmark, 203. 

Young Italy, Society of, its character 
and aims, 100; and Milan revolt, 104; 
handicaps Cavour, 111. 

Zobel, Aurtrian general, at battle of Pa- 

lestro, 128. 
Zurich, treaty of, 159; disregarded in 

Italy, 160.